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This thesis explores the (re-)positioning of the EU border agency Frontex within a 
wider shift towards humanitarianism and human rights in EUropean1 border 
governance. By examining Frontex’s public self-representation through time, it shows 
that the agency has gradually appropriated humanitarianism and human rights, while 
at the same time continuing to rely on a conceptualisation of migration as a security 
issue. The thesis traces this development, outlining how the agency has increasingly 
mobilised all three discursive formations in its public narratives about itself, border 
controls, and unauthorised migration to EUrope. Seeking to move beyond analysing 
Frontex through its public documents and statements only, the thesis complements this 
analysis with insights gained through interviews and informal conversations with 
Frontex staff and guest officers, as well as participant observations at Frontex events 
and in joint operations between May 2013 and September 2014. Exploring the 
perceptions of those working for and with Frontex, it complicates common portrayals 
of Frontex as a unitary, rational actor in EUropean border governance. Instead, it 
argues that Frontex is better understood as a highly fragmented organisation situated 
in an ambiguous environment and faced with inconsistent and contradictory demands.  
Situated at the intersection of critical security studies and critical migration and border 
studies, this thesis seeks to make three contributions to these literatures: first, it argues 
that critical security studies would benefit from a cross-fertilisation with insights 
gained in new institutionalism, which add organisational dynamics as an additional 
layer of analysis to developments in broader security fields. Second, it provides 
insights into the relationships between the discursive formations of security, 
humanitarianism, and human rights in contemporary border governance. The thesis 
argues that the three formations, at times seen as opposed to one another, share a 
number of important commonalities that create the conditions of possibility for the 
appropriation of humanitarianism and human rights by security actors such as Frontex, 
                                                 
1 This thesis uses the term “EUrope” to problematize the coterminous use of “EU” and “Europe”, 




and for the emergence of new coalitions of actors in the EUropean border regime; as 
security, humanitarian, and human rights actors share the goal of rendering EUropean 
border controls less (visibly) violent. Third, the thesis provides rare empirical insights 
into the security actor Frontex, which has remained relatively opaque and elusive 
despite attracting much interest within academic and activist communities alike. 
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Introduction 
It is late May, 2013. In Warsaw’s Pepsi Arena football stadium, around 700 people 
have gathered for the annual European Day for Border Guards. Many have met each 
other before and are chatting in small groups. Those who mix and mingle are border 
guards from various member states, representatives of the security industry, Frontex 
staff members, or guests from third states, specifically invited for this special day. 
Among them are also chosen delegates from NGOs, international organisations, and 
EU agencies, as well as a few researchers, including myself. When entering the event 
area, a large exhibition hall opens up and invites participants to learn about recent 
developments at EUropean external borders. Security companies showcase their latest 
inventions. On large banners, they feature military-style images, inviting onlookers to 
“See through the confusion. Minimize the threat.” From scanners able to detect false 
passports to radio wave barriers alerting against intruders, what they advertise is clear: 
protection from the ‘migrant threat’ by means of newer, better, more sophisticated 
technology. A brief stroll further, a different scenario unfolds. Amnesty International, 
ECRE, PICUM and various other rights-based organisations present their perspective 
on EUropean border management. Videos and leaflets cite the numbers of deaths in 
the Mediterranean: attempts to show the human side of border controls. Right next to 
them, yet separated by a movable, orange wall, various national police and military 
forces each have their own stall, presenting their work as border guards. In the middle, 
in between border guards and NGOs on the one hand, and security companies on the 
other, Frontex has set up its exhibition space.  
At the centre of the exhibition, Frontex is also the organiser of this event: its diverse 
participants have come by invitation of the agency. In panel discussions during the 
day, representatives of Frontex, academia, national border guard and police forces, 
NGOs, EU institutions, and think tanks speak about EUropean border controls with 
one another, highlighting challenges, best practices, and future developments. Sitting 
in the audience, I cannot help but wonder how this has happened, how Frontex – an 
agency that is barely 7 years old at this moment in time, and that has been subject to 
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intense criticism by NGOs and activists since its very beginnings – has seemingly 
become a connection point for national border guards, security companies, NGOs, 
international organisations, and EU institutions.  
This particular day in May marked the beginning of my fieldwork for this thesis, and 
illustrated what had intrigued me already from my desk in Edinburgh, and during 
political work with friends and allies in Berlin and Sicily: Frontex, the EUropean 
border management agency, seemed to be changing its public self-representation, 
beginning to present itself as an active promoter of fundamental rights, and as a saviour 
of people in distress at sea. As Frontex’s mandate is the coordination of external border 
controls, and its focus has continued to remain on border security, this development 
puzzled me. More than that, it inspired my research questions for this thesis. First, I 
wondered, how do humanitarianism, human rights, and security relate to each other, 
and to governing EUropean borders? I had observed that Frontex’s increase in 
humanitarian and human rights language was illustrative of a wider strengthening of 
humanitarianism and human rights in EUropean border governance, and wanted to 
reflect on this development.  
Second, I was interested in exploring how the agency negotiated humanitarianism, 
human rights, and security in public narratives about itself, its work, and the 
environment it finds itself in. I was curious to see whether people working for or with 
the agency in various capacities would similarly rely on humanitarianism, human 
rights, and security in representing their work and the role and tasks of Frontex. As 
such, my second research question was how does Frontex negotiate humanitarianism, 
human rights, and security in its self-representation, and how has this changed over 
time? While I realised that I would not be able to retroactively research staff members’ 
changing presentations of their work and Frontex’s role in EUropean border controls 
through time,2 I knew from observing Frontex as an advocate and activist that there 
had been changes in its public statements and documents. Tracing these changes 
                                                 
2 Analysing changes in staff members’ representations through time would have required a longitudinal 
study, with interviews conducted across the ten-year period analysed in this PhD, which was not feasible 
in the framework of this doctoral project. 
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through time seemed highly relevant: not only would it allow me to look at how 
Frontex has gradually been constructed as a partially humanitarian and human rights 
actor, but it would also give some indication of when this shift began. Third, thinking 
through the effects of Frontex’s repositioning would allow for reflecting on the role of 
humanitarianism and human rights in contemporary EUropean border governance 
more widely, and on whether these discursive formations could be employed 
effectively to challenge a highly problematic border system, or if and how they might 
further reinforce this very system. In line with this concern I set out to explore the third 
question guiding this research project: what are the effects of these changes in self-
representation on the agency and its position in the border regime? 
The curiosity that drove this research was inspired by two rather different motivations. 
On the one hand, I had a scholarly interest in the relationship between 
humanitarianism, human rights, and security formations. I wanted to think through 
their connections, their tensions, similarities, and their articulation in contemporary 
EUropean border governance. In addition, I was eager to learn more about Frontex, 
too, an agency that had remained relatively elusive over the first few years of its 
existence. On the other hand, my research interest was inspired by my concerns 
regarding political activism and social justice. I had myself been involved in 
campaigns calling for search and rescue at sea and universal human rights, and I 
wondered how such work might inadvertently be connected to Frontex’s repositioning 
as a humanitarian and human rights actor. In paying close attention to how the three 
discursive formations were negotiated by Frontex, I thus also hoped to be able to 
reflect more widely on what the connections between humanitarianism, human rights, 
and security might mean for activism and critique; for those who work to oppose a 
highly exclusionary, discriminatory, violent and often deadly border regime.  
 
Changes in Frontex’s self-representations through time 
A first, explorative study of Frontex’s annual reports rather clearly illustrates the 
changes that I was interested in. While an in-depth, qualitative analysis of Frontex’s 
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self-representation over the last ten years will be presented in chapter 4, a quick word 
count through Frontex’s annual reports at the very beginning of this doctoral project 
confirmed my initial impression that there was some re-positioning by the agency that 
would be worth examining in greater depth. First, I ran a word count for “human 
right/s” and “fundamental right/s” in Frontex’s annual reports, in order to see whether 
what I had perceived as an increasing emphasis of the agency on these legal norms 
would be apparent in the documents. Figure 1 shows how often the terms appeared in 
the general reports of the agency since its foundation. As is apparent at first sight, there 
has been a stark increase in references to fundamental rights3 beginning from 2008 
onwards, while they were not referred to at all in the agency’s earlier reports. The 
reasons for this and the contexts in which these references appear in the reports and 
other publications will be explored in depth in chapter 4. Here, suffice it to note that 
Frontex has increasingly mobilised a human rights terminology in presenting itself and 
its work to outsiders. By now, Frontex has effectively mainstreamed human rights 
language in its official publications and communication. In doing so, it has presented 
itself not only as fully respecting fundamental rights, but also as actively promoting 
them in its operations (see e.g. Frontex 2012a).  
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
human right* 0 0 0 0 1 9 4 4 5 10 
fundamental 
right* 0 0 0 3 5 16 22 58 65 137 
Figure 1: Word counts of rights-related terms in Frontex’s annual reports over time 
Seeking to find out how the agency’s language on saving lives at sea evolved over 
time, I decided to search the same reports specifically for “saved”, “saving”, and 
“save”, as well as “rescue”, “rescuing”, and “rescued’. As figure 2 shows, references 
to saving or rescuing individuals increased as well in recent years, although not as 
                                                 
3 As figure 1 shows, Frontex refers primarily to ‘fundamental rights’ rather than ‘human rights’, which 
is in line with wider EU discourse and the legal obligations the agency faces under the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Charter was first proclaimed and ratified in 2000, and 
became legally binding with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 (European Union 2000).  
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strongly as those concerning fundamental rights. Moreover, Frontex already 
referenced these terms briefly in earlier years, with them appearing in 2006 and 2007. 
Again, this is merely a quantitative exploration of the changes that interest me in this 
thesis, but it illustrates that also regarding the agency’s emphasis on saving lives, there 
has been a shift in recent years. Since 2011, the agency regularly highlights the number 
of lives saved during its operations, citing them in its annual reports as well as issuing 
news items on its website publicising such numbers on an ongoing basis. On its 
website, Frontex has described itself as “Europe’s biggest Search and Rescue (SAR) 
operation” for at least the last three years (Frontex 2013a). The agency also frames 
facilitators of unauthorised migration as risking the lives of people on the move in 
dangerous sea crossings, indifferent to their potential deaths (see e.g. Frontex 2010a). 
In this narrative, the work the agency does in seeking to detect and identify individuals 
attempting to reach the European Union is framed as a humanitarian effort, aimed at 
saving those at the mercy of smugglers and criminal groups. 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
sav* 0 1 0 0 2 1 2 3 2 4 
rescu* 0 0 2 0 0 3 4 6 14 18 
Figure 2: Word counts of rescue-related terms in Frontex’s annual reports over time 
Frontex’s key mandate, however, remains border security. What security is, and how 
it can be defined, is a matter of much controversy in the academic literature (see 
chapter 1). There is a variety of concepts that might contribute to constituting border 
control and migration as security issues in Frontex’s annual reports. While a more 
thorough evaluation of the agency’s various ways of constructing migration, people 
on the move, and border controls as security problems will be conducted in chapters 4 
and 5, running a word count for some of the terms commonly associated with security 
in the realm of migrations and borders is insightful as an initial exploration of 
Frontex’s positioning in this regard. In the annual reports, I decided to search for 
“illegal”, “threat”, and “risk” – all terms commonly associated with security.  
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Examining the results in their context, it is noticeable that Frontex gradually stopped 
referring to “illegal migrants” from 2008 onwards (see figure 3). A further search for 
“irregular” confirms the impression that the agency started using this term instead to 
describe individuals from 2009 onwards, while continuing to use “illegal” and 
“illegally” to describe border crossings and other practices. The word count also shows 
that Frontex used the term “threat” less often in recent years. The word “risk” on the 
other hand remains crucial to Frontex’s self-description, and continues to be regularly 
invoked.  
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
illegal 2 41 81 27 14 12 28 22 18 14 
_(im)migration 2 20 34 3 4 4 3 0 14 0 
_(im)migrant(s) 0 15 22 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 
_ly 0 1 5 2 5 3 7 9 2 5 
_border crossing 0 0 5 13 3 4 14 12 9 7 
irregular 0 0 2 0 6 21 7 18 14 15 
_(im)migration 0 0 2 0 1 13 7 8 14 10 
_migrant(s) 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 5 0 5 
threat 1 4 11 3 1 8 0 1 3
5 6 
risk 7 34 42 25 22 24 27 37 42 49 
Figure 3: Word counts of security-related terms in Frontex’s annual reports over time 
When connected with a cursory qualitative analysis, it can be observed that despite 
some slight changes in the vocabulary of the agency – away from the terms “illegal 
migrant”, “illegal immigration” and “threat” – Frontex still very much relies on the 
discursive formation of security when describing migratory trends or its own work to 
the public. As will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the agency mobilises both risk 
management and threat and crisis narratives. They are not only conveyed through the 
language used, but also through maps and images presented on the agency’s website.  
                                                 
4 The report refers to an ‘“illegal immigration” Operation Action Plan (OAP) managed by the Council 
Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI)’ that Frontex contributed 
to. Interestingly, “illegal immigration” is thus used only within quotation marks.  
5 The report uses ‘threat’ only in conjunction with ‘EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
(SOCTA)’. 
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Lastly, it should be acknowledged that Frontex’s annual reports vary in length. As 
figure 4 shows, however, the variation in page length does not correlate with the 
increases of fundamental rights and search and rescue terminology, and as such cannot 
explain the apparent change in Frontex’s self-representation within its annual reports 
over time. While the length of its general reports has increased over time, the rise in 
references to humanitarianism and human rights are disproportional to the growth in 
page length.  
 
 
Figure 4: Word counts in Frontex’s annual reports over time, divided by page numbers 
Of course, word counts of this sort are a crude method of analysis to identify all three 
of the discursive formations named above, and the words included in (and excluded 
from) this initial search are open for debate. Other terms might be relevant too, and in 
addition to specific words in and of themselves, the associations, connections, and 
images created by the agency matter in terms of understanding whether and how 
Frontex frames migration and border controls as a matter of security, as well as how 
its presentations regarding humanitarianism and human rights have changed over time. 







2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Frontex Annual Reports over Time
rights humanitarianism threat risk
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change in Frontex’s self-representation through its annual reports over time that merits 
closer examination. This insight marked the very beginning of this research project. It 
motivated much of the more detailed analysis that was to follow, which will be 
presented in the remainder of this thesis.  
 
Frontex: Not an isolated case 
The coexistence of humanitarianism, human rights, and security in Frontex’s self-
representation is not an isolated case, but is illustrative of wider developments in the 
border regime. Staggering numbers of deaths at sea in recent years have contributed to 
growing concerns about search and rescue at sea: “irregular” boat crossings have come 
to be framed not only as a security concern for EU and Schengen member states, but 
increasingly also as a great risk for those attempting to reach EUropean shores without 
authorisation. At the same time, humanitarian, human rights, and security actors have 
entered mutually supportive, if tense relationships with one another in EUropean 
border governance. The ensemble of actors described in the opening paragraphs 
describes far more than what happened on this particular day in a Warsaw football 
stadium: in recent years, we have been seeing the increasing convergence of 
humanitarian, human rights, and security discursive formations and actors in 
EUropean border governance more widely.  
As Nick Vaughan-Williams (2015a, 2015b) observed, the EU’s current policy 
framework for migration and border management, the 2011 “Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility” (GAMM), was partially framed in security terms, presenting 
unauthorised migration as a threat to good governance, the economy, the welfare 
system, and social cohesion. On the other hand, it also presented a concern for the 
well-being of “irregular migrants”, emphasised their human rights, and declared a 
“migrant-centred” approach to migration management to be at its core: “[i]n essence, 
migration governance is not about ‘flows’, ‘stocks’ and ‘routes’, it is about people” 
(European Commission 2011a, 6). The document, designed as a guiding framework 
for EU policies and practices in relation to migration and mobility more widely, 
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mobilised the discursive formations of humanitarianism, human rights, and security. 
Rather than being opposed to one another, the three formations coexisted in the 
GAMM, a guiding document for EU migration and border policies and practices.  
When examining EU policy documents and public statements pertaining to migration 
governance since then, humanitarian, human rights, and security discursive formations 
continue to be drawn on simultaneously. The highly publicised mourning about the 
drowning of more than 360 individuals when their ship capsized off the coast of 
Lampedusa on October 3rd 2013 provides one example of this. The deaths gave rise to 
widespread statements of grief and calls for action, most of which invoked 
humanitarian concerns – above all the need to reduce deaths at sea. Condolences also 
came from EU leaders, and Commissioner Malmström and Commission President 
Barroso flew to Lampedusa in the week following the disaster. Malmström’s first 
reaction to the news was a tweet issued on the day of the disaster, in which she wrote: 
“[a]ppalled by Lampedusa tragedy. Thoughts are with victims and families. We must 
redouble efforts to fight smugglers exploiting human despair” (Malmström 2013a). 
Already in this very first reaction, she brought together humanitarian concerns with a 
securitising focus on smugglers who ought to be fought.  
Similarly, other official responses to the Lampedusa deaths linked appeals to improve 
search and rescue and decrease deaths at sea with a narrative that blamed those 
facilitating unauthorised crossings of the Mediterranean and called for an intensified 
fight against smugglers (Barroso 2013a, 2013b; Malmström 2013b; Stranieriinitalia.it 
2013; UNHCR 2013). Malmström soon called for the deployment of “an extensive 
Frontex search and rescue operation that [would] cover the Mediterranean from 
Cyprus to Spain” (Malmström 2013c). According to her, such an operation would 
prevent further losses of lives at sea by improving the possibilities to identify, track 
and rescue small boats. Not only in the short-term responses to the deaths, however, 
were humanitarian concerns articulated together with a security focus. The policy 
recommendations and action reports by the Commission-led “Task Force 
Mediterranean”, established as a direct response to the Lampedusa disaster, clearly 
articulated humanitarian concerns while proposing largely security-focused measures, 
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including closer cooperation with third states in border and migration control 
(European Commission 2013, 2014a).  
While humanitarianism, human rights, and security formations have coexisted in 
statements, reports, and policy guidelines, there has also been a multiplication of 
humanitarian actors in EUropean borderlands in recent years. Since William Walters 
described this development as the “birth of the humanitarian border” in 2011, it has 
become even more pronounced (Walters 2011, 144). Not only are the EU and 
international organisations frequently relying on humanitarian language, but also, the 
number of humanitarian actors involved in various ways in migration governance has 
further increased. The Watch the Med Alarm Phone, the Migrant Offshore Aid Station, 
Seawatch, SOS Méditerranée, Jugend Rettet, Sea-Eye, and Helpatross are only some 
of the initiatives and organisations aiming specifically to decrease deaths at sea that 
have newly emerged in the last 2 years, while also long-established organisations such 
as Greenpeace and Médecins Sans Frontières began search and rescue activities in the 
Mediterranean Sea for the first time in this period. Other initiatives have sprung up to 
support those who have survived the crossing on their journey through Europe, or once 
arrived in their destination countries. In part, such initiatives – at times rather critical 
of EU border policies and practices – are responses to the deadly consequences of the 
long-standing securitisation of migration and the absence of legal entry routes to the 
European Union for much of the world’s population. In 2014-2015 alone, more than 
7000 deaths were recorded in the Mediterranean (IOM 2016).  
 
What this thesis seeks to contribute 
Empirical and methodological insights 
With its focus on the relationships between security, human rights, and 
humanitarianism in the self-representations of Frontex, this thesis is situated at the 
intersection of critical border and migration studies and critical security studies. It 
provides an empirical contribution to these fields by offering insights into Frontex, an 
organisation that has faced much criticism but has often remained relatively opaque 
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and inaccessible from the outside. Most analyses and commentaries on Frontex rely 
on analysing written materials rather than interviews or field visits, with some notable 
exceptions (e.g. Aas and Gundhus 2015; Pallister-Wilkins 2015). This thesis aims to 
contribute to these studies by providing further insights regarding the understandings 
and perceptions of those working for or with the agency. By using ‘nonlocal’ methods 
rather than focusing on one particular site of Frontex’s interventions, I provide insights 
into how discursive formations and interpretations circulate within the agency (see G. 
Feldman 2012). Insights into Frontex that move beyond analyses of public statements 
are of importance not only because there is a lack of empirical knowledge about the 
internal workings of this agency, but also because Frontex plays a unique role in the 
border regime.  
From “risk analyses” to discussions in the European Parliament, interviews in the 
press, research and development work, and deliberations within the agency’s 
management board, to joint operations at specific external borders, trainings, and 
deportation flights, Frontex enacts borders at a variety of sites and in diverse contexts. 
Examining shifts in its self-representation, as well as contradictions and divergences 
within the agency allows for developing a better understanding of the agency’s border 
performances across these sites. “Border agents and state bureaucrats play a critical 
role in determining where, how, and on whose body a border will be performed” 
(Wonders 2006, 66). Numerically small in comparison to member states’ border agents 
and state bureaucrats, Frontex is among the bureaucracies which conceptualise the 
border as well as performing it on site, while seeking to ‘harmonise’ standards of 
border practices across member states. As such, how it enacts and conceptualises 
borders through its various practices is of particular interest to those studying 
EUropean external border governance.  
Relatedly, this thesis also seeks to contribute a nuanced account of the various 
rationalities at work within Frontex. While sociological and political theory 
approaches in critical security studies have made important contributions to 
understanding the constructions of particular issues as matters of security, and to 
analysing how security functions as a mode of government, there has been a tendency 
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within some of these works to assume the existence of overarching rationalities in 
security organisations or entire security fields as explanatory forces (Bröckling, 
Krasmann, and Lemke 2011; Petersen 2012; Walters 2015). Rather than viewing 
changes in Frontex’s self-representations a priori as functions of and subordinated to 
the discursive formation of security (see e.g. Bigo 2002a, 79), this thesis remains open 
to the coexistence of multiple rationalities, which might conflict with each other or 
vary across different aspects of the agency’s work. Combining organisational 
sociology with a Foucauldian analysis, it provides a diversified account of the agency’s 
self-representations that eludes the imposition of any single rationality of government.  
Simultaneously, this thesis, its choice of methods and the flexibility in its research 
design provide insights into researching security and other relatively inaccessible 
organisations. While researching organisations will almost always require a fair 
amount of trust-building and / or negotiation, security agencies are often particularly 
concerned about outsiders gaining information about them and their work, and defend 
their secrecy by pointing to the security threats they seek to address. Given the specific 
field they research, scholars within critical security studies have been acutely aware of 
such access limitations (see Salter 2013a). New institutionalist analyses on the other 
hand are mostly premised on extensive if not full access to organisations, including 
internal deliberations, documents, meetings, and discussions. While gaining full access 
to security organisations for research purposes might often prove extremely difficult 
if not impossible, my thesis seeks to show how an open-ended, experimental, and 
multi-faceted research approach can elicit valuable insights where access limitations 
persist, by combining formalised interviews, participant observation, document 
analysis, and informal conversations. As such, it demonstrates that organisational 
analysis can provide important contributions to understanding change and continuity 
in security organisations also where full access cannot be negotiated.  
 
Deepening analyses in critical security studies 
Within critical security studies, the thesis primarily speaks to the political sociology 
approaches originally associated with Didier Bigo, Anastassia Tsoukala, and Elspeth 
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Guild, and further developed by Jef Huysmans and Claudia Aradau, among others. 
Didier Bigo’s research has produced important insights into the emergence of practices 
in the border regime, and the heterogeneous ways in which these practices enact 
securitisation. In his work, he seeks to explain “why the discursive formations of 
securitization continue to be so powerful even when alternative discursive formations 
are well known, and why the production of academic and alternative discursive 
formations has so little effect in either the political arena or in daily life” (Bigo 2002a, 
65). According to Bigo, security professionals share an ‘ethos’ of shared knowledge 
and secrecy, which creates a community in which insiders – i.e. security professionals, 
be they local, national, or international, public or private – can make claims that are 
believed without evidence, whereas outsiders struggle to enter the field, particularly if 
they do not speak the same language. His analyses focus mostly on inter-agency 
rivalries, i.e. on the competition between various police, military, and other security 
forces over threat definitions, prioritisation, and competences. He argues that “all the 
institutions dealing with coercion, both internally and externally, have the same 
interest: to perpetuate the existence of their profession” (Bigo 2006, 393).  
While this might be partly true, Bigo neglects the complexity of intra-organisational 
dynamics in his analysis. Focusing on the ‘social universes’ (Bigo 2014) and 
professional socialisation of security actors allows analysts to understand some of the 
divisions and competitions, but it fails to take the organisational dynamics of security 
agencies into account, which influence developments in the wider field. Bigo notes 
that “security agencies cannot be understood in terms of a reaction to a given stimulus. 
Rather, they are ‘semi-autonomous’” (Bigo 2006, 390). At the same time, however, he 
stops short of providing an account of how the internal workings of these ‘semi-
autonomous’ actors influence practices, interpretations, and the agencies’ positioning 
in the wider field. Indeed, he argues that “the definitions of threats and the priority of 
the fight against insecurity can mostly be explained by inter-agency rivalry and by the 
politicisation of matters of public security” (Bigo 2006, 391). Intra-agency rivalries, 
competitions, and dynamics do not feature in his account, which seems to rely on a 
conceptualisation of security agencies as mostly unitary and coherent. This however 
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stands in stark contrast to insights gained in organisational sociology, where new 
institutionalist approaches have offered a more complex image of organisations as 
fragmented and heterogeneous, and as having several, potentially competing, goals 
and ambitions.  
Drawing on new institutionalism, Christina Boswell (2007, 2008) has criticised 
scholars in critical security studies for oversimplifying organisational dynamics within 
the security field. While the expansion of power is a goal many organisations have, 
there are other objectives that weigh in on organisational strategies and practices. 
Boswell (2008) problematizes that organisations often face conflicting external 
pressures to which they seek to respond in order to maintain legitimacy, while also 
attempting to uphold internal understandings and belief systems. Following her 
critique, I argue that work in critical security studies more generally, and Didier Bigo’s 
work in particular, would profit from a cross-fertilisation with organisational 
sociology. This would allow for analyses to move beyond a focus on inter-agency 
competition to include an appraisal of the complexities within security organisations 
themselves. Such a deepening of analyses has become particularly timely due to recent 
developments: contrary to Bigo’s vision of the security field as one of insiders who 
cannot or do not want to respond to alternative discursive formations, we have seen 
the increasing strengthening of humanitarianism and human rights discursive 
formations not only in the border regime overall, but also specifically among security 
professionals, as the example of Frontex illustrates.  
Understanding these changes requires moving beyond viewing security organisations 
as unitary, single-minded actors, instead exploring the dynamics and contradictions 
within these institutions as well as examining their perceptions of and interactions with 
their wider environment. Casting doubt on Bigo’s claims that security professionals 
are ‘deaf’ to alternative discursive formations, and that security agencies aim to 
“perpetuate the existence of their profession” only (Bigo 2006, 393), Frontex’s recent 
developments towards humanitarianism and human rights in particular demonstrate 
that a more nuanced analysis of organisational change is called for. As I will argue in 
greater depth in chapter 1, this thesis will show how critical security studies and 
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organisational sociology can mutually benefit from building on each other’s insights 
and analyses in understanding continuity and change in the security field. 
 
Extending debates on humanitarianism and human rights 
With its specific focus on the relationship between humanitarianism, human rights, 
and security, this thesis further speaks to critical enquiries into the connections 
between militarisation, war, violence, and security on the one hand, and human rights 
and humanitarianism on the other hand. While these discursive formations tend to be 
seen as opposed to one another in public debates and some academic writings, several 
authors have exposed the often intricate linkages between them. Didier Fassin (2012) 
has analysed the entanglement of humanitarianism and security in the governing of the 
Sangatte camp in France among other places, and has been influential in his 
explorations of the prevalence of “humanitarian reason” in the contemporary world. 
Miriam Ticktin (2006, 2011) has shown how humanitarianism works as a strategy of 
government and control in France, where an opening of humanitarian residence 
permits in case of severe illnesses was accompanied by a closing down of more 
regular, rights-based routes. Michel Agier (2010, 30) has referred to humanitarianism 
as “a form of policing”, and problematized its working as a strategy of control in 
refugee camps. There have also been critical accounts of the connections between 
human rights and violence, notably by Costas Douzinas (2007) and Wendy Brown 
(2004), who problematized the entanglement of human rights with notions of empire 
and liberal imperialism.  
What this thesis seeks to add to these accounts is a reflection on how all three 
discursive formations relate to one another in contemporary border governance. While 
Claudia Aradau (2004b, 2008) examined the working together of humanitarianism, 
human rights, and security in the governance of human trafficking, she treated their 
convergence as an exception in the wider field of border governance, arguing that 
“[c]ompared to the more straightforward examples of securitization such as migration, 
trafficking is a peculiar case, as it has witnessed a move from state security to a 
humanitarian approach” (Aradau 2008, 98). Moreover, Aradau failed to distinguish 
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between humanitarian and human rights actors in her analysis. While her in-depth 
analysis of the cooperation between humanitarian / human rights actors and security 
organisations in governing human trafficking provides highly valuable insights into 
their working together in practice (see chapters 1 and 2), she falls short of providing a 
wider reflection on the relationships between all three discursive formations, and the 
tensions and differences between human rights and humanitarianism in particular. 
While both discursive formations might blur in the practices of some NGOs and 
international organisations, Frontex mobilises them differently, distinguishing 
carefully in positioning itself vis-à-vis humanitarianism on the one hand and human 
rights on the other hand. Accordingly, this thesis argues that there are important 
differences between humanitarianism and human rights not only on a theoretical level, 
but also in the way they are enacted and appropriated in border governance today, 
which merit further reflection and analysis.  
Importantly, reflections on how humanitarianism, human rights, and security work 
together speak not only to the academic debates regarding their connections cited 
above. In addition, the empirical insights and theoretical reflections regarding their 
entanglement in contemporary border governance presented in this thesis are of high 
relevance also to those who wish to oppose exclusionary and violent border controls 
in their daily practices. Activists, NGOs, scholars, and commentators relying on 
humanitarianism and human rights in order to critique a security-focused border 
regime might inadvertently contribute to the further securitisation of migration. What 
my thesis seeks to offer is a problematization of the close relationships between 
humanitarianism, human rights, and security as they are articulated in EUropean 
border governance today. In doing so, I hope to open up space for a renewed reflection 
on what effective opposition to highly violent and exclusionary policies and practices 
might look like in this context.  
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On the thesis time frame 
The fieldwork for this thesis took place between May 2013 and September 2014. While 
some of my interviewees were already expressing expectations that arrival numbers in 
Europe were set to increase in the near future, the dramatic scenes that would unfold 
across the continent in 2015 and continue into 2016 were not foreseen by anyone I 
spoke with. Given the forcefulness with which migration has come to the forefront of 
public debates and media coverage since I conducted my last interview, as well as the 
sheer magnitude of both arrivals and deaths, I decided to limit my analysis in this thesis 
to the first ten years of Frontex’s existence, examining the years 2005-2014. In light 
of last year’s events, new fieldwork would be warranted to adequately comment on 
these most recent developments, and the interpretations of them by Frontex staff, 
management, and guest officers. At the same time, what I explore in this thesis has not 
lost its pertinence or accuracy. Indeed, the arguments I make about Frontex’s 
repositioning, internal fragmentation, and the entanglement of humanitarianism, 
human rights, and security in contemporary EUropean border governance have been 
clearly reflected in the events unfolding over the last 18 months.  
Importantly, Frontex has remained at the forefront of debates about how to respond to 
stark increases in deaths and arrival numbers, including through renewed proposals to 
transform the agency into a European Border and Coast Guard (European Commission 
2015a). Illustrating the close association of Frontex with search and rescue, the 
agency’s budget for operations Triton and Poseidon was tripled in direct response to 
the deaths of more than 800 individuals in a single incident on April 18, 2015 
(European Council 2015). While the thesis is focused on the 10 years between 2005 
and 2014, the discussions and findings presented in it have thus remained relevant 
since then. In the epilogue, I will reflect on some key developments since January 1st, 
2015, and their relationship to the findings and arguments presented in this thesis.  
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A brief note on terminology 
Before proceeding to outline the individual chapters of this thesis, I would like to make 
a brief note regarding the choice of terminology in this text. Writing about mobility 
and borders at a time when the word “migrant” itself has become intricately bound up 
with a whole range of negative associations constitutes a challenge. While xenophobia 
and racism have been prominent factors in the responses to migration and boat arrivals 
by EUropean publics for decades, debates on migration have become increasingly 
toxic, and nationalisms across EUrope have been flaring up violently as boat arrivals 
increased again over the last two years. In 2002, Didier Bigo wrote that “[m]igrant, as 
a term, is the way to designate someone as a threat to the core values of a country, a 
state, and has nothing to do with the legal terminology of foreigners” (Bigo 2002a, 
71). Today, this statement might be more accurate than ever before. Last autumn, 
several media outlets joined in a discussion and problematization of the negative 
connotations of the term “migrant”, highlighting how it dehumanised the deaths and 
suffering of millions of people (see e.g. Malone 2015; Marsh 2015; Pritchard 2015; 
Taylor 2015). As the terms “refugee” and “asylum seeker” have formal legal meanings 
which should be preserved, and have also become negatively charged (Braithwaite 
2016), this thesis seeks to avoid such concepts. Instead, it uses terms such as 
“individuals”, “people”, or “persons” wherever possible to emphasise a simple fact: 
those who drown in the Mediterranean, who are pushed back by border guards, left in 
dire conditions in camps within or outside EUrope, or who successfully manage to 
traverse the many borders of the European Union, are above and before all else, human 
beings.  
 
Outline of chapters  
In the first chapter, I situate the thesis in the wider literatures of critical border and 
migration studies and critical security studies. By introducing the works within critical 
border studies that this thesis speaks to, I explain the relevance of studying a border 
security agency such as Frontex, which actively performs the borders of the European 
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Union through its various activities, shaping both conceptions and practices of 
bordering. Moreover, I position the thesis in the critical security studies literature, 
outlining how it contributes to this body of work by complementing it with the insights 
gained in organisational sociology and new institutionalism. In chapter 2, I explore 
humanitarianism, human rights, and security as separate yet related discursive 
formations. After introducing each of them in turn in their historical context, I then 
proceed to examine their commonalities and shared foundations, as well as points of 
tension between them. In doing so, I argue that the shared foundations of the three 
discursive formations have created the conditions of possibility for the appropriation 
of human rights and humanitarianism by state and security actors, and for the 
emergence of new coalitions of actors in EU border governance.  
Chapter 3 outlines the methods and methodological approach this thesis is based on, 
and explains how I proceeded with negotiating access and conducting my fieldwork. 
In addition, it offers reflections on how my own background and positioning 
influenced my research, and considers the limitations of this research project. Chapters 
4 to 6 present the findings of the research itself. In chapter 4, I provide two different 
perspectives on Frontex, examining how its foundation has come to be understood as 
a compromise between different EU institutions, and how the agency can be 
understood through its public documents. More specifically, I present a qualitative 
analysis of Frontex’s annual reports and press releases from its foundation in 2005 
until the end of 2014. In doing so, I trace how the agency’s self-representation has 
changed over time, and how it has increasingly integrated humanitarianism and human 
rights in its narratives about itself and its work, as well as migration and EUropean 
border controls. While chapter 4 provides two perspectives from the outside by looking 
at publicly available documents and statements, the following chapter complements 
this with a third perspective, exploring the data gathered in interviews and informal 
conversations, at events, and during visits of the joint operations Poseidon Land in 
Bulgaria and Hermes in Italy.  
Chapter 5 finds that there are stark divergences between Frontex’s public documents, 
the narratives presented by staff members in its headquarters, and those implementing 
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Frontex operations at EUropean external borders. Drawing on new institutionalism, I 
argue that Frontex faces inconsistent demands from diverse stakeholders in its 
environment, whose support is often of existential importance to the agency. Having 
to respond to diverse and opposing pressures to maintain legitimacy and external 
support, Frontex has decoupled aspects of its work from one another. As a fragmented 
organisation, Frontex remains flexible in its responses to partially contradictory 
external pressures.  
In chapter 6, I explore the effects of Frontex’s changes in self-representation on its 
position in EUropean border governance. I examine the prevalence of crisis narratives, 
and argue that Frontex has become positioned as a solution to humanitarian as well as 
security ‘crises’ in recent years. Relatedly, I contend that Frontex’s appropriation of 
humanitarianism and human rights has repositioned the agency as a ‘civilising force’ 
in EUrope and beyond, strengthening its position in the EUropean border regime. 
Furthermore, I argue that the shared foundations of humanitarianism, human rights, 
and security have allowed for the emergence of new coalitions of actors, including 
Frontex’s Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights. Lastly, I caution that a focus 
on ‘sanitising’ EUropean borderlands from abuse and death risks further reinforcing 
already existing efforts to further externalise border controls and the violence 
associated with them. In the conclusion and epilogue, I reflect on how my findings 
relate to the events that have taken place since the end of 2014, and offer some 
reflections on the implications of my research findings for those seeking to oppose the 
violence and discrimination of the current border system.  
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Chapter 1: Borders, Security, and the Importance of 
Organisational Dynamics 
By undertaking a study of Frontex’s negotiation of the discursive formations of 
humanitarianism, human rights, and security, and its gradual appropriation of the 
former two, this thesis draws on three academic fields: critical border and migration 
studies, critical security studies, and organisational sociology. Primarily, the thesis 
situates itself at the intersection of critical border and migration studies on the one 
hand, and critical security studies on the other hand: it centrally builds on 
conceptualisations of borders and securitisation developed in these fields, and seeks to 
contribute empirical and theoretical insights to ongoing debates within them. The 
interest of critical border studies in bordering processes has at times become 
synonymous with the studying of securitisation processes in critical security studies, 
due to the increasing securitisation of migration and border controls in EUrope over 
the last two to three decades. From a perspective of border studies, Frontex is one of 
the actors performing EUropean external borders on a daily basis and in a variety of 
contexts, ranging from the production of knowledge to training national border guards 
to conducting joint operations at EUropean external borders. From the perspective of 
critical security studies, Frontex is a security agency which engages in (in)securitising 
migration and borders through diverse practices, while competing with other security 
actors over threat definitions, resources, and competences.  
By examining how borders and border guarding are represented by those working with 
and for the agency, and how various discursive formations are manoeuvred by them 
when doing so, the thesis shows that the discursive formation of security does not exist 
in isolation, but has become increasingly entangled with humanitarianism and human 
rights. Furthermore, it explores (some of) the bordering and securitising processes 
performed by Frontex, and shows that these are neither uniform nor coherent across 
sites. In doing so, the thesis draws on organisational sociology in order to shed light 
on the organisational dynamics within Frontex, and argues that cross-fertilising critical 
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border and critical security studies with organisational literatures adds an additional 
layer of analysis to existing accounts of development and change in the border regime.  
This chapter will position the thesis in the fields of critical border and migration studies 
and critical security studies, outlining the main propositions that have been made in 
both fields. Rather than attempting to introduce these bodies of literature in their 
entirety, I will seek to situate my own work within them, and to highlight some of the 
contributions this thesis makes to them. After introducing both literatures, I will show 
how new institutionalist approaches can add to and enrich research at the intersection 
of critical border studies and critical security studies.  
 
Critical border studies: who borders, where, and how? 
In 1994, John Agnew published an influential article in which he critiqued what he 
described as a ‘territorial trap’ in International Relations, referring to the failure of the 
discipline to engage with the characteristics and contingent nature of states’ spatial 
practices, and instead assuming an unchanging and unproblematic relationship 
between states, sovereignty, and territory (Agnew 1994). His work has prompted much 
discussion since (see e.g. Agnew 2010; Elden 2010; McConnell 2010; Murphy 2010; 
D. Newman 2010; Reid-Henry 2010; Vaughan-Williams 2008b), and has contributed 
to the emergence and growth of the field of border studies in the last two decades. 
Already in 1998, Anssi Paasi asserted that “[a]n increasingly critical attitude exists 
towards the state and boundaries as categories that are taken for granted, and this can 
also be seen in a new interest in boundary literature” (Paasi 1998, 70). Since then, this 
critical approach and the corresponding literature has further expanded and diversified.  
What unites many border scholars is the conviction that borders are “central to any 
understanding of the social” (Rumford 2006, 166). They are opposed to viewing 
borders as natural, neutral, or static, emphasising instead their historical contingency, 
political implications, and change through time (see e.g. Vaughan-Williams 2009a, 1). 
Scholars within critical border studies oppose methodological nationalism, i.e. the 
taking for granted of the categories of states, sovereignty, state borders and 
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territoriality, and also problematize methodological EUropeanism (De Genova 2013a; 
Garelli and Tazzioli 2013a; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Borders are understood 
to be closely bound up with the politics of representation, identity, and classification 
(Paasi in Johnson et al. 2011, 62). They create epistemic limits and subjectivities, 
influencing our perception of ourselves and the world around us: “what can be 
demarcated, defined, and determined maintains a constitutive relation with what can 
be thought” (Balibar 2002, 87). While everyday life inside states can render borders 
invisible or hidden (for some), assumptions regarding community, belonging, identity, 
sovereignty, territory and law become apparent in moments of border crossing (Salter 
2012, 739).  
In Western media, the border has risen to be a “privileged signifier”, as William 
Walters points out: “it operates as a sort of meta-concept that condenses a whole set of 
negative meanings, including illegal immigration, the threat of terrorism, 
dysfunctional globalization, loss of sovereignty, narcotic smuggling, and insecurity” 
(Walters 2008, 174–175). According to Walters, the border has become naturalised in 
public debates, being invoked as self-evident and unquestionable, and promising 
protection from the very threats it invokes. Challenging this naturalisation, scholars in 
critical border studies seek to “decentre the border”, arguing that “the border is not 
something that straightforwardly presents itself in an unmediated way. It is never 
simply ‘present’, nor fully established, nor obviously accessible. Rather, it is manifold 
and in a constant state of becoming” (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2012, 728). To 
understand the contingency and political character of borders, critical border studies 
advocates a double shift away from traditional conceptions of borders: first, a move 
from the concept of borders towards the notion of bordering as a social, political, and 
cultural process; and second, the use of the lens of performance to highlight bordering 
practices as being constantly produced and reproduced (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 
2012, 729).  
Focusing on bordering processes makes clear that borders are not viewed as static or 
fixed, and that on the contrary their inscription requires constant renewal – as does, in 
fact, the keeping alive of the institution of the state itself (Johnson et al. 2011): 
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“[s]emantically, the word ‘borders’ unjustly assumes that places are fixed in space and 
time, and should rather be understood in terms of bordering, as an ongoing strategic 
effort to make a difference in space among the movements of people, money or 
products” (van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002, 126). Importantly, bordering practices 
are not only practiced by states. Non-state actors, ordinary citizens and non-citizens 
are involved in this process, which Rumford calls borderwork (Rumford in Johnson et 
al. 2011; Rumford 2012). Borderwork is thus not solely the domain of largely 
exclusionary, securitising state practices, but refers to the whole range of bordering 
processes enacted by citizens, non-citizens, and state actors: “[w]hat a border is, and 
what a border does, is being made on site” (Walters 2015, 15). Also the lens of 
performativity to understand bordering processes points to the enactment of or 
resistance against borders by border-crossers, citizens, governments, and other agents 
(Johnson et al. 2011; Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2012; Wonders 2006). 
“[A]lthough states attempt to choreograph national borders, often in response to global 
pressures, these state policies have little meaning until they are ‘performed’ by state 
agents or by border crossers” (Wonders 2006, 66). As such, border agents and state 
bureaucrats play central roles in the performing of borders in specific locales, ways, 
and on particular bodies.  
In addition to advocating a dynamic and performative understanding of bordering, 
critical border scholars seek to complicate the traditional metaphor of borders as lines 
on maps and between territories (Rumford in Johnson et al. 2011; Parker and Vaughan-
Williams 2012; Parker and Vaughan-Williams et al. 2009; Salter 2012). Particularly 
in the cases of the European Union and the United States, numerous authors have 
pointed out that today, bordering and exclusion are not only performed at the political 
borders, but increasingly also within states’ territories, and indeed far beyond them: 
“[t]he border is everywhere that an undesirable is identified and must be kept apart, 
‘detained’ and then ‘expelled’” (Agier, 2011, p. 50; see also Johnson et al., 2011; 
Vaughan-Williams, 2008b). What might be visible as a formidable barrier to some, 
however, is often invisible to others: Rumford (2012) points to Frontex patrols in the 
Mediterranean and off the West African coast as one example of borders that are 
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displaced from the political borders of EUrope. While being highly visible to those 
they aim to deter or intercept, they are mostly invisible to EUropean citizens. 
For particular categories of people, then, borders seem to be disappearing: they are 
crossed with increasing speed and frequency by commodities and information, as well 
as some people. As such, borders mean radically different things for different people 
in different contexts and at different points in time (Paasi 1998, 81; Rumford 2012, 
892). In Étienne Balibar’s words,  
 
[b]orders are vacillating. This does not mean that they are disappearing. Less than 
ever is the contemporary world a ‘world without borders’. On the contrary, borders 
are being both multiplied and reduced in their localization and their function; they are 
being thinned out and doubled, becoming borders zones, regions, or countries where 
one can reside and live. The quantitative relation between ‘border’ and ‘territory’ is 
being inverted (Balibar 2002, 92, emphasis in original). 
Balibar notes that this has profound consequences for the relationships between state, 
citizenship and nationality, which are increasingly disintegrated (see also Bigo 2013). 
Nevertheless, and countering some of Balibar’s assertions, Salter notes the uniqueness 
of state borders, the crossing of which means the possibility of appealing to laws in a 
particular country (Salter 2012, 750).6 The enormous efforts and risks many take in 
order to reach EUrope, as well as EUropean investments in ‘securing’ its external 
borders to hinder unauthorised crossings confirm this assertion, as unauthorised 
travellers and member states alike know that only the physical crossing of member 
states’ political borders will oblige the latter to provide international protection to those 
in need.  
Within critical border studies, overlapping and dispersed forms of migration and 
border government within EUrope have been understood by means of the concept of 
the border regime (see e.g. Berg and Ehin 2006; Bigo 2002b; Buckel and Wissel 2010; 
                                                 
6 As legal cases such as the ECHR’s 2012 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy have shown, however, crossing 
state borders is not always necessary to enter a particular state’s jurisdiction. On a theoretical level, 
Vaughan-Williams (2008b) showed in relation to Guantanamo Bay that the relationship between state 
borders, territory, and law is far from straightforward.  
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Casas-Cortes et al. 2015; Hess 2012; Sciortino 2004; Tazzioli 2013; Tsianos and 
Karakayali 2010; van Houtum 2010; Walters 2002). “Put simply, a border regime is a 
system of control, regulating behaviour at the borders” (Berg and Ehin 2006, 54). 
Regime analysis was developed by International Relations scholars when different 
agents, including ‘non-traditional’ ones such as NGOs and multinational corporations, 
were becoming progressively more intertwined with one another (Tsianos and 
Karakayali 2010). The notion of regimes sought to overcome some of the limits of 
neo-realism, expanding the focus of analysis to include the multiplicity of actors 
involved. A regime is defined as a heterogeneous ensemble of “principles, norms, rules 
and decision making procedures” (Wolf 1994, cited in Tsianos and Karakayali 2010, 
375). Following Foucault, states cannot be seen as unitary actors, which function 
smoothly according to a centralised rationality (Foucault 1991, 103). Instead, they 
might be better conceptualised as “an amalgamation of heterogeneous and sometimes 
competing state apparatuses” (Buckel and Wissel 2010, 37). In the governance of 
EUropean external borders, a range of such state apparatuses rooted in different 
member states interact with a variety of other actors, including EUropean institutions, 
international organisations, and non-state actors such as citizens, local residents, 
people on the move, activists, and nongovernmental organisations.  
Due to the diversity of those actors and their objectives, the border regime cannot be 
expected to follow one central logic or rationality. Instead, its developments should be 
conceived as ‘field effects’ of the actions of a variety of actors (Tsianos and Karakayali 
2010, 376). Policy created within the EUropean border regime has accordingly been 
understood as composite policy resulting from the involvement of policymakers from 
different sectors, who have diverging perceptions and preferences (Berg and Ehin 
2006, 54). Policies pertaining to external borders touch diverse policy paradigms, and 
involve a range of actors – including those working within Justice and Home Affairs, 
European Neighbourhood Policy, and Regional Policy. These different actors’ 
involvement explains the multiplicity of discourses about the external border not only 
between state and non-state actors, but indeed within the EUropean policymaking 
community itself (Berg and Ehin 2006). The notion of a border regime allows space 
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for the historical contingency of border governance, which is the outcome of “a mix 
of implicit conceptual frames, generations of turf wars among bureaucracies and waves 
after waves of ‘quick fix’ to emergencies, triggered by changing political 
constellations of actors” (Sciortino 2004, 32–33). Implementation of rules in local 
contexts varies considerably, leading to considerable differences in the carrying out of 
border controls and related practices between member states (Tsianos and Karakayali 
2010, 382). As a result of inconsistencies both at the level of policy and discourse and 
that of implementation, the “border regime is likely to remain uneven, differentiated 
and highly context-dependent also in the future” (Berg and Ehin 2006, 67).  
Approaches drawing on Foucault’s concept of governmentality feature prominently in 
critical border studies, and allow for the kinds of contradictions, ambiguities, and gaps 
discussed above (Fassin 2011; Walters 2015). Foucault used governmentality in 
different ways in his work, referring to it both as “the art of government” in a broader 
sense and the emergence of a particular, liberal governmentality in the 18th century, 
which he saw as closely linked with security apparatuses (Foucault 2009). Importantly, 
Foucault’s understanding of security is different from ‘traditional’ notions of security 
as related to exceptionalism and war, and is instead closely bound up with freedom of 
circulation, calculations of probability, and risk (Bigo 2008). In Foucault’s work, 
security “is not a form of war and is not a form of generalised surveillance. It is not a 
byproduct of the exception setting the norm, and even not a byproduct of the 
panopticon. It is not about the supervision of all by the sovereign’s glance. It is about 
the production of a category, of a profile” (Bigo 2008, 100). Foucault advocated 
conceptualising government as the range of “techniques and procedures for directing 
human behavior” (Foucault 1997, 81), and emphasised two complementary meanings 
of the term, encompassing both the government of others and of the self: “[f]or to 
“conduct” is at the same time to “lead” others (according to mechanisms of coercion 
which are, to varying degrees, strict) and a way of behaving within a more or less open 
field of possibilities” (Foucault 1982, 789). Importantly, governing also produces 
subjects in two senses of the word: “subject to someone else by control and 
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dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge” (Foucault 
1982, 781).  
Foucauldian notions of governmentality and subjectivity have allowed critical border 
scholars to analyse bordering processes as producing governable populations of 
‘citizens’ or ‘legitimate travellers’, of ‘strangers’, ‘guest workers’, ‘refugees’, or 
‘illegals’ (Balibar 2009, 204; Buckel and Wissel 2010, 38; Casas-Cortes et al. 2015, 
84). “Borders, in this sense, may be considered to be a kind of means of production – 
for the production of space, or indeed, the production of difference in space, the 
production of spatial difference” (De Genova 2013a, 254). The fragmentation of 
populations into different subgroups provides legitimacy for “exposing someone to 
death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, 
expulsion, rejection, and so on” (Foucault 2003, 256). In EUropean border governance, 
a schism separates the Global North from the Global South, opposing the subject 
position of the ‘EUropean’ to that of the ‘non-EUropean’ in a wider postcolonial 
discourse (Buckel and Wissel 2010, 38; see also Salter 2012, 739), and subjecting the 
latter to necropolitics, i.e. the “subjugation of life to the power of death” (Mbembe 
2003, 39). As a ‘means of production’, borders also produce representations and border 
spectacles of illegality, exclusion, and enforcement (Casas-Cortes et al. 2015; Cuttitta 
2014; De Genova 2010, 2013b; Dines, Montagna, and Ruggiero 2015). Meanwhile, a 
variety of authors have argued that in doing so, borders simultaneously produce an 
illegalised, disenfranchised labour force, which is contrary to what the enforcement 
spectacle might suggest not excluded, but differentially included and exploited in 
EUropean labour markets (Balibar 2009; De Genova 2002, 2010, 2013b; Mezzadra 
and Neilson 2013).  
Despite having made important contributions to conceptualising border and migration 
governance, William Walters expresses concerns that the governmentality lens offered 
by Foucault has become a filter in parts of contemporary migration research: “[a]n 
instrument intended to enhance the intelligibility of certain patterns turns into a device 
that filters out unexpected colours and hues from the world” (Walters 2015, 5). 
Similarly, Bröckling, Krasmann and Lemke (2011) remark vis-à-vis studies of 
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governmentality more widely that scholars tend to focus too much on already familiar 
meta-narratives, producing repetitive critiques that become part of the academic 
common sense. They as well as Walters deplore a search for singular or homogeneous 
rationalities of government. When looking at Frontex in particular, it is apparent that 
the agency negotiates more than one discursive formation in its self-representation. 
This thesis seeks to examine how different discursive formations are manoeuvred in 
the narratives of those working for and with Frontex in different locations and 
functions. 
A further criticism of critical border studies concerns the tendency of scholars to 
engage in presentism, focusing on contemporary events, governmentalities, and 
techniques of power without connecting them to a wider historical context, centrally 
including histories of colonialism (Walters 2015). As Mignolo and Tlostanova (2006) 
point out, subjectivities and epistemologies reproduced through bordering today find 
their origin during colonial and imperial times, being closely connected to imaginaries 
‘the West’ projected on different parts of the world (see also De Genova 2013b; 
Mignolo 2000). Hansen and Jonsson (2011, 2012, 2014) on the other hand demonstrate 
how the history of EU integration as well as the development of EUropean migration 
governance shows clear continuities with colonial EUrope’s understandings of itself, 
of Africa, and of the relationship between the two continents. As Walters notes, in 
analysing contemporary developments it is important to ask “what is the genesis of the 
mechanisms that make up migration policy? Where did political sovereignty find these 
tools?” (Walters 2015, 17). Accordingly, the discursive formations of human rights, 
humanitarianism, and security as they (re-)surface in the EUropean border regime 
today need to be situated in their broader historical context, which I will seek to do in 
chapter 2.  
Contrary to some other variants of migration and border research, scholars within 
critical border studies position themselves politically vis-à-vis the processes of 
exclusion and marginalisation they analyse:  
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[w]e, as researchers or scholars of migration, are indeed ‘of the connections’ between 
migrants’ transnational mobilities and the political, legal, and border-policing 
regimes that seek to orchestrate, regiment, and manage their energies. We are ‘of’ 
these connections because there is no ‘outside’ or analytical position beyond them. 
There is no neutral ground. The momentum of the struggle itself compels us, one way 
or the other, to ‘take a side’ (De Genova 2013a, 252). 
Over the last few years, researchers in critical border and migration studies in the UK 
and beyond have come together in conferences and common writing projects to think 
through practices of ‘militant research’, which aims to identify openings for rupture 
within states’ attempts to ‘manage’ migration, and to destabilise highly exclusionary 
and violent border regimes (see e.g. Casas-Cortes et al. 2015; De Genova 2013a; 
Garelli and Tazzioli 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; Grappi 2013; Kasparek and Speer 2013; 
New Keywords Collective 2016; Pezzani and Heller 2013; Scheel 2013; Sossi 2013). 
This thesis seeks to continue some of these conversations. 
 
Critical security studies  
The growing securitisation of migration and border controls over the last 20-30 years 
has been one of the themes researchers in critical border studies have been particularly 
interested in. They share this interest with those working within critical security 
studies, leading to an overlap and partial blurring of both academic fields around 
questions of migration and borders. This thesis is positioned at the intersection of 
critical migration and border studies and critical security studies, which share an 
engagement with the securitisation of migration and border controls. Critical security 
studies emerged as a separate field from strategic studies in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
when academic efforts to interpret security questions in a wider way coincided with 
pressures from social movements to include non-military issues as part of the security 
agenda, and the perceived need to respond to the end of the Cold War also theoretically 
(Huysmans 2006a, 18; Krause and Williams 1996, 229). In the 1990s, academic 
understandings of security expanded significantly, covering concerns for the 
environment, inter-ethnic tensions, and migration (Aradau 2008, 43). At the same time, 
the political world also saw an “explosion of security questions”, when more and more 
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issues were understood and debated through a security lens (Huysmans 1998a, 248). 
Since these early beginnings, a wealth of literature has emerged which engages with 
security in a ‘widened’ or ‘deepened’ way (see Krause and Williams 1996).  
The following section will present a brief overview of the field of critical security 
studies. Far from providing a comprehensive account of the diverse body of 
scholarship within this field, I will highlight key concepts, debates, and developments, 
with a particular emphasis on the theoretical approaches this thesis seeks to speak and 
contribute to. Frequently, three ‘Schools’ have been identified within the field of 
critical security studies, each of which is associated with different approaches: the 
Copenhagen, Aberystwyth, and Paris ‘Schools’ of security studies. As the c.a.s.e. 
collective (2006) pointed out, such a differentiation can be misleading, as clear-cut 
dividing lines are difficult to draw and common ground, collaborations, and academic 
debates exist across the approaches. The following discussion about different 
‘Schools’ should therefore be read as means to structure a diverse field with a variety 
of approaches, rather than a representation of three clearly distinct, separate sets of 
theories. Listing ‘Schools’ invariably excludes approaches that are not primarily 
associated with one of the three main institutions, among them feminist, queer, and 
postcolonial theories. In order to clearly situate this thesis in the wider field of critical 
security studies, I will nevertheless introduce the three Schools in turn, while drawing 
on a wider body of literature to comment on their contributions and limitations. 
 
Moving beyond militaristic security: the ‘Copenhagen School’ 
The Copenhagen School is rooted in international relations and criticised their 
discipline’s failure to scrutinise the meaning and construction of security. They 
opposed previously prevailing approaches taking security as an objective given, 
opening up a much-needed critical inquiry into academic understandings and the 
historicity of security. In doing so, they succeeded in widening and deepening the 
concept of security “without opening it up to an unlimited expansion which would 
render the concept meaningless for academic and political purposes”, making their 
approach highly influential in critical security studies (L. Hansen 2000, 288). As such, 
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the School has been said to “constitute possibly the most thorough and continuous 
exploration of the significance and the implications of a widening security agenda for 
security studies” (Huysmans 1998b, 480). The School’s most prominent members are 
Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. While the Copenhagen School is often counted as part 
of critical security studies, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde conceptualised it as distinct 
from both traditional security studies and Critical Security Studies (i.e. the 
Aberystwyth School) in outlining their own approach to security studies (Buzan, 
Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 205).  
Broadly speaking, their work focuses on the analysis of securitising speech acts, i.e. of 
verbal declarations of ‘security issues’ as such. Through securitising acts the 
securitising actor constructs an intersubjective understanding between herself and her 
audience “to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to 
enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (Buzan and 
Wæver 2003, 491). For securitisation to occur, the relevant audience has to accept the 
securitising act and thereby the use of exceptional measures. The Copenhagen School 
was part of and built on the linguistic turn in International Relations, emphasising the 
performative nature of security talk. Rather than merely representing reality, speech 
acts were understood as generating security threats. In order to securitise successfully, 
speech acts draw on a larger constellation of meanings related to security, which is 
historically contingent and socially institutionalised: “[l]ike the grammar of a 
language, it evolves over time but it cannot be changed at random” (Huysmans 2006a, 
25).  
Since its initial theory development, the Copenhagen School’s approach has inspired 
a large amount of scholarship, while also having been criticised for conceptual 
weaknesses, lack of theoretical refinement, and methodological dilemmas (Balzacq 
2011; Stritzel 2007; M. C. Williams 2011). Over the last years, there has been an 
overall move away from analysing speech acts in isolation, and a development of more 
contextual and dynamic readings of security (Stritzel 2012, 553). In addition to 
Wæver’s claim that securitising speech acts can be used to further legitimacy for future 
acts, Vuori argues that securitisation can serve to raise an issue on the political agenda, 
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to deter, to legitimate past acts or to uphold the status of a security issue, and to exert 
control (Vuori 2008, 76). He also notes that securitizing speech acts cannot only be 
made by the ‘powers that be’, but also by other actors with sufficient social capital 
(Vuori 2010). Stritzel (2007, 2011a, 2011b, 2012) argues for the importance of taking 
socio-political contexts and historical developments into account, whereas Ciutǎ 
advocates a radically contextual approach, relying entirely on actors’ self-perceptions, 
definitions and practices in relation to security (Ciutǎ 2009, 325–326). The meaning 
of security would then be open-ended and change through time, rather than being based 
on some essential core, as the Copenhagen School’s focus on existential threats to a 
referent object’s survival implies.  
Other authors point out that an exclusive focus on speech acts is problematic: issues 
can be securitised without necessarily invoking speech acts, for instance by associating 
a particular policy issue with others that are already viewed as security threats: “even 
when not directly spoken of as a threat, asylum can be rendered as a security question 
by being institutionally and discursively integrated in policy frameworks that 
emphasize policing and defence” (Huysmans 2006a, 4). With its focus on speech acts, 
the Copenhagen School fails to account for security practices other than speech acts 
that might further the perception of issues as matters of security, neglecting in 
particular institutional practices (Aradau 2008, 45). Instead, they presuppose an easy 
and unidirectional transition from verbal statements about security to practices 
addressing a proclaimed threat (Boswell 2007; Neal 2009).  
Moreover, the School’s implicit privileging of political elites in their analyses has been 
deemed problematic. Among others, Ken Booth asked “[w]hat about the security 
threats to those without a political voice?” (Booth 2007, 165). As Lene Hansen points 
out, security cannot always simply be spoken by those threatened (L. Hansen 2000). 
The focus on spoken rather than embodied (in)security, according to her, contributes 
to the absence of gender in the Copenhagen School framework and the inability of the 
theory to capture gender-specific security threats, such as honour killings of women in 
Pakistan. Importantly, the question of who is able to make securitising speech acts is 
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not only gendered, but also intimately bound up with notions of race and class: today’s 
political elites remain, to a large extent, white, wealthy, Western men.  
A focus on political elites furthermore undervalues the role of other influential actors, 
such as security professionals (Huysmans 1998a). Indeed, it presupposes that there are 
clear moments in which decision-makers make critically important speech acts that 
lead to securitisation. Studies however suggest that security functions in highly 
dispersed ways, with algorithms and surveillance technology informing decisions that 
are frequently based on previous knowledge and automatic or programmed decision-
making (Amoore and de Goede 2008a; Huysmans 2011). How these findings might 
inform the study of security and securitisation will be explored in greater depth below. 
Lastly, the Copenhagen School has inspired important and fruitful debates on the 
relationship between exceptionalism, speech acts, and security (see e.g. Aradau 2008; 
Balzacq et al. 2010; Bigo 2007; Bourbeau 2014; Doty 2007; Huysmans 2004, 2006b, 
2008; Huysmans and Buonfino 2008; Neal 2012; Salter 2008). Some of the challenges 
to the School’s conceptualisation of security as bound up with exceptionalism will be 
further explored in the discussion of the Paris School’s approach below.  
 
Security as emancipation: the ‘Aberystwyth School’ 
In addition to Copenhagen School approaches, an alternative critical security 
scholarship was established by scholars of the ‘Aberystwyth’ or ‘Welsh School’, most 
prominently Richard Wyn Jones and Ken Booth. In an explicitly normative endeavour, 
they argue that understandings of security as military-focused, state-centred and zero-
sum should be countered by conceptualisations of security as aimed at and interlinked 
with achieving human emancipation (c.a.s.e. Collective 2006, 448). Their view of 
security is thus an ideal-theoretical one, contrary to the militarised and largely negative 
conceptualisation the Copenhagen School proposes (Floyd 2007, 330). As such, they 
do not share the view that desecuritisation is necessarily desirable. Instead, they argue 
that there are good reasons for conceptualising issues such as HIV/AIDS as security 
threats. Importantly, they highlight “the mobilisation potential that is undoubtedly 
created by using the term ‘security’” (Wyn Jones 1999, 109), and caution that 
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desecuritisation might remove an issue from a political agenda altogether rather than 
transforming it from a security into a political issue (Floyd 2007, 347). Securitising an 
issue, from this perspective, can be a way to galvanise attention and support to address 
it.  
For the Aberystwyth School, phenomena such as war and violence, poverty, poor 
education, and political oppression are security issues. Fundamentally, security and 
emancipation are viewed as two sides of the same coin: true security is human 
emancipation (Booth 1991, 319). Accordingly, the School challenges the state-
centrism at the heart of much of security studies: “globally, the sovereign state is one 
of the main causes of insecurity, it is part of the problem rather than the solution” (Wyn 
Jones 1995, 310). Instead, Wyn Jones advocates focusing security interchangeably on 
the individual, society, community, particular ethnic or cultural groups, or humankind. 
States are merely means to an end, tools to achieve emancipation. As this shows, the 
Aberystwyth School has a rather different agenda than the Copenhagen School. Their 
goal is not to analyse how security issues are defined and constructed by those in power 
today; but instead to look at the world through political theory to determine ‘objective’ 
threats to individuals (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 35). Underlying this practice 
is the belief that meanings attached to words can and do change over time, and that 
proactive, normative scholarship can help provoke such change (Booth 2007, 169). 
The Aberystwyth School critiques the Copenhagen School’s conceptualisation of 
security as outside of (normal) politics or as depoliticised, and insists that in a 
broadened security field, it is precisely political decision-making that sets priorities 
vis-à-vis different threats to emancipation. That unauthorised migration is presented 
as a security threat to societies and states, first and foremost, and not to those who 
embark on hazardous journeys due to a lack of safe and legal routes, is ultimately a 
political choice. Accordingly, it is the task of security scholars to press for a 
conceptualisation of security that is human instead of state-focused, and that resists 
militarisation.  
Following this approach, the increasing focus on humanitarianism and human rights 
in the border regime outlined in the introduction might be seen positively, as the 
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security of those travelling via boat has featured more prominently in public and policy 
debates over recent years. Capitalising on this and further advancing an understanding 
of security that is centred on those on the move, however, has significant shortcomings. 
As Claudia Aradau emphasises, security is inherently exclusionary, relying on 
conceptualising external threats to a particular in-group:  
 
[w]hat CSS [the ‘Aberystwyth School’] and their equation of emancipation to security 
have missed is the element of universality that a politics of emancipation entails and 
security lacks. Security cannot be democratized, it cannot be universally partaken of. 
Its imaginary is subtended by practices that divide and exclude categories of subjects 
deemed dangerous or risky (Aradau 2008, 143–144).  
Given that security utterances rely on a structure of meaning that – while historically 
contingent – cannot be changed at random, advancing alternative conceptions of 
security risks implicitly inscribing concepts and mechanisms of in- and exclusion 
embedded in understandings of national security in new realms, such as that of ‘human 
security’ (Huysmans 2006a, 34; see also Fierke 2015, 6). As this thesis will show, 
invoking the security of those travelling on unseaworthy boats across the 
Mediterranean might be a laudable attempt to shift the referent object away from 
borders and states, but it stops short of fundamentally challenging the repertoire of 
practices traditionally associated with state security, including cooperation with transit 
or origin countries to stop or deter individuals from making hazardous crossings.  
Invoking security, even if in relation to individuals rather than states or societies, 
moreover tends to call on states to guarantee this security, and to mitigate or eradicate 
‘threats’ (Floyd 2008, 44). It may ultimately fall back on and further reinforce a state-
centric view. Related to this criticism, Giorgio Shani argues that human security “may 
be sufficiently malleable to legitimize greater state control over society in the name of 
protection” (Shani 2007, 7, emphasis in original). He cautions that human security 
might end up reinforcing the state and a focus on national security, as its emphasis is 
not on transcending the state, but on ensuring that states protect their populations. 
Similarly, Mark Duffield sees human security as a form of biopolitics allowing a range 
of global actors to govern populations in various contexts (Duffield 2010; Fierke 2015, 
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175). Aradau (2004a) further problematizes that equating emancipation with security 
suggests that social change can occur only within the logic of security. 
In addition, Rita Floyd cautions that “the biggest problem with Booth and Wyn Jones’ 
approach is [that n]either of the two theorists offers guidelines for when an issue is not 
a security issue, always implying the more security the better” (Floyd 2007, 333). In 
relation to human security in particular – a notion closely connected to the 
conceptualisation of individuals as key referent objects for security that has become 
increasingly prominent in international politics and development – Floyd further notes 
that “apart from the idea that security should be about individuals, human security 
entirely lacks a framework of analysis” (Floyd 2008, 42). When examining Frontex’s 
appropriation of humanitarianism and human rights alongside its continued focus on 
security, the questions of what enabled this shift to occur, and what its effects are, are 
not addressed within a Welsh School approach. By asking what security should do, it 
“is explicitly geared to changing the dominant culture of security rather than 
identifying a new actually existing security logic.” (Corry 2012, 240).  
There thus exist important critiques of the Welsh School’s conceptualisation of 
security, and a range of warnings regarding its call to shift the referent object of 
security to the individual level. At the same time, Roe (2012) points to the possibility 
of reclaiming security as a site of contestation over inclusion and exclusion through 
the Aberystwyth School approach. McDonald states, “it could be argued that the 
choice within the Copenhagen School to ultimately limit attention to powerful actors 
and voices blinds its proponents to the role of security as a site of competing discourses 
or images of politics, and even potentially as a site for emancipation” (McDonald 
2008, 575). While Floyd criticises the concept of human security in terms of its limited 
analytical usefulness, she emphasises its normative utility, noting that this is something 
the Copenhagen School lacks (Floyd 2008, 2011).  
Nunes protests against charges that the concept of ‘emancipation’ is universalist, 
arguing that instead, “[t]he meaning of security is not based on a universal, a priori 
notion of what being secure is, but rather stems from the experiences of insecurity of 
real people in real places” (Nunes 2012, 351). Most importantly, perhaps, Browning 
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and McDonald note that depictions of security as either entirely ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
oversimplify matters, and fail to engage with the temporal and spatial specificity of 
security: “[the] recognition that security does different things at different times and in 
different places [is missing]” (Browning and McDonald 2011, 242). While the Welsh 
School approach does not provide the necessary tools to analyse how Frontex’s shift 
towards humanitarian and human rights-centred self-representations became possible 
and which effects it produced, it raises questions that are nevertheless of great 
importance for this analysis. Not only does it make the normative case against state 
security, but it also insists on re-claiming security as a site of contestation and potential 
change. Focusing on individuals’ security, then, might at times have the potential to 
galvanise attention and support to issues that adversely affect lives and wellbeing. As 
noted above, however, doing so also risks creating new forms of exclusion, 
government, and violence.  
 
Practices first: Understandings of the ‘Paris School’ 
Whereas both previous approaches or ‘Schools’ emerged from within International 
Relations, scholars in Paris developed their own security analyses roughly at the same 
time as the Copenhagen School, approaching security from a sociological and political 
theory perspective (c.a.s.e. Collective 2006, 446). Originally associated with the work 
of Didier Bigo and his colleagues, including Anastassia Tsoukala and Elspeth Guild, 
Jef Huysmans did important work defining the specifics of this particular approach 
and positioning it within critical security studies (c.a.s.e. Collective 2006; Huysmans 
2006a). Since its beginnings in Paris, a variety of authors who are not necessarily 
linked to Paris as a geographical location have built on the School’s approach to 
security, and have further refined, qualified, and expanded it in their own analyses of 
security governance (see e.g. Amoore 2006, 2014; Amoore and de Goede 2008b; 
Aradau 2004b, 2008, 2014; Aradau and van Munster 2007, 2008, 2012a; Brassett and 
Vaughan-Williams 2012, 2015; Cote-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter 2014; de Goede 
and Randalls 2009; Squire 2009, 2010; Vaughan-Williams 2008a, 2009a, 2009b, 
2010; Walters 2002, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2015).  
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These highly diverse works share in common that they conceptualise security as a 
technique of government, rather than an essential (if contested) concept. A 
Foucauldian approach allows for a less unitary and coherent view of the state, seeing 
it instead as consisting of a variety of practices, institutions, actors, and rationalities 
(Huysmans 2006a). Security in this approach is understood as “ordering the social” 
(Aradau 2008, 6), as administering relations of fear and trust between people. It 
thereby serves to displace what Huysmans referred to as an epistemological fear – “the 
fear of not knowing who is dangerous” – with an “objectified fear” of particular groups 
of people (Huysmans 2006a, 53). Security policy tends to be focused on creating or 
maintaining a distance between an in-group and a threatening ‘other’, and/or 
eliminating the identified threat. Moreover, the discursive formation of security 
constructs and reasserts a unified, protection-worthy ‘us’, a political identity of the 
referent object to be protected, and an equally unified, abject, excluded ‘other’ (Aradau 
2008; Huysmans 2006a). At the same time, “[t]he ordering of security based on a 
dynamics of abjection and of exclusion exposes the very promise of security as an 
impossible promise” (Aradau 2008, 62).  
At times explicitly, at others implicitly, a number of authors taking a sociological / 
Foucauldian approach to security view the discursive formation of security as distinct 
from and opposed to preferable alternatives, most importantly humanitarianism and 
human rights. William Walters wrote of the securitisation of people on the move and 
their simultaneous “distancing from discourses of democracy, human security, and 
human rights” (Walters 2002, 570). Also Jef Huysmans repeatedly invoked a 
“difference” between framing border-crossers in security vs. human rights terms, and 
referred to human rights as an “alternative” policy framing (Huysmans 2000, 757; see 
also 1998a, 228; 2006a, 3; 53; 146; Huysmans and Squire 2009, 13). Implied in these 
differentiations seems to be a preference for human rights-based discourses and 
approaches over security-focused ones, given the exclusionary effects of the latter. In 
light of Frontex’s increasing reliance on fundamental rights and humanitarian 
language, which the agency deploys in addition to a continuing security focus, the 
apparent opposition between rights-based and humanitarian approaches on the one 
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hand and security-focused frameworks on the other hand needs to be reconsidered, 
however.  
Regarding the relationship between humanitarianism and security, some authors have 
noted that despite their apparent opposition, both work together in practice at times. 
Bigo (2006, 394) and Huysmans (2006a, 5) for instance pointed to “humanitarian 
interventions” as demonstrating a partial merging of the two frameworks. Moreover, 
Huysmans and Squire (2009, 6) noted that “pragmatic humanitarians” failed to 
effectively challenge a security frame, which could accommodate depoliticised, 
“vulnerable” subjects. In Bigo’s account, securitisation features as the dominant, 
overarching discursive formation in border governance, which human rights and 
humanitarian debates hide:  
 
[t]he internal debates […] between securitarian discursive formations (about 
blockades, expulsions, deterrence, and surveillance) and humanitarian discursive 
formations (about the necessity for a welfare state, low birthrates, and human rights 
for asylum seekers) hide these general conditions of securitization. Indeed, the second 
type of discursive formation—the humanitarian—is itself a by-product of the 
securitization process (Bigo 2002a, 79; see also Cuttitta 2014).  
Bigo continues by arguing that by advocating the rights of some groups, those 
mobilising humanitarian discursive formations end up reinforcing the categorisation 
of migrants, thereby further bolstering the securitisation of migration and justifying 
border controls. While this might be a valid point to make, this thesis seeks to 
problematize the seemingly straightforward hierarchy between humanitarianism and 
securitisation outlined by Bigo. Humanitarianism and human rights have their own 
dynamics, and are inherently ambivalent and unstable discursive formations. What 
matters is not necessarily the relative dominance of each of them vis-à-vis security, 
but their interrelationship and entanglement with one another. By assuming that the 
discursive formation of security is in some way automatically or unchangeably 
dominant in border governance, openness to change, friction, contradiction and the 
constant renegotiation of each of these discursive formations in the practical field of 
border governance gets lost.  
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Claudia Aradau (2004b, 2008) has provided one of the first in-depth analyses of the 
entanglements of security, humanitarianism and human rights from within critical 
security studies. Examining the governance of human trafficking, she raises pertinent 
points regarding the cooperation between NGOs and police, the incorporation of a 
‘victimisation’ approach within security practices, and the merging of 
humanitarianism/human rights and security in the governance of trafficked women. In 
her analysis, Aradau sees trafficking as a ‘special case’ (Aradau 2008, 98). Recent 
developments however have shown that the convergence of the discursive formations 
of humanitarianism, human rights, and security in the governance of human trafficking 
has been far from exceptional. Building on Aradau’s work and expanding it to external 
border governance, Polly Pallister-Wilkins (2015) examines the interrelation of 
humanitarianism and border policing among Frontex officials and Greek border forces. 
Following a Foucauldian approach, she shows that in the officers’ narratives, concerns 
to save and assist unauthorised border crossers go hand in hand with policing 
objectives. In pointing out that each has been bound up with notions of care and control 
historically, she argues that “there is nothing contradictory in the use of humanitarian 
ideas and practices in European border policing” (Pallister-Wilkins 2015, 55).  
Importantly, Aradau (2008) does not distinguish between humanitarianism and human 
rights. She seems to use both terms interchangeably, and fails to draw out existing 
nuances and tensions between them. Pallister-Wilkins (2015) on the other hand 
differentiates between humanitarianism and human rights. Nevertheless, she focuses 
her analysis solely on the invocation of humanitarian language by border officials. 
Indeed, she argues that while using humanitarian framings, “Frontex cannot uphold 
human rights,” as this remains the sovereign responsibility of member states (Pallister-
Wilkins 2015, 66). This analysis might be true from a legal perspective. However, it 
fails to engage how Frontex officials and border guards frame their work in human 
rights terms, how this is related to their mobilisation of humanitarian and security 
language, and how it affects the agency’s positioning in the EUropean border regime.  
Katja Franko Aas and Helene Gundhus (2015) examine humanitarian, human rights, 
and security framings by Frontex officials and Norwegian border police. Drawing on 
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Fassin (2007a), they suggest that Frontex engages in “a particular style of 
‘humanitarian government’, which deploys moral sentiments in contemporary 
politics” (Aas and Gundhus 2015, 13). Contrary to Fassin’s observations, their 
research finds that this does not necessarily weaken the emphasis on human rights, but 
can coexist with an intensifying rights discourse. Importantly, the authors find 
differences in framings mobilised by those in Frontex’s headquarters and the guest 
officers they interview. They however stop short of theorising these, and of analysing 
the relationships and similarities across humanitarianism, human rights, and security 
that render their entanglement in border governance possible.  
More generally, authors (broadly) associated with the Paris School emphasise the 
importance of practices, visual representations, institutions, technologies, actors, 
specific knowledges and skills, and have more recently also drawn increasingly on 
new materialist approaches in their work (see e.g. Aradau 2010; Aradau, Coward, et 
al. 2015; Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2015; Squire 2015). They focus on 
practices, contexts, and technologies “that enable and constrain the production of 
specific forms of governmentality” (c.a.s.e. Collective 2006, 457). In doing so, they 
are less interested in identifying intentions behind particular uses of power, but instead 
emphasise the effects of power games, looking at the field effects of competing 
rationalities, institutions, and actors. A further key difference between the Copenhagen 
and Paris School approaches is that the former focuses on exceptionalism as integral 
to security, whereas the latter highlights the importance of routines, day-to-day 
practices, and bureaucracies in constituting (in)securitisation:7 
 
[s]ecuritization works through everyday technologies, through the effects of power 
that are continuous rather than exceptional, through political struggles, and especially 
                                                 
7
 Bigo and some of his colleagues refer to (in)securitisation instead of securitisation. This is intended 
to emphasise that “security does not diminish insecurity and we do not even have two sides generating 
a dynamics of co-constitution of opposites: we have only one side in a non-orientable surface (as in a 
Möbius strip) that we have to call (in)security, or an (in)securitization process […] it means, for 
example, that border controls and their technologies do not solve the insecuritization of borders; they 
propagate fears of mobility in their everyday routines” (Bigo 2014, 221). 
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through institutional competition within the professional security field in which the 
most trivial interests are at stake (Bigo 2002a, 73). 
Analysing everyday practices, according to the Paris School, exposes that illiberal rule 
is not in fact an exception to the rule of liberal-democratic states, but that it is produced 
through ordinary laws and routines: “[i]t shows how the control of populations is 
routinized and how unequal access to fundamental rights is a defining feature of the 
liberal state” (Balzacq et al. 2010; see also Bigo 2007, 2013). Jef Huysmans argues 
that securitisation works through a “multiplicity of little security nothings”, rather than 
exceptional speech acts (Huysmans 2011, 376). Indeed, these speech acts themselves 
are no more than “little security nothings”: they are only one small part of a set of 
unspectacular and unexceptional practices, devices, or sites that constitute 
securitisation processes. While security is thus not necessarily bound up with 
exceptional measures and practices, it alters what is perceived as ‘normal’ in society 
(c.a.s.e. Collective 2006, 456).  
As noted above, Didier Bigo’s work has been influential within (and beyond) the Paris 
School. From the early 1990s, Bigo analysed the role of security professionals in 
(in)securitisation processes, and showed how these professionals searched for new 
focus areas when the end of the Cold War meant that traditional security concerns were 
being eroded. As new ideas of the enemy were evolving, ‘the immigrant’ became a 
convenient focus of concern for both police and military forces (Bigo 2006). A 
common security field emerged in which military personnel and secret services, 
policemen and border guards met and structured new interpretations of security, and 
where ‘the immigrant’ figured as an internal and external ‘threat’ simultaneously (Bigo 
2002a, 77). In Bigo’s view, political speech acts tend to be ex post facto justifications 
of routine security practices enacting fear and unease, rather than marking the 
beginning of a securitisation process (Bigo 2014, 211). He draws on political 
statements as well as media representations in his analyses, but argues that these are 
largely secondary to practices by security professionals (Bigo 2001). He and his 
colleagues have argued that “a sociological approach is stronger than a purely 
linguistic approach to securitization, because it combines discursive and non-
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discursive formations, including know-how, gestures, and technology” (Balzacq et al. 
2010). Simultaneously, Bigo has also distanced himself from what he refers to as an 
“over generalization of a certain form of Foucauldianism”, which uses biopolitics as 
an explanatory tool to make sense of new developments in border governance (Bigo 
2014, 220). He questions both the novelty of governmentality by biopolitics, and 
argues that it cannot be seen as a cause of today’s practices, which he instead 
understands to be rooted in the professional socialisation of those enacting the border.  
Instead, he draws heavily on Bourdieu in his work, using the concepts of field and 
habitus to explain securitisation through the practices of security professionals. As 
Claudia Aradau pointed out, in his Bourdieusean approach to language Bigo is not far 
removed from the Copenhagen School: both share a conceptualisation of securitisation 
as being produced by those in positions of authority.8 While Wæver sees securitisation 
as a political spectacle, however, Bigo emphasises the importance of bureaucracies in 
constituting this process (Aradau 2008, 48–49). In doing so, he focuses primarily on 
rivalries between security agencies, who compete for power and the continuity of their 
existence by contesting or advocating for particular threat definitions, prioritisations, 
and competences (Bigo 2006). As noted in the introduction, Bigo’s account fails to 
take dynamics inside organisations seriously, and portrays them as unitary and rational 
actors. While he makes clear that security agencies do not merely react to external 
stimuli, but are “semi-autonomous” (Bigo 2006, 390), his account falls short of 
offering insights into how organisational behaviours come about, and what internal 
factors influence the actions organisations take. Secondly, Bigo’s account of 
competitions in the security field suggests that security agencies are primarily or even 
solely interested in the maximisation of their power and continuation of their existence 
(Bigo 2006, 393).  
Christina Boswell (2007) has criticised both the Paris and the Copenhagen Schools for 
failing to account for organisational dynamics in the security field. Following her 
                                                 
8 This has been criticised by Claudia Aradau, who remarked that both approaches failed to consider the 
constitution of abject subjectivities and their (in)ability to speak security (Aradau 2008, 57).  
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critique, this thesis seeks to move beyond accounts of inter-agency competition over 
power and survival as the primary driver of developments in the security field. 
Drawing on new institutionalism, it seeks to provide an appraisal of some of the 
complexities within Frontex as a security organisation. In doing so, this thesis adds an 
additional layer of analysis to sociological and political theory accounts of the border 
security field.  
 
New institutionalism and critical security studies 
New institutionalist approaches in organisational sociology have engaged with 
organisational dynamics in-depth, and provide valuable insights in this regard. 
Challenging the dominant assumption that organisations function rationally and 
primarily seek to maximise their power, new institutionalist accounts emphasise that 
there are a range of goals organisations might strive for at different moments in time, 
including internal and external legitimacy, maintaining a coherent worldview, or 
acting ‘appropriately’ (Boswell 2007; DiMaggio and Powell 1991a; Greenwood et al. 
2008). Rather than being homogenous actors, organisations are understood as 
fragmented and multifaceted, and driven by a number of potentially conflicting 
motivations and interests (Greenwood et al. 2008, 14). New institutionalist approaches 
will be discussed in greater depth in chapter 5, which will explore how insights gained 
in organisational sociology help understand Frontex’s changes through time as well as 
the agency’s current self-representation. Rather than introducing these theories in 
detail, this section will demonstrate how the approaches described above as the ‘Paris 
School’ of critical security studies speak to and are compatible with new 
institutionalism.  
Combining Paris School approaches with new institutionalism brings together two 
distinct sets of theories, which however enrich and complement each other. In 2006, 
Bigo argued that “[i]t is certainly too early to clearly define the centrifugal forces that 
compel the police and military to share the same interests, the same rules and the same 
vision of what is at stake (i.e. what the emerging threats are)” (Bigo 2006, 394). This 
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“startling homogeneity” of organisational rules and structures is what new 
institutionalist approaches have sought to explain in their analyses (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991b, 64). Drawing on new institutionalism can thus provide some insights to 
Bigo’s puzzle, as processes of organisational change have long been theorised by 
authors in this field. Paris School approaches more generally have found that even 
within a highly heterogeneous field of security professionals, “security agencies share 
the same vision of the threat as a deterritorialized and global one” (Balzacq et al. 2010). 
Organisational sociology can provide insights into how agencies such as Frontex 
respond to what they perceive as successful strategies in their environments, and how 
this might lead to growing similarities between the organisational rules, threat 
perceptions, and practices of different security organisations (a process referred to as 
isomorphism within organisational analysis). 
A number of institutional analyses in the realm of migration and border governance 
have already been conducted, and have been widely cited also by scholars within 
critical security studies. Virginie Guiraudon and Gallya Lahav provided important 
insights into some of the institutional dynamics underlying EU immigration and border 
policies (Guiraudon 2000, 2003; Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). They showed that 
officials of member states’ interior ministries moved responsibilities for migration 
control to the EU level to avoid domestic constraints, including national courts and 
NGOs. Sandra Lavenex (2006, 2007) demonstrated that the desire to avoid constraints 
subsequently led to the increasing externalisation of migration control, which she 
described as a “continuation of the transgovernmental logic of cooperation” that 
Guiraudon identified (Lavenex 2006, 346). She argued that responsibility for 
migration control was shifted ‘up’ to the EU level and ‘out’ to third states, as home 
affairs officials attempted to avoid political, normative and institutional constraints on 
policymaking. Guiraudon, Lahav, and Lavenex all show that policy processes in 
relation to the EU’s external borders are partially shaped by institutional interests and 
struggles between different actors within states, rather than merely by competition 
between states. Analysing how the European Commission responded to the task of 
incorporating immigration and asylum policy in EU external relations, Christina 
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Boswell (2008) added that also intra-organisational dynamics influence policy 
outcomes. She cautioned that these internal dynamics should not be underestimated, 
arguing that actors might be more concerned with internal legitimacy or coherence 
than with responding to outside pressures, and could not be expected to always act 
rationally due to internal structures, dynamics, and constraints.  
Some of the theoretical understandings of new institutionalism and Paris School 
approaches are fairly similar, with the former viewing actors and their identities as 
socially constructed and reflective of their institutional environment (Meyer, Boli, and 
Thomas 1994). New institutionalist scholars propose a dialectical relationship between 
action and actor, “see the “existence” and characteristics of actors as socially 
constructed and highly problematic, and action as the enactment of broad institutional 
scripts rather than a matter of internally generated and autonomous choice, motivation, 
and purpose” (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1994, 10). This is similar to the critical 
approaches advocated by Bigo and his colleagues. While Bigo specifically focuses on 
the professional socialisation of actors, the ‘habitus’ and dispositions of security 
professionals might well be seen as forming part of the ‘broad institutional scripts’ 
Meyer et al. refer to. In discussing the three different ‘universes’ of those engaged in 
different ways with controlling borders, Bigo (2014, 211) outlines general beliefs and 
perceptions associated with those belonging to the “military-strategic field”, the 
“internal security field”, and the “global cyber-surveillance social universe” 
respectively. It is clear that their subject positions as well as their actions cannot be 
ascribed to autonomous choice alone, but are closely interlinked with wider 
characteristics of the field they are socialised into. New institutionalists share Bigo’s 
concern with socialisation, noting that through similar training and education of 
particular professional groups, these tend to share similar ideas regarding appropriate 
practices and structures (see DiMaggio and Powell 1991b, 71). 
According to organisational sociology, the perception and reputation of organisations 
and their practices depends on their ability to justify their existence, structures, and 
actions in relation to generalised discourses: 
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[t]he definition and standing of the modern organization are constitutively linked to 
what is legitimate and necessary. In this way, environmental concerns, a broadened 
conception of worker rights, or more organized conceptions of the economy and its 
function must be incorporated in the structure and action of the organization (Meyer, 
Boli, and Thomas 1994, 19). 
Generalised discourses thus produce organisational structures, actions, and legitimacy. 
This also includes those discourses that are not referenced explicitly by Meyer et al., 
but are essential to critical security studies: discourses on common security threats, 
generalised risk, border management, and migration, for instance. More importantly, 
taking a wider view of the institutional environment of the border regime – as indicated 
in the quote above – enables me to move beyond the discourses most frequently 
associated with security professionals, and to explore the role of ‘alternative 
discourses’ such as humanitarianism and human rights in the organisational 
environment of security actors. Rather than assuming that security agencies will be 
oblivious to discourses from beyond the security realm, organisational sociology 
allows for an analysis of how particular, generalised discourses become incorporated 
by organisations across different fields for a variety of reasons.  
Importantly, new institutionalism emphasises that an environment should not be seen 
as a “coherent rational superactor (e.g., a tightly integrated state or a highly 
coordinated invisible hand)” but “an evolving set of rationalized patterns, models, or 
cultural schemes” (Meyer 1994, 33; see also Meyer and Rowan 1991). As such, a 
number of rationalities might coexist within an organisation’s environment, in which 
different actors, legal structures, or normative ideas suggest different purposes or 
procedures to be followed (Scott and Meyer 1994a, 117). Such an understanding is in 
line with conceptualisations of the border regime – Frontex’s environment – proposed 
within critical border and security studies. Building on the theoretical insights from 
critical border studies and the Paris School approach to critical security studies, this 
thesis views the border regime as highly fragmented, constituted by diverse actors, and 
not following one central rationality, but instead changing and developing as a result 
of the interactions and competitions of security professionals, politicians, people on 
the move, NGOs and international organisations, EUropean institutions, citizens, and 
other stakeholders.  
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While building on Foucauldian insights, I agree with Bigo (2014, 220) that 
governmentality should not be understood as a causal factor or determining force for 
organisational practices. Similar concerns have also been raised by Christina Boswell 
(2008, 2009), who argued that instead of merely responding to wider 
governmentalities, behavioural patterns of organisations might have a variety of other 
functions, including social-psychological needs for stable social roles and norms, or 
the desire to make sense of and simplify highly complex environments. These points 
of critique also resonate with the concerns raised by William Walters (2015) and 
Bröckling, Krasmann and Lemke (2011) vis-à-vis governmentality studies that I 
discussed earlier: governmentality has become somewhat of a filter in some scholarly 
works, prompting their authors to search for homogeneous rationalities rather than 
remaining open for “unexpected, paradoxical, heterogeneous and perhaps unstable 
combinations of rationalities and techniques” (Walters 2015, 6). Drawing on new 
institutionalism facilitates greater openness in terms of analysis also because 
organisations are a priori understood as fragmented, following diverse rationalities, 
and not necessarily acting rationally. This perspective complicates the kind of 
governmentality approaches criticised by Bigo, Boswell, Walters, and Bröckling et al., 
as it questions the determining force of a single or limited set of rationalities within a 
given environment on organisational practices. In this thesis, rationalities, discursive 
formations, and techniques of government are understood as partly constituted by 
practices, while simultaneously informing and influencing these practices.  
While new institutionalism can add important insights to the study of continuity and 
change in organisations, approaches in this field tend to undertheorise the 
organisational environment. Bringing together approaches from within critical security 
studies and organisational sociology thus enriches and benefits both strands of theory. 
A Foucauldian analysis of the discursive formations of humanitarianism, human 
rights, and security, as well as their circulation and interactions in the border regime 
today can provide important insights into the environment Frontex finds itself in, and 
the wider institutional myths that are dominant in it. Scott and Meyer remarked that 
“the most interesting and useful forms of institutional theory depend on showing the 
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collective and cultural character of the development of institutional environments” 
(Scott and Meyer 1994b, 4), which is what a Paris School approach can contribute to 
most meaningfully.  
On the other hand, institutional analysis allows us to add a middle level to Bigo’s 
analysis of (in)securitisation, complementing his work on professional socialisation 
and professionals’ ‘social universes’ with the additional dimension of organisational 
dynamics, which influence the competitions and power struggles within the wider field 
of the border regime. Organisational identities, structures, and internal discrepancies 
influence the positioning of individual security agencies such as Frontex within their 
environment, in addition to the factors Bigo wrote about, such as professional groups’ 
dispositions, perceptions and beliefs. New institutionalism thus adds an additional 
layer of analysis to the accounts of Bigo and his colleagues, while their analyses add a 
more complex and well-developed conceptualisation of the environment to 
organisational sociology. Despite having distinctly different focuses, new 
institutionalism and a Paris School approach speak to each other, and complement one 
another meaningfully. By bringing together an in-depth analysis of the institutional 
environment and its wider discursive formations (including their structures, subject 
positions, and the power relations they invoke) on the one hand, with a nuanced 
analysis of organisational positioning vis-à-vis these wider discursive formations on 
the other hand, this thesis will offer timely insights into the growth of humanitarianism 
and human rights in the border regime, and the emergence of Frontex as a ‘civilising 




In this chapter, I have outlined the wider fields of study this thesis speaks to, and have 
introduced some of the debates it seeks to advance. Admittedly, the boundaries I drew 
between the various approaches – in particular the distinction between critical border 
and security studies, as well as the wider group of the Paris School – are partly 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Borders, Security, and the Importance of Organisational Dynamics  51 
artificial, as a number of texts and authors might be seen as part of more than one of 
the discussed fields. They are, like this thesis, located at the intersection of different 
‘Schools’ or approaches, and might be ordered and characterised differently by other 
authors.  
Overall though, it is clear that both critical migration and border studies and critical 
security studies seek to intervene into traditionally prevailing approaches and 
conceptualisations within international relations and, more generally, social sciences. 
Opposing state-centric, naturalising, and static understandings of borders, mobility, 
and governance that have for a long time dominated research in these areas, they offer 
a different reading of processes of bordering, securitising, and governing. What I 
aimed to show in this chapter is that despite the important insights and contributions 
that these literatures have made, they tend to rely on a simplified view of organisations, 
which are often conceptualised as coherent, unitary actors. Given the importance of 
organisations and bureaucracies within the EUropean border regime, insights into 
intra-organisational dynamics from within new institutionalism can help to deepen 
analyses of continuity and change not only within individual organisations (such as 
Frontex), but also in the border regime more widely. Accordingly, this thesis seeks to 
bring critical border and security studies into conversation with organisational 
sociology, arguing that both sides could refine and enrich their analyses by drawing 
on the insights of the other. While new institutionalist analyses provide a more 
complex conceptualisation of internal organisational processes, motivations, 
identities, and goals, studies in critical security and border studies offer a nuanced and 
differentiated conceptualisation of a specific organisational environment, namely the 
EUropean border regime, and have shown that Foucauldian approaches can help 
theorise these environments also more generally.  
Ultimately, both critical border and security studies seek to understand processes of 
exclusion and ‘othering’ by looking at how (and by whom) these are enacted, 
performed, and contested. Sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly, authors in these 
fields simultaneously ask what alternative modes of governance might be, and how 
less violent and exclusionary futures might be made possible. In doing so, some among 
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them seem to implicitly present human rights and / or humanitarian discourses as the 
potentially better alternatives to securitisation. While such assumptions exist within 
accounts in the ‘Paris School’ (as shown above), they emerge most strongly from 
within the ‘Aberystwyth School’, which advocates an individual-centred approach to 
security. The increasing appropriation and co-optation of humanitarian and human 
rights discourses by a key security actor – Frontex – ought to be seen as a positive 
development from authors within this ‘School’, as a growing emphasis has been placed 
on the security threats faced by individuals on the move. Such a perspective, however, 
falls short on two counts: first, it fails to provide an analytical framework within which 
the shift towards humanitarianism and human rights can be understood. Second, it fails 
to analyse how this shift towards a focus on the ‘human’ has enabled new forms of 
government and exclusion. Accordingly, this thesis will draw on a ‘Paris School’ 
approach in order to examine how security, humanitarianism, and human rights are 
related both on a discursive level, and in the specific context of contemporary border 
governance in EUrope. In the next chapter, each discursive formation will be defined 
and connected to its wider context, while discursive similarities, differences, and 
tensions between them will be explored.  
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Chapter 2: Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security 
In public debates as well as academic writings, security-centred approaches to 
migration are often opposed to ‘better’ alternatives, particularly human rights or 
humanitarian approaches. In a recent article, Tugba Basaran for instance 
problematized that a politics of unease raised “the cost of empathy toward securitized 
(unwelcome) populations, thus unsettling bonds of solidarity and humanity” (Basaran 
2015, 215). Challenging this opposition between security and humanity, I aim to show 
in this chapter – and throughout the thesis – that security, humanitarianism, and human 
rights can and do feed into each other in the governance of EUropean external borders. 
Frequently, the increasing appropriation of humanitarian and human rights language 
by security actors such as Frontex is dismissed as a strategic act, viewed as being 
insincere and divorced from the ‘real’ practices on the ground. Following Nick 
Vaughan-Williams, I question this interpretation and argue that in the co-existence 
between these various discursive formations “there is more at stake […] than merely 
a difference between the ‘rhetoric’ of humanitarian policies and the ‘reality’ of 
dehumanising practices” (Vaughan-Williams 2015a, 2). Not only does such an account 
overly simplify the complex relations between the three formations, it also simplifies 
the processes within Frontex as an organisation and its staff members as individuals, 
who – despite working as border guards – often want to be doing the ‘right’ thing, 
which for some of them includes meeting their humanitarian and / or human rights 
obligations (see Ioannides and Tondini 2010).  
Most importantly, however, the ‘rhetoric’ vs. ‘reality’ argument fails to appreciate the 
intricate connections between humanitarianism, human rights, and security. In doing 
so, it risks resulting in a call for a better implementation of humanitarian and human 
rights rhetoric, rather than engaging more deeply and creatively with how the violence 
in EUropean borderlands might be critiqued most effectively. As Nick Vaughan-
Williams notes, however, the  
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need to step back and search for alternative critical philosophical resources is 
increasingly pressing because many of the conventional grounds for critiquing border 
violence found in academic and non-academic literatures that focus on an abstract and 
idealised human subject - human rights, humanitarianism, and ‘migrant-centredness’ 
- have already been coopted by authorities complicit in that violence (Vaughan-
Williams 2015a, 2).  
This co-optation by Frontex is the focus of this thesis, and has been examined and 
reflected on in other contexts by a number of authors, mostly within the field of 
anthropology. Didier Fassin (2012) and Miriam Ticktin (2006, 2011) analysed the 
simultaneous governing of migration in France through security and humanitarianism. 
Michel Agier (2010, 30) conceptualised humanitarianism as the governance of 
‘undesirables’ through spatial confinement among other strategies. Costas Douzinas 
(2007) and Wendy Brown (2004) on the other hand problematized the entanglement 
of human rights with liberal imperialism.  
Beyond state actors’ appropriation of humanitarianism and human rights, existing 
analyses of the growing cooperation of NGOs and international organisations on the 
one hand, and border police, military, Frontex, and other security actors on the other 
hand deserve mentioning. The increasing presence of NGOs in EUropean border 
regions was described by Walters (2011) as the ‘humanitarianisation’ of EUropean 
borders, and was witnessed also by Ruben Andersson (2014) during his fieldwork at 
the Spanish-Moroccan borders. Far from being adversaries, (some) NGOs and 
international organisations collaborate in the governance of migration in a variety of 
different contexts, including search and rescue, the management of refugee camps, 
assisting people in transit, conducting ‘voluntary’ return programmes, overseeing 
deportations, etc. Regarding the implementation of search and rescue missions in 
Spain, Andersson writes of a ‘symbiosis’ between the Red Cross, the Guardia Civil, 
and journalists, who shared information, exchanged staff members, know-how, and 
resources, and helped each other with translations, interrogations, and the 
identification of ‘smugglers’.  
What this chapter seeks to add to these accounts is a theoretical reflection on the 
similarities and differences between humanitarianism, human rights, and security as 
three independent yet closely related discursive formations. Exploring how 
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humanitarianism, human rights, and security relate to each other on a discursive level 
provides important insights into an analysis of their articulation in governing 
migration. To clarify the concepts at the heart of this thesis, this chapter will introduce 
each of the discursive formations in turn and briefly reflect on their respective 
histories. Subsequently, I will analyse the similarities, differences, and interrelations 
between humanitarianism, human rights, and security. In doing so, I will argue that the 
shared fundamentals of the three discursive formations have created the conditions of 
possibility for the appropriation of human rights and humanitarianism by state and 
security actors, and for the intertwinement of humanitarianism, human rights, and 
security in contemporary EUropean border governance.  
  
Three discursive formations 
Drawing on Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, this thesis uses the concept of 
discursive formation to think through the connections between humanitarianism, 
human rights, and security. While a full archaeology of these discursive formations is 
not possible within the constraints of this chapter, I will seek to draw on some of the 
routes of inquiry outlined by Foucault. Importantly, the exploration that follows “is 
not intended to reduce the diversity of discursive formations, and to outline the unity 
that must totalize them, but is intended to divide up their diversity into different 
figures” (Foucault 1972, 159–160). As outlined already, it does so by dividing the 
highly diverse terrain of EUropean border governance into three discursive 
formations: humanitarianism, human rights, and security. Following Foucault, the 
concept of discursive formation describes instances where  
 
between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a 
regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations) […]. 
The conditions to which the elements of this division (objects, mode of statement, 
concepts, thematic choices) are subjected we shall call the rules of formation. The 
rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, 
modification, and disappearance) in a given discursive division (Foucault 1972, 38). 
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While being characterised by particular rules, discursive formations are dynamic and 
in constant historical flux, they are “forming formedness”: their principles of order are 
continuously overridden and ever changing (Angermuller 2014, 15). They neither have 
a definite origin nor a clearly defined end point they are striving towards. Moreover, 
discursive formations are composed of multiplicities of diverse elements that may be 
contradictory to one another (Foucault 1972, 200). This means, as Angermuller notes, 
that “an arbitrary moment inheres in every representation of discursive formation. No 
part can represent the whole since it cannot be clear where discursive formation starts 
and where it comes to an end” (Angermuller 2014, 16). When exploring the 
characteristics of and connections between humanitarianism, human rights, and 
security, it is thus important to emphasise that these discursive formations are highly 
diverse and dispersed rather than unified. Those drawing on the same discursive 
formation do not necessarily share the same reasoning or viewpoints, and might rely 




Having introduced security and (in)securitisation in chapter 1, I will keep the 
discussion of these concepts short here. In this thesis, I draw primarily on sociological 
approaches within critical security studies, most importantly on the works of Didier 
Bigo, Jef Huysmans, and Claudia Aradau. As such, I understand security as a 
discursive formation and a technique of government that orders social relations, 
administering trust and fear between individuals and groups of people (Aradau 2008, 
6; Huysmans 2006a, 53). In doing so, it produces an in-group, deemed to be in need 
of protection, and a threatening ‘other’ that is excluded and sought to be kept at a 
distance.  
In his lectures on Security, Territory and Populations, Michel Foucault made a number 
of propositions about security, without however developing any of them in depth (Bigo 
2008; Foucault 2009). Nevertheless, his initial thoughts stimulated a range of scholarly 
work that relies on a conceptualisation of security not as aimed at controlling or 
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disciplining individuals, but instead as closely related to liberty, normalisation, and the 
management of populations. According to Foucault, the security apparatus which 
emerged in the 18th century was “not so much establishing limits and frontiers, or 
fixing locations, as, above all and essentially, making possible, guaranteeing, and 
ensuring circulations: the circulation of people, merchandise, and air, etcetera” 
(Foucault 2009, 51). In this, security differs from discipline: it is not isolating, closing 
off, or centralising, but instead aimed at “constituting an ‘environment of life’ for 
populations, by opening, integrating and enlarging” (Bigo 2008, 97). Relying on the 
principle of freedom of circulation and of the protection of population life, security 
simultaneously implies the management of ‘risk’, based on calculations of probability 
and statistical distributions. Security is thus also the outcome of surveying statistical 
regularities, and deriving abnormalities. It produces categories and profiles, and is 
profoundly normalising. Those deemed ‘abnormal’ or ‘threatening’ are excluded, kept 
at a distance, or disposed of.  
Within the critical security studies literature, there has been an interest in two different 
modes of enacting insecurities: one that invokes an existential threat to be combatted 
through urgent and exceptional measures that are conceptualised as distinct from 
‘normal’ politics, and another one that focuses on a governmentality of risk that 
pervades everyday security practices and routines. The so-called Copenhagen School 
upholds the distinction between security as related to exceptionality and the logic of 
war on the one hand, and risk as a more mundane concept that does not invoke the 
same notion of threat, urgency, and survival on the other hand (Aradau, Lobo-
Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008, 149). Building on this distinction, Olaf Corry (2012) 
suggests differentiating between both by using the terms ‘securitisation’ and 
‘riskification’ respectively, arguing that the latter relates to “second-order security 
politics” focused on analysing the preconditions for danger or harm before they 
materialise (Corry 2012, 238). Karen Lund Peterson (2012) however cautions that 
simply using the concept ‘riskification’ to describe speech acts that invoke future risks 
instead of direct and imminent threats closes down enquiries into how security and 
related techniques change over time. The separation between security on the one hand 
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and risks on the other hand has moreover been challenged by analyses of the 
bureaucratic, routine constitution of security through practices, in which risk analysis 
and management have come to play an increasingly prominent role (Aradau, Lobo-
Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008).  
Rather than focusing on speech act analysis as Corry’s proposal does, Jef Huysmans 
(2014) suggests differentiating between two different techniques of enacting 
insecurity, namely “exceptionalist securitising” and “diffuse securitising.” 
Exceptionalist securitising intensifies challenges to the nation or political community 
by framing them as existential threats and invoking a conception of war, including the 
need to fight against an enemy. Importantly, in doing so it “also defines what counts 
as normal or democratic in the very act of identifying what is considered abnormal or 
non-democratic” (Huysmans 2014, 69). While concerned with ‘exceptional’ 
situations, this mode of securitising is not only concerned with inter-state matters of 
war and peace. Instead, it “often works the boundary between the normal democratic 
and the exceptional into intimate and everyday relations,” such as crossing 
international borders, and thus has profound consequences on how individuals can live 
their daily lives (Huysmans 2014, 72).  
Diffuse securitising, on the other hand, de-intensifies and scatters insecurities, 
including through the expansion of security technologies to areas not traditionally 
associated with security, such as migration, environmental protection, or development 
policy. Rather than invoking an existential threat or deadly enemy, diffuse 
securitisation is often related to analysing, preparing for, and managing uncertainties 
and risks: “[d]efining uncertainty as the ‘new’ security question and instituting 
practices of risk management have played a central role in this process of breaking 
down the instituted hierarchies and divisions of insecurity” (Huysmans 2014, 77). 
Diffuse securitising often works by making associations and drawing connections 
between different types of insecurities or risks, reconnecting diverse elements into a 
‘patchwork of insecurities’. In doing so, it does not simply describe realities, but brings 
a world of risks into being. A key technology of diffuse securitising, surveillance, 
“makes suspicion an organising principle of relating,” and inscribes this suspicion on 
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particular bodies and actions (Huysmans 2014, 103).9 While diffuse securitising 
renders the boundaries of security ambiguous and contested, they do not disappear 
altogether: it allows security practices to extend to beyond previous boundaries, but 
not to be everywhere, all the time (Huysmans 2014, 88). 
What is important to emphasise in the context of this thesis, however, is that both 
modes of securitising do not mutually exclude one another. Huysmans discusses this 
at the example of state borders: “[t]he exceptional status of the border becomes enacted 
not in terms of a routinised defence of the territory but the routines are deployed in and 
come to symbolise a fight against violent enemies that pose an existential threat to the 
polity” (Huysmans 2014, 61). While the practices of border control can mostly be 
described as diffuse securitising, they are often framed as part of exceptionalist 
security politics (Huysmans 2014, 181). The co-existence between both modes of 
securitising is also reflected in Frontex’s exceptionalist representations of particular 
events as ‘crises’ on the one hand, and its practices of information gathering, risk 
analysis, and surveillance that can be described as diffuse securitising on the other 
hand, as chapters 4 and 5 will show.  
Related to Huysmans’ distinction between exceptionalist and diffuse securitising are 
two different modes of operation in political decision-making. Following Huysmans 
(2006a, 2014), as well as Neal (2009) and Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins (2014), I 
understand security as consisting both of political spectacles and technocratic 
processes, i.e. as being constituted by highly visibilised, public contests over framings 
and policies, as well as by much less publicised routines, bureaucratic processes, 
technologies, skills and knowledges that develop incrementally.  
 
                                                 
9 Huysmans’ theorisation of diffuse securitising is closely related to analyses of risk in critical security 
studies. The interest in risk analysis, calculation, and management within the wider security field has 
grown over the last 15 years (see e.g. Amoore 2006, 2009, 2014; Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 2008b; 
Aradau and van Munster 2007, 2008, 2012a, 2012b; de Goede and Randalls 2009; de Goede, Simon, 
and Hoijtink 2014; Neal 2009; van Munster 2009). 
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The notion of ‘humanity’ 
Contrary to this conceptualisation of security, the discursive formations of 
humanitarianism and human rights are based on the notion of ‘humanity’. Despite the 
seemingly universal appeal of this term, different groups of people were deemed to 
belong outside a notion of a shared humanity throughout history. At the time of the 
French revolution, women were excluded from the ‘universal’ rights outlined in the 
“Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” (Rancière 2004). And during 
colonialism, the colonised were violently excluded from humanity and actively 
dehumanised (Cornell 2014). Even today, we are seeing “varying degrees of 
humanity”, for instance in relation to the duty to rescue individuals at sea (Basaran 
2015, 213). The concept of ‘humanity’ can thus be deeply exclusionary, and does not 
provide a stable normative foundation for policies and practices. In Douzinas’ words, 
it simultaneously “carries an enormous symbolic capital, a surplus of value and dignity 
[…]. This symbolic excess turns the ‘human’ into a floating signifier, into something 
that combatants in political, social and legal struggles want to co-opt to their cause, 
and explains its importance for political campaigns” (Douzinas 2007, 55–56).  
In the contemporary world, the notion of ‘humanity’ is frequently invoked in relation 
to humanitarian arguments or human rights claims. As the following discussions will 
show, there are remarkable similarities between the discursive formations of human 
rights and humanitarianism while at the same time, important differences between 
them persist. As Miriam Ticktin summarises,  
 
in a broad sense, human rights institutions are largely grounded in law, constructed to 
further legal claims, responsibility, and accountability, whereas humanitarianism is 
more about the ethical and moral imperative to bring relief to those suffering and to 
save lives; here, the appeal to law remains opportunistic. Although both are clearly 
universalist discursive formations, they are based on different forms of action and, 
hence, often institute and protect different ideas of humanity (Ticktin 2006, 35; see 
also Barnett 2011, 16).  
While both discursive formations have increasingly blurred over the last two decades, 
they have separate genealogies and trajectories, and “should not be conflated” (Barnett 
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2011, 17). In the following, both humanitarianism and human rights will be introduced 
in turn, before moving on to an examination of their relationships to security. 
 
Humanitarianism 
Humanitarian ideas have a long history in Europe, and have come to fundamentally 
structure common ways of thinking. While humanitarianism “is not one of a kind but 
rather has a diversity of meanings, principles, and practices”, the aim to relieve 
unnecessary suffering is shared across these different meanings and practices (Barnett 
2011, 221). Didier Fassin defines humanitarianism as a moral discursive formation as 
well as a political resource that serves particular interests (Fassin 2010a, 239). 
Humanitarianism has, at its heart, an “unstable balance” between contradictory 
elements and characteristics (Barnett 2011, 8):  
 
[o]n the one hand, moral sentiments are focused mainly on the poorest, most 
unfortunate, most vulnerable individuals: the politics of compassion is a politics of 
inequality. On the other hand, the condition of possibility of moral sentiments is 
generally the recognition of others as fellows: the politics of compassion is a politics 
of solidarity. This tension between inequality and solidarity, between a relation of 
domination and a relation of assistance, is constitutive of all humanitarian government 
(Fassin 2012, 3). 
Here, it is important to note that the suffering of others causes both pain and pleasure: 
“we love to feel pity”, as Saint Augustine wrote already in the fourth century (Fassin 
2012, 251). While humanitarianism invokes a universalising ethics, compelling us to 
feel sympathy and connection with strangers, it can also engender inequality: 
humanitarianism can serve both revolutionary and counterrevolutionary goals (Barnett 
2011, 221).  
Often, the emergence of humanitarianism is dated back to the abolitionist movements 
in the UK, France, and the US, while the foundation of the Red Cross movement by 
Henry Dunant in 1864 is seen as a pivotal moment in its institutionalisation (Barnett 
2011; Fassin 2012; Ticktin 2011). Where exactly humanitarianism had its beginnings, 
however, is not self-evident: “[h]umanitarianism has a long and sometimes ambiguous 
history, largely because it is not easily defined” (Ticktin 2011, 69). In Douzinas’ 
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words, “[h]umanitarianism started its career as a limited regulation of war but has now 
expanded and affects all aspects of culture and politics” (Douzinas 2007, 57). Michael 
Barnett (2011) divides the history of humanitarianism into three broad phases: 
Imperial Humanitarianism prevailed between 1800 and 1945; Neo-Humanitarianism 
between 1945 and 1989, and Liberal Humanitarianism since the end of the Cold War. 
While compassion for the suffering of other human beings has existed for centuries, 
Barnett characterises the emergence of Imperial Humanitarianism as bearing three 
marks of distinction: “assistance beyond borders, a belief that such transnational action 
was related in some way to the transcendent, and the growing organization and 
governance of activities designed to protect and improve humanity” (Barnett 2011, 
10). From the beginning, two different types of humanitarianism coexisted: “an 
emergency branch that focuses on symptoms, and an alchemical branch that adds the 
ambition of removing the root causes of suffering” (Barnett 2011, 10). Although 
emergency humanitarianism quickly became synonymous with what humanitarianism 
as a whole stood for, including through its success in creating and enacting 
international humanitarian law, branches of humanitarianism that looked at the roots 
of suffering and sought long-term changes existed throughout its history. Importantly, 
both types of humanitarianism were closely bound up with colonialism and racism, 
and the work of missionaries attempting to “civilise” or “humanise” the “savage 
peoples” (Barnett 2011, 82). While humanitarians were initially mostly driven by 
religion, towards the late 19th century references to a transcendent god began to be 
replaced by references to humanity as a whole.  
As the Second World War ended and decolonialisation began in earnest, the shift from 
Imperial to Neo-Humanitarianism was characterised by a move towards 
professionalization, secularisation, and an increasing institutionalisation. As Barnett 
outlines, there were also changes in how the ‘beneficiaries’ of humanitarian practices 
were conceived:  
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[w]ith the missionaries losing ground to the development experts, humanitarians were 
[…] more sensitive to infantilizing language and discarded any hint that these people 
were “backward” or “child-like”, even though distinctions between “undeveloped” 
and “developed” retained evolutionary images in which the West would show the rest 
of the world its future. And, they used expert knowledge and utilized quasi-
technocratic language to justify their interventions. Although these changes could 
suggest a more respectful approach, humanitarianism was still something done for 
and to others, not with them (Barnett 2011, 105). 
In addition to the continued importance of paternalism in humanitarian thought and 
action, the charged political climate of the Cold War led humanitarians to actively 
attempt to appear depolitical, as well as to separate their work from more a politically 
charged human rights language. The foundation of Médecins Sans Frontières in 1971 
was a key development for the “moralist antipolitics” of this era (Ticktin 2011, 73).  
After the end of the Cold War, humanitarian thought and practice transformed once 
more. Its reach expanded, as “[h]umanitarianism was the only feasible direction for 
‘the ethically serious European’ following the discrediting of both communism and 
developmentalism after 1989” (Edkins 2003, 254). In Didier Fassin’s words, “[a] new 
moral economy, centered on humanitarian reason, therefore came into being during 
the last decades of the twentieth century” (Fassin 2012, 7). Simultaneously, the 
proliferation of liberalism, and with it the belief that markets, democracy, and the rule 
of law were the universally applicable solution for all of humankind led to an 
intensification of previously existing trends: the cooperation between state actors and 
humanitarian organisations grew closer, the role of expertise in humanitarian work 
increased, new connections between development, human rights, and relief efforts 
were forged in response to ‘new wars’ and ‘complex emergencies’ (Barnett 2011; 
Ticktin 2011). In contrast to Neo-Humanitarianism, Liberal Humanitarianism 
expanded to root causes of suffering, and became more explicitly political in doing so 
(Barnett 2011, 167). 
Indeed, a repositioning in relation to politics took place in the 1990s. During the Cold 
War, both branches of humanitarianism largely agreed on the necessity to remain 
apolitical, even though they interpreted this differently (with alchemic humanitarians 
including issues such as ‘development’ into their ‘apolitical’ stance). In contrast, the 
end of the Cold War and subsequent events led humanitarians to rethink their 
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relationship to politics, and their identity. Importantly, the emerging consensus was 
that “humanitarianism could and should engage in politics, if by politics it meant 
explicitly recognizing that the goals of justice, peace, and equality required changing 
politics as usual” (Barnett 2011, 195). While some organisations, such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, remained decidedly antipolitical, many 
other humanitarians increasingly embraced an engagement with politics. In the 1990s, 
the relationship between humanitarianism and the military began to change, too, and 
both became increasingly blurred: “whereas at the beginning of the decade aid 
agencies tried to recruit states for their cause, by the beginning of the next decade they 
discovered that states had already co-opted humanitarianism for their interests” 
(Barnett 2011, 172). Around the turn of the millennium, military forces came to view 
humanitarian and human rights actors not as opponents, but as constructive critics 
helping to make military violence more efficient (Weizman 2011, 117).  
While many of the dilemmas humanitarians have faced in the last two decades were 
intensified by the developments after the end of the Cold War – including the tension 
between emergency relief and root causes, as well as the relationship between 
humanitarianism, governance, and politics – they are by no means new, and have often 
been present from the very beginnings of humanitarianism (Barnett 2011, 6). The last 
few decades, however, have further institutionalised humanitarianism, and firmly 
engrained humanitarian ideals in contemporary societies. Fassin argues that 
humanitarian arguments have become unquestionable, and the need to save lives and 
mitigate human suffering are commonly accepted ‘truths’: “[h]umanitarian reason is 
morally untouchable” (Fassin 2012, 244; see also Calhoun 2010; Fassin 2007b, 2010a, 
2010b). This is echoed also by Michel Agier (2010; 2011a; 2011b), who refers to the 
present as the “age of humanitarianism”, in which dissensus to the idea of a shared, 
global humanity is stifled or dismissed. Humanitarianism circulates widely, and the 
media as well as politicians, NGOs, international organisations and activists refer to 
and build on it. Humanitarian arguments have also become more prominent in 
EUropean border governance in recent years (Andersson 2014; Apostolova-Englehart 
2012; Aradau 2004b, 2008; Campesi 2014; Cuttitta 2010, 2014; Fassin and Pandolfi 
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2010; Horsti 2012; Pallister-Wilkins 2015; Tazzioli 2013; Ticktin 2006; Tsianos and 
Hess 2010; Vaughan-Williams 2015a; Walters 2011). In Fassin’s words, “the 
distinctive feature of contemporary societies is without doubt the way that moral 
sentiments have become generalized as a frame of reference in political life” (Fassin 
2012, 247).  
Given the increasing importance of humanitarianism today, the following sections will 
discuss its characteristics in the contemporary world, particularly in relation to the 
governance of migration and borders. As a technique of government, humanitarianism 
is engaged with the management of the “undesirables of the world” both abroad and 
at home, in refugee camps, reception centres and detention facilities (Agier 2011b). 
Both Fassin (2010a, 244) and Agier (2011a) note that humanitarianism has the power 
to let live and to let die. They argue that the life that is either sacrificed or saved is 
what Giorgio Agamben refers to as ‘bare’ or ‘sacred’ life, i.e. mere biological existence 
without a social or political dimension to it (Agamben 1995, 133; Fassin 2010a, 244): 
 
[h]umanitarianism occupies the whole space of life, including the political space: 
situations in which the victim and the guilty, the true refugee and the false refugee, 
the vulnerable and the undesirable occupy the whole representation of the person, and 
sound the end of the citizen who may say what he or she wants without condition 
(Agier 2011a, 202). 
Humanitarianism reduces individuals to victims, simultaneously “stripping them of the 
very cultural, historical, and social processes that make them human and confer 
genuine dignity on them” (Barnett 2011, 228). ‘Victims’ are racialized as non-white, 
and are imagined as strangers: “not just people one happens not to know, but people 
paradigmatically distant” (Calhoun 2010, 33).  
Moreover, ‘victims’ are rarely involved in the decision-making around humanitarian 
action. The professionalization of humanitarianism partially relies on a belief that 
human needs remain constant across diverse contexts and situations, which justifies 
the involvement of experts rather than affected populations in planning and 
implementing humanitarian practices. Expert involvement is presented as objective 
and impartial, but simultaneously keeps power concentrated among a small group of 
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select people: those who are in a position to choose to travel to foreign lands to ‘assist’ 
people ‘in need’ are mostly white, Western, and middle-class. Relying on expert 
knowledge and valuing ‘objective’ expertise over embodied, local experiences can 
further a paternalistic approach:  
 
[h]umanitarianism is the desire to relieve the suffering of distant strangers. 
Paternalism is the act of interfering in the lives of others, often without their 
permission, on the grounds that such interventions are for their own good. Paternalism 
and humanitarianism are not twins, but the family resemblance is often uncanny. 
Humanitarians frequently act first and ask questions later – and at times, not at all 
(Barnett 2011, 233).  
While not all humanitarianism is necessarily paternalistic, paternalism has featured 
strongly throughout its varied history, as shown above.  
Claims to expert and moral authority, moreover, can conceal oppressive power 
relations and even brute force. According to Agier (2010, 2011b), humanitarianism 
can serve as an “instrument of control”. He denounces that often, humanitarian projects 
smooth over destruction and violence caused in the first instance by military 
interventions. Agier argues that humanitarianism acts as the “left hand of Empire”: 
“[t]here is a hand that strikes and a hand that heals” (Agier 2011a). He furthermore 
notes that the “management of undesirables” is becoming increasingly diversified, as 
categories and spaces associated with individuals multiply (see also Zetter 2007). This 
management relies on the combined forces of both humanitarianism and the police, 
which work together in limiting human mobility. “Humanitarian action thus 
increasingly finds itself, if not systematically ‘trapped’, at least included a priori in the 
control strategies of migratory flows of all kinds” (Agier 2011a, 33; see also Pallister-
Wilkins 2015). Humanitarian interventions might channel people to specific places 
where help is provided, keeping them from moving further afield. As one example, 
Agier points out that humanitarian arguments were used to justify plans to control 
mobility beyond EUropean frontiers: during the 2011 political upheavals in North 
Africa, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy for instance proposed the creation of 
regional ‘humanitarian zones’ in order to stop migratory journeys (Agier 2011b).  
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Moreover, Didier Fassin notes that there are hierarchies of lives inherent in 
humanitarianism, which value the lives of those who intervene and those whom they 
assist, or of foreign and national employees, differently. He argues that these 
inequalities do not come from individual prejudices, but are structural aporias of 
humanitarianism. According to Fassin, they are grounded in the asymmetric risks for 
different groups of people, as well as differential relations of compassion vis-à-vis 
these groups (Fassin 2010a, 255). Due to the different valuation of lives in 
humanitarianism, Fassin distances his account somewhat from a Foucauldian, 
biopolitical perspective on the population in its entirety. On the contrary, however, 
Nick Vaughan-Williams argues that Fassin’s understanding of humanitarianism fits 
with a Foucauldian conceptualisation of biopolitics once Foucault’s analysis of racism 
is brought back in (Vaughan-Williams 2015b, 40–43). As discussed in chapter 1, 
Foucault saw racism – i.e. the distinction between ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ lives, 
which allowed for actively killing and ‘letting die’ some parts of the population – as 
central to biopolitics. Following Fassin’s analysis, a similar discrimination and 
differential valuation of lives can be discerned in humanitarianism, which functions as 




Related to humanitarianism but nevertheless distinct from it, the discursive formation 
of human rights similarly enjoys almost universal approval today (Moyn 2010, 15). As 
Douzinas notes,  
 
[h]uman rights appear to have triumphed in the world. They unite left and right, the 
pulpit and the state, the minister and the rebel, the North and the South. Human rights 
are the fate of our societies, the ideology after ‘the end of ideologies’, the only values 
left in a valueless world after ‘the end of history’ (Douzinas 2007, 177–178). 
Also in the EUropean border regime, human rights feature prominently. They are not 
only advanced by the ‘usual suspects’ such as Amnesty International and Human 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security  68 
Rights Watch: importantly, also “EU officials speak fluently in the language of human 
rights with regular references to fair treatment, due process, and personal dignity” (G. 
Feldman 2012, 83). Lending legitimacy to the policies and practices to govern 
migration, human rights are mobilised by EUropean institutions, member state 
politicians, and not least Frontex. They are, like humanitarianism and security, a 
technique of government. Human rights organise political space, frequently aiming to 
monopolise it (Brown 2004, 461). “[T]hey are one way through which the effects of 
power are distributed across the social body” (Douzinas 2007, 101). Gearty sees parts 
of the success of human rights in the space they leave for interpretation and idealism, 
making them adaptable to diverse contexts and societies (Gearty 2014, 38); while 
Brown emphasises their “neat fit” with and legitimation of liberal imperialism and 
global free trade (Brown 2004, 461).  
The wide circulation of human rights points to a fundamental ambiguity at the heart of 
the politics of human rights: “it involves […] the insurrectional movements linked with 
the invention of democracy, but also the instrumental uses of the idea of human rights 
to legitimize the status quo and strategies of domination” (Balibar 2013, 20; see also 
Douzinas 2007; Kennedy 2002). Human rights can thus both conceal and legitimise 
dominant structures, and at the same time also be used as a tool to expose inequalities:  
 
rights are not just defenses against social and political power but are, as an aspect of 
governmentality, a crucial aspect of power’s aperture. As such, they are not simply 
rules and defenses against power, but can themselves be tactics and vehicles of 
governance and domination (Brown 2004, 459; see also Wall 2014, 107). 
In an insightful overview of some of the main debates and critiques of human rights, 
Douzinas and Gearty draw on Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari in arguing that rights 
cannot be understood as a-historical or a-cultural, but are always embedded in power 
relations (Douzinas and Gearty 2014, 8). Moyn (2010) showed that contrary to 
common assumptions, human rights have been intimately tied up with states and 
sovereignty from the beginning. Since the French revolution, states were seen as being 
best suited to guarantee these rights to their citizens. Asad remarked that also the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) almost immediately invoked an 
individual’s belonging to a country or territory, emphasising that “the universal 
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character of the rights-bearing person is made the responsibility of sovereign states, 
each of which has jurisdiction over a limited group within the human family” (Asad 
2000, para. 13). In her famous and related critique, Hannah Arendt (1967) argued that 
rights were deeply implicated with state power and citizenship. They effectively broke 
down when individuals were stripped of their national and citizen rights during 
Nazism, and those without a home and political status found themselves expelled from 
humanity altogether: “[t]he world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of 
being human” (Arendt 1967, 299). While the international human rights system thus 
limits the authority of states over their citizens, it also reinforces state power – up until 
today, a large part of human rights activism and legal work is primarily addressed to 
states (Merry 2006, 5; see also Salter 2012, 750). As Mutua phrased it, “[t]he state is 
the guarantor of human rights; it is also the target and raison d’etre of human rights 
law” (Mutua 2001, 203).  
Despite these clear political entanglements of human rights, activism in this field tends 
to present itself  
 
as something of an antipolitics—a pure defense of the innocent and the powerless 
against power, a pure defense of the individual against immense and potentially cruel 
or despotic machineries of culture, state, war, ethnic conflict, tribalism, patriarchy, 
and other mobilizations or instantiations of collective power against individuals. More 
precisely, human rights take their shape as a moral discursive formation centered on 
pain and suffering rather than political discursive formation of comprehensive justice 
(Brown 2004, 453). 
This self-representation is linked to the specific history of contemporary human rights, 
which Moyn argues could only become this successful globally by being precisely 
that: a minimalist, legalistic anti-politics. Rather than grounding human rights in an 
ancient history reaching back to notions of natural or God-given rights, Moyn (2007) 
argues that any such attempt “distorts the past to suit the present”. While contemporary 
connotations of human rights “[draw] on prior languages and practices the way a 
chemical reaction depends on having various elements around from different sources”, 
Moyn (2007) cautions against a linear reading of the concept’s history. He emphasises 
that there are major differences in how rights were conceptualised during the French 
revolution, for instance, and how they are conceptualised today. Linking both risks 
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failing to recognise the specificities of each (Moyn 2010, 25). Even the incorporation 
of human rights in international treaties and the United Nations should not be 
connected uncritically to the contemporary discursive formation of human rights, 
which Moyn argues has rather different connotations. In the 1940s, human rights 
featured only marginally in discussions around a new, global order. Moreover, the 
concept failed to ‘take off’ in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War 
because it failed to provide a solution to the most pressing dilemma of the time: 
whether human wellbeing was better attainable under communism or social 
democracy. Only in the 1970s did the term ‘human rights’ enter common parlance and 
transcend merely legalistic uses, following its growing mobilisation among dissident 
movements in communist countries. At that stage, other utopian visions had failed, 
and human rights as a minimalist ‘anti-politics’ could lead a way out of this impasse 
(Moyn 2010).  
By framing struggles in terms of individual rights instead of political structures, human 
rights conceal deeper issues around the roots of conflict and injustices, and focus on 
small improvements for particular individuals or groups rather than the more 
fundamental and large-scale questioning of exploitative structures or political systems 
(Douzinas 2007, 109–110). As such, “[h]uman rights remedies, even when successful, 
treat the symptoms rather than the illness, and this allows the illness not only to fester, 
but to seem like health itself. […] this may, in some contexts, place the human rights 
movement in the uncomfortable position of legitimating more injustice than it 
eliminates” (Kennedy 2002, 118 & 119). Notably, this legalistic, anti-political 
approach with its focus on the individual and the importance of jurisprudence emerged 
within a specifically Western context (Mutua 1995, 489). Similarly, a recent shift 
towards a more programmatic, comprehensive approach to human rights – which 
coexists with a more minimalist, rights-based interpretation – can be situated in the 
West. As Moyn (2010) notes, human rights are now frequently bound up with notions 
of democracy, good governance, and liberalism (see also Brown 2004, 455).  
At the same time, human rights have marginalised other forms of critique in recent 
decades: “[h]uman rights ideas displace alternative visions of social justice that are 
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less individualistic and more focused on communities and responsibilities, possibly 
contributing to the cultural homogenization of local communities” (Merry 2006, 4; see 
also Kennedy 2002, 108). This has furthered critiques of what some might frame as an 
imperialist stroke of contemporary human rights, in which visions of a ‘better’ society 
and political system are sought to be actively spread around the world (see e.g. Asad 
2000; Mutua 2001). As justifications of recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq showed, 
rights have become an instrument of particularly Western states to spread ‘universal 
values’, such as liberalism and good governance across the world (Brown 2004, 460; 
Mutua 2001, 223). As such, human rights “are part of the cultural package of the West, 
complete with an idiom of expression, a system of government, and certain basic 
assumptions about the individual and his relationship to society” (Mutua 2001, 237). 
Where states fail to adhere to particular standards, they are deemed less ‘civilised’ at 
best, and at worst perceived as a case for liberal intervention (Anghie 2006, 745). The 
spread of this “cultural package”, then, has not had (only) positive effects. As Michael 
Ignatieff, a defender of human rights and liberalism, acknowledges: “the impact of this 
shift [towards human rights as a moral imperium] has not necessarily been to the 
benefit of oppressed individuals, but rather to the benefit of the states which intervene 
in other states in the name of human rights” (Ignatieff, cited in Mutua 2007, 610, 
footnote 215; see also Douzinas 2007, 33).  
Like security and humanitarianism, human rights also produce particular subject 
positions in need of specific forms of protection. As the discursive formation presents 
itself primarily in moral rather than political terms, it tends to focus on the relief of 
pain and suffering rather than on ideals of comprehensive justice (Brown 2004). In 
doing so, it divides humanity into distinct parts. Similarly to humanitarianism, human 
rights produce victims and rescuers, who depend on each other: rescuers exist only if 
there are victims, and victims need to be recognised as such by a rescuer (Douzinas 
2007, 68). Importantly, however, human rights also produce perpetrators, who are 
deemed as evil and degenerate. Accordingly, “[t]he grand narrative of human rights 
contains a subtext that depicts an epochal contest pitting savages, on the one hand, 
against victims and saviors, on the other” (Mutua 2001, 201). The focus on perpetrators 
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is somewhat different from humanitarianism, which primarily emphasises the 
undeserved suffering of victims and their heroic saviours. In a further difference, 
human rights focus specifically on regulating the relationships between states and their 
citizens. Human rights focus on the entitlements and rights of victims, and might thus 
be viewed as potentially more emancipatory than humanitarianism: “[d]uties are owed 
to the other person, whereas charity can be weighed against other considerations, such 
as the seriousness of the situation and questions of convenience or financial results, 
and is open for individual utilitarian calculations” (Basaran 2015, 213; see also Barry 
1982). Nevertheless, due to their specific codification in law, human rights are 
generally understood as principles that need to be balanced against one another, and 
can be limited or restricted to maintain e.g. national security, or the human rights of 
others (Douzinas 2007, 60). Humanitarianism on the other hand does not have these 
in-built limitations.  
While they have different emphases and histories, humanitarianism and human rights 
tend to blur in contemporary practice, with rights-focused NGOs such as Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International working on humanitarian topics, such as 
appealing for search and rescue measures in the Mediterranean Sea; and humanitarian 
NGOs such as the Red Cross movement calling for respect for fundamental rights 
(Amnesty International 2014a; Human Rights Watch 2012a; ICRC 2015). Given some 
of the key similarities between the two discursive formations, this is not necessarily 
surprising: both are centred on the notion of a common humanity, focus on limiting 
unnecessary human suffering, and at the same time perpetuate hierarchies of suffering 
(by for instance legitimising military interventions). Having introduced each of the 
three discursive formations at the centre of this thesis individually in this section, I will 
now move on to a discussion of their relationship, looking at similarities and points of 
tension between them.  
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Interconnections between humanitarianism, human rights, and 
security 
Entanglements in practice 
When looking at some of the developments in the EUropean border regime over the 
last decade, the close relationships between all three discursive formations become 
visible. As noted before, the EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
(GAMM), adopted in May 2012, features language commonly associated with 
securitisation, as well as “a strong humanitarian concern expressed for the lives and 
well-being of ‘irregular’ migrants precisely as humans with the same fundamental 
rights as EUropean citizens” (Vaughan-Williams 2015a, 3). This double concern is 
also reiterated in a number of other EUropean policy documents, including the 
regulation of the European Border Surveillance System EUROSUR (European 
Commission 2011b). In this section, the entanglement of humanitarian, human rights, 
and security in contemporary border and migration practices will be discussed. 
Subsequently, I will turn to an analysis of their discursive similarities.  
In terms of practices, Paolo Cuttitta (2013, 2014) showed how humanitarianism and 
security reinforced one another at the example of Lampedusa. By failing to transfer 
new arrivals from the little island to the Italian mainland and even closing down the 
local reception centre, the Italian government constructed humanitarian emergencies 
in Lampedusa at will. Images of ‘masses’ sleeping rough, and concern about the 
inability of the island to deal with arrivals that at times outnumbered the resident 
population were then mobilised to justify further security measures to prevent irregular 
migration, such as push-back operations in the Mediterranean Sea. Restrictive and 
security-focused practices were thus advanced by creating and capitalising on what 
was widely perceived to be a humanitarian emergency. The example of Lampedusa is 
not an exception: in the wake of the Cap Anamur case10 in 2004, the German and 
                                                 
10 The Cap Anamur was a ship owned by a German NGO with the same name. In 2004, the ship’s crew rescued 37 
migrants in distress at sea close to Italian waters. The Italian government refused the boat entry into Italian territorial 
waters, and a nearly two-week standoff between the Italian coastguard and the Cap Anamur ensued. Eventually, 
the boat disembarked in Sicily, where most of those who had been rescued were deported immediately. The ship’s 
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Italian Ministers of the Interior Schily and Pisanu mobilised humanitarian arguments 
to promote the creation of extraterritorial camps for asylum seekers, claiming these 
would stop migrant deaths at sea (Hess and Tsianos 2007; Klepp 2010a). Similarly, 
deaths in Ceuta and Melilla in 2005 and arrivals of wooden boats in the Canary Islands 
in 2006 were used to articulate a sense of humanitarian concern: again, “the narrative 
of the new humanitarianism was used, which demands the prevention of migration to 
avoid human tragedies” (Hess and Tsianos 2007, 34–35, my translation).  
Such a framing is however deeply problematic: it “shadows the fact that the targeted 
persons are not only bodies to be saved, but subjects of rights” (Jeandesboz 2011, 123). 
Moreover, it does not take threats individuals might face in origin or transit countries 
into account, as well as failing to problematize the EUropean visa regime and border 
controls that create the need for smuggling services in the first place. It seems bizarre 
to justify forcibly preventing people from leaving North and West African shores by 
claiming that this would save their lives; especially when it is known that among them 
are people fleeing violence and persecution. Nevertheless, humanitarian arguments 
have become one of the main justifications for externalising border controls (Casas-
Cortes et al. 2015, 74).  
As discussed in chapter 1, Bigo (2002a) and Cuttitta (2014) contend that 
humanitarianism is a by-product of securitisation. Contrary to them, I argue that 
humanitarianism and human rights ought to be taken seriously as independent 
discursive formations. Most importantly, humanitarianism and human rights should 
not be dismissed as mere strategies aiming to advance or conceal security actors’ 
objectives. Such an instrumentalist perspective not only fails to do justice to the 
multiplicity of actors involved in mobilising these discursive formations, it also 
presupposes a singular, overarching rationality that drives processes in the border 
regime. As discussed above, humanitarianism and human rights can be used to conceal 
or to expose injustices and oppression: politicians and security actors rely on 
humanitarianism and human rights as much as activists, NGOs, and unauthorised 
                                                 
captain and two crew members were charged with assistance to illegal immigration. They were acquitted in 2009 
(Baldaccini 2010; Hans 2009). 
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border-crossers themselves. Reporting from their research on Lesbos, Tsianos, Hess, 
and Karakayali note that “[b]oth the migrants in the camp, as well as the critics in the 
metropolises, rely on a human rights discursive formation that seems at present to be 
the only vehicle capable of articulating migrants’ interests” (Tsianos, Hess, and 
Karakayali 2009, 7; see also Tsianos and Karakayali 2010, 383). Humanitarian and 
human rights language is mobilised in opposition to securitising practices as much as 
justification for them – its relation to security is more complex than merely 
instrumentalist accounts would be able to grasp.  
 
Discursive similarities  
Instead, what I propose in this thesis is that there are crucial commonalities across all 
three discursive formations, which create the conditions of possibility for the 
appropriation of humanitarianism and human rights by state and security actors. The 
following observations are focused on the particular articulation of humanitarianism, 
human rights, and security in the contemporary governance of EUropean borders: “[i]n 
archaeological analysis comparison is always limited and regional. Far from wishing 
to reveal general forms, archaeology tries to outline particular configurations” 
(Foucault 1972, 157). While it does not offer a full Foucauldian archaeology, this 
section examines the proximities of the three discursive formations in relation to the 
subjectivities and techniques of government they produce, as well as their relationship 
to sovereign power, neo-imperialism, and politics. Despite being only a partial analysis 
of their discursive relations, the following discussion provides insights into the 
preconditions for the intertwinement of humanitarianism, human rights, and security 
formations with each other, and for the appropriation of humanitarianism and human 
rights by the security actor Frontex.  
First of all, proximity across the discursive formations can be found in relation to the 
subject positions they produce. While using different concepts, it is notable that each 
formation produces a migrant ‘other’. Security others in a variety of ways, positing 
particular groups as ‘illegals’, ‘terrorists’, ‘criminals’, ‘welfare scroungers’, ‘risky 
subjects’, ‘bogus asylum seekers’, ‘carriers of diseases’, or of questionable morality, 
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and opposing ‘them’ to a homogenised ‘us’ to be protected. While being based on the 
ideal of a common humanity, humanitarianism on the other hand relies on the 
construction of subjects as ‘victims’ versus ‘saviours’, in which the former are 
debased, pitied, and looked down upon. Similarly, also human rights construct victims, 
perpetrators, and saviours. Victims are faceless, nameless, and defined by their 
deficiencies, dependency and needs (Agier 2010, 2011a; Douzinas 2007).  
 
[E]very human rights campaign or humanitarian intervention presupposes an element 
of contempt for the situation and the victims. Human rights are part of an attitude of 
the postcolonial world in which the ‘misery’ of Africa is the result of its failings and 
corruption, its traditional attitudes and lack of modernisation, its nepotism and 
inefficiency, in a word of its sub-humanity (Douzinas 2007, 70). 
Both the figure of the ‘illegal’ in the discursive formation of security and that of the 
‘victim’ in humanitarianism and human rights are “incompatible with those of the 
subject and the citizen”, and the transition between the former two is frequent and 
random (Agier 2011a, 215; see also Andersson 2014, 280). Both are racialised 
categories, imagined as non-white and non-Western (Douzinas 2007, 85; Mutua 2001, 
207). Jenny Edkins argued that this differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ – which 
all three discursive formations share – “is the reason […] why an increase in talk of 
normative criteria and the moral basis of humanitarianism is accompanied so closely 
by the incorporation of the independent humanitarian movement in practices of 
governance” (Edkins 2003, 255).  
It is the white, Western citizen which figures in all three discursive formations as 
implicit ‘us’. In humanitarianism and human rights, the citizen becomes the saviour, 
affirming their own humanity by ‘helping’ others. Importantly, the relationship 
between saviours and victims is a hierarchical one: “[w]e do not like these others, but 
we love pitying them. They, the savages/victims, make us civilised” (Douzinas 2007, 
70). It is this pity that is at times mobilised by activists in an effort to counter the 
portrayal of migrants as dangerous others and security threats. Not only is pity 
hierarchical, however, it also fails to fundamentally challenge existing categorisations 
(Aradau 2008, 35; Douzinas 2007, 97). As Claudia Aradau (2008) shows at the 
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example of trafficked women, invoking them as specifically pitiable victims indirectly 
reinforces the categorisation of other people on the move and prostitutes as delinquent 
subjects, given the construction of trafficked women as different from these groups 
(see also Ratfisch and Scheel 2010). At the same time, victims of trafficking 
themselves continue to be subjected to disciplinary techniques, have to follow 
particular rehabilitation programmes, and are often still ultimately returned to their 
home countries.  
Secondly, all three discursive formations can be said to produce and reinforce 
sovereign power. The discursive formation of security tends to take the state or the 
nation as its referent object, focusing on the threat people on the move allegedly pose 
to them. As Lene Hansen pointed out, “[t]hreats and insecurities are not just potentially 
undermining of the state and things that could be eliminated, they constitute the state: 
the state only knows who and what it is through its juxtaposition against the radical, 
threatening Other” (L. Hansen 2006, 30). In Giorgio Agamben’s (1995) analysis, 
sovereignty has its origin in the production of bare life, which it simultaneously 
includes and excludes. Sovereign power decides over the life and death of its subjects. 
Humanitarianism focuses on those who are deemed to constitute bare life, and appeals 
for pity and assistance on their behalf. It does not fundamentally question their 
exclusion, but instead perpetuates their ‘othering’ further: 
 
[i]n the same way that sovereign power produces the bare life it needs to sustain itself, 
humanitarianism renders people into needy victims, lives to be saved taken outside of 
the workings of normal juridical–political order, in such a way that justifies flouting 
norms of territorial integrity and ‘intervening’ in the affairs of another sovereign state 
(Vaughan-Williams 2009a, 134–135; see also Edkins 2003). 
Also human rights have from their very beginning been bound up with exclusions, and 
qualifications of who was (not) viewed as ‘human’. Examining the history of 
international declarations, Douzinas finds that “[h]uman rights and national 
sovereignty – the two antithetical principles of international law – were born together, 
their contradiction more apparent than real” (Douzinas 2007, 98; see also Edkins 2000, 
18). When appealing to the state as the principal guarantor for human rights, state 
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responsibility and power are further strengthened and legitimised. Consequentially, 
Douzinas describes human rights and sovereignty as “two sides of the same coin” 
(Douzinas 2007, 178). By focusing on expanding human rights to particular categories 
of people, their lives become incorporated into the field of bio-sovereignty, further 
strengthening it:  
 
the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts with 
central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of 
individuals’ lives within the state order, thus offering a new and more dreadful 
foundation for the very sovereign power from which they wanted to liberate 
themselves (Agamben 1995, 121). 
In sum, security, humanitarianism, and human rights produce and depend on those 
who are ruled, those who rule, and those who are excluded (Edkins 2003, 256). Rather 
than challenging sovereignty, the discursive formations of humanitarianism and 
human rights tend to reinforce it (Caldwell 2004, 6). 
When exploring the techniques of government tied up with each of the formations, 
further proximities emerge. Security is concerned with governing populations through 
biopolitical and disciplinary means, including the use of databases to establish ‘risk 
profiles’ of entrants, the filtering of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ border-crossers, and the use 
of detention and deportation against ‘undesirables’, who are confined to or removed 
from particular spaces. Human rights on the other hand are intimately bound up with 
liberal ideas about self-expression, individualism, and the rule of law, and function 
both as biopolitical and disciplinary techniques of power (Douzinas 2007). In relation 
to the government of people on the move, the formation of human rights also often 
entails an element of spatial confinement, or government of people in space. This 
occurs at the very least while the determination of categories of protection and rights 
takes place, but also in relation to particular categories of people – such as 
unaccompanied minors – who are assigned to particular spaces over longer periods of 
time.  
A further example for this type of spatial governance is the Dublin Regulation, which 
facilitates the confinement and at times deportation of people on the move to the first 
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EU country they enter for the purposes of initially determining and subsequently 
accessing their rights. Lastly, humanitarianism has been described as the “management 
of undesirables” (Agier 2011a) and a “form of policing” (Agier 2010) that governs 
populations in ways at times not dissimilar to security, often through spatial 
confinements in camps. Makaremi (2009) coined the term “humanitarian 
confinement” in relation to France’s government of asylum seekers and irregular 
arrivals, referring to the spatial practice of confining victims/threats in so-called 
‘international zones’ at airports. As Walters notes, “[t]his paradoxical term effectively 
captures the ambivalence of a policy that engages its target population as 
simultaneously vulnerable and criminalized” (Walters 2015, 7). All three discursive 
formations thus rely on disciplinary and biopolitical techniques to govern populations, 
centrally including the government of people in space.  
Fourthly, humanitarianism, human rights, and security can all be argued to include 
neo-imperialist ambitions. Striving for ‘pre-emptive’ security (de Goede, Simon, and 
Hoijtink 2014), ‘buffer zones’ are being created outside of the EUropean borders, 
extraterritorialising security, border controls, and sometimes deaths to third states 
(Zaiotti 2009). Human rights have been used to justify wars and interventions, as well 
as to ‘other’ particular communities – e.g. Muslims for their alleged lack of respect for 
women’s or gay rights – both at home and abroad (Douzinas 2007). They carry 
assumptions about ‘civilised’ and ‘backwards’ societies within them, which are 
intricately bound up with ideas of racial inferiority (Merry 2006, 226). Merry adds to 
this that the human rights system is shaped by deep inequalities in power and resources 
between the global North and the global South. While human rights cannot be said to 
constitute a coercive or consistent legal system, they have emerged as a powerful 
discursive formation that transports ideas about ‘civility’, ‘good governance’, and 
liberalism across national boundaries: “the globalization of human rights fits a 
historical pattern in which all high morality comes from the West as a civilizing agent 
against lower forms of civilization in the rest of the world” (Mutua 2001, 210). Indeed, 
both human rights and humanitarian arguments have been used to justify military 
interventions by Western states over the last two decades. As Kennedy asserts, “[t]he 
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human rights vocabulary promises Western constituencies a politics-neutral and 
universalist mode of emancipatory intervention elsewhere in the world” (Kennedy 
2002, 117). Donnelly refers to ‘imperial humanitarianism’ to capture the 
problematique of military interventions justified in humanitarian terms (Donnelly 
2007, 298), and Balibar similarly notes that “‘humanitarian right’ turns out to be 
intimately combined with imperialist strategies for policing the world” (Balibar 2013, 
19).  
Lastly, humanitarianism, human rights, and security discursive formations can be seen 
as antipolitics which simplify the issues they are concerned with, portraying suggested 
actions as the only viable option to ensure security, or to reduce suffering and injustice. 
As Douzinas notes, humanitarianism tends to mask the complexities of reality, and 
focuses on the immediate relief of suffering:  
 
[u]nited in our pity, we call for soothing interventions and care little for the pre- or 
post-intervention situation as long as they reduce the amount of pain. As a result, the 
complexity of history, the thick political context and the plurality of possible 
responses to each new ‘humanitarian tragedy’ is lost (Douzinas 2007, 82). 
Reactions to human rights violations are of similar urgency and simplicity, whereas 
exceptionalist securitising focuses on combating what is framed as an existential 
threat, rather than addressing the underlying factors that lead to the emergence of such 
‘threats’ in the first place. Simplifying complex issues, humanitarianism, human 
rights, and exceptionalist securitising all tend to naturalise proposed policy options, 
portraying them as the only choice.  
Despite apparent differences, the discursive formations of security, humanitarianism, 
and human rights thus share a number of important commonalities. The similarities 
and connections across the three discursive formations have created the prerequisites 
for their contemporaneous articulation in a wider interdiscourse11 of migration control 
                                                 
11 The concept interdiscourse is taken from Michel Pêcheux’s (1982) work and refers to a complex of 
related discursive formations, the meanings of which are partially determined by their relationships with 
each other (see also Fairclough 1992).  
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in contemporary EUropean border governance in which they have, at times, become 
almost exchangeable. Similarities across the discursive formations have allowed for 
the appropriation of humanitarianism and human rights by state and security actors, as 
doing so does not fundamentally challenge the assumptions under which they exist and 
operate. Their entanglement has further allowed for frequent transitions between the 
discursive formations, at times barely noticeable: a humanitarian ‘crisis’ can be 
responded to with security ‘solutions’; a human rights deficit in a given place might 
justify the intervention of a security agency. Invoking one of the formations in the 
ambivalent field of border governance might produce effects within the others, due to 
the close connections they share.  
At the same time, the specific relations that humanitarianism, human rights, and 
security have with one another do not erode their existence as distinct discursive 
formations: as the first part of this chapter showed, differences between them persist. 
What this discussion sought to show, however, is that in seeking to understand the rise 
of humanitarian and human rights rhetoric among state and security actors, it is 
important to take the close connections these three discursive formations have come 
to share over time into account.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I introduced the three discursive formations that are at the centre of this 
thesis, and situated them in their historical context. Subsequently, I explored how 
humanitarianism, human rights, and security are related to one another. In particular, 
I argued that each of the discursive formations ‘others’ people on the move, 
constructing them as victims, smugglers, or ‘illegals’ respectively; each produces and 
reinforces sovereign power; each works as technique of power, has neo-imperialist 
ambitions, and simplifies and decontextualizes issues to provide easy solutions. In 
highlighting these similarities, I sought to destabilise both common assumptions about 
the opposition of the discursive formations to each other, and instrumentalist accounts 
of the appropriation of humanitarianism and human rights by state and security actors. 
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Similarities between the three discursive formations need to be taken seriously, as they 
help explain why humanitarianism and human rights have failed to pose a fundamental 
challenge to security policies in recent years. In conclusion, I argue that discursive 
commonalities between the three formations constitute the preconditions for their 
increasing entanglement in EUropean border governance, and the appropriation of 
humanitarianism and human rights by state and security actors. As the following 
chapters will show, the similarities between the discursive formations have allowed 
Frontex to increasingly portray itself as a saviour of ‘migrant victims’, as doing so 
does not entail the need to question the fundamentals of contemporaneously existing 
security discursive formations: Frontex has simultaneously been able to uphold its 
identity as a protector of EUropean citizens from ‘migrant threats’. 
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Chapter 3: Methods and Methodology 
Having situated this thesis in the wider literature of critical border and security studies, 
and having outlined some of the conceptual reflections on humanitarianism, human 
rights, and security that are central to this thesis, this chapter will introduce the 
methodological assumptions my work is based on and the methods I used. As such, it 
will serve as guidance for chapters 4, 5, and 6, which will present the empirical 
findings of my research. After an initial discussion on the relevance and role of 
methods and methodology in international relations, and within critical research in this 
area, I will explain why I chose to study Frontex as an example of the articulation of 
the discursive formations of humanitarianism, human rights, and security in the 
EUropean border regime. Subsequently, I will introduce the methods I used to study 
Frontex, drawing on the concepts of experimentation and bricolage. Lastly, I will 
provide a number of reflections on this thesis and the research process, pertaining to 
my positionality and personal motivations, issues of access and negotiations within the 
security field, and some of the limitations I see and acknowledge in this present work.  
 
Critical research, methods and methodology 
As pointed out before, I situate myself within the critical traditions of migration, 
border, and security studies. Accordingly, I ascribe to different understandings of 
ontology, epistemology, and the role of research in society than those most commonly 
adhered to in political science. Rejecting positivist notions of value-free, objective 
research, critical researchers also challenge the problem-solving, empiricist approach 
of the positivist paradigm, and instead question common assumptions, norms, and 
givens in today’s world (Guillaume 2013; Law and Urry 2004; E. Newman 2010). 
This debate has real consequences: uncritical research into border controls risks 
generating knowledge that might contribute to tougher enforcement and increased 
exclusion, siding - while maintaining a supposedly neutral approach - ultimately with 
the more powerful (Düvell, Triandafyllidou, and Vollmer 2009). This speaks to what 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Methods and Methodology   84 
some have problematized within social sciences more generally: the inability to carry 
out ‘bias-free’ research, as the choice is between uncritically accepting and 
legitimising the status quo, or questioning and changing it (see Becker 1967; Gouldner 
1973; Mies 1992).  
As an illustration of this, Bigo cautioned against the common use of administrative 
labels as analytical concepts in research, including human trafficking, refugees vs. 
migrants, and national security: “[w]hen these labels are used by academics as 
categories of understanding, the state is articulated through these authors more than 
they have a capacity to think about the state” (Bigo 2011, 230–231). Governmental 
categories are reinforced and legitimised in such approaches. Beyond the use of 
specific concepts, other authors have problematized the prevalence of “national 
paradigms” or a “container model of society” in much of migration research, which 
relies on and simultaneously reinforces the nation-state (Bommes and Thränhardt 
2012; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). While critical scholarship seeks to probe, 
question, or challenge common labels and practices, it does not always escape from 
this form of “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). 
Drawing out commonalities among critical approaches, Salter (2013b) formulated four 
postures of critical inquiry. He identified a shared conviction that social and political 
realities are messy and defy ascriptions of single, unifying principles, and that agency 
is everywhere, including in individuals, groups, ideas, and objects. He furthermore 
argued that critical inquiry understands causality as emergent: “analyses set out the 
conditions of possibility for a set of politics, identities, or policies, rather than a single 
or complex source” (Salter 2013b, 2). Lastly, Salter reiterated the point already raised 
above, which is that all research, writing, and other forms of engagement are inherently 
political: “we understand politics in its broadest sense to mean questions concerning 
justice, power, and authority; critical scholarship means an active engagement with the 
world” (Salter 2013b, 2).  
For some years, there was a scarcity of literature discussing what such a positioning 
might mean in terms of methods. In part, this might have been due to the fact that 
methods were often criticised for being disciplining or hygienising (Aradau and 
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Huysmans 2013, 2). More recently, however, there has been a renewed interest in 
questions of methods in critical research, as publications by Hansen (2006), Aradau 
and Huysmans (2013), and two edited books on this topic illustrate (Aradau, 
Huysmans, et al. 2015a; Salter and Mutlu 2013). These most recent engagements with 
methods have distanced themselves from the disciplining and constraining canon of 
research methods as it is frequently taught to students in the social sciences. Instead, 
the authors contend that “method and methodological reflections can be a key site of 
revisiting critique and politics in IR research” (Aradau and Huysmans 2013, 3). In 
doing so, they make a number of moves that challenge ‘traditional’ conceptions of 
methods.  
First, they position themselves against dividing and hierarchically arranging 
methodology and methods as it is commonly done, with theory as coming first, 
followed by methodology and finally methods (Aradau, Huysmans, et al. 2015b; 
Aradau and Huysmans 2013). Instead, they propose conceptualising – and 
problematizing – method as practice: “[m]ethods are a practice of and within power 
relations; they exercise power and are inscribed by power relations” (Aradau, 
Huysmans, et al. 2015b, 11). As such, the authors also emphasise the performative and 
political character of methods, which are understood not merely as describing worlds, 
but as creating them in continuously changing ways. Social realities, identities, 
categories, and objects are made and re-made through methods, which act within and 
upon social and security worlds (Aradau and Huysmans 2013; Aradau, Huysmans, et 
al. 2015b; Law 2004; Law and Urry 2004). Following such a conceptualisation, 
researchers need to make choices pertaining to the kinds of worlds they want to enact 
when selecting and employing methods. Given that their methods interfere with and 
have effects on the world, they are inevitably political: “[t]here is no innocence” (Law 
and Urry 2004, 404; see also Law 2004). Disengagement becomes impossible, and the 
question remains instead one of how to engage with the world. Law and Urry argue 
that dominant methods in the social sciences mirror their historical legacy, particularly 
a 19th century focus on fixing, demarcating and categorising a world “out there” (Law 
and Urry 2004, 403).  
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Methods and Methodology   86 
Proposing a more ‘contemporary’ and critical approach to methods, Aradau and 
Huysmans suggest conceptualising them as devices and acts. As devices, methods are 
“probing and messy rather than logically and procedurally strict”, an understanding 
that “changes the principles guiding scientific research from rigour and systematicity 
to experimentation and bricolage” (Aradau and Huysmans 2013, 12). Not only is this 
according to the authors in line with much of scientific practice, which merely tends 
to be presented as impeccably logical and systematic ex post facto, but it might 
encourage a more openly and explicitly experimental approach to research. Critical 
research as bricolage experimentally brings together “concepts, questions, and 
controversies distinct to empirical sites” (Aradau, Huysmans, et al. 2015b, 9), 
“enact[ing] worlds in fragile ways that only become temporarily stabilized” (Aradau 
and Huysmans 2013, 13). In addition, and connected to the performativity and political 
character of methods, Aradau and Huysmans reconceptualise methods as acts. As 
such, they can affect ruptures in dominant knowledge and politics, for instance by 
supporting subjugated knowledge or subjects (Aradau and Huysmans 2013, 17). This 
resonates with what Sandro Mezzadra identified as a key task of militant research: “the 
ability to locate and consolidate the possibility of ruptures” (Mezzadra in Garelli and 
Tazzioli 2013c, 310). 
This thesis builds on work within the multi-faceted tradition of critical border and 
security studies, and acknowledges the performative and political character of 
methods. Understanding methods as messy and experimental, I will outline how and 
why I conducted my research, and reflect on how particular choices I made – as well 
as my own positionality – influenced the research process. Before doing so, however, 
I will outline why I decided to focus on Frontex in particular in this study.  
 
Studying Frontex  
Founded in 2004, Frontex quickly became a symbol for tighter controls at – and 
beyond – EUrope’s borders, the advance of security technology, partnerships with 
private security and arms companies, and the failure to rescue those in distress at sea. 
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As such, it has attracted an enormous amount of criticism by NGOs, activists, and 
scholars, much of which is centred around issues of human rights (inter alia, Baldaccini 
2010; Carrera 2007; Cholewinksi 2004; Human Rights Watch 2011; Keller et al. 2011; 
Klepp 2010b; Papastavridis 2010; Pollack and Slominski 2009; statewatch and 
migreurop 2012). While a large part of this criticism focuses on Frontex’s practical 
missions, the agency plays a crucial role in the EUropean border regime also in another 
regard: 
 
[a]part from the operative elements, which aim to develop a European border 
protection practice, Frontex is a ‘think tank’, which conceptualises future blueprints 
of the border, as well as a laboratory, which generates experimental knowledge about 
the consequences of conceptual changes for the practice of ‘border management’. 
Meanwhile, the agency portrays itself as a neutral, technology-oriented service 
provider, which stays out of political decision-making (Kasparek 2010, 113–114, my 
translation). 
Frontex does thus not only shape border practices, but also border thinking. Given its 
importance as a “think tank” and “laboratory”, and its high symbolic relevance in 
EUropean border governance, Frontex makes for a suitable case study to better 
understand recent developments in the border regime. According to Yin (2003, 13), 
“[a] case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident.” While some have criticised case studies for failing to 
generate generalizable knowledge, Flyvbjerg (2006, 223) pointed out that “there does 
not and probably cannot exist predictive theory in social science.” Yin (2003) 
remarked that while case studies are not generalizable to populations, they are instead 
generalizable to theoretical propositions, and Walton (1992) even suggested that case 
studies might produce the best theory.  
As noted, Frontex has been at the centre of human rights and humanitarian criticism 
of EUropean border controls. Seemingly oblivious of the stark criticism in its early 
years, the agency began appropriating these discourses in 2008, and has greatly 
increased references to them in its official communications and documents (see 
introduction). As legislative changes by the Commission and the Council obliged 
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Frontex to create the position of a Fundamental Rights Officer and an advisory 
Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, then Frontex executive director Laitinen 
declared that “[n]ot only respect for Fundamental Rights, but their active promotion, 
is a firm cornerstone of the agency’s strategy” (Frontex 2012a). In addition, Frontex 
signed working agreements with the UNHCR in 2008 and with the Fundamental 
Rights Agency in 2010 (FRA 2010; UNHCR 2008). Both organisations by now are 
also part of the agency’s Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, which comprises 
nine NGOs12 and six international organisations13 who advise Frontex on all matters 
pertaining to fundamental rights. These developments have led some to be optimistic, 
suggesting that Frontex might be underway to become a “rights-advocate agency” 
(Horii 2012, 176). While my view of recent developments is more cautious, Frontex 
has clearly shifted its discourse considerably over the last years.  
Nevertheless, Frontex is not (only) a humanitarian and human rights actor. It is at the 
heart of the surveillance system EUROSUR, the primary goal of which is “detecting 
and preventing irregular migration and cross-border crime” (European Commission 
2011b). It continues using quasi-military equipment to detect unauthorised border 
crossings, and conceptualising irregular migration as ‘risk’ and ‘threat’. When the 
agency refers to “vulnerability”, most often it refers to the vulnerability of the borders 
to unauthorised migration (Frontex 2013b). Frontex’s main goal is the control of 
EUropean borders, and as shown in the introduction already, it combines the discursive 
formations of humanitarianism, human rights, and security in its work.  
When studying how Frontex mobilises these three discourses in practice, it is 
important to bear in mind that the agency is embedded in a wider network of actors, 
including member states, EUropean institutions and agencies, NGOs, international 
                                                 
12 AIRE Centre, Amnesty International’s European Institutions; Caritas Europa; Churches’ Commission 
for Migrants in Europe; European Council for Refugees and Exiles; International Commission of Jurists; 
Jesuit Refugee Service; Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants; Red Cross 
EU Office 
13 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; Council of Europe; European Asylum Support 
Office; International Organization for Migration; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights; 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe. 
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organisations, and others. Far from being the omnipotent actor that NGOs at times 
seem to portray it as, Frontex is itself partly controlled by member states and EU 
institutions (Rijpma 2010). With its roughly 300 staff members, it is dwarfed by the 
175,000 national border guards in the EU (Frontex 2013c, 2015). Frontex is dependent 
on the European Parliament and the Council as budgetary authorities, and is controlled 
by a management board consisting of member state and Commission representatives 
(Peers 2011). It does not have the power and autonomy to control EUropean border 
governance that tends to be attributed to it, and is only one actor among many engaged 
in ‘managing’ migration in the EUropean border regime (Bialasiewicz 2012, 845). In 
this context, understanding social and political realities as messy is of particular 
relevance: imposing a singular, unitary principle or rationality on an agency situated 
amongst and partially controlled by a highly fragmented and diversified group of 
stakeholders would fail to capture the complexities of this environment itself, and of 
the agency’s negotiation of its position within it. 
Despite Frontex’s embeddedness in this wider field, the agency remains an insightful 
actor to study in relation to developments in the border regime. It promotes a common 
“border guard culture” through its trainings, academies, and events; invests in research 
and development of ‘new solutions’ in border governance; and engages on its own 
terms with member states and EU institutions. It brings together border forces, the 
industry, and policymakers, and pro-actively constructs understandings of border 
governance through its website, media interviews, and other forms of public 
interventions. All its activities are based on ‘risk analyses’, and it sets standards 
regarding data collection, analysis, and reporting on migration. As such, the agency 
develops new ways of thinking, speaking, and acting in relation to EUropean borders 
(Kasparek 2010), and has acquired expert status. It is for these reasons that my research 
focuses on Frontex, while recognising that discursive shifts towards humanitarianism 
and human rights have occurred more widely. 
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Choices and methods in the research process 
As arguably much of social scientific practice, my research process was not always the 
linear implementation of a previously elaborated, coherent and rational research design 
responding to my research questions. While I certainly attempted to follow what I had 
planned to do prior to beginning my fieldwork, the evolution of the research process, 
failed negotiations regarding research access, unexpected research opportunities, and 
insights gained during data collection led me to change course at times, adding and 
dropping particular aspects of the fieldwork along the way. In doing this, I was 
adhering to a flexible research design, allowing for adaptations of the research process 
according to unexpected eventualities and opportunities (see Baszanger and Dodier 
2004; Guillaume 2013; Robson 2002; Voelkner 2013).  
 
Ethnographic sensibility and nonlocal research 
My approach was inspired by Gregory Feldman’s (2012) conceptualisation of 
“nonlocal ethnography”, a development of Marcus’ (1995) “multi-sited ethnography”. 
In his seminal article, Marcus argued that ethnographies were no longer taking place 
only in individual sites, but that there was an emerging trend in anthropological 
research to follow people, objects, metaphors, or stories as they moved between sites 
and analytical dimensions, thereby connecting the local to the global. Writing on 
policymaking on migration in the EU, Feldman criticises Marcus for privileging data 
gathered through direct, sensory contact and for attempting to establish cause-and-
effect links between actors. He notes that in today’s EUropean societies, indirect 
relations between different actors are more common than direct, organic connections. 
Policies and practices pertaining to immigration and border controls are not decided 
by a single sovereign, but emerge within networks. As specific rationales, discourses, 
and narratives become dominant in these networks, they as well as existing forms of 
bureaucratic and technical organising make particular policy choices appear logical or 
even inevitable. When studying issues of global governance, in Feldman’s view, the 
challenge is to account for empirical processes that cannot be understood in their 
entirety through empiricist methods: 
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[n]onlocal ethnography shifts the accent of analysis from location-specific practices 
to rationales that enable, organize, and effectively integrate many disparate practices, 
in order to identify unmappable ethnographic terrain, as it were. ‘Nonlocal’ describes 
rationales and practices that are present in multiple locations but not of any particular 
location (G. Feldman 2012, 192, emphases in the original). 
 
The goal of nonlocal ethnography is to uncover and question the rationales and 
discourses underlying border governance, and to understand “how policy actors create 
and reiterate a self-referential circle of policy phrases that become ever more resilient 
as they are repeated” (G. Feldman 2012, 20). While I studied a specific organisation 
rather than the network it is embedded in, Frontex itself is partially characterised by 
such indirect relations and network-like characteristics. The implementation of its joint 
operations is some steps removed from the work taking place in its headquarters, as 
chapter 5 will discuss in greater depth. Rather than taking a localised approach, I 
therefore attempted to gain insights into how those working for and with Frontex in a 
variety of contexts and locations made sense of their work, of Frontex, and of the wider 
field of border and migration governance.  
An eclectic approach, nonlocal ethnography combines the analysis of policy 
documents, newspapers, press releases, public statements and email correspondence 
with personal interactions, participant observation and informal as well as formalised 
interviews. It breaks with the traditional privileging of participant observation, but 
strives to maintain the epistemological basis of ethnography. On the one hand, it seeks 
to displace the researcher, to overcome pre-existing biases and engage openly with 
previously unfamiliar ideas, values and practices. It however understands 
displacement not as the crossing of geographical boundaries, but instead as “any 
research (or personal) practice that dislodges the assumptions, discourses, and 
rationales the researcher would otherwise take for granted” (G. Feldman 2012, 195). 
On the other hand, nonlocal ethnography seeks to illustrate the historical contingency 
of present phenomena. This is achieved through genealogical approaches and analyses 
of context, rather than the traditional long-term embedding of the researcher in a 
specific community. In this way, nonlocal ethnography “critiques the hegemony of 
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“common knowledge” and traces the role of contingency in human affairs” (G. 
Feldman 2012, 196). 
This approach to research enables researchers to maintain what Walters (2015) and 
Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) refer to as an “ethnographic sensibility”. Importantly, 
“[s]uch an outlook is able to capture the way in which technologies of control are 
cobbled together somewhat adventitiously: one can say they are emergent and never 
perfectly follow a plan” (Walters 2015, 6–7). Following this understanding, I 
conducted semi-structured interviews with seven Frontex staff members based in the 
agency’s headquarters, with a member of its management board, with an NGO 
representative of Frontex’s Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, with a 
national policeman of a EUropean country who had trained Frontex guest officers, 
with four EUropean guest officers who were deployed in Bulgaria in March, 2014 and 
three EUropean guest officers who were deployed in Sicily in August, 2014. The 
Frontex staff members I interviewed were senior officers in leading positions, who 
worked in different units within the agency (including the press office, risk analysis, 
operations, training, and fundamental rights). The variety of interviewees reflects my 
attempt to speak to individuals working for and with Frontex in different capacities 
and contexts. At the same time, I remained open and flexible in my selection of 
research participants in order to respond to new opportunities as they arose, and to 
mitigate access difficulties. All interviews took place between December 2013 and 
September 2014. Rather than introducing security, human rights, or humanitarian 
discourses myself, I asked open questions pertaining to the work of Frontex; the 
importance of border control; the agency’s role in EUropean border governance; and 
its challenges and future ambitions. Interviews were semi-structured, and those that 
could be audio recorded lasted between 36 minutes and 1:52 hours each, with an 
average of 65 minutes per interview.  
Before conducting these interviews, I spoke informally with EUropean border guards, 
Frontex staff, and industry representatives during the EUropean Day for Border 
Guards in May 2013. When the opportunity presented itself to observe the agency’s 
47th management board Meeting in February 2014 in its entirety, I seized it. On this 
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day, I also had the chance to have informal conversations with members of the 
management board during coffee and lunch breaks, and at a dinner and subsequent 
drinks I was invited to that same evening. Passing through Berlin, I attended a Frontex 
event on search and rescue and maritime border controls a week later, at which I again 
had the possibility to talk to some of the agency staff members I had previously met. 
Lastly, I had informal conversations with various guest officers deployed in the 
Frontex operations I visited, who were not always permitted to give formalised 
interviews. Particularly in Bulgaria I encountered a sizable group of guest officers who 
had been asked not to give me an interview by their national authorities but were happy 
to meet with me in groups and pairs, and talk about what moved them at the time – 
including their reasons to participate in the operations, and their thoughts on border 
controls and migration. While in Bulgaria and Italy, I also spoke informally with a 
range of local activists about their impressions of the situation at the borders, and of 
Frontex’s activities in the region.  
Before beginning any of the formal interviews, I explained the purpose of the research 
to participants, and asked them to sign a consent form. Given my interest in finding 
out how individuals represented Frontex’s work to an outsider, and whether as well as 
how humanitarianism and human rights were mobilised in this representation, I framed 
the research project as being interested in the changes in EUropean border governance 
in recent years, and the role that Frontex had played in them. The consent form 
specified that all data would be anonymised if this was requested by participants. 
While none of the interviewees requested anonymity, I nevertheless decided to 
anonymise their statements for three reasons. First, the deliberately vague framing of 
my research project means that I cannot be 100% certain whether participants would 
feel comfortable with being cited in this thesis. Second, I am not seeking to make 
arguments about particular individuals in specific positions, but am engaging with an 
organisational discourse that transcends the individual interviewees and their reliance 
on it: attaching names or positions to particular statements would not add to the 
analysis undertaken in this thesis. Third, regarding interviewees in Frontex operations, 
there exist individual cases where I am not certain whether all necessary authorisations 
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were obtained by the interviewee before consenting to speak to me. As any form of 
identifying information might in these cases potentially lead to sanctions for the 
involved officers, I decided to remove such information from this thesis.  
In those cases where I engaged in informal conversations rather than formal 
interviews, all my conversation partners were aware of my identity as a researcher. As 
these were often spontaneous conversations in informal contexts, including over 
dinner or drinks, I was not able to ensure full informed consent and cannot be certain 
whether conversation partners were always fully aware that what they told me might 
be used as part of my research. Due to the ethical issues arising from this ambiguity, I 
do not include direct quotations or identifying information on the individuals I spoke 
with informally in this thesis.  
Engaging with Frontex staff, guest officers, and management board members in a 
variety of ways and contexts, I realised not only that there were gaps and discrepancies 
in the implementation of border governance, but came to see that Frontex itself was 
far from being a homogenous, unitary actor.14 To trace and make sense of these 
incoherencies, I decided to draw on organisational sociology in my analysis of the 
agency’s self-representation. The starkest differences and contradictions emerged 
when interacting with Frontex guest officers in Bulgaria and Italy, as will be further 
detailed in chapter 5. While initially planning to spend 1-2 months at each site, I 
ultimately stayed in each location only for about one week. By going to these places 
and attempting to speak to staff within the Frontex operations I realised that there were 
numerous barriers to research access, and ultimately decided to shorten my stays – the 
reasons for this will be discussed in the reflexive section below.  
Advocates of more ‘traditional’ ethnographic methods might argue that spending such 
short amounts of time in various places is insufficient to gain an understanding of the 
local context, and to build rapport with my participants. While these might indeed be 
limitations, my aim was not to gain an in-depth understanding of how the border was 
                                                 
14 Didier Bigo (2014) has described deep divisions within the security field, which are also visible within 
Frontex, and Law refers to organisations more generally as holding together noncoherent realities (Law 
2004, 112–113). 
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performed in specific areas. As the discursive formations of humanitarianism, security, 
and human rights are articulated in different settings and by various actors, I sought to 
trace them in their multiplicity (see Cohn 2006, 92). Combining interviews, informal 
conversations and participant observation at particular events without imposing an 
established grid of analysis on them allowed me to get closer to understanding the 
perspectives and worldviews of Frontex’s staff, management, and guest officers, and 
to be surprised by some of the more unexpected narratives I heard (see Bueger and 
Mireanu 2015, 129; Law 2004, 102). Moreover, the process allowed the various 
individuals involved in the research process to actively present their views, identities, 
and their work, partially shaping the conversations we had (see Jacoby 2006, 162). 
While the eclectic mix of methods I used in my research does not allow me to produce 
a detailed ethnography of Frontex operations, or the working of its headquarters, it 
provides important insights into how discourses circulate between different 
dimensions of the agency’s work and how they allow staff, management, and guest 
officers to make sense of Frontex’s activities and their own work.  
 
Analysing documents: methodological remarks 
The interviews, conversations, and participant observation I conducted to understand 
how Frontex positions and presents itself today were complemented with an analysis 
of written documents to trace changes in the agency’s self-representations over the last 
10 years. The analysis of changes in Frontex’s language through time – which will be 
presented in chapter 4 – warrants a few remarks on the methodological implications of 
analysing documents. First, documents are often discussed as if they were the united 
voice of a particular organisation: authorship is often invisible to outsiders, and thus 
attributed to the institution as a whole rather than individuals within it (Freeman and 
Maybin 2011). Who is involved in drafting them or in supervising the drafting process, 
in ordering and presenting the necessarily selective ‘truth’ the organisation chooses to 
tell, however, matters: “[t]he point is that writing is about making, not mirroring” 
(Freeman and Maybin 2011, 163). Similarly, it matters who is able to read particular 
documents. In relation to Frontex, a great part of its documents and texts are never 
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published. Restricted for security reasons, its operational plans, evaluations, up-to-date 
analyses and a wealth of other information are not available to those outside the 
organisation. It is important to acknowledge that I could only access a small part of 
the documents written within Frontex over the last ten years, and specifically those 
that were meant to communicate to the outside, rather than specifying procedures, 
rules, or structures internally. As I was not able to spend time embedded within the 
organisation, my analysis of the published documents will have to stop short of taking 
the process of crafting them into account, including the multiple authors, strategic 
choices, and discussions that were likely involved in the creation of documents within 
the agency – nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that the documents cited 
below were written by particular individuals, and are the result of particular choices.  
A further characteristic of documents that is pertinent to the analysis in chapter 4 is 
that they are “always plural”: they relate, build on, and sometimes explicitly refer to 
other texts and are thus situated in a “network of textual relations” (Freeman and 
Maybin 2011, 162). Freeman and Maybin suggest that they be understood as social 
practices, and Harper points out that documents “are a part of the way in which the 
organisation talks to itself ... [and] about itself” (Harper 1997, cited in Freeman and 
Maybin 2011, 164). In doing so, Frontex for instance projects a unified, coherent 
organisational identity, despite the most likely diverse authorship of the documents in 
question, as well as divergences within the agency that will be discussed in chapter 5. 
The self-representations of Frontex, like language more generally, are always 
performative and never merely constative, regardless of the intentions of the authors 
(Freeman 2006, 65–66). Public documents like those analysed below are thus “a nexus 
of social practice. Documents serve to coordinate behavior as well as communicate 
information. They create groups, providing them with a common language and 
vocabulary and helping them express to others what they are trying to do” (Freeman 
2006, 53). As such, they are important not only in terms of presenting and positioning 
Frontex vis-à-vis its environment, but also to foster a particular self-understanding and 
organisational identity within the agency. 
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As there are a plethora of written outputs the agency produced over the course of its 
existence, not all could be analysed in depth. By analysing all of the agency’s annual 
reports on the one hand, I was able to see how Frontex explains and justifies its actions 
retrospectively, both vis-à-vis the stakeholders and the public. The elaborate reports 
allow for a contextualisation of the agency’s actions, which are described in relation 
to particular understandings of the migratory and policy developments the agency 
describes. Complementing this analysis with an examination of all press releases 
published by Frontex between its foundation and 31/12/2014 on the other hand permits 
me to understand how the agency comments on events as they are unfolding and 
describes its work while it is ongoing. These much shorter texts do not offer the same 
richness in terms of justification and contextualisation, but they constitute the primary 
means of Frontex to comment on topical events and communicate speedily to external 
actors, including the general public. In a less systematic way, I also drew on several 
presentations by the agency to the European Parliament, on newspaper interviews with 
Frontex staff, and on “feature stories” published on Frontex’s website.  
This data, together with verbatim interview transcripts and notes from fieldwork 
observations, informal conversations, and those interviews where participants did not 
consent to be audio recorded, was entered into NVivo. Within the software, I 
subsequently coded all data in order to explore it and to help uncover discursive 
relationships between different statements, documents, and interviews (Robson 2002). 
In this process, I used the functionality that NVivo offers sparingly, drawing on its 
ability to pull out all instances of a particular code across diverse sources, while 
continuously returning to the entire documents and transcripts until the very end of the 
writing process, to ensure that I had not lost individual narratives or differences across 
interviewees when looking at specific codes in isolation. Data analysis and collection 
took place in a dialectic process, with preliminary analysis feeding into further data 
collection and vice versa.  
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Personal reflections and access issues 
While research participants could influence the research process by presenting 
themselves and their work in particular ways, my own influence on the process was 
arguably at least as significant. Locating the self within the research, rather than 
presenting it as an objective or neutral exercise, is central to much of critical 
scholarship (c.a.s.e. Collective 2006, 476). To me personally and within critical 
research generally, reflexivity is of great importance. Salter noted that there are three 
ways in which positionality matters: positions within structures of race, class, gender, 
and nationality inevitably “influence both one’s unquestioned assumptions, one’s 
access, and the way that others relate” (Salter 2013c, 20). Secondly, he calls for 
reflexivity regarding the political and social conditions for the production of 
authoritative knowledge. Thirdly, Salter states that academics need to position 
themselves vis-à-vis the world: “there are a number of postures towards engagement: 
from scholar-agitator to activist to social critic to policy-advisor” (Salter 2013c, 23). 
Cultivated particularly – but not only – among feminist scholars, reflexivity 
encourages a continuous re-interrogation of research and scholarship (Ackerly, Stern, 
and True 2006, 4):  
 
[w]hereas personal experience is thought by conventional social science to 
contaminate a project’s objectivity, feminists believe one’s own awareness of one’s 
own personal position in the research process to be a corrective to “pseudo-
objectivity.” Rather than seeing it as bias, they see it as a necessary explanation of the 
researcher’s standpoint which serves to strengthen the standards of objectivity, 
resulting in what Sandra Harding has called “strong objectivity” or “robust 
reflexivity” (Tickner 2006, 28). 
Writing on autoethnography, but equally applicable to reflexive writing, Doty (2010) 
argues that engaging in such an approach connects the researcher with their work, 
enables them to include emotions, intuition, and felt experience in their writing, and 
brings them into the story they seek to tell. In this spirit, the remainder of this chapter 
will offer some reflections on the choices I made throughout this research process, on 
how my own positionality influenced what and how I researched, on research access 
negotiations and failures, and on some of the limitations I see within this present work.  
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Positionality 
Personally, I am treading the fine line between academia and activism, and I care 
deeply about the issues I write on in this thesis. I decided to do research on this 
particular topic because I felt perplexed by Frontex’s apparent turn to humanitarianism 
and human rights, and noticed that friends whom I knew through activism and political 
work were either confused or outright cynical and disbelieving regarding the change 
in rhetoric taking place. Rather than viewing this development as a deliberate strategy 
of Frontex to fool the public or its stakeholders, or as a sign that Frontex was 
developing into a “rights-advocate agency” (Horii 2012, 176), I cultivated what 
Cynthia Enloe refers to as “curiosity”. As she writes, “[d]eveloping a new kind of 
curiosity is not just academic. It takes energy. It is political. It is cultural. It is personal” 
(Enloe, 2007, p.1, cited in Aradau and Huysmans 2013, 15). For me, doing research 
on these issues has been all of this. It has been a quest to understand better how, why, 
and with what effects humanitarian and human rights discourses – which are the 
backbone of much of the political work challenging and opposing the exclusionary and 
violent border regime – have been appropriated seemingly at ease by Frontex and other 
state actors. My hope is that understanding the relationships of these discourses with 
security better might encourage reflections on some of the inherent shortcomings and 
problems of humanitarianism and human rights as bases for political change among 
those who most frequently rely on them: academics, activists, and NGOs.  
When I wrote my board review paper for this PhD in May 2013, I wrote about at least 
18,673 deaths at EUrope’s borders since 1988, documented by Gabriele del Grande’s 
blog Fortress Europe15. The blog has not been updated since February 2016, when the 
death toll was marked at 27,382. Given that death estimates vary widely depending on 
the source of information used, it is difficult to give an up-to-date number that can be 
compared with Del Grande’s earlier blog counts. Clearly, however, the unfathomable 
numbers increased further since February, with 2,726 deaths documented in between 
                                                 
15 http://fortresseurope.blogspot.co.uk/ 
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1 March and 11 August 2016 (IOM 2016). While I was planning, doing, and writing 
up my research, far more than 10,000 individuals lost their lives as a consequence of 
the policies and practices that form the backdrop of this thesis.16 Watching the ever-
repeating news on ship wrecks, deaths, and missing people unfold throughout my time 
as a PhD student was deeply disturbing, and more than once led me to question the 
relevance of my research. At the same time, it reinforced my conviction that political 
change is urgently necessary, and needs to be sought in a variety of ways and on 
different levels – including through critical scholarship, public engagement, direct 
action, and political pressure groups.  
I regard border controls and the discrimination based on nationality they entail as 
inherently problematic. Accordingly, I disagree with many of the assumptions Frontex 
staff make and the work the agency does. These beliefs, as well as my position within 
a university and a network of activists, my class background, age, nationality, race, 
and gender influenced how I conceptualised and implemented my research, and how 
my respondents interacted with me. Throughout my fieldwork, I however attempted 
as much as possible to put my own opinions and political ideas aside. My reasons for 
doing so are summed up in an excellent chapter by Carol Cohn, in which she reflects 
on her research with nuclear defence intellectuals, and which is worth quoting at 
length:  
 
[a]lthough what impelled me into this research was a political critique, in the actual 
doing of the work I have had to try to put that aside. This is not because I hold a 
positivist notion of objectivity, but for several reasons. First, because my goal is to 
learn, to find out what’s out there, without imposing preconceptions about what 
people are like, what the issues are, or what form of analysis or theoretical framework 
is most appropriate to engage. I was not trying to prove a point or test a hypothesis, 
                                                 
16
 Over the course of writing this PhD, the interest in counting deaths in the Mediterranean also seems 
to have increased substantially. While Gabriele del Grande was one of the first to document and 
publicise deaths, there now exist several research projects collecting data on ‘migrant deaths’ in the 
Mediterranean (see e.g. http://www.mediterraneanmissing.eu/ and http://www.borderdeaths.org/). Also 
the IOM began publicly documenting such deaths in 2013, and regularly provides updates on death 
counts on a dedicated website (http://missingmigrants.iom.int/). Nevertheless, it is remarkable that 
neither Frontex nor other border forces collect data on this issue up to today. As Aas and Gundhus 
argue, a “lack of a ‘will to knowledge’ about migrant mortality” persists within Frontex (Aas and 
Gundhus 2015, 10). 
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but to see what was there and think about it. […] My other reasons for always trying 
to set aside my politics, opinions, and analyses were much more personal. […] First, 
temperamentally, I am a listener. In a conversation, give me the choice between telling 
people what I think about something, or finding out how they think about it, and I will 
almost always choose the latter. […] Second, I find it excruciatingly painful to have 
direct confrontations with very powerful people who are doing (or have done, or will 
do) what I consider to be terrible things, or things with terrible effects. […] Finally, 
and maybe most significantly, I find it both personally and professionally untenable 
to talk with people without being able to be honest about what I want to know, and 
why I am talking with them. To do that, I have to let my genuine interest in how the 
world looks to them, and why it does so, be what I and my research are about (Cohn 
2006, 104 & 105). 
 
Like Cohn, both my personal predispositions and my desire to learn and understand 
led me to listen openly and curiously, much rather than expressing my own views in 
this particular project. And like hers, the focus of my research was very much driven 
by a genuine desire to learn about my participants’ worldviews, and to understand how 
they viewed their work, Frontex, and EUropean border governance. While my political 
convictions differed substantially from what I heard from many of my interviewees, I 
had a genuine curiosity to learn about their perspectives. My goal was not to condemn, 
but to learn about and comprehend realities in their complexities. While I believe that 
political change is necessary, I believe that potential alternatives must be based on a 
thorough understanding of the status quo – including the realities, views and values of 
border guards. From an initial curiosity as to how anyone could choose to become a 
border guard and have a worldview that aligns with it, my questions shifted towards 
the wider discourses circulating in this field, and their power to influence and shape 
people’s thoughts and interpretations (see Cohn 2006, 103). As Hacker wrote, “I 
needed an approach that didn’t require bad guys with bad attitudes . . . an approach 
that would let you look at the nature of the way the whole thing was put together” 
(Hacker, 1990, cited in Cohn 2006, 91). Meanwhile, I acknowledge that my research 
– as any other – was influenced by my positionality and beliefs (Miller and Fox 2004, 
37).  
Mostly, research participants were content to hear about my general interest in these 
questions and did not pressure me to take a stance myself. Where they did ask me to 
position myself, I tried to remain as elusive as possible. When joining the members of 
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Frontex’s management board for dinner, for example, one of them requested my 
confirmation for his impression that I was rather left-wing in terms of politics. Seated 
in the middle of high representatives of member states’ national border guards, whom 
I assumed to have rather different political views from myself, I was uncertain what to 
reply at first. Seeking to avoid a clear answer that might lead to confrontation or 
suspicion, I admitted that if forced to decide whether being right-wing or left-wing, I’d 
situate myself more towards the latter. This did not satisfy the questioner, however, 
who went on to request which party I had voted for during the last national elections 
in Germany. Given that I had coincidentally been barred from voting for technical 
reasons, I used that anecdote to shift the focus of the conversation, and succeeded in 
doing so. As this incident illustrates, I tried to remain elusive to my interviewees 
wherever possible, while avoiding to lie or distort the truth. Nevertheless, I felt the 
dilemmas resulting from my self-identification as a political activist doing research in 
the security field throughout the research process. At times, I felt deeply uncomfortable 
about the views my interviewees shared with me, some of whom showed crude, biased, 
and racist attitudes towards border crossers (see Jacoby 2006, 168). At other times, I 
felt guilt and discomfort about holding back my own views. This was particularly the 
case when I realised that I actually liked some of my interviewees and conversation 
partners, despite deeply disagreeing with their career choices. Some of them, besides 
volunteering their time to speak with me, made a conscious effort to help me in my 
research, putting me in touch with other interviewees or otherwise enabling me to gain 
access to meetings and research opportunities.  
While I was attempting to learn from the research participants and understand their 
views when interacting with them, the fragmented nature of my fieldwork meant that 
in between my various research stints, I met activist friends and colleagues, learned 
about new campaigns, and shared some of the knowledge I had gained through my 
academic work within those communities. Moving back and forth between the 
identities of the researcher and that of the activist felt alienating at times, and brought 
about the above-mentioned feelings of guilt and discomfort. In particular one episode 
I experienced as deeply uncomfortable, as it challenged the neat separation of the two 
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identities which I had attempted to uphold. At an event in Berlin on maritime search 
and rescue and border controls, Frontex’s interim executive director Gil Arias-
Fernández was speaking. Despite the event being fully booked, I was enabled to attend 
by Frontex’s management, having observed their board meeting only the week before. 
At the event, however, a large number of activists were present, too. Some were friends 
and colleagues, others belonged to groups I simply knew of. As the atmosphere was 
extremely adversarial, with a group of activists trying to disrupt and derail the 
discussion and repeatedly shouting “murderers” and other defamations at the 
panellists, I felt rather uneasy in my chair. While the event caused major frustration 
among Frontex staff, who told me afterwards that they would reconsider doing public 
events in the future, it did not result in my visible association with activists or NGOs. 
Nevertheless, it served as a pertinent reminder that my position as a researcher driven 
by curiosity and a desire to understand was very different from what I was used to 
regarding activist networks, where Frontex tends to be viewed as ‘ultimate evil’, a 
symbol for the violence and death the border regime has caused over the last decades.  
Despite the discomfort I felt at times, I still believe that putting my political beliefs 
aside while doing research was important. Not only did it allow interviewees to express 
themselves in the way they saw fit, without necessarily having to legitimise, defend, 
or justify their work, but it also allowed me to remain open for surprises, for shared 
understandings and unexpected views. When speaking informally to a group of 
EUropean border guards over some wine, for example, one of them leaned over and 
told me quietly that he did not believe in borders. He asked me what would happen 
when all borders disappeared, and I responded that so-called “illegal” migration would 
cease to exist. In response, he exclaimed “exactly!”, and proceeded to explain that 
everyone should be allowed to freely move where they wanted to. Exchanges such as 
this, occurring in confidence in the context of a very informal encounter with a group 
of border guards from various countries would have been difficult had I clearly 
positioned myself politically, rather than expressing an openness and curiosity to 
converse with and learn from the guest officers.  
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Not only my political stance, but also my identity as a white, EUropean, young, 
middle-class, and able-bodied cis-woman influenced my research, and particularly my 
fieldwork. Most palpable to me were the comments and distinct dynamics related to 
my identity as a young woman, which influenced how research participants interacted 
with me. I first became aware of this during the evening of the EUropean Day for 
Border Guards in May 2013, when I joined the dinner and party hosted by Frontex for 
the EUropean border guard community, without at this stage having contacts among 
their staff or the various national border guards and industry representative attending 
the event. While introducing myself to small groups of attendees over dinner and 
asking them if I could join their conversations, I also spent considerable time alone 
during the evening, observing what was happening around me. Throughout the night, 
I found myself approached by individual young men, who sought to establish contact 
in ways familiar to me from student parties, bars, or clubs. While perhaps not 
particularly surprising in hindsight, the realisation that in that particular context I was 
seen primarily as a young woman alone at a party rather than a researcher or even a 
critic took me by surprise, and ultimately led to me leaving the event earlier than 
planned when I began to feel uncomfortable as a result of one staff member’s advances.  
At times, I had the feeling that being a young woman made it easier to get particular 
guest officers in the operations (who were mostly young men) to speak to me, and to 
do so in an informal manner also where the authorisation for an interview had been 
denied by their national authorities. In a different context, this factor was explicitly 
mentioned: over dinner after the management board meeting, one attendee made a 
reference to the Fundamental Rights Officer being a charming woman, and being liked 
and well respected for this reason. He then referred to me, saying that I knew well 
myself how these things worked, and pointed out that most of those attending were 
obviously older men. The comment was meant as an encouragement to pursue further 
ideas for fieldwork I had been uncertain over, but it reveals how my gender and age 
influenced how I was perceived (and at times welcomed) by staff and management 
members. As others have noted before, being a young woman meant that I was not 
viewed as particularly threatening, and might have encouraged some people to speak 
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with me more freely, or even agree to speak to me at all (see Cohn 2006, 97). On the 
flipside, it also led to not being taken as seriously.  
 
Access 
As noted already, my positionality certainly had an impact on how I could negotiate 
research access with Frontex, which was not always a straightforward process. Being 
a security actor, Frontex is keen to stay in control of the information given to outsiders, 
and research access was at times difficult to obtain. As Salter noted, this is not an 
exception, but characteristic of security research: “access is particularly sensitive in 
the security field” (Salter 2013c, 22). Early on in the research process, in summer 2013, 
an internship with Frontex’s Fundamental Rights Officer was advertised. I decided to 
apply for it in the hope of spending a few months in the agency’s headquarters, doing 
research at the same time. Despite being shortlisted, I was ultimately not selected for 
the position. Upon request, I was informed that they had preferred a candidate who 
was more fully committed to Frontex, rather than using this opportunity also for their 
own research. When asking whether I might instead be able to conduct a research stay 
with the same officer in February 2014, four months of negotiations via email ensued. 
There were major concerns regarding my ability to access internal documents, and we 
discussed possibilities to enable me to come while limiting such access. When in June, 
the request was put on hold again until yet another meeting to take place in October 
2014, I stopped actively pursuing it, focusing instead on moving forwards with 
interviews and visits to Frontex operation in Italy. I was too uncertain whether these 
negotiations would lead anywhere after months of seeing them postponed time and 
again, and felt growing pressure to move forward with my PhD at the same time. The 
time pressures associated with doctoral (and other kinds of) research, including 
through the strict time limits attached to PhD funding, ultimately led me to abandon 
plans for a research stay within Frontex, and move ahead with the project in other 
ways. 
The ability to conduct interviews in the headquarters depended mostly on the press 
officer, who set up four appointments when I requested to speak to different staff 
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members. As I had obtained the contact details of two other staff members through the 
internship application process, I used those to organise additional interviews myself 
during my trip to Warsaw in December 2013. Research within Frontex operations was 
more difficult. In order to speak to Frontex staff in the headquarters, only their consent 
was needed. To interview guest officers in an ongoing operation, however, I was told 
that I required the authorisation of Frontex, the host member state, and the guest 
officer’s member state, in addition to the consent of the individual in question. In 
Bulgaria, the national authorities officially allowed me to visit ‘the border’ for a 
maximum of 1 hour, writing simply that “[b]order guards are very busy. You can not 
[sic] stay for 4-6 weeks”, as I had requested. After a lengthy bus ride from Sofia, I was 
picked up from the local bus station in Elhovo by the Frontex support officer and a 
Bulgarian colleague, who had agreed to take me to ‘the border’. I had been informed 
beforehand by the Bulgarian authorities that “on the Bulgarian-Turkish border a border 
police operation [was] ongoing. […] civilians [were] not authorized to enter the zone.” 
I was thus dependent on my Frontex companion for access to the area. About 16km 
outside of Elhovo, we stopped to meet a team of EUropean guest officers. It was 
apparent that they had been deployed there – presumably out of the way of their 
colleagues – specifically to speak to me and a film crew who was visiting at the same 
time. At all times, a Bulgarian press officer was present, who was occasionally asked 
for permission regarding particular requests. Unsurprisingly, the guest officers I 
interviewed had received phone calls from Frontex before my arrival, and I was told 
that they had been instructed that they could speak to me and answer (most of) my 
questions, but that they should not allow me to use a recording device.  
After about an hour and a half at the location I was interrupted while doing an 
interview, and told that I had to leave. The support officer kindly drove me to the hotel 
in the nearest city (Yambol), where many of the guest officers – including himself – 
were staying, and encouraged me to hang out in the lobby and speak to his colleagues. 
He promised to send around an email to his guest officer colleagues informing them 
of my presence, and letting them know that I was interested in speaking to them. Due 
to the triple authorisation needed for interviews, conducting those turned out to be 
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difficult: several guest officers told me they had asked their (various) national 
authorities if they could speak to me, but had been requested not to do so. Spending 
time in the hotel lobby and speaking informally to various officers became my main 
activity while there. The informal situations and above-mentioned gender dynamics – 
all the guest officers I encountered there were men, and most of them in their late 
twenties or early thirties – initially helped me to establish contact and to chat with them 
informally. It however also meant that I soon got requests regarding whether I had 
facebook or whether I had a partner, and that it was non-negotiable that my drinks at 
the hotel bar were paid by guest officers, etc. Unprepared for requests for personal, 
rather than professional contact, and uncertain about how to maintain a professional, 
distanced relationship while at the same time hoping for officers to speak to me 
informally and in confidence, I eventually decided to leave the fieldwork site, and to 
return to Sofia. I realised that I struggled with the idea of building up a friendly 
relationship with my interviewees that might last beyond the moment of research 
because of their work as border guards: I did not want to become friends with them. 
At the same time, I was not in a situation where I could use a more formal interview 
context to obtain information while maintaining a more distanced approach. 
In Italy, I encountered the further difficulty that guest officers were spread out over 
different locations in Sicily. My arrival in Syracuse caused tensions, as somewhere in 
the Frontex hierarchies the message that I was coming had gotten lost: my first 
interview with one of the guest officers (unexpectedly) led to anger and frustration on 
the host member state’s side, as it was seen as not fully authorised. Nevertheless, I 
managed to conduct interviews with two other officers present in Syracuse at the time. 
Requests to accompany the guest officers during their work were however denied, and 
no further assistance to contact other guest officers was forthcoming. Where I stayed, 
I could speak to only three people, as they and a translator where the only ones working 
for the Frontex operation in that location. As I did not have contact details of the other 
teams deployed on the island, conducting more interviews ultimately proved 
impossible. Moreover, guest officers in Syracuse stayed in apartments, meaning that 
there was also no space where to coincidentally meet and talk beyond the context of a 
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pre-arranged interview. The difficulties of gaining further access, combined with the 
high costs of staying in Sicily during the tourist season, led to my decision to travel 
back to Scotland. 
As noted above, insights gathered through the combination of methods I used stop 
short of providing a comprehensive understanding of how Frontex works as an 
organisation, and in some ways offer more superficial insights than an in-depth 
ethnographic study at one particular location might have. On the other hand, these 
insights tell far more about how different dimensions of the agency’s work relate to 
each other, how discourses circulate and how various actors within the agency make 
sense of their work and their employer. Conducting research through ‘nonlocal’ 
methods has allowed me to understand Frontex as a fragmented, and at times 
incoherent organisation, and to see its operations and its work within the headquarters 
as only partially connected. The choice for taking an experimental, opportunistic 
approach to methods was in part due to expected difficulties in gaining research access 
to the agency. Trying various research sites, access routes and seizing opportunities as 
they arose allowed me to minimise the risk of being ‘shut out’ or being granted only 
minimal access. In a further effort to decrease such risks, I enriched the access I was 
granted from the beginning with analyses of official documents, press releases, 
speeches, and media interviews by Frontex. By combining various methods and 
sources in this way, I gained multifaceted and fragmented insights into the agency and 




While my research offers timely insights into the relationships between 
humanitarianism, human rights, and security, and how they are mobilised together in 
the border regime, there are certainly limitations to the focus and approaches I have 
taken in this project. Most obviously, perhaps, there are limitations related to the 
restricted access that I had, being for instance barred from observing Frontex 
operations in practice. This would have allowed me to see both the technologies and 
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objects employed in Frontex’s work, as well as being able to observe border practices 
myself. My insights are primarily related to how various individuals affiliated with 
Frontex present the agency, and in particular how they talk about it. I could observe 
such practices only to very limited extents, by for instance witnessing the interactions 
of staff and management members and guest officers at the European Day for Border 
Guards, the management board meeting, or during the operations. Nevertheless, 
engaging with how the research participants presented Frontex was helpful in 
understanding whether discursive formations circulating within the agency inform the 
views of staff members, guest officers, and management.  
In addition, the fragmented insights I gained throughout the research process do not 
allow for a deeper analysis of a number of dynamics in the functioning of Frontex. In 
particular, I will not be able to analyse dynamics relating to the nationalities, races, or 
genders of those working for Frontex, despite having spoken to officers from a variety 
of different countries, and with different gender identities. While I believe that 
valuable analyses could and should be undertaken in relation to these and other 
dynamics, in part to explore whether there exist further discrepancies and 
incoherencies within the agency along such axes of identification, I will not be able to 
offer such an examination in this thesis. Not only did I not include specific questions 
pertaining to nationality, race, or gender in my interview schedule, but also, the 
number of interviews I conducted is not sufficiently large to identify similarities or 
differences in the research data across these different axes.  
By choosing to focus on an actor aiming to govern and control migration, I might 
furthermore be reproached of reinforcing what De Genova (2013a, 2013b) refers to as 
the Border Spectacle, the imaginary of a tightly controlled, highly exclusionary border 
that succeeds in perfectly controlling mobility. As he notes,  
 
[p]articularly in the denunciatory mode of a putative critique of border militarization 
and aggressively restrictive immigration policies, migration studies frequently risks 
becoming an unwitting accomplice to the spectacular task of broadcasting the one-
dimensional falsehood of border enforcement as the perfect enactment of ever more 
seamless and hermetically sealed exclusionary barriers (De Genova 2013a, 255). 
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Indeed, my research focuses on Frontex as a security actor rather than foregrounding 
the determination and innovations of individuals who find ways to overcome and 
subvert controls despite increasing patrols and higher fences. At the same time, 
however, I expose internal contradictions and tensions within Frontex, illustrating 
rather clearly that the agency is not in full control over what it does even in its 
operations. As such, I hope to challenge the view of ‘Fortress EUrope’ as a tightly 
sealed entity following a singular rationality, and present a much more fragmented, 
less rational and cohesive image of EUropean border governance.  
Lastly, my study might be considered to contribute to an already excessive focus of 
migration studies on EUrope, resulting in a charge of EUro-centrism. This is difficult 
to argue with, as it is certainly true that a EUro-centric focus is reflected also in my 
own work. For me personally, the focus on EUrope has to do with my political interests 
in this region. I am appalled by current policies and practices, and my desire to 
contribute to a change in border and migration governance inspires and drives my 
academic work. Given my position as a EUropean citizen, this might also be the 
context where I have the biggest chance of being taken seriously and listened to.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sought to offer some insights into how I conceptualise methods 
and methodology, and how I used particular practices within my research project. 
Conducting critical research, I am subscribing to different standards and 
understandings of research than those dominant in international relations today. By 
offering detailed reflections regarding the methods I used and the motivations and 
aspirations that drove my research, I showed how my choices and beliefs influenced 
the research process underlying this thesis. In particular, I reflected on the dilemmas I 
faced because of positioning myself as an activist and an academic, and showed how 
my identity as a young, white, EUropean woman likely influenced the ways in which 
research participants interacted with me. Revealing some of the struggles and 
difficulties I faced in terms of research access illustrates some of the difficulties in 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Methods and Methodology   111 
conducting research on bureaucracies more generally, and security organisations 
specifically. Despite these difficulties and limitations, I found the research process 
extraordinarily rewarding, and enjoyed pursuing my sense of curiosity by interacting 
with and learning from those working for and with Frontex. In addition, I gained 
revealing and timely insights into the agency’s self-representation and its 
appropriation of humanitarianism and human rights. The next chapters will introduce 
these insights, by focusing first on changes within Frontex’s official discourse over 
time (chapter 4), on contradictions and incoherencies within the agency itself (chapter 
5), and on the effects of Frontex’s turn toward humanitarianism and human rights on 
its position within the wider border regime (chapter 6).  
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Chapter 4: Knowing Frontex - Two Perspectives 
In the first 10 years of its existence, Frontex has become a key player in EUropean 
border governance. Not only has it grown at great speed in terms of budget, staff 
members, and responsibilities, it has also become a focal point for criticism and 
discontent, and a symbol for EUrope-wide efforts to reinforce controls of the Schengen 
borders. At the same time, Frontex has been depicted as a one-size-fits-all solution to 
‘problems’ and ‘crises’ in border governance, and has seen ad-hoc increases to its 
budget in times of public mourning about deaths at sea, as well as in times of public 
anxiety due to heightened arrival numbers in EUrope. While often vilified by activists, 
the agency has thus emerged as the standard EUropean response to a diverse range of 
‘problems’, and has been presented as such by EU institutions and national 
policymakers. While having gradually increased its powers and competences in recent 
years, Frontex has remained a controversial and highly symbolically charged actor in 
EUropean border governance. The following three chapters will turn to analyse the 
agency, building on the conceptual underpinnings and methodological approach 
introduced in chapters 1-3.  
Chapters 4 and 5 will engage with different ways of knowing Frontex, and will offer 
three perspectives on the agency. In doing so, these chapters also offer some reflections 
on how Frontex can be known, and which knowledges about the agency are produced 
by different kinds of scholarly analyses. Rather than presenting one coherent account 
of Frontex, I will present three outlooks on it, each of which provides a partial answer 
to the question of how we can understand Frontex and its shift towards 
humanitarianism and human rights. First, this chapter will outline the history of the 
agency’s foundation as it has been understood in the academic literature, with Frontex 
emerging as a compromise between the diverse interests of EU institutions and 
member states within a wider context of ongoing securitisation of migration in 
EUrope. It will show what these insights reveal about the coexistence of diverse 
rationalities within Frontex today, and what assumptions and understandings they rely 
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on. Second, I will reflect on the role of language in the political field, and discuss the 
usefulness and limitations of document analysis as a specific way of knowing 
organisations’ changing representations and interventions through language.  
These reflections will be followed by an analysis of Frontex through its published 
documents, in particular its annual reports and press releases. As media, activists, EU 
parliamentarians and national politicians put a spotlight on the role and the activities 
of the agency, Frontex carefully constructed a public image of itself, communicating 
to stakeholders and the general public by means of reports, press releases, appearances 
at EUropean and governmental hearings, and occasional interviews in national media 
outlets. As the introduction to this thesis showed in brief, quantitative terms, this public 
image has changed through time, gradually beginning to include more references to 
humanitarianism and human rights. In this chapter, I will analyse what subjectivities 
are created through Frontex’s documents, which positions and discursive formations 
are negotiated in them, and how Frontex’s self-representations in these documents 
have changed through time. In the conclusion of this chapter, I will reflect on how 
examining the history of Frontex’s foundation on the one hand, and analysing its 
published documents on the other hand renders Frontex knowable to social scientists. 
To complement the insights into Frontex’s shifting discourse presented in this chapter, 
the following chapter will offer a third perspective on Frontex. Following a new 
institutionalist approach and drawing primarily on interview data, chapter 5 will 
analyse Frontex as an organisation in a contested and contradictory environment.  
 
First Perspective: Frontex as a compromise  
Examining Frontex’s foundation 
One way in which Frontex has been understood in the academic literature is through 
the history of its foundation, in particular an examination of the interests of various 
actors in negotiations on EUropean border controls that were taking place in the early 
2000s. The wider political context at the time was one in which interior ministries were 
seeking to find ways to avoid constraints on a security-centred, restrictive governance 
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of migration, without necessarily sharing the same vision on how this might best be 
achieved. Guiraudon and Lahav showed how efforts to move matters of immigration 
and border controls to the EU level in the late 1990s and early 2000s more generally 
were motivated by the desire of home affairs ministries to avoid domestic constraints, 
such as national courts and NGO mobilisation (Guiraudon 2000, 2003; Guiraudon and 
Lahav 2000). Building on this work, Lavenex (2006, 2007) argued that similar 
concerns also led to the increased emphasis on externalising migration controls, as 
officials working within home affairs were seeking new ways to avoid political, 
normative, and institutional constraints emerging on a EUropean level. Together, the 
authors demonstrated that EU policy processes in this area have been closely bound 
up with institutional interests and competitions. This could be argued to be the case 
regarding the establishment of Frontex, too.  
What gave rise to these negotiations and could be regarded as Frontex’s ‘founding 
myth’ was the persistent belief that the lifting of border controls among Schengen 
member states necessitated stricter controls at these states’ external borders. This myth 
is still invoked today, as the reintroduction of border controls across EUrope in 
response to a perceived ‘loss of control’ at the external borders in 2015 and 2016 
illustrated (see e.g. European Commission 2016a). Also in a promotional video by 
Frontex, it is reiterated: “[a]s internal border controls were removed, the need to 
strengthen external borders became paramount. The Schengen chain is only as strong 
as its weakest link” (Frontex 2013d). Accordingly, cooperation on immigration and 
border controls in EUrope began in the 1980s with the Schengen treaty, which 
contained initial provisions on inter-state cooperation regarding matters of 
immigration and asylum (Schengen Agreement 1985). While these agreements were 
made between individual states, the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht incorporated 
cooperation on matters of migration in the EU framework as a whole (Léonard 2010, 
233).  
Five years later, the Treaty of Amsterdam further consolidated an EU approach to 
migration that was characterised by continued a focus on security. It introduced the 
notion of EUrope as an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” (AFSJ), which was 
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framed as being in need of protection from outside threats (Kostakopoulou 2009, 187; 
Lavenex 2001, 2005; Pellerin 2005). This security-focused approach was continued 
also at the 1999 Council meeting in Tampere, which officially incorporated a 
commitment to externalise border controls in order to prevent migration towards 
EUrope (Lavenex 2007, 134; Samers 2004). The perception that external border 
controls needed to be improved remained strong in the following years, and led 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain to commission a feasibility study 
exploring the idea of a common EU border police in 2001. While agreeing that better 
cooperation in this field was needed, the UK and several Scandinavian countries 
expressed reservations regarding such far-reaching ambitions (Jorry 2007; Monar 
2005; Neal 2009).  
The years between 2001 and 2003 were marked by a series of negotiations, 
accommodation, and compromises between the Commission and the Council on the 
one hand, and between various member states within the Council on the other hand 
(Neal 2009, 340). While the Commission initially took up the results of the feasibility 
study, the December 2001 Justice and Home Affairs Council in Laeken did not make 
reference to a common border guard, reflecting the reluctance of some of the 
participating countries. The presidency conclusions did however request the Council 
and the Commission to look into “mechanisms or common services to control the 
external borders” (European Council 2001, para. 42; Jorry 2007). Nevertheless, the 
Commission held onto the idea of a common border guard, and published a 
communication that outlined the path towards an EU Corps of Border Guards in May 
2002 (European Commission 2002). In June, the Council reiterated its concern to 
improve cooperation and coordination among member states, but postponed any 
decision on a common border guard that could support (rather than replace) national 
forces to an undetermined later stage (European Council 2002, 27).  
Instead, a so-called ‘Action Plan’ created the “External Borders Practitioners Common 
Unit”, consisting of the previously existing “Strategic Committee on Immigration, 
Frontiers and Asylum” working group (SCIFA) as well as representatives of the 
national border guards, which became known as SCIFA+ (Neal 2009, 341). The unit 
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was set up in autumn 2002, and promptly implemented a number of pilot projects in 
different member states (Jorry 2007). The work of SCIFA+, however, was viewed as 
ineffective by the Commission and several member states (Léonard 2009, 377; Neal 
2009, 342). As the 2004 enlargement of the European Union moved closer, concerns 
regarding the perceived challenges in governing the external borders of the 10 new 
member states grew, and the interest to progress with improving and harmonising 
external border controls across the EU remained great (Ekelund 2014, 109–110). 
Given the dissatisfaction with SCIFA+, the Thessaloniki Council Conclusions in June 
2003 invited the Commission “to examine […] the necessity of creating new 
institutional mechanisms, including the possible creation of a Community operational 
structure, in order to enhance operational cooperation for the management of external 
borders” (European Council 2003, para. 14).  
Seizing this opening, the Commission proposed that the Council establish a “European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders” in 
November 2003 (European Commission 2003). The Commission proposal seemed to 
take the differing stances among member states into account, and suggested 
establishing an agency that was to be tasked primarily with coordinating the 
cooperation between member states, as well as providing a number of other services 
to them.17 Less than a year later, in October 2004, Council Regulation 2004/2007 
created the agency, commonly known as Frontex (European Council 2004). 
Importantly, taking a decision on Frontex this swiftly allowed for the marginalisation 
of the European Parliament in the process. The 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam was 
followed by a five-year transition period in which the Parliament was only consulted, 
and decisions in the Council needed to be taken unanimously. As of January 1st, 2005, 
                                                 
17 According to Art. 2(1) of its founding regulation, Frontex initially had six tasks, namely to: “(a) 
coordinate operational cooperation between Member States in the field of management of external 
borders; (b) assist Member States on training of national border guards, including the establishment of 
common training standards; (c) carry out risk analyses; (d) follow up on the development of research 
relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders; (e) assist Member States in circumstances 
requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders; (f) provide Member States 
with the necessary support in organising joint return operations” (European Council 2004). These were 
expanded in 2007 and 2011 (European Parliament and Council 2007, 2011).  
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the European Parliament would have been actively involved in Frontex’s foundation 
through the co-decision procedure, which gave it equal standing with the Council in 
terms of passing regulations in some issue areas, including those pertaining to 
migration and asylum (Léonard 2009, 380).  
While the Parliament was consulted prior to the Council’s decision on Frontex’s 
foundation, its proposed amendments to the regulation – including attempts to 
strengthen the community character of the agency by empowering the Commission 
and the Parliament as overseers, and to reinforce the agency’s fundamental rights 
obligations in the document (European Parliament 2004) – were ignored (Léonard 
2009). As a result, fundamental rights were only referenced in the preamble of 
Frontex’s founding regulation, not in the substantive text itself (European Council 
2004). Mostly, the Council followed the Commission’s proposal in establishing 
Frontex, but decided to strengthen states’ powers over the agency: the management 
board was to consist of a representative of each Schengen member state, in addition to 
two representatives of the Commission (European Council 2004). As Sarah Léonard 
summarised, “Member States were able to agree relatively swiftly on the creation of 
an agency that they would be able to control [...] and which would be limited to the 
coordination of operational cooperation at the external borders” (Léonard 2009, 381).  
 
 
What does this perspective tell us?  
This account of Frontex’s establishment provides a number of interesting insights, but 
also relies on assumptions that are to some extent in tension with those adopted in the 
remainder of this thesis. As has been apparent, the institutions involved in the setting 
up of Frontex in this narrative are conceptualised to some extent as unitary and 
rational, pursuing particular objectives in a process of rational negotiation and 
reasonable compromise. While disagreements between member states in the European 
Council form part of the explanation for Frontex’s foundation, tensions and 
discrepancies within the Commission, Parliament, and member states are left out of 
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the picture. Rather than this constituting a fundamental contradiction with the 
remainder of this thesis, this account is a simplification of the internal dynamics of 
each of the actors involved. In this way, it is a perspective that ‘zooms out’ of each of 
the institutions and reduces their complexity, focusing instead on their interrelations, 
which from a distance appear as coherent and rational. This perspective, albeit 
necessarily partial, offers valuable insights into Frontex as an organisation in a 
contested and diverse environment.  
As outlined, from this vantage point Frontex has been seen as a compromise between 
those who were striving for a EUropean approach to border guarding – including the 
Commission, Germany, and Italy – and those who were reluctant to give up parts of 
their sovereign powers, such as the United Kingdom and Scandinavian countries 
(Campesi 2014; Neal 2009). Accordingly, a variety of perspectives and rationalities 
are seen as having informed the foundation of Frontex, which was established as the 
response to diverse concerns. It was conceived as an agency intending to serve member 
states who felt that practical support was needed at their (or others’) external borders, 
while at the same time ensuring that it would not be perceived as a threat to those 
member states concerned about safeguarding their sovereign right to control their 
borders. Disagreements also included different visions of what border guarding should 
look like.  
As Campesi wrote, “Frontex was […] born in the context of an ambiguous dialectic 
between the technocratic ideology of risk management and the recurrent call for 
emergency measures” (Campesi 2014, 128). It was founded partly as a technocratic 
agency tasked with ‘risk management’, analyses, and research, advancing the 
normalisation of governing migration as a security issue (Neal 2009). At the same 
time, the agency faced repeated demands by member states for “urgent and rapid 
action” at their external borders (Carrera 2007, 12). In 2007, a change of Frontex’s 
founding regulation by the Council and the Parliament reinforced this latter element, 
establishing the mechanism of “Rapid Border Intervention Teams” for situations “of 
urgent and exceptional pressure, especially the arrival at points of the external borders 
of large numbers of third-country nationals trying to enter the territory of the Member 
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State illegally” (European Parliament and Council 2007, Article 1(1)). The amendment 
obliged member states to provide personnel in these situations, making ‘solidarity’ 
compulsory. It also made clear that an emergency-focused outlook – or exceptionalist 
securitising, following Huysmans’ (2014) terminology (see chapter 2) – would 
continue to coexist with a technocratic risk-management approach – or diffuse 
securitising – within Frontex.  
In addition, looking at Frontex through a history of its foundation explains why diverse 
stakeholders continue to partially control the agency today. The national border guards 
of all state signatories of the Schengen acquis continue to oversee the agency’s 
activities by serving on its management board. Currently, the management board 
consists of 30 heads of border guards of Schengen treaty signatories, two Commission 
delegates, and two representatives of non-Schengen states’ border forces who are 
invited to attend meetings, but not allowed to vote on decisions (the UK and Ireland). 
The management board supervises the executive director, the agency’s annual reports 
and programmes of work, budget, organisational structure and staffing policy, among 
other duties (European Council 2004, Articles 20 and 21). Due to its composition,  
 
board discussions are still tilted towards political issues. National interests have 
remained key at the cost of the effectiveness of the agency (Cowi, 2009, p. 65). 
Similarly, although the executive director (appointed by the board on proposal of the 
European Commission) is formally independent (Art. 25 Regulation 2007/2004), his 
appointment is strongly influenced by intergovernmental compromises (Wolff and 
Schout 2013, 316). 
Member state interests thus continue to be of vital importance to the agency’s activities 
and functioning, and Frontex remains directly accountable to them.  
In addition to the powers of member states and the Commission, the Parliament has 
had an influence on Frontex since the agency’s foundation. It has had partial control 
over Frontex’s budget since the beginning, and has seen its competences in the field 
of EU policymaking expand more widely since then.18 After having been marginalised 
                                                 
18 As mentioned above, the co-decision procedure between Parliament and Council was introduced in 
2005 for some issue areas, including those pertaining to immigration and asylum. The entry into force 
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in the founding process of the agency, the Parliament has used its growing 
competences to exert pressure on Frontex in relation to human rights and SAR. In 
2011, the European Parliament and the Council expanded Frontex’s mandate a second 
time. In the process leading up to the new regulation, the European Parliament insisted 
on strengthening the role of fundamental rights in Frontex’s founding regulation 
(European Parliament 2011; statewatch 2012a). With the amendments, Frontex thus 
not only received greater powers – such as the permission to own and lease equipment, 
and to create and use information systems to exchange data with other EU agencies – 
but was also obliged to create a Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights consisting 
of NGOs, EU agencies, and international organisations, as well as to establish the 
position of a Fundamental Rights Officer inside the agency.  
Understanding Frontex’s foundation as a compromise between diverse interests allows 
for tracing and identifying these interests and influences both in its initial setup, and 
in its contemporary functioning. It makes clear that the agency is not an entirely 
autonomous and independent actor, but that it was created in a way that sought to 
satisfy diverse concerns, and continues to be held accountable by diverse actors. This 
opens up the possibility that the coexistence of different discursive formations in the 
agency’s public documents might be a reflection of both these aspects. It also suggests 
that differences and tensions between coexisting rationalities, goals, and interests are 
likely to have been present and productive within Frontex since its very beginning. 
What this historical-institutional perspective fails to account for, however, is how 
Frontex has negotiated the different interests and pressures in its environment once it 
became an actor in its own right, and how it has manoeuvred its position vis-à-vis its 
stakeholders and the outside world more generally. While not being entirely separate 
and independent from its environment, Frontex is also not fully steered or controlled 
by it. As Frontex issues public documents and press releases of its own accord, 
examining the ways in which it has presented itself provides a different perspective on 
                                                 
of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 extended co-decision – henceforth referred to as the ordinary legislative 
procedure – to 40 policy areas, again increasing the powers of the European Parliament (Servent 2012) 
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the agency, complementing the historical and institutions-focused one outlined thus 
far. Analysing its public communications provides insights into how the complex 
position the agency finds itself in has been negotiated vis-à-vis the public, and how 
this has led to an increase in humanitarian and human rights references in public 
documents published by the agency.  
 
Second Perspective: Frontex’s public self-portrayal over time 
As discussed in greater depth in chapter 3, analysing Frontex’s changing self-
representations through its public documents has particular methodological 
implications. Most importantly, perhaps, documents tend to create the impression of a 
unitary, coherent organisation: authorship, disagreements, negotiations, and 
compromises during the writing process are invisible when examining the final text 
(Freeman 2006; Freeman and Maybin 2011). In addition, public documents serve not 
only to communicate information, but are also performative: in Frontex’s case, they 
create an image of Frontex towards the outside and position the agency within its wider 
environment, while also cultivating a particular organisational identity within the 
agency. I could only access a small part of the documents written by those working for 
Frontex over the last ten years, namely texts that publicly present the agency towards 
the outside. As such, the impression of a united voice emerging from Frontex is even 
more pronounced, as I could not draw on internal communications and differentiations 
for my analysis. Importantly, the resulting fiction that Frontex is a unitary and coherent 
actor that might at times seem to emerge in the discussion below will be challenged 
and dismantled in chapter 5.  
 
The early years: 2005-2008 
When examining annual reports and press releases issues between 2005 and 2008, the 
first few years after Frontex began its activities, its public interventions appear clearly 
security-focused: the agency describes the need to “combat”, “fight”, and “tackl[e] 
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illegal immigration” (Frontex 2006a, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2008a), and “to 
avert the illegal immigration threat” (Frontex 2007e; similarly Frontex 2007f). In its 
early years, the agency writes primarily about “illegal” (im)migrants and 
(im)migration. As Neal noted, Frontex uses security discourses despite the rather 
neutral wording of its founding regulation: “[c]rime, illegal immigration, human 
trafficking and international terrorism are all uttered in the same breath” (Neal 2009, 
350). At the same time, however, Frontex’s mandate inscribed a risk management 
logic in the agency: it was tasked with providing integrated risk analyses, trainings, 
and follow up on relevant research. Frontex described its activities as “intelligence 
driven” already in its first reports, and established the “Frontex Risk Analysis Network 
(FRAN)” in 2006. It also invoked a managerial approach to border governance by 
referring repeatedly to “Integrated Border Management (IBM)” and “best practice” in 
these early years (Frontex 2006b, 2007d, 2008a).  
The risk-based approach inscribed in its mandate and the urgency and exceptionalism 
invoked at times constitute two distinct modes of operation within the discursive 
formation of security (see chapter 2), which coexist in Frontex’s self-representations. 
In a 2007 statement on “facts and myths” about Frontex, Laitinen spoke to the tension 
between both, and made clear that in his view, Frontex ought to focus on risk 
management rather than emergency response:  
 
[t]he raison d’etre of Frontex are not emergency operations but the consistent 
introduction of well planned regular patrols by Member States, in order to limit urgent 
missions and to integrate the management of borders in all its dimensions defined by 
the Member States. Doctors say that the best intensive care unit cannot replace 
prophylaxis; I would say that it applies also to borders (Frontex 2007g).  
While expressing a clear preference for a risk management based approach, the 
medical metaphor used by Laitinen shows that ultimately, both approaches were 
perceived as necessary and complementary by him: while prevention was key and was 
likely to decrease “emergency operations”, urgent interventions would be needed in 
cases where prevention had failed, or where unforeseen incidents occurred.  
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In the first years of its existence, Frontex declared that one of its objectives was 
“reducing illegal immigration” (Frontex 2007a; see also Frontex 2010b, 5, 42–44), 
which resonated with member states’ interests at the time, particularly those which 
were experiencing boat migration (Rijpma 2010). Initially, the agency omitted any 
reference to potential asylum seekers among the “illegal migrants” it reported on. In 
response to a request by the Immigration Law Practitioners Association (ILPA) 
regarding asylum claims in its HERA and NAUTILUS operations, Frontex replied that 
“FRONTEX is not aware of any claims of asylum which have been submitted to the 
national authorities during the referred joint operations. Nevertheless, it could be the 
case, that hosting Member State[s] could receive asylum claims later on, just after the 
interrogation” (cited in Guild and Bigo 2010, 270). As Guild and Bigo problematized, 
the lists of nationalities identified through interviews conducted by Frontex guest 
officers included Somalis, Eritreans, Iraqis and Pakistanis, who were among the largest 
groups of asylum seekers at the time. Regardless of this, however, Frontex initially 
sought to avoid any responsibility for or association with asylum claims in its 
operations, and categorically described the individuals it sought to stop as “illegal 
migrants”.  
While mobilising presenting migration as a risk and a threat, Frontex made reference 
to saving lives, too. Some of the first news items released on the agency’s website in 
late 2006 and early 2007 describe the purpose of its HERA operation as not only 
controlling “illegal immigration”, but also as “reducing the numbers of lives lost at 
sea” (Frontex 2006c; similarly Frontex 2007a). What was portrayed as rescue at sea 
entailed the physical diversion of ‘saved’ individuals back to the countries of 
departure, in this case Senegal and Mauritania. The aim of joint patrols was presented 
in February and April 2007 as being “to stop migrants from leaving the shores on the 
long sea journey and thus reducing the danger of losses of human lives” (Frontex 
2007h; see also Frontex 2007i). In the annual report for 2006, the agency reported that 
“[d]uring HERA I and II operations, close to 5000 illegal immigrants could be stopped 
from setting off for a dangerous journey that might have cost their lives” (Frontex 
2007d, 12). In the 2007 report, it was stated that out of 401 “migrants”, 166 were 
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rescued – without however specifying whether this meant that they were in distress 
and needed assistance, or whether they were “saved” by being stopped to take the risk 
of travelling further towards EUrope (Frontex 2008a, 24).  
These references to saving lives by preventing migration were part of a wider 
discursive narrative common in EUropean member states at the time. In 2003, then 
Prime Minister Tony Blair had proposed the establishment of extraterritorial camps 
for refugees, justified by a reference to saving lives. In 2004, German and Italian 
interior ministers Schily and Pisanu advocated similar plans, again arguing that such 
camps would stop deaths at sea. And also in response to the arrival of boats in the 
Canary Islands in 2006, similar arguments were made (Hess and Tsianos 2007; Klepp 
2010a). Frontex’s use of this wider narrative did thus not occur in isolation. While 
emphasising that joint operations contributed to saving lives by stopping individuals 
from departing, Frontex made clear that it did not intend to be a search and rescue 
agency. In a press release in 2007, executive director Laitinen was moved to publicly 
emphasise the security mandate the agency had been given:  
 
[l]ast weeks [sic] I learned reading the press that Member States don’t want Frontex 
to fulfil its tasks; Member States want Frontex to become a search and rescue body. 
Legal advisors could have some problems in explaining why a Community agency 
should take action in an area that is out of the mandate not only of the agency but also 
the European Union (Frontex 2007g). 
It seems that Laitinen attempted to resist a public call by one or several member states 
for Frontex to be more involved in search and rescue activities. His response marked 
Frontex’s refusal to become a “search and rescue body”, which the agency invoked 
also in recent years (as will be further discussed below). In firmly rejecting calls to 
actively conduct search and rescue operations, Frontex self-identified as a security 
actor, albeit one that emphasised the ‘humanitarian’ by-product (saving lives at sea) 
its security-focused joint operations allegedly resulted in.  
While references to saving people in distress at sea were made early on in Frontex’s 
publications, its annual reports and press releases did not address human rights at all 
within the first years of its existence. Neither did the agency refer to human rights 
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when reporting to the Commission on a technical mission to Libya in 2007 (Buckel 
and Wissel 2010; Frontex 2007j), in spite of NGOs warning about the dire situation in 
the country for those on the move at the time (Amnesty International 2005, 2007; 
Frelick 2009; Human Rights Watch 2005). When evaluating its Nautilus operation – 
in which Human Rights Watch alleged illegal pushbacks to Libya took place – and 
related operations, Frontex deputy director Arias-Fernandez was quoted as saying:  
 
[b]ased on our statistics, we are able to say that the agreements [between Libya and 
Italy] have had a positive impact. On the humanitarian level, fewer lives have been 
put at risk, due to fewer departures. But our agency does not have the ability to 
confirm if the right to request asylum as well as other human rights are being 
respected in Libya (cited in Human Rights Watch 2009a, 37). 
While pointing to the allegedly humanitarian effect of its operations, Frontex thus 
eschewed any responsibility for making sure that human rights were respected in 
Libya, despite highly critical public reports at the time. In fact, it took almost three 
years for Frontex to refer to human rights in its press releases or annual reports: in June 
2008, the first reference to human rights appeared in a news piece on the occasion of 
a cooperation agreement with UNHCR (Frontex 2008b). As the following section will 
show, references to human rights became more regular from then on. 
In conclusion, the first years of Frontex’s establishment were characterised by a self-
representation that portrayed “illegal migration” as both a threat and a risk to 
EUropean states, and constructed Frontex as “fighting” this threat primarily by 
improving preparedness through its risk analyses and trainings, and by actively 
working to decrease unauthorised arrivals in EUropean states. As such, the narrative 
presented in the agency’s annual reports and press releases connected diffuse 
securitising practices and technologies to a wider framing of migration as an existential 
threat, i.e. exceptionalist securitising (Huysmans 2014, see chapter 2). In this framing, 
Frontex was first and foremost presented as a protector of EUrope. In an early form of 
quasi-humanitarian reasoning, this self-representation co-existed with claims that 
Frontex’s explicitly security-oriented operations had the positive side-effect of saving 
the lives of those who were diverted back to their countries of departure. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Knowing Frontex - Two Perspectives   127 
Simultaneously, however, press releases actively distanced the agency from demands 
to conduct search and rescue operations, and emphasised Frontex’s security mandate. 
Importantly, neither asylum nor non-refoulement nor human rights played a role in 
these early self-representations, which focused very strongly on Frontex’s role in 
keeping individuals away from EU territory.  
 
Incorporating human rights and humanitarianism: 2008-2011 
While Frontex’s early publications were characterised by its framing of migration as a 
“threat” to “fight”, the agency slowly began to change its language in the years to 
come. In its 2009 General Report, Frontex began using the term “irregular” instead of 
“illegal” in conjunction with “migrant”, and subsequently used “illegal” primarily to 
describe actions – such as “illegal border crossings”, “illegal stay” or “entry” – rather 
than individuals. Instead, “irregular” was used more often in conjunction with 
“migration”, and particularly “migrants”. This change might be seen as a move away 
from what has often been criticised as incriminating and securitising language, and 
corresponds to a wider shift within the European Union more generally (see 
Morehouse and Blomfield 2011). At the same time, however, Frontex continued to 
construct human mobility as a security problem. The agency listed irregular migration 
in the same sentence as “serious organised crime” and terrorism (Frontex 2013e, 7; 
similarly Frontex 2011a), and reiterated its objectives “to curb illegal migration”, “to 
tackle irregular migration”, and “to better fight trafficking in human beings” in its 2010 
annual report (Frontex 2011b, 4, 14, 24). In 2010, the agency moreover started to 
publish public versions of its risk analyses, in which asylum applications are counted 
as one “indicator” of the “threat of irregular migration” to which member states’ 
borders might be “vulnerable” (Frontex 2010c, 2010d, 2010e, 2010f, 2011c). Despite 
the subtle shift from “illegal migrants” towards “irregular” ones, Frontex thus 
continued the risk-focused language of its early years.  
In addition, the agency engaged in the occasional, time-specific declaration of 
situations as exceptional, urgent, or part of a crisis, and also in this way fostered an 
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interpretation of mobility as a security issue. Most extensively, Frontex engaged in 
exceptionalist securitising in 2011, the year of political upheavals in North Africa and 
increased boat departures towards EUrope; but also before and after that point in time, 
crisis-invoking statements can be found. In relation to the RABIT deployment in 
Greece in 2010, Frontex stated that the situation there had to be brought “under 
control” (Frontex 2010g), implying that it had been out of control beforehand. 
Reflecting back on the year, the annual report of 2010 stated that “Frontex 
demonstrated capability and flexibility in tackling the significant challenge related to 
irregular migration in 2010 — the drastic increase in migratory pressure towards the 
EU via the Greek-Turkish land border” (Frontex 2011b, 15). When reporting on 2010 
statistics in May 2011, Frontex wrote that “detections of illegal border crossing soared 
on previous years as the dominant routes used by migrant smugglers continued to shift. 
The Greek-Turkish land border in particular saw massive increases in migratory 
pressure” (Frontex 2011d). Meanwhile, the fact that the overall number of detections 
in 2010 had actually slightly decreased in comparison to 2009 was mentioned briefly, 
leaving the reader with the impression of an increasing and threatening trend, rather 
than a state of stability.  
As noted already, 2011 was the year in which Frontex most actively furthered images 
of crisis and emergency in relation to EUrope’s southern borders. Even before being 
prompted by member states, Frontex reacted publicly to rising numbers of arrivals in 
Italy. On February 14th, the agency released a news item addressing the “sudden 
migratory situation in Lampedusa”, stating that a fact-finding team had been 
dispatched and operational responses were being prepared in Warsaw, despite the 
absence of a request for assistance by Italy at that point (Frontex 2011e). A day later, 
the agency first published some statistics on the numbers of individuals arriving at 
Italy’s shores and compared those to previous years, and then issued another news item 
reporting that Italy had requested the assistance of Frontex for “targeted risk analysis 
on the possible future scenarios of increased migratory pressure in the region […] and 
the possibility of the opening up of a further migratory front […]” (Frontex 2011f). 
The high pace of reporting on the unfolding “crisis” was kept up, with another news 
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item four days later announcing the imminent deployment of guest officers to Italy 
(Frontex 2011g), and further ones published on February 22 and 25 reporting on the 
beginning of the Hermes operation and the deployment of guest officers (Frontex 
2011h, 2011i).  
Two press releases on March 11 and 25 reported on the development of different 
scenarios and responses by Frontex, and the latter referred to “the notable increase in 
migratory pressure on Italy and the island of Lampedusa in particular”, announcing 
the widening and extension of JO Hermes (Frontex 2011j, 2011k). Executive director 
Laitinen assured readers that “Frontex is closely monitoring the development in North 
Africa and stands ready to assist the Member States operationally if requested. We are 
also continuously developing additional operational responses for potential rapid 
deployment throughout the Mediterranean if needed” (Frontex 2011j). Through the 
frequency of the reporting, the emphasis on “the highly volatile situation in North 
Africa” (Frontex 2011l) and Frontex’s readiness to act, as well as the use of war-like 
terms such as “migratory front”, the agency’s press releases contributed to the 
perception of the situation as one of crisis and exception.  
Also when Frontex reported back on activities in 2011 in its general reports of 2011 
and 2012, this framing prevailed. The agency stated that there had been the need to “to 
tackle the exceptional and urgent emergency situation caused by massive migration 
flows at the Greek-Turkish land border” (Frontex 2012b, 15), and designated 
occurrences in Italy as “mass influx of migrants” (Frontex 2013e, 51), “migratory 
crisis situation” (Frontex 2012b, 21), “massive and disproportionate migration flows” 
(Frontex 2012b, 49), and a “migration crisis”, which “demanded a reinforced 
operational response package” (Frontex 2013e, 51). Frontex’s reporting on the 
“migration crisis” of 2011 resonated with a wider narrative within the border regime 
that labelled the arrivals of people from Tunisia and Libya as “exceptional” or even an 
“exodus” (see e.g. European Commission 2011c; Times of Malta 2011). Importantly 
though, Frontex took a pro-active role in the framing and continuous reporting of this 
“crisis”.  
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In response, the agency received a boost to its resources: it obtained €30 million from 
the Commission and €1.8 million by Schengen Associated Countries in addition to its 
2011 budget of €86 million, representing an increase of 27.3% (European Commission 
2011d; Frontex 2011m, 2012b). More importantly, perhaps, it positioned itself as the 
“solution” to the “problem” at hand and as capable of supporting member states 
proactively. As Jef Huysmans noted, the activities Frontex undertook in response to 
the proclaimed “crisis” nevertheless had a strong risk component, consisting of 
information gathering, identification of new arrivals, early detection and prevention of 
crime, and updating risk analyses (Huysmans 2014, 95). Once again, techniques of 
diffuse securitising took place in a context that was framed within a language of 
exception and crisis both within Frontex’s public documents, and in the wider political 
narratives at the time.  
As noted in the previous section, there were nearly no references to asylum seekers in 
the first documents and statements published by Frontex, which classified all those 
“intercepted” categorically as “illegal immigrants”. From 2009 onwards, asylum 
seekers were mentioned and portrayed as a risk both to EU member states as well as 
to the asylum system: “[a] large volume of [asylum] applications will put a strain on 
border control authorities and will inevitably prevent the rapid provision of protection 
for those third-country nationals with legitimate claims” (Frontex 2010b, 6). Implying 
and at times explicitly stating that many asylum applications were “unfounded”, 
Frontex thus claimed to safeguard the interests of “legitimate” asylum seekers through 
its work. In addition, Frontex press releases started reporting on “unscrupulous 
smugglers” which “lured these desperate people” into dangerous situations, sometimes 
resulting in their deaths (Frontex 2010a). By introducing the commonly used narrative 
of the “unscrupulous smuggler”, Frontex drew on the discursive formations of 
humanitarianism and security simultaneously.  
In this narrative, smugglers are blamed for the deaths and suffering of innocent and 
defenceless people on the move on overcrowded and unseaworthy boats or in 
otherwise unacceptable conditions caused by the smugglers’ greed for profit and 
disrespect for human lives. As Pallister-Wilkins argues, the narrative “references 
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Frontex’s core mandate of border law enforcement and humanitarianism premised on 
a victim and savior dichotomy that has (as we have seen) come to dominate multiple 
forms of governance over the previous two decades” (Pallister-Wilkins 2015, 64). It 
presents Frontex as a protector of EUrope and of smuggling victims simultaneously, 
while shifting blame for deaths and suffering away from the agency. Further drawing 
on the discursive formation of humanitarianism, annual reports and press releases also 
featured increased references to saving lives at sea again, after a period of relative quiet 
since 2007. It was pointed out that “the rescue of people in distress at sea were among 
the key elements highlighted during maritime joint operations in 2010”, and that 
“maritime joint operations resulted in significant decrease of illegal migration flows, 
also avoiding high numbers of boatpeople in distress; this contribution to saving lives 
is considered the most appreciated effectiveness” (Frontex 2011b, 42). While still 
formulated somewhat clumsily in terms of the “effectiveness” of operations aimed to 
primarily decrease unauthorised arrivals in EUrope, these increasing references to 
saving lives indicate a renewed connection of security and humanitarianism in the 
agency’s publications. In March 2011, also the exploration of the use of UAVs was 
justified with their potential to reduce the death toll by saving more lives at sea 
(Frontex 2011a).  
These renewed references to humanitarianism also coincided with the appearance of 
fundamental rights in Frontex documents. In the annual report for 2008, it read: “[f]ull 
respect and promotion of fundamental rights, belongs to the value “Humanity”. It is 
the most important corner stone of modern European border management” (Frontex 
2009, 10). Over time, the emphasis put on fundamental rights in Frontex’s publications 
gradually increased. In the 2009 annual report, it was stated that “full and sincere 
respect of Fundamental Rights is a firm and strategic choice of Frontex. It will be 
demonstrated through the values of the agency in all its operational and administrative 
activities and when developing the capacity of the Member States” (Frontex 2010b, 
4). In the 2010 document, this statement was reiterated, and already in the foreword of 
the report, the chair of the management board listed a number of specific activities 
relating to fundamental rights that Frontex had conducted over the course of the 
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previous year (Frontex 2011b, 4, 7). In addition, the report featured a page-long section 
on fundamental rights, demonstrating the agency’s commitment to them. While not as 
frequently and extensively as humanitarian and security-related discourse positions, 
also fundamental rights were occasionally linked to security issues. In 2010, Laitinen 
was quoted in a news release as saying: “[f]ighting crime at the border is a key 
objective of the Lisbon Treaty, one of the cornerstones of which is full respect for 
fundamental rights. There is no need to compromise between these two goals – they 
are complementary and can be achieved in tandem” (Frontex 2010h). Similar to the 
intertwining of security and humanitarianism discussed above, fundamental rights 
were thus incorporated into a primarily security-centred outlook in Frontex’s public 
documents in this period.  
The clear increase in fundamental rights references in Frontex’s reports and press 
releases between 2008 and 2011 coincided with increasing pressures by the European 
Parliament on the agency. In 2010, negotiations for the 2011 amendments of Frontex’s 
founding regulation commenced. In March 2011, Frontex’s management board passed 
the agency’s Fundamental Rights Strategy and a Code of Conduct, explicitly 
incorporating fundamental rights in the agency’s working routines for the first time 
(Frontex 2011n, 2012c; Neumann 2013, 26). In the announcement accompanying the 
decision, Laitinen was cited as saying “[f]undamental rights and human dignity have 
always been at the heart of Frontex’s values” (Frontex 2011n). Frontex’s press releases 
thus began to present the agency as pro-actively and sincerely committed to 
fundamental rights only months before these principles were more firmly inscribed in 
its legal basis, while references to saving and protecting those in need increased as 
well.  
In sum, Frontex’s self-representation between 2008 and 2011 began to shift 
considerably vis-à-vis its earlier documents. While an understanding of migration as a 
risk to be managed remained central in the agency’s public narratives, the active 
construction of “crises” in 2010 and 2011 reinforced an exceptionalist reading of 
events in EUrope at the time, framing them as “crises” in need of urgent responses. In 
addition, the common narrative on “unscrupulous smugglers” began to feature in the 
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agency’s public documents, in which the discursive formations of humanitarianism 
and security were tied up simultaneously. This coincided with a renewed emphasis on 
Frontex’s contributions to saving lives at sea. Importantly, references to fundamental 
rights increased significantly during this period, and fundamental rights were 
presented as having always been central to Frontex’s work. In this period, then, the 
discursive formations of humanitarianism, human rights, and security came to be 
increasingly intertwined in Frontex’s public documents, and the agency began to be 
presented as a protector of human rights, a saviour of people from unscrupulous 
smugglers, and a protector of EUrope at the same time.  
 
Mainstreaming and connecting human rights, humanitarianism, and 
security: 2011-2014 
While the invocation of a crisis and emergency in Frontex’s public documents was 
most visible in 2011, the threat scenario connected to this year of “exception” was also 
invoked in the years since then. Despite relatively low numbers of arrivals in 2012, the 
agency reported that “the risk of a resurgence of illegal border crossings on the Eastern 
Mediterranean route remains” (Frontex 2013e, 9). In late 2013, the agency reported on 
“migratory pressure [that] was comparable to the same period in 2011” (Frontex 
2013f). And with arrival numbers increasing again, Frontex stated that 2013 “saw a 
massive upswing in irregular migrants [sic] arrivals in the Central Mediterranean. This 
[…] meant there were more detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU maritime 
borders than during the height of the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’” (Frontex 2014a). Also the 
2013 annual report spoke about “a huge increase in Syrian nationals”, “intense migrant 
flows” and reported that “the volumes of migration flows almost returned to the level 
of the exceptional pressure stemming from the “Arab Spring” of 2011” (Frontex 
2014b, 54, 63). As migratory movements increased further since then, the reference 
point of 2011 was given up eventually, and in 2014 a news release instead compared 
arrivals to the “the exceptionally high [arrival] levels of summer 2013” (Frontex 
2014c) and referred to “the extremely high migratory pressure Italy is currently subject 
to” (Frontex 2014d).  
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Warning of what was to come, the agency’s first quarterly risk analysis report in 2014 
moreover stated that “[s]ince the start of the war in Syria, a rather insignificant drop in 
applications during winter is normally followed by a larger increase during the 
following summer, with the respective curve resembling more upward stairs than the 
usual waves” (Frontex 2014c). Contrary to some of the earlier statements, this last 
forecast points to a predictable increase in mobility, fitting in with Frontex’s risk-
focused approach rather than feeding into the rhetoric of unexpected exception or 
emergency. As noted already, much of the agency’s work remains based on risk 
analyses and migration management. Different versions of its risk analyses reports 
have been published seven times a year (though this number increased in 2015),19 and 
have outlined and forecasted changes in migration patterns. A risk-based narrative 
suggests pre-planning and preparedness rather than emergency responses, and coexists 
with the more urgency-driven mode of securitising the agency has emphasised at other 
times.  
In recent years, much of the language of Frontex’s reports and press releases has 
continued to present unauthorised migration as a risk and a threat to EUrope. In the 
2012 annual report, for instance, the agency clearly outlined the risks posed through 
document fraud:  
 
[f]irstly, document fraud allows migrants in irregular or unlawful situations to enter 
the territory of a Member State, and potentially also to move freely within the 
Schengen area. Secondly, individuals assuming a bogus identity and operating within 
black markets seriously affect internal security, and undermine international criminal 
investigations as well as national social systems and the ability of any state to 
effectively manage and protect its legitimate communities. Finally, document fraud 
profits and progressively demands closer and stronger links to organised crime groups 
as modern documents require more skilled and expensive techniques to produce 
quality forgeries (Frontex 2013e, 35).  
                                                 
19 Until 2014, this included one Annual Risk Analysis, four Frontex Risk Analysis Network Quarterly 
Reports, and an Eastern European Borders Annual Risk Analysis as well as a Western Balkans Annual 
Risk Analysis. From 2015, the agency started publishing quarterly reports for the Eastern Borders and 
Western Balkans, and released an Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community Joint Report.  
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The presence of individuals relying on false passports – which for many constitutes 
the only way to enter and reside in EUrope that does not involve life-threatening boat 
journeys or equally dangerous, hidden land border crossings – is constructed as a threat 
to the economy, the welfare state, internal security, and the “legitimate communities” 
EUropean states are seeking to protect. The associative connections made between 
diverse issue areas in the statement above create what Huysmans refers to as a 
“patchwork of insecurities,” and contribute to a generalised sense of unease in relation 
to unauthorised migration (Huysmans 2014, 84). In particular associations between 
migration and (organised) crime were made repeatedly in Frontex’s publications in 
this time period. In Frontex’s 2013 annual report, smuggling was framed as a “serious 
cross-border crime” (Frontex 2014b, 15). It was moreover warned that Frontex’s 
“analysis of the different waves of migrant boats that have targeted Italy’s sea border 
since November 2013 suggests development of the logistical & organisational 
capacities of the criminal groups which facilitate the gathering and embarkation of 
migrants along Libya’s coast” (Frontex 2014c). By associating irregular migration 
with organised crime, black markets, and internal state security, the agency thus 
continues to construct migration as a diffuse risk affecting diverse areas of EUropean 
societies. Labelling boat arrivals as “waves” that are “targeted” specifically at Italy’s 
coast moreover feeds into a wider describing migration in terms of fluidity – such as 
“flood”, “tide”, or “flow”, which further contributes to the dehumanisation and 
securitising of people on the move (see Pugh 2004). 
As noted above, 2011 was a turning point for Frontex in terms of its fundamental rights 
obligations, as the agency was mandated to create the position of a Fundamental Rights 
Officer, and to establish a Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights. Accordingly, 
its 2011 annual report made a particular emphasis on fundamental rights. Not only did 
executive director Laitinen report on the structural changes the regulation amendments 
required, but he also emphasised that this was in line with Frontex’s previously 
existing commitments to fundamental rights in a foreword to the report:  
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[d]espite all these changes, some things remain the same: the need to maintain 
Frontex’s vision, goals and values by ensuring quality in everything we do; the 
commitment and professionalism required to deliver constant and reliable support to 
the Member States; and an unfaltering recognition of the importance of fundamental 
rights at every stage of operations will all stand us in good stead for whatever 
challenges the future may hold (Frontex 2012b, 5).  
This emphasis on fundamental rights continued in news items issued in 2012 and 2013, 
with Laitinen being cited in May 2012 as saying “Frontex, from the very beginning of 
its work, took the respect of fundamental rights as a sine qua non in the performance 
of all its tasks […]” (Frontex 2012d). In September 2012, Laitinen stated that “Not 
only respect for Fundamental Rights, but their active promotion, is a firm cornerstone 
of the agency’s strategy” (Frontex 2012a). Also in Frontex’s annual reports, 
fundamental rights were reported about in increasing breadth. In the 2012 and 2013 
reports, 5-6-page annexes reported about activities related to fundamental rights, as 
did numerous sections within the reports (Frontex 2013e, 2014b). In both, the values 
and mission of Frontex were described as strongly connected with fundamental rights, 
as the following quote illustrates: “[h]umanity links Frontex’s activities with the 
promotion and respect of Fundamental Rights as an unconditional and integral 
component of effective integrated border management resulting in trust in Frontex” 
(Frontex 2014b, 11). Adherence to fundamental rights was thus framed not only as a 
value in and of itself, but also as a means to gain trust and legitimacy.  
When examining recent publications, it appears that fundamental rights language has 
effectively become “mainstreamed” in Frontex’s publications, with references to their 
centrality and importance incorporated into many of its press releases, public 
statements, and all of its annual reports. Importantly, fundamental rights language has 
been combined with other aspects of Frontex’s self-representation, beginning to 
construct a narrative of an agency that is promoting best practices, professionalism, 
the rule of law, and fundamental rights through its trainings and joint operations. At 
the same time, there has been a shift away from focusing on the reduction of irregular 
migration within Frontex’s publications. While in the annual reports and press releases 
published during Frontex’s early years, a decrease in irregular migration was described 
as one of the agency’s primary goals, its 2012 annual report instead cites the 
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importance of “reduc[ing] the loss of lives at sea and the number of irregular migrants 
who enter the EU undetected” (Frontex 2013e, 20, my emphasis). Relatedly, a 2014 
quarterly risk analysis acknowledged the displacing effects of Frontex operations, 
pointing out that migratory routes were shifting rather than stopped in response to the 
agency’s activities (Frontex 2014c).  
In addition to an increase in references to fundamental rights, Frontex’s public 
documents in recent years saw a growing positive emphasis on the efforts the agency 
was undertaking to save people in distress at sea: its 2011 annual report stated that 
23,192 “migrants in distress” had been saved, the following year’s report spoke of 
5,575 “migrants”, and that of 2013 reported repeatedly that more than 37,000 
“persons”, “people”, and “migrants in distress” had been saved (Frontex 2012b, 50; 
2013e, 17, 52; 2014b, 3, 16, 64; see also Frontex 2012e; 2013f). At least since late 
2012, the agency has described itself as “Europe’s biggest Search and Rescue (SAR) 
operation” on its website (Frontex 2013a). Also during the European Day for Border 
Guards 2013, an annual event organised by Frontex to strengthen the EUropean border 
guard community, an emphasis on Frontex’s efforts to save people in distress at sea 
was made. The director of Frontex’s Operations Division, Klaus Roesler, noted in a 
panel discussion that “it’s worth to reiterate that two out of three detected migrants are 
rescued, are subject to a search and rescue operation. It means that border surveillance 
regularly turns into a search and rescue operation coordinated by the responsible search 
and rescue centres, following international law” (Roesler, in Frontex 2013g).  
Roesler’s statement illustrates a commitment to a “rule-of-law” humanitarianism, i.e. 
to assisting member states’ Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCCs) in search 
and rescue operations when asked to do so. Similarly to 2007, there exists a 
simultaneous insistence that Frontex’s mandate remains limited to border security. 
This position became particularly clear during a partially public exchange between 
Frontex and the Italian minister of the interior Alfano in summer 2014. As boat arrivals 
increased, Alfano mobilised humanitarian appeals to call for greater European 
responsibility in the region. In June, he argued that it was Europe that needed to take 
over the Mare Nostrum operation, given that those saved wanted to go to Europe rather 
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than specifically to Italy (La Reppublica 2014a). Shortly thereafter, he announced that 
Mare Nostrum would be substituted by a Frontex-coordinated operation (La 
Reppublica 2014b). At this point, a struggle over Frontex’s responsibilities and 
character became visible: soon after Alfano’s claim that Mare Nostrum would be 
replaced by Frontex, the agency was quoted as denying this in media reports, saying 
that it had neither the resources nor the mandate to do so (La Reppublica 2014c; Meier 
2014). Unperturbed, Alfano began speaking about “Frontex plus” as the replacement 
for Mare Nostrum (La Reppublica 2014d; La Stampa 2014).  
After meeting Commissioner Malmström in Brussels, Alfano and the Commissioner 
reiterated that “Frontex plus” would substitute Mare Nostrum (ANSA 2014a; 
European Commission 2014b). Frontex interim executive director Arias Fernandez 
however insisted that the agency’s mandate remained limited to border security during 
a hearing at the European Parliament. Announcing that Frontex would launch a new 
operation in the Mediterranean, he reiterated that “Joint Operation Triton will not 
replace Mare Nostrum. Neither the mandate nor the available resources allow for that 
replacement” (LIBE Committee 2014). When answering questions by 
Parliamentarians, Arias Fernandez further clarified that  
 
 
Frontex has never given its name to any operation. So “Frontex plus” is totally 
misleading for the public and also for you […]. In any case, the difference between 
Mare Nostrum and Triton is fundamentally the nature of the two operations. While 
Mare Nostrum is clearly a search and rescue operation, Triton will be with the main 
focus on border control, border management. Although as it is obvious, saving lives 
is an absolute priority (Arias Fernandez in the LIBE Committee 2014). 
Similar declarations were also made in Frontex press releases at the time, which 
simultaneously emphasised the importance of saving lives, and Frontex’s border 
control mandate (Frontex 2014d, 2014e, 2014f). A concept paper Frontex sent to the 
Italian government that was leaked to the press made clear that the operational aim of 
Triton would be “to control irregular migration flows towards the territory of the 
European Union and to tackle cross border crime” – a clearly security-oriented goal 
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(Frontex 2014g, 10). While search and rescue activities are mentioned in the 
document, they appear only marginally and are described as Italy’s responsibility.  
In this publicised contention regarding the agency’s role in saving lives at sea, 
Frontex’s public interventions and press releases presented the agency as committed 
to fulfilling its duties under international maritime law, i.e. responding to distress calls 
in the vicinity of its operations, and following instructions by national MRCCs to 
conduct search and rescue activities on an ad hoc basis. More expansive interpretations 
of humanitarianism, particularly suggestions that Frontex should conduct operations 
with the objective of searching and rescuing individuals at sea, were firmly rejected. 
In the public documents released by Frontex, it is implied that the agency’s life-saving 
activities occur as a side effect of its security-focused joint operations, and take place 
under the responsibility of member states. At times, security and humanitarian 
language even seem to merge in the self-representations mobilised within press 
releases and annual reports, such as in this example: “53 758 migrants (approximately 
147 migrants per day on average) were apprehended/rescued during joint sea 
operations in 2013” (Frontex 2014b, 63). The use of “apprehended/rescued” seems to 
indicate that in some instances, humanitarian and security languages have become 
exchangeable in the agency’s public documents. 
The mainstreaming of humanitarianism and human rights in Frontex’s publications 
has gone hand in hand with a greater emphasis on asylum seekers, who now feature 
more regularly also outside of their role as “indicators” in Frontex’s “risk analyses”. 
In particular, references to the discursive narratives of the “fraudulent asylum seeker” 
and the “unscrupulous smuggler” have increased recently, and enmesh the discursive 
formations of humanitarianism, human rights, and security. As one example of this, 
the chair of the management board elaborated in his foreword to Frontex’s 2013 annual 
report:  
 
[t]hose in need of protection can only be identified and granted an orderly admission 
procedure if the EU’s external borders are under intensive surveillance. The same 
applies when it comes to combating human smuggling as a complex, international, 
unscrupulous and organised business. In order to improve the situation of refugees 
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sustainably and to fight all aspects of cross-border crime we need to step up and 
coordinate our cooperation with the relevant countries of origin, the transit of irregular 
migration and cross-border crime (Frontex 2014b, 3).  
While reaffirming the need to protect ‘legitimate’ asylum seekers and refugees, other 
asylum seekers have repeatedly been portrayed as cunning, strategic, and illegitimate. 
In July 2014, a news item on Frontex’s website reported trends of the previous year, 
including “a sharp increase of nationals of the Russian Federation of Chechen origin 
refused entry and then using asylum applications in Poland as a way to enter the EU 
and then move on to Germany” (Frontex 2014h, my emphasis; see also Frontex 2014b, 
19). Similar claims were made in another news item on the “Western Balkans Annual 
Risk Analysis” in 2014: “[w]hen detected, almost all migrants claimed asylum. The 
abuse of visa-free travel through mostly unfounded asylum application in the EU 
remained at the same level as in 2012” (Frontex 2014i, my emphasis; see also Frontex 
2014c). Drawing on the widespread narrative of the ‘fraudulent asylum seeker’, 
applying for asylum is thus portrayed as a strategy to gain access to the EU by 
“irregular migrants” (rather than by bona fide refugees). By associating and partially 
equating asylum with irregular migration as well as with deceit and abuse, these 
publications draw on and further consolidate a generalised sense of unease vis-à-vis 
migration and asylum in EUrope (see e.g. Bigo 2002a; Huysmans 2014; Huysmans 
and Buonfino 2008).  
Similarly, publications by Frontex also continued to refer to the narrative of the 
‘unscrupulous smuggler’ in justifying its activities in recent years. In relation to the 
death of 45 individuals, the following statement was attributed to deputy executive 
director Gil Arias Fernandez: “[t]hese people were put on rubber boats or told to swim 
or cross the freezing cold river by the facilitators […]. In fact, an important target of 
our operation are the criminal facilitation networks who are behind these arrivals” 
(Frontex 2011o; see also Frontex 2011p, 2012e, 2012f). While irregular migration is 
constructed as a security threat to member states, the narrative of the ‘unscrupulous 
smuggler’ shifts the blame for this phenomenon as well as resulting deaths to the 
facilitators of these journeys. It moreover enables Frontex not only to remain silent 
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vis-à-vis the more fundamental reasons for irregular migration, but also makes it 
possible to frame unauthorised border crossers as threats and victims at the same time.  
Consequently, the discursive narrative positions Frontex simultaneously as a protector 
of EUropean citizens from outside threats, and as a compassionate rescuer of those 
seeking to reach EUrope without authorisation. The narrative of the ‘asylum fraudster’ 
and of the ‘unscrupulous smuggler’ are commonly known among publics in EUrope, 
and alluding to them allows Frontex’s messages to be instantly understood. They 
combine concern for the welfare and rights of ‘genuine’ refugees on the one hand with 
the assertion that ‘fraudsters’ and ‘smugglers’ need to be combatted decisively to 
protect ‘genuine’ asylum seekers and potential ‘smuggling victims’, and to shield 
‘ourselves’ from risks and threats. The narratives thereby draw on the simultaneous 
articulation of the discursive formations of humanitarianism, human rights, and 
security. In conclusion, press releases and annual reports released by Frontex between 
2011 and 2014 saw the mainstreaming of the portrayal of Frontex as a rescuer and 
human rights promoter, which was at the same time closely bound up with ideas more 
traditionally associated with security and law enforcement: staying in and exercising 
control.  
 
Knowing Frontex through its publications 
Seeking to understand Frontex through the representations in its public documents 
opens up a second perspective on the agency. It allows the analyst to add depth and 
context to the quantitative overview of particular terms in Frontex’s publications 
through time, which was provided in the introduction. In doing so, it shows that 
humanitarianism, human rights, and security have become increasingly interconnected 
in Frontex’s public documents. In the agency’s early publications, migration was 
presented primarily as a threat and a risk, and Frontex was portrayed as analysing, 
anticipating, and managing this risk as well as being ready to quickly respond to 
unexpected emergencies as they arose. Initial, cautious references to saving lives 
suggested that Frontex’s security-oriented joint operations had humanitarian side 
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effects by intercepting and returning individuals at sea. While terms such as “illegal 
migrants” were gradually phased out in subsequent years, the reports and press releases 
continued to contribute to the (diffuse and exceptionalist) securitising of unauthorised 
migration, presenting it both in terms of risks responded to through routine analysis 
activities and by invoking crises and emergencies. References to human rights were 
only made from 2008 onwards. Nevertheless, they have become mainstreamed in 
Frontex’s publications in recent years, being consistently highlighted as a key aspect 
of the agency’s work.  
While the press releases and reports at times highlight one discursive formation in 
particular, they most often draw on a combination of them. The analysed documents 
also mobilise the widely known discursive narratives of the ‘asylum fraudster’ and the 
‘unscrupulous smuggler’, in which the formations of humanitarianism, human rights, 
and security are tied up with one another. In Frontex’s publications, the three 
discursive formations have thus become increasingly enmeshed in recent years. As a 
result of this, the agency is simultaneously constructed as a protector of EUrope, a 
saviour of lives at sea, and a promoter of fundamental rights. Following a loosely 
Foucauldian approach, the preceding discussion opens up two questions in particular. 
First, what has enabled the three discursive formations to co-exist in Frontex’s 
publications, and to become increasingly tied up with each other? Second, what are 
the effects of their combination in Frontex’s public documents?  
In chapter 2, I reflected on the first question, and proposed that the discursive 
similarities of humanitarianism, human rights, and security create the preconditions 
for their intertwinement in contemporary EUropean border governance, including in 
Frontex’s publications. In particular, I argued that the commonalities across the three 
discursive formations meant that calling for an improved implementation of 
humanitarian principles and / or human rights did not necessarily constitute a 
fundamental challenge to dealing with migration as a threat or a risk, and thereby the 
continuation of Frontex’s practices (including risk analysis and joint operations, 
among others). As noted, all three discursive formations are intimately bound up with 
the governance of populations in space, and construct unauthorised border crossers as 
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‘others’. Their similarities make it possible to incorporate references to saving lives 
and protecting rights in Frontex’s publications, while maintaining a conceptualisation 
of migration as a risk and a threat at the same time.  
The second question will be addressed in greater detail in chapter 6. Nevertheless, a 
few preliminary observations are warranted here. Importantly, Foucault proposed 
treating discourses “as practices that systematically form the objects of which they 
speak” (Foucault 1972, 49). While his understanding of discourses includes not only 
linguistic, but also non-linguistic practices, the conceptualisation of discursive 
practices as productive (rather than merely reflective of an already existing reality) is 
of great relevance here. Examining changes in Frontex’s public documents does not 
only provide insights into how the language in them has changed over time; the 
language that is used to describe Frontex’s work, borders, and migration 
simultaneously creates the world the agency is situated in (see Hajer 1993, 44). How 
mobility is responded to is intimately bound up with how it is perceived and 
understood, which linguistic practices are central to (see Fischer and Forester 1993, 
6). Judith Butler uses the term “discursive performativity” to capture the productive 
capacity of discourse:  
 
[d]iscursive performativity appears to produce that which it names, to enact its own 
referent, to name and to do, to name and to make. […] As a discursive practice 
(performative "acts" must be repeated to become efficacious), performatives 
constitute a locus of discursive production. No "act" apart from a regularized and 
sanctioned practice can wield the power to produce that which it declares (Butler 
1993, 107). 
As noted already, Frontex’s public documents draw on discursive formations that 
circulate widely in contemporary EUrope. They continuously reiterate already-
existing subjectivities and narratives, and are thereby performative. Not only do they 
(re-)produce particular conceputalisations of migration and mobility, but also, they 
produce Frontex as a humanitarian, human rights, and security actor. From the 
perspective of Frontex’s public documents, then, Frontex can be known as a (self-
proclaimed) saviour of lives, a promoter of fundamental rights, and a protector of 
EUropean citizens. Chapter 6 will elaborate what the effects of this construction on 
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Frontex are, as well as how the intertwinement of humanitarianism, human rights, and 
security formations is performative in the EUropean border regime more widely.  
There is one last point that needs to be discussed in this section: the preceding analysis 
does not address the question of intentionality. Importantly, examining the change in 
the language used in Frontex’s public documents alone cannot give a satisfactory 
answer regarding the motivations of those commissioning, editing, or writing the 
relevant documents to gradually increase the references made to humanitarianism and 
human rights. Given the access limitations I faced (as discussed in chapter 3), it would 
be mere speculation to discuss the motivations underlying the discursive shifts outlined 
in this section. While having access to internal meetings, discussions, briefings, and 
documents would undoubtedly have yielded highly valuable insights, some underlying 
methodological issues would moreover have remained even if access had not been so 
limited.  
In my research, I was interested in discursive shifts over the first decade of Frontex’s 
existence. However, I was only able to conduct interviews once I actively started my 
doctoral project, i.e. from 2013 onwards. Seeking to establish the motivations of 
linguistic changes in Frontex’s documents retroactively through interview data would 
have posed a number of difficulties: first, in terms of finding interviewees who would 
be able to share insights into discussions and decisions taken in Frontex’s early years 
(none of my interviewees had worked for Frontex since its foundation). Second, in 
terms of adding considerable doubt regarding the accuracy of interviewees’ memories 
and retrospective accounts of organisational change and motivations. Third, seeking 
to attribute intentionality to interviewees also risks affirming a conceptualisation of 
the intentional subject as prior to and independent of discourse, which is in tension 
with the Foucauldian conceptualisation followed in this thesis (Angermuller 2014, 25). 
Importantly, when analysing the articulation of discursive formations following a 
Foucault-inspired approach, it is not the aim to understand individual actors’ intentions 
or motivations in making particular utterances or drawing new connections (Foucault 
1972, 125). Instead, the focus of analysis is on what makes such connections and 
transitions between discursive formations possible, on mapping the proximities, 
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analogies, and symmetries that allow for their exchanges or interplay (Foucault 1972, 
161–162). Also from a new institutionalist perspective, identifying singular 
motivations for linguistic changes within organisations is problematic: as the next 
chapter will discuss in greater depth, the idea of Frontex as a rational organisation that 
takes decisions on how to present itself does not live up to scrutiny. Importantly, these 
limitations do not imply that those working for Frontex have not had particular 
motivations for actions taken, including linguistic changes. Instead, they problematize 
the feasibility of clearly separating out and identifying their intentions for the analyst, 
both from a practical and from a theoretical standpoint.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I offered two perspectives on Frontex, which both render the agency 
knowable in different ways. While the first one followed other scholars’ accounts of 
Frontex’s foundation, the second followed Frontex’s annual reports and press releases 
over the first 10 years of its existence. Both perspectives produce a particular kind of 
knowledge about the agency. Examining the debates and negotiations leading up to 
Frontex’s foundation allows for understanding the agency as a compromise between 
diverse actors: Frontex has been established as the answer to a variety of concerns, and 
continues to be held accountable by actors pursuing different interests. Such a 
conceptualisation helps to make sense of the coexistence of different rationalities 
within the agency, and of its ongoing need to negotiate multiple discursive formations. 
It allows for a less unitary and deterministic view of Frontex’s work and narratives, 
and suggests that its multi-faceted self-representations have changed and evolved 
partially in response to developments in the wider border regime. Shifts of power 
relations both among and within EU institutions might have led to a re-consideration 
of policies and terms used, as more “migration-friendly” actors – most importantly the 
European Parliament – gained greater influence in recent years, and humanitarianism 
and human rights became stronger discourses in the border regime overall, as I outlined 
in the introduction to this thesis.  
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The second perspective has engaged with the agency’s self-representations, and how 
these changed over the first 10 years of its existence. When examining Frontex’s public 
self-representations over time, the increases in references to search and rescue 
activities and fundamental rights are remarkable (see introduction). The date 
boundaries drawn between the three different phases of Frontex’s self-representation 
are to some extent artificial, as the three phases blur into each other. Nevertheless, I 
showed that Frontex’s publications presented the agency very strongly as a security 
actor in its early years, making no references to human rights and very limited 
references to saving lives at sea as a result of diverting boats back to their countries of 
origin until 2008. In the following years this slowly changed, as humanitarianism and 
human rights began to be incorporated in the agency’s public documents, and an 
entanglement of humanitarianism, human rights, and security in Frontex’s self-
representation began to emerge through the narrative of Frontex’s ‘fight’ against the 
‘unscrupulous smuggler’ exploiting ‘vulnerable migrants’. Over the last years, 
humanitarianism and human rights were effectively mainstreamed throughout the 
agency’s annual reports and press releases, and a combination of humanitarianism, 
human rights, and security emerged in Frontex’s self-representations in that period.  
Importantly, the incorporation of humanitarianism and human rights did not challenge 
the fundamentally security-centred representation of Frontex. While Frontex’s press 
releases and reports have increasingly drawn on humanitarian and human rights 
language, Frontex continued to be portrayed as a security actor, ready to respond to 
urgent threats as well as constantly calculating and manging risks. The incorporation 
of human rights and humanitarianism did not pose a challenge to ongoing portrayals 
of migration as a risk and a threat due to the similarities across the discursive 
formations (see chapter 2). Instead, these similarities allowed for the intertwinement 
of the formations in key narratives employed by the agency, such as that of the 
‘unscrupulous smuggler’ and of the ‘asylum fraudster’. 
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Chapter 5: Frontex from an Organisational Perspective 
The previous chapter provided two different perspectives on Frontex, looking at the 
agency through the history of its foundation on the one hand, and through its published 
documents on the other hand. While both perspectives provide valuable insights 
regarding Frontex’s negotiation of humanitarianism, human rights, and security, each 
also has its limitations. As problematized already in chapter 4, the account of Frontex’s 
foundation simplifies the institutional actors involved, depicting them as unitary, 
rational agents. In addition, it stops short of engaging with Frontex’s own role as an 
actor within a contentious environment of diverse stakeholders. Tracing Frontex’s 
public documents through time, on the other hand, is necessarily partial in that it relies 
only on the written end results of complex internal processes and decision-making. 
While it can be argued that these outputs constitute an important part of Frontex’s 
organisational discourse, and indeed the discursive landscape of the EUropean border 
regime more generally, they also construct Frontex as a unitary, rational actor that 
responds appropriately to ever-changing patterns of migration and mobility through 
search and rescue activities, fundamental rights training, as well as risk analysis and 
joint operations.  
In order to probe this construction of Frontex, this chapter will complement the 
preceding perspectives with a third way of knowing Frontex. Drawing on findings 
from interviews, participant observations, and informal conversations, I move beyond 
Frontex’s official self-representation vis-à-vis the public. Importantly, the diverse 
forms of engagement I had with those working for and with the agency in different 
locations complicate its portrayal as a unitary, rational actor. Instead, these encounters 
suggest that Frontex can also be understood as a fragmented (or decoupled) 
organisation situated in a highly contested field, and subject to diverse and at times 
contradictory pressures from the outside. This relates, of course, to the history of the 
agency’s foundation as it was presented in the previous chapter. Rather than seeing 
Frontex as the product or compromise of its stakeholders’ interests, it however allows 
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for a more nuanced conceptualisation of how those working for and with the agency 
portray and negotiate the agency’s positioning in the EUropean border regime.  
As I discussed in chapter 3, my access to Frontex remained limited throughout my 
research, and insights presented here offer glimpses into the agency rather than a fully-
fledged organisational analysis. While I was only able to spend short periods of time 
in Frontex’s headquarters, at Frontex events, and in joint operations in Bulgaria and 
Italy, the data I could gather in these dispersed locations and with diverse people 
meaningfully complements and complicates the data presented in the previous chapter, 
providing the additional perspective of the agency through the accounts of those 
working for and with Frontex. In the following, I will introduce how humanitarianism, 
human rights, and security were negotiated in different locales – in Frontex’s 
bureaucracy on the one hand, and at ‘the borders’ on the other hand – and will point to 
contradictions and incoherencies in self-representations between these places. After 
outlining my findings, I will draw on new institutionalism to discuss discrepancies and 
continuities across the locales. Most importantly, I will argue that Frontex is a highly 
fragmented organisation, and that inconsistencies between different parts of the 
organisation reflect inconsistencies and contradictions in its wider environment. 
In doing so, I rely on 16 semi semi-structured interviews: six of these I conducted with 
staff members in December 2013, an interview with a management board member in 
January 2014, and a skype interview with an additional staff member in September 
2014. An interview with an NGO member of Frontex’s Consultative Forum on 
Fundamental Rights in September 2013 further informs the following analysis. This is 
complemented by fieldwork in Bulgaria and Italy: in Bulgaria, I conducted formal 
interviews with four guest officers and had numerous informal conversation with 
others, who did not want to or were not authorised to speak more formally. I could not 
audio record these interviews or conversations, but took handwritten notes throughout. 
In Italy, I conducted three formal interviews and went for dinner with all individuals 
affiliated with the Frontex-operation in the city I visited, talking informally with them. 
I could audio-record two of the three interviews, and took handwritten notes of the 
third interview and informal conversations. Lastly, I draw on observations and 
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informal conversations during the agency’s 47th management board meeting in 
February 2014 (including informal conversations during breaks, and over dinner and 
drinks following the meeting), during the European Day for Border Guards in May 
2013. As discussed in chapter 3, relying on informal conversations always raises 
ethical concerns: while all those I spoke with in informal contexts were aware of my 
identity as a researcher, I cannot be certain that they always fully understood that also 
information provided informally might contribute to my research. As such, no direct 
quotes obtained in informal conversations will be shared here. In order to preserve the 
interviewees’ anonymity, I will moreover not rely on the pronouns “he” or “she” in 
the following discussion. Given that this might make it possible to reconstruct who the 
speaker was for those who have a broad overview of who I had permission to 
interview, I chose to use the gender-neutral pronoun “they” instead. 
What will become apparent in the following discussion is that those working for and 
with Frontex drew on the discursive formations of humanitarian, human rights, and 
security to varying degrees. Whether their motivations in doing so while speaking to 
me were mostly strategic, or whether they genuinely believed in the narratives they 
mobilised cannot be determined here (see chapter 4). What is important, however, is 
that interviewees were able to draw on and combine the discursive formations of 
humanitarianism, human rights, and security in their accounts of their work and 
Frontex’s role, and did so in varying ways – and without prompting – throughout the 
interviews.  
 
Frontex’s self-portrayal by staff and management 
When speaking to Frontex management and staff, a relatively uniform organisational 
discourse emerged. Interviewees drew on humanitarianism, human rights, and security 
in speaking about their work, Frontex, and the importance of EU border controls. They 
invoked a continuum of threats in relation to migration, ranging from the 
overburdening of the asylum system to terrorism, drug dealing, rape, the shadow 
economy, bank robbery, murder, counterfeiting, human trafficking, and weapon 
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smuggling. At the same time, interviewees framed their work as risk management, and 
presented Frontex as intelligence-driven and as promoting best practices. Without 
prompting, almost all interviewees also invoked search and rescue as well as 
fundamental rights as central to the work that Frontex was doing. In this section, I will 
briefly outline how staff and management mobilised each of the discursive formations 
in turn and illustrate this with quotes, before then contrasting these narratives with 
those mobilised by the guest officers I spoke with in Frontex operations.  
 
Security: migration as a threat and a risk 
Among Frontex staff and management, migration was frequently linked with 
(organised) crime and terrorism and portrayed as presenting a variety of threats. 
Particularly when I asked about the importance of border management for the 
European Union, but also in comments about the role of Frontex more generally, these 
associations appeared. One staff member for instance explained:  
 
if you are a UK citizen living in Edinburgh, you don’t want someone coming from 
Lithuania to come by flight, without control, bringing arms, making a bank robbery, 
killing two people and going back to Lithuania safe. You don’t want someone coming 
from, from a specific country, being trained in a camp, come back and then, having 
the training, put a bomb in the metro station and make it explode. You don’t want 
people to earn money in the UK working illegally in, in a restaurant and then sending 
the money somewhere to finance some illegal activities, drug trafficking, or, or for 
buying, purchasing drugs or for trafficking human beings. You don’t want people 
who come with the contagious diseases to pass the border without any... There are 
various dimensions of border control (FR4). 
As this statement illustrates, migration was associated with a continuum of threats to 
EU citizens, EU member states, and the EU itself (see Bigo 2002a). Reflecting the 
breadth of this continuum, threats were at times framed in highly individualised terms 
– “how would you feel if your daughter got raped and you only have this open border 
and the criminal can leave Europe and you’ll never find him again?” (FR1) – and at 
other times related to the functioning of the state or social as a whole – “everybody 
will come here. And it will be a total disorder so to say. And disorder in the bad sense, 
of like, not having sufficient jobs or food or anything” (FR3). They were also bound 
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up with the functioning of Schengen, which was portrayed as embodying as well as 
necessitating the solidarity the EU was relying on. Frontex and its coordination of 
border controls was portrayed as a key “solidarity instrument” (FR1) that supported 
member states in keeping the threat of irregular migration at bay. The agency was also 
presented as law enforcement actor, implementing the rules that Schengen member 
states had agreed on, in particular the Schengen Borders Code. Both law and order as 
well as security and threat discourses emerged across all interviews with Frontex staff 
and management.  
At times, the presentation of migration as a threat was bound up with notions of 
urgency. As one staff member explained, “Frontex can also deploy, let’s say, urgent, 
urgently a set of people, assets, in an area which is experiencing sudden problems. And 
an unexpected level of threat” (FR4). The capacity of Frontex to speedily respond to 
an unforeseen “threat” was emphasised, which is in line with interpretations of security 
as requiring a readiness to urgently respond to essentially unpredictable threats. On the 
other hand, staff members also invoked understandings of security as risk 
management, presenting their work as routine and cyclical: 
 
we get intelligence and so on, and we try to provide knowledge about how the 
operation is going, what are the findings, if we have to readjust the deployment, if we 
have to readjust the way of the, the operational response to specific new trends. And 
then, in the end of these operations, we support also the, let’s say the final evaluation 
of the operation, each operation. Lesson learned, best practices, problems, 
improvements, and so on. In a circle that, let’s say, looks to learn from, from the 
operations for the future (FR4).  
This understanding of risk analyses and operations as building on each other was 
framed by FR2 as running “almost in automated mode: member states already know 
that in this period of the year we are going to discuss with them what they will be able 
to provide next year, […] so everything is already in a cycle mode.” In this framing, 
the focus was thus not on urgent responses to unpredictable threats, but on routine 
monitoring and planning ahead. Frontex was presented as a service provider, offering 
“additional support” to member states and European institutions, in particular 
“intelligence-driven” planning and preparation. Throughout the interviews, the 
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importance of risk analyses, best practices, capacity building, trainings, evaluations 
and learning was highlighted.  
In line with this emphasis on managing risks, several interviewees remarked that 
Frontex’s focus was not on stopping irregular migration, but on detection and 
identification:  
 
well, the importance of border control is, let’s put it this way: I believe that no one 
would allow to enter in his own home somebody that you should not know. And this 
is the key point. We believe that all the people that will cross the EU borders legally 
or illegally should be identified (FR7). 
There’s also the main idea to make sure that people who travel legally should be able 
to cross the border as smoothly as possible. And those that are not legal travellers 
should be found among the travellers as easy as possible (FR5). 
Concerns around detection and identification are closely bound up with a 
conceptualisation of security as risk management, and of migration overall as a risk to 
be calculated and managed (see Aradau and van Munster 2008; Huysmans 2014). This 
focus on identifying individuals rather than necessarily stopping them stands in 
contrast to common portrayals of Frontex as seeking to stop and return people, or even 
waging “war” against them. Rationalities and technologies of risk, however, render the 
population of border crossers in its entirety suspect, positing them to be in need of 
profiling, identification, and filtering. FR5 referred to the importance of filtering rather 
clearly, emphasising the need to let ‘legitimate’ travellers pass smoothly while 
detecting ‘illegitimate’ travellers among border crossers as efficiently as possible (see 
Bigo et al. 2011). 
Frontex staff and management thus framed migration both as a continuum of threats 
that might require urgent responses, and as a risk to be managed and prepared for (see 
also Neal 2009, 349). Two staff members reflected on this coexistence of an urgency-
based and a more long-term, risk-based approach within Frontex. FR2 emphasised the 
novelty of risk-based approaches in EU border governance, arguing that this was 
something “the agency introduced in the traditional methods of border control”, and 
that it constituted “a way of better managing not only the resources, but also the real 
needs at the border.” FR1 emphasised developments in Frontex over time, arguing that  
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we’re becoming more, I think, less of an emergency help to more of a part of a system. 
What the system in the end will be we shall see, it’s difficult to say today. But you 
know, EUROSUR is an existing system. There is a new information exchange 
platform and we’re part of it. And we provide the member states with very specific 
products. So it’s, we still, you know, rush to the border to help when there is a crisis, 
when there is a large flow of migrants, but I think there is more, there is the, we 
develop things that are more long-term, less emergency (FR1). 
Clearly, staff members were aware of the coexistence of both modes of operation, 
urgency-based responses which were bound up with a perception of migration as a 
continuum of threats (or exceptionalist securitising) on the one hand, and risk-based 
approaches focusing on long-term planning, risk minimisation, detection and 
identification (or diffuse securitising) on the other. Their coexistence indicates the 
existence of various rationalities within the agency, which might complement as well 
as contradict one another at different moments in time. With one of the major concerns 
among staff members at the time of my fieldwork being the limited financial budget 
for the agency despite its increasing responsibilities, it is not difficult to imagine that 
tensions around the prioritisation of these means for urgent responses vs. long-term 
preparedness might arise. At other times, both approaches feed into one another and 
coexist harmoniously: as staff members explained, urgent interventions produce 
intelligence that is fed back into Frontex’s “risk analyses”, which in turn contribute to 
improving operational responses, including “rapid interventions”. The reasons for and 
effects of this coexistence of modes of securitising within Frontex will be further 




Apart from security formations, Frontex staff and management also drew on the 
discursive formations of humanitarianism and human rights. In most of the interviews 
I conducted, research participants introduced the topic of search and rescue at sea 
without prompting from my side. While they emphasised that the agency was doing 
its best to rescue people in distress at sea, they at the same time stressed that Frontex 
remained a security organisation. Repeatedly, interviewees asserted that “Frontex is 
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not there to solve the problem” (FR4), that “I don’t think we want to become an SAR 
agency” (FR6), “we are not a search and rescue organisation” (FR1), “Frontex has no 
mandate or competence to coordinate search and rescue cooperation” (FR2), and 
“Frontex is not a search and rescue agency. It’s a border agency” (FR3). While they 
emphasised that those participating in Frontex operations would aid a boat in distress 
if they received requests by a member state to do so, interviewees insisted that this did 
not mean that Frontex could be said to coordinate search and rescue operations. In 
addition, they spent considerable time explaining how difficult it was to see small boats 
in the vast area of the Mediterranean Sea, especially in bad weather conditions:  
 
[w]hen you have a boat in the middle of the sea and the, you have seven wind force 
and the boat is overcrowded and there are waves between 4 and 7 meters, you cannot 
even approach the boat. Because if you get close to a boat, you can create the 
conditions for capsizing or you cannot transport people because they can die. You 
know, putting a person, a pregnant woman or an old person or a child on a rope on 
the sea which is moving like this between boat A and boat B, one being ten meters 
high, it’s really, really bad. […] Sometimes, you know, the migrants put themselves 
really in bad conditions (FR4). 
As this quote illustrates, some interviewees were at least partially blaming the 
travellers themselves for the dangerous situations they found themselves in. Others 
were more sympathetic, and pointed to the strict visa regime as barring whole 
categories of people from travelling to EUrope legally. Regardless of whether they 
apportioned blame to the travellers or not, staff members seemed to feel a need to 
explain and justify Frontex’s actions at sea. They pointed not only to the practical 
difficulties of saving lives at sea, but also insisted that it was the responsibility of 
member states to coordinate search and rescue operations.  
In the interviews, a fine line between emphasising that Frontex was doing everything 
it could and had saved tens of thousands of people, and pointing out that search and 
rescue was not something the agency was responsible for emerged. Frontex staff 
members endorsed a ‘rule-of-law’ humanitarianism, positively emphasising Frontex’s 
adherence to international legal frameworks, while at the same time guarding 
themselves against criticism based on a more expansive reading of humanitarian 
duties. Frontex’s negotiations with Italy over the replacement of Mare Nostrum in 
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2014, which I discussed in the previous chapter, are an interesting example of this 
balancing act. Speaking to one of the Frontex staff members involved in these ongoing 
discussions in September 2014, it became clear that there was an ongoing struggle 
between Italy and Frontex over the agency’s activities in the Mediterranean: 
 
they want one thing which we cannot deliver, so this is the basic line […]. But they 
are constantly trying to push for that, as much as possible. But we cannot. It’s not a 
question of negotiating. On that thing we cannot negotiate, because we cannot. We 
cannot do what is Mare Nostrum doing right now. It’s not our role and it’s not our 
activities and we’re not supposed to be doing that, so this is the end. We will not do 
that (FR7).  
In addition to concerns about overstretching Frontex’s mandate, some staff and 
management members also suggested that Mare Nostrum might be a ‘pull factor’, or 
embolden facilitators to send people on the sea journey without adequate resources. 
When asked whether there might be tensions between search and rescue and border 
security objectives, interviewees however denied this to be the case. Instead, they 
framed search and rescue activities as temporarily suspending border controls, which 
would then resume as soon as the rescued individuals were disembarked somewhere. 
As FR2 elaborated, for instance: “when you are at sea, the first priority is to save lives. 
Then you process immigration as you should afterwards. I mean first you save the 
lives, then you take a look.” FR1 emphasised that better surveillance could lead to 
earlier detection and thus a higher chance of successful search and rescue operations, 
emphasising how both objectives could work together. Again, this points to 
interviewees’ commitment to a rule-of-law interpretation of humanitarianism and 
search and rescue obligations, fulfilling but not exceeding international legal 
requirements. While a more pro-active approach to saving lives – i.e. conducting 
operations with search and rescue rather than border security objectives – was 
explicitly rejected, Frontex’s participation in nationally coordinated search and rescue 
operations was positively emphasised and not viewed as problematic by those 
interviewed.  
Also beyond search and rescue activities, references to saving and protecting people 
on the move were made. When asked whether Frontex’s risk analyses took the risk 
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that travellers faced into account, FR4 explained that this was indeed the case, and 
pointed to a potential need to ‘prevent’ departures in case of particularly bad weather 
for the individuals’ own good. FR7 noted that illegalised people could more easily be 
exploited once they arrived in EUrope, and that identifying them would therefore help 
authorities to “protect” them. Relatedly, also the narrative of ‘unscrupulous smugglers’ 
who exploit vulnerable people was mobilised in the headquarters: similar to Frontex’s 
public documents, staff members portrayed the agency as protecting people from 
exploitation and violence. They linked migratory movements with organised crime, 
and the risks people faced on their journeys to EUrope with the unscrupulous 
behaviour of facilitators: 
 
I don’t know if you saw, there was a boat last week that sank, they were forced by 
the, this facilitators that are, on purpose they sank the boat with the migrants. And 
this is something, you know - this is really the issue at this point, you know? […] 
Because it’s not like we are against, we as Frontex are against migrants. Here, no one 
is against migrants. They are not criminals, they are people they are trying to look for 
their lives and some of them escaping and this is not our target. […] one of our main 
focus is facilitators. These are the people that we are very, very much interested in. 
We are putting a huge effort trying to detect, identify the facilitators and try as much 
as possible to bring them to justice (FR7). 
Again, emphasising the exploitation of individuals by facilitators allows for the 
construction of an image of Frontex as one of protecting individuals from harm both 
by rescuing them when in distress and by fighting people smuggling. Understanding 
those seeking to cross into EUrope without authorisation both as victims and threats 
enabled Frontex staff to present the agency’s work as protecting EUropean citizens 




Contrary to the more cautious negotiation of Frontex’s stance towards search and 
rescue, the importance of fundamental rights was emphasised and endorsed 
unambiguously throughout the interviews, and was frequently juxtaposed to what staff 
members framed as unjustified or misguided criticism from the outside. FR5 for 
instance asserted: “as you might know, Frontex has for long been pinpointed by 
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different nongovernmental organisations for not respecting fundamental rights and 
things like that. Which is far from true and actually, the full respect of fundamental 
rights has a very special position within Frontex.” Interviewees emphasised that 
Frontex took human rights very seriously, and that the criticism the agency received 
was largely misdirected: in Frontex operations, fundamental rights had not been 
violated. After stating this, FR3 however also pointed out that Frontex was in a 
transition phase, gradually ensuring that fundamental rights are being respected in all 
its activities and at all times.  
Most interviewees emphasised that already before the introduction of the Consultative 
Forum on Fundamental Rights (Forum) and the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), 
fundamental rights had been very important to Frontex. At the same time, they 
acknowledged that awareness of fundamental rights had increased since then, as they 
had “been highlighted in a clearer way” (FR5). Many remarked that initially, attitudes 
towards the Forum and the Fundamental Rights Officer had been cautious. I was told 
that there had been fears by Frontex staff that they would be told that what they were 
doing was wrong, but that instead, a constructive and cooperative approach prevailed. 
Particularly FR2 praised the day-to-to cooperation with the Fundamental Rights 
Officer, and also other interviewees commented favourably on her and the Forum’s 
work. Those staff members directly involved with the Consultative Forum also 
assessed its work positively. At the same time, they emphasised that trust needed to be 
built within the agency regarding the work of the Forum and the Fundamental Rights 
Officer: “you also need to consider that we are in an agency, you need to kind of build 
mutual trust. So... and this is a process that cannot happen you know overnight. So you 
need to allow some time to everybody. But what, certainly I mean, I’m confident, 
because I could see really an extremely constructive approach” (FR6). Overall, it 
seemed that Frontex staff members were well aware of the necessity of embracing 
fundamental rights publicly, while also acknowledging that mainstreaming them in 
practice was still work in progress.  
As noted, Frontex staff asserted that human rights were not violated during the 
agency’s own operations, and emphasised Frontex’s promotion of best practices and 
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the setting of standards: “wherever Frontex is it should be the highest standard, I think 
that’s pretty much understood by everybody, in terms of fundamental rights 
especially” (FR3). Importantly, interviewees were quick to distance Frontex from 
allegations of abuse by border guards outside of its missions. There seemed to be some 
frustration among them with the negative press abuses in some member states entailed 
for Frontex. Countering this, a member of Frontex’s management board and the NGO 
representative I spoke with emphasised the possibility of Frontex operations leading 
to the reporting of human rights violations, and thus human rights improvements. In 
addition, I was told that the Greek representative in Frontex’s management board in 
particular had come under increasing pressure in board meetings because of the 
problematic human rights situation in Greece.  
Further illustrating this dynamic, two national delegates were asked to explain 
incidents which left people who had attempted to cross their respective national 
borders dead during the management board meeting I attended. When speaking to me 
informally, other delegates expressed their shock and disbelief regarding these states’ 
practices, indicating that there exist diverging standards of acceptability regarding 
violence against border-crossers across EUropean states, and between (some) 
EUropean states and Frontex. Importantly, discussions of human rights standards as 
well as the singling out of particular member states were deeply tied up with a 
questioning of standards of ‘EUropeanness’ of countries in EUrope’s periphery, 
particularly Greece and Bulgaria. This came to the fore a number of times in the 
interviews, when participants referred to the different heritage and training of border 
guards in EUrope, lauding the more long-standing traditions of policing in countries 
such as Germany or Sweden. Overall, according to interviewees, Frontex had played 
a key role in improving the human rights situation in e.g. Greece over time.  
 
Summing up: Frontex’s organisational discourse 
Despite some nuances and different emphases between the accounts of different 
interviewees, a relatively uniform organisational discourse emerged among members 
of Frontex staff and management I spoke with. They framed migration as a threat to 
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be ready to respond to at short notice, while also emphasising the novelty Frontex had 
to offer to ‘traditional’ conceptions of border security through its intelligence-based 
approach. In terms of humanitarianism, interviewees cautioned against excessive 
expectations from the outside and emphasised the limited mandate of the agency. As 
noted, they embraced a rule-of-law reading of humanitarianism, while rejecting wider 
interpretations of humanitarian duties vis-à-vis those in need. This emphasis on the 
rule of law rather than wider, moral concerns fits with the portrayal of the agency as a 
law enforcement organisation, aiming to make sure that legal rules are applied: in EU 
and international law, search and rescue obligations are firmly enshrined. In addition, 
also fundamental rights are an integral part of the legal framework Frontex is bound 
by. While staff members acknowledged that Frontex’s commitment to them in practice 
was still ‘work in progress’ and of relatively recent origins, the growing emphasis on 
fundamental rights fits together with a wider narrative of Frontex as an agency that 
promotes the rule of law, best practices, uniform standards, and a common culture of 
border guarding across EUrope.  
 
Guest Officers’ understandings of Frontex  
As Frontex’s work is not only planned and carried out at the headquarters, but in part 
also implemented through its operations, I visited operation Poseidon Land at the 
Bulgarian-Turkish border in spring 2014, and operation Hermes in southern Italy in 
summer 2014. When interviewing guest officers within Frontex operations at the 
Bulgarian-Turkish border and in Sicily, I realised quickly that the people I spoke with 
were not using the organisational discourse I had heard in the headquarters. As I will 
outline below, guest officers and seconded officers articulated highly diverse 
interpretations of their work and of Frontex.  
Before exploring how the discursive formations of security, human rights, and 
humanitarianism were mobilised by those participating in Frontex operations, it is 
important to note that the guest officers I interviewed normally work in their own 
countries, and are deployed to Frontex operations for only one to three months at a 
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time. They are under the command of the “host member state”, i.e. the country they 
are deployed to, during that time. Seconded guest officers serve with Frontex for up to 
six months, and contrarily to guest officers can be sent to several joint operations in a 
row. Both types of officers in both research locations explained their decision to 
participate in a Frontex operation similarly, noting that it allowed them to understand 
another country’s border policing better, learn new practices, get to know new people, 
places, and languages, and meet colleagues which then would be valuable contacts 
during their daily work back in their home countries. Some also pointed to financial 
incentives and to benefits for their career prospects at home when spending some time 
in police missions abroad.  
Unequivocally, all officers expressed that they felt rather distanced from Frontex, and 
were at times hesitant to respond to my questions about the agency at all. When asked 
about changes in Frontex over time, one guest officer said:  
 
I think that’s very difficult to answer, because, me my little role, a small place there, 
I don’t know if I can see the big picture in that, that sense. I have not really felt very 
big change in my contact with Frontex and how I see Frontex from my starting till the 
end (laughs). But my contact is not very strong, you know?  
They also articulated doubts about the usefulness of their role in the operation: “I think, 
why this mission, what can we gain from it. That’s what I think. And sometimes I have 
difficulties to really… understand myself.” Throughout, officers expressed that 
Frontex was “far away” from them in their everyday work, that they had not been in 
touch with the agency a lot before or after the operation, that they had not paid much 
attention to it, or that Frontex simply did not play a role in their everyday work at 
home. Overall, the officers expressed that they felt rather disconnected from Frontex 
and did not always know much about the agency. This distance and disconnect will be 
further explored in the last part of this chapter.  
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Bulgaria 
When speaking to guest officers close to the Bulgarian-Turkish land border, both 
human rights and humanitarianism seemed to be virtually absent. Officers focused on 
the need to “catch the bad guys”, and migration was framed as a threat which needed 
to be controlled as close to the border as possible. Otherwise, “migrants” would travel 
on and would be increasingly difficult to “catch”. According to one guest officer, one 
of the biggest problems in the EU were “migrants”: “they’re here, they are making 
problems, they are involved in all kinds of criminal activities and so on.” They then 
said “we want as few [migrants] as possible.” Their colleague interjected, saying that 
“generally, I’m sure we don’t consider them as potential criminals. I’m sure it must be 
hard in someone’s life that he decides to leave one’s land.” They added though that 
the globe was huge and not everyone could live in Europe. This is why borders existed. 
They appeared older and more senior than their colleague (judging from the amount 
of stars on their uniform), and redirected the conversation several times during the 
interview, relativizing rather crude statements regarding migration by their younger 
colleague and asking me to not “misunderstand”, as both of them had nothing against 
migration. People only had to enter the EU legally, and this was what Frontex was 
there to ensure. The dynamics between both officers suggested that the more senior 
border guard was aware of certain limits as to what was acceptable to say about people 
on the move towards an outsider like myself. They did not express disagreement with 
their colleague, but intervened and qualified the other’s statements repeatedly to 
reassure me that neither of them had a problem with those who sought to cross EU 
borders as such.  
Throughout the interviews and informal conversations I had when at the Bulgarian-
Turkish border, the focus remained entirely on security and control concerns. Only 
when specifically asked about criticisms of Frontex did one officer informally 
comment briefly that Frontex was “taking care” of people on the move and that for the 
agency, human rights were central. When enquiring about potential changes in 
Frontex’s guidelines for the joint operations, a guest officer said they had not noticed 
any such changes in the “six to seven” operations they had participated in. Most of the 
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officers I spoke with were “surveillance experts”, using thermovision cameras and 
other equipment to detect individuals crossing into Bulgaria, and then alerting the 
Bulgarian authorities who would “take the necessary steps.” In my reflective notes at 
the time, I noted that I felt a reluctance to speak openly among guest officers, whose 
answers to my questions were often rather short. I expressed an uncertainty whether 
this was due to them being cautious and holding back particular views or thoughts, or 
due to them feeling that they did not have much to respond to my questions on Frontex. 
I also wondered whether the relative absence of humanitarian concerns among the 
officers I met might have been connected to the fact that I was visiting a land operation, 
where numbers of deaths are relatively low. In order to speak to officers involved in a 
sea border operation, I decided to visit operation Hermes in southern Italy.  
 
Italy 
In Sicily, a somewhat different and very diverse picture emerged. The three officers I 
interviewed expressed starkly differing perceptions about their work and the context 
they were working in. In contrast to the surveillance experts I had interviewed in 
Bulgaria, I primarily spoke to guest officers working as debriefers in Italy, i.e. those 
responsible for interviewing individuals after their arrival in Europe to gather 
intelligence about their motivations, routes, and facilitators. Contrary to the officers in 
Bulgaria, they had direct and often quite intense contact with those arriving. While the 
officers’ different narratives cannot be said to be representative of Frontex guest 
officers overall, they provide insights into the breadth of positions and interpetations 
among those implementing Frontex operations. For this reason, I will briefly outline 
each of their positioning in turn. 
One officer was invoking an image of migration as a stark threat and a danger, of 
travellers who lie, cheat, and carry diseases such as Ebola and Scabies into the EU. 
They did not express any kind of sympathy or compassion towards them. Instead, they 
advocated summary returns of those arriving to the countries they had travelled from 
as the only ‘real solution’ to the growing numbers of arrivals, and suggested that it was 
people’s own fault if they found themselves in situations of distress, after deciding to 
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enter unsafe boats without appropriate equipment. In their view, Italy’s Mare Nostrum 
operation was not saving people, but instead “aiding and abetting illegal immigration”, 
which was a crime. The scenario they described was thus entirely centred on a security 
perspective, portraying migration as a continuum of threats, without any mentioning 
of humanitarian or human rights concerns. 
The second officer expressed more understanding for those fleeing poverty and 
violence. They mobilised both risk management and threat-focused discourses, for 
instance pointing to the need to harmonise procedures, learn from best practices, make 
cooperation more efficient, and find the right level of migration to benefit EU member 
states: „it must be regulated in a way so we can have a certain level of system for 
people staying, living in our society.” They moreover maintained that “illegal” 
migration was a “huge problem”, that “Europe” wanted “to stop this flow”, and that 
the fact that migration was not regulated strictly enough was a threat to member states’ 
welfare systems. During the interview, the officer repeatedly linked migration and 
crime, and stated that in their country, international crime had increased to new record 
levels since the creation of the Schengen zone. At the same time, they also drew on 
humanitarianism, speaking in particular about the protection needs of Syrians and the 
dangers of irregular sea crossings. Towards the end of explaining the need to limit 
irregular migration, they said:  
 
and it’s a little bit heart-breaking as well. Because we are talking about people here. 
That’s what I think is a little bit difficult. Here we talk about people who are not really 
doing something wrong. Normally in my job back home I, people do bad things and 
I arrest them or… And here the, these type of immigrants, they haven’t done much 
wrong. Okay, they broke the border, they illegally entered Schengen, okay, but that’s 
it. […] and they have a difficult situation, many of them. You realise how unfair the 
world is. And I, me and maybe you too are one of the lucky ones. In the big picture. 
Speaking about their understanding of those on the move, the officer reflected also on 
their own privilege. As in the headquarters, they combined security and humanitarian 
discourse positions in their accounts of Frontex and EUropean border controls, but – 
contrary to there – did not mention human rights at all. When I specifically asked about 
the changing role of human rights, they said that since they began to be involved with 
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Frontex in 2010, human rights had been an integral part of the trainings and briefings 
provided. They went on to reflect on their own experiences in Frontex operations, and 
explained that while they were aware of human rights complaints that had been made, 
they did not actually know what Frontex did when receiving reports about “serious 
incidents.” Similarly to what I had heard from an NGO staff member and Frontex 
management, the officer nevertheless suggested that Frontex might have a beneficial 
effect on the human rights situation in EUrope: “but in a way I think Frontex maybe 
can be a good thing, that these things would never have been reported. Maybe in any 
channel.” In their account, the officer thus carefully negotiated humanitarianism, 
human rights, and security, while also expressing some uncertainty and distance vis-
à-vis Frontex and its responses to potential abuses. They seemed to occupy a somewhat 
ambivalent position towards the agency and EUropean cooperation more widely, 
emphasising its potential and necessity on the one hand, and expressing cautious doubt 
as to its practices and efficiency on the other hand.  
The account of the third officer in Italy differed starkly from this and all other guest 
officers’ accounts. Throughout the interview, this officer made clear that their primary 
desire was to help people, and that they trusted those they interviewed. They explained 
how they would do small favours for recent arrivals, by for instance sending WhatsApp 
messages to their families to tell them that they were alive: “sometimes I write ‘please 
don’t call back, because this is not me, this is a friend from, from Europe.’ Anyway, 
they call, you know (laughs). And I have half of Syria calling on my phone.” The 
officer shared several individuals’ stories with me, highlighting the violence and horror 
their interviewees had lived through before reaching Europe. Throughout, they 
emphasised that they understood and respected people’s decisions to leave and come 
to Europe, and that these people had not come voluntarily. One recent story seemed to 
have moved them in particular, and it was the first they told me: 
 
one of my goal is to, that they could see, they were able to see that we are equals. You 
know? Just only this situation that in his country makes them to be hidden in a boat 
and running away and trying to jump over Italy to get to another country in the North 
of Europe and my point is that they don’t feel like they are an inferior, inferiority, you 
know? That we are equals. […] with this guy I spent almost 5 hours talking to him. I 
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offered, he was very busy with his child and I offered him help. You know, I, what 
you need, I will give you, I will try to obtain for you. […] And he told me that when 
he came to the shore, the facilitators told them that they were able to carry on all their 
belongings, and when they came to the shore, in the last moment, before they’re going 
in to the boat, the facilitators [said]: ‘no, you cannot go through. You need to leave 
all, all in the shore.’ And I saw him that he was carrying, carrying two old [inaudible] 
like a laptop suitcase, but full, you know, and I asked him ‘but yes I saw you with, 
with…’ ‘No Alex20, this is milk. I left all and I try, I get just only the important things. 
It’s milk for my sons and that’s all.’ And two Quran books, because they are Sunnis. 
And for me it’s very, very, you know, we live in this, in this society consumism and 
capitalist, and we take care about some things. But they teach you a lot of things. So 
that’s the point. Maybe for those things, sometimes I think I really help them. […] 
Sometimes, two years ago, one guy has told me, you are talking like two hours or 
three hours. […] And he told me, ‘Alex, I will remember you for the rest of my life.’ 
At this point, the officer took a long break and seemed to struggle with tears. Overall, 
it seemed that they were genuinely moved by the stories of those they were working 
with.21 When explaining their role as a debriefer, they made clear that it allowed them 
to reassure new arrivals and offer them a “smile and a welcome”. Initially, I was 
puzzled as to how this declared desire to help travellers fit together with working in a 
position that meant gathering information used to further impede these same people 
from arriving in EUrope. When I asked if the information they collected was not used 
to reinforce border controls the officer agreed, without seemingly seeing a 
contradiction between this and their desire to ‘help’ those who tried to cross borders 
without authorisation. Later on, they said that they understood the role of Frontex not 
as stopping people from coming to EUrope, but as being prepared for them and 
identifying them. In their explanation of their work, they drew on humanitarianism to 
justify the need for operations in the Mediterranean, arguing that a lack of surveillance 
meant high risks for those crossing, whose deaths would never be known about: 
 
and that’s what’s, what is I think, that, in my opinion, what is the main task of Frontex. 
To try and go one step in advance. To avoid those kind of tragedies. Because most of 
people that works in this has very, a very good feeling about this, you know. They 
believe in the work they are doing, even the migrants told me they are very 
professional. They [say] ‘you can see on his face, that from the heart, they want to 
                                                 
20 The interviewee’s name has been changed. 
21 Similar emotional reactions were also found by Aas and Gundhus (2015) when speaking to 
Norwegian police officers involved in Frontex operations. 
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save us. It’s not like in other places, ‘they are paying me to do this.’ They want’, the 
migrants say this. And I think it’s, it’s one of the properties of Frontex.  
In the officer’s representation of Frontex, also their colleagues’ motivation was to save 
people. In doing so, they portrayed the agency as a truly humanitarian organisation, 
bringing together individuals prepared to save and assist people in distress, and 
conducting surveillance for this reason. As in all interviews I conducted in Italy, the 
officer spoke about Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation as well, describing it like their 
colleagues as a ‘pull factor’. This officer portrayed the existence of Mare Nostrum as 
a dilemma – if the operation was stopped now, many more people would die, as they 
relied on the presence of the Italian navy and coastguard in the Mediterranean. If it 
was continued, more and more people would arrive in EUrope, which the officer 
portrayed as problematic as well. It was at this point, towards the very end of the 
interview, that the officer brought up security concerns in relation to irregular arrivals 
for the first time: 
 
sometimes things happens. And maybe in five years somebody will explode a bomb 
maybe in Copenhagen and all people will say who was this guy, from where he came, 
why the authorities didn’t check who was this guy? Because there are hundred of 
thousand of people coming. And we need to control this, we need to know who is 
coming and where is he going.  
They thus portrayed those arriving as potentially including terrorists, who would need 
to be identified by the state – thereby drawing on the risk management discourse 
present also among Frontex’s staff and management. Primarily, however, the quotes 
included in this section serve to show the divergence of this officer’s framing from 
those of the other guest officers, and Frontex’s organisational discourse. While 
drawing on the same discursive formations of humanitarianism and risk management, 
the officer strongly and consistently foregrounded humanitarian concerns. In doing so, 
they presented one end of a spectrum of highly diverse self-representations guest 
officers in Frontex operations provided in informal conversations as well as formalised 
interviews. As this part of the chapter illustrates, Frontex’s organisational discourse 
was only ever partially reflected in the accounts of officers I spoke with in Frontex 
operations. Moreover, there seemed to be no overarching unity among the 
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representations officers shared with me, and I remained deeply puzzled as to the 
heterogeneity of their positioning vis-à-vis humanitarianism, human rights, and 
security discursive formations after my visits of operations Poseidon and Hermes.22  
 
Theoretical reflections  
Rather than conceptualising Frontex as a unitary actor – as tends to be the case in 
critical security and border studies – the divergences and inconsistency identified in 
the previous sections make clear that it is important to take a closer look at Frontex’s 
internal dynamics. As explained in chapter 1, it is here that new institutionalism can 
make a valuable contribution to critical security studies. Analysing the relationships 
between organisations and their environments, new institutionalist accounts have 
shown that rather than following one goal or rationality, organisational dynamics tend 
to be more complex and at times contradictory. As Andrew Neal noted already in 2009, 
this is true also for Frontex: “the agency performs many roles, and these do not 
conform to a single overarching logic” (Neal 2009, 346). Accordingly, this last part of 
the chapter will draw on new institutionalism to make sense of the divergences 
described, and present a more nuanced analysis of Frontex as a fragmented, loosely 
coupled, and partially contradictory organisation. 
 
Organisations and their environments 
New institutionalist approaches to organisational behaviour emerged in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, and are particularly interested in the relationship between 
organisations and their environments (Scott 2014; Scott and Meyer 1994b). New 
institutionalist analysis holds that organisations perceive themselves to be dependent 
                                                 
22 Given that I only visited two joint operations, and could conduct formal interviews with only 7 
individuals, I am not able to identify patterns in the differences between officers’ accounts. Whether 
their role within the joint operation, their nationality, their gender, or a range of other factors might have 
influenced their narratives of migration and their work cannot be determined based on the data I 
collected.  
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on their environment. Often, how organisations are perceived from the outside matters 
profoundly to them, as they depend on resources such as money, labour, and materials 
from their environment for their survival. In addition, “the organization’s existence 
must be accepted by the environment; its operations must not, for instance, be impeded 
by legislation. To use a very general term, we can say that the organization must enjoy 
a certain degree of legitimacy in the eyes of its environment” (Brunsson 1989, 13–14). 
In addition to securing support and resources, legitimacy is important for organisations 
also to maintain the confidence of the organisation’s members internally (Boswell 
2007, 604; 2009, 43). As such, organisational success depends in part on how well 
organisations do at internalising beliefs and understandings that circulate in their 
environment (Meyer and Rowan 1991, 53).  
When seeking to gain legitimacy, organisations often need to espouse particular 
norms, values, ideologies, or goals vis-à-vis their environment (Brunsson 1989, 5–6): 
 
organizations that omit environmentally legitimated accounts of structure or create 
unique structures lack acceptable legitimated accounts of their activities. Such 
organizations are more vulnerable to claims that they are negligent, irrational, or 
unnecessary (Meyer and Rowan 1991, 50). 
Responding to expectations within the environment can constitute a particular 
challenge when conflicting demands are made vis-à-vis the organisation, as will be 
further discussed below. Importantly though, “there is no such thing as the 
environment” in ‘objective’ terms according to new institutionalists (Dery 1986, 19; 
see also Weick and Bougon 1986). While wider cultural, historical, normative, and 
cognitive frameworks within organisational environments inform organisational 
culture (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1994, 9), what matters is how organisations perceive 
and make sense of their environments. Organisational culture and identity influence 
how organisations interpret, react to, and learn from pressures and expectations within 
their environment (Greenwood et al. 2008, 16; Olsen 1976, 338). Being constantly 
reproduced in the day-to-day functioning of the organisation, the beliefs and norms 
attached to organisational identity help members avoid cognitive overload and reduce 
the complexity of choices and decisions by portraying only some of a range of options 
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as rational or thinkable (Boswell 2009, 41; DiMaggio and Powell 1991b). They 
determine what individuals within organisations perceive and pay attention to in their 
“infinitely chaotic environment”, and what they deem to be irrelevant or non-existent 
(Dery 1986, 20).  
As Gioia and Sims note, “after a time individuals within a group or an organization 
tend to think, at least to some degree, alike. Some would call this shared meaning 
organizational culture” (Gioia and Sims 1986, 8). Often, organisational action will 
reflect particular routines that have become taken for granted as “the way we do these 
things”, whereas alternatives become inconceivable to organisational actors 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991a; Scott 2014, 68). Rather than ascribing a universal set 
of behaviours to diverse organisations – following e.g. rational, power-maximising 
objectives – it is important to examine the specific organisational culture and identity 
in order to make sense of organisational behaviour. Indeed, “collective understandings 
and inter-subjective meanings structure the ways that actors define their goals and what 
they perceive as rational actions” (Horii 2012, 162). Importantly, however, while 
organisations seek to enhance or maintain their legitimacy through their behaviour, 
they “can and often do misread the signals they receive from their environments” 
regarding the conditions they need to meet to do so (Boswell 2009, 45). 
Examining Frontex staff’s understandings of the agency and its environment allows 
for moving beyond a one-dimensional conceptualisation of Frontex as a unitary, 
power-maximising security agency. Frontex finds itself in the environment of the 
EUropean border regime, i.e. a multiplicity of actors concerned with the governance 
of EUropean external borders and migration. Staff and management are acutely aware 
of the complexities of this environment, and throughout the interviews referred to other 
organisational actors that had an influence on the running of the agency. When asking 
about Frontex’s work, changes through time, or future prospects, staff and 
management members in the headquarters frequently invoked the agency’s multiple 
“stakeholders” as decisive, stating that “we don’t exist in a vacuum” (FR7) and 
“everything we do is not done in isolation” (FR4). They consistently noted that the 
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agency was acting within a wider migration policy framework that it had no influence 
on.  
In the interviews I conducted with Frontex staff and management, Frontex was 
portrayed as an actor with diverse stakeholders in a contested field. One staff member 
likened Frontex’s history to running and building up the motor of a car at the same 
time, emphasising the perceived need to deliver results as well as building up structures 
and capacity at the same time: “the agency didn’t choose to consolidate, build up 
everything and then start running. This was not a, an option which was made available 
by our management and by our stakeholders” (FR4). FR4 invoked pressures to deliver 
quickly, making clear that this had been a major challenge for an organisation that was 
at the same time building up its structures. Frontex staff repeatedly referred to high 
expectations the agency was facing from its stakeholders, in particular the European 
Parliament, the Commission, and the member states.  
Indeed, several staff members expressed worries that the agency was being burdened 
with increasing tasks and responsibilities, without the necessary time to consolidate 
existing structures. More specifically, interviewees emphasised that there were great 
expectations regarding search and rescue at sea, which as they stated rested on 
misunderstandings of Frontex’s role, or mistaken appraisals of the difficulties of search 
and rescue operations in practice. Relatedly, staff and management articulated 
concerns that they might be blamed for travellers’ deaths. For example, a management 
member expressed unease about raising false expectations when talking about the new 
surveillance system EUROSUR:  
 
what I really dislike at the moment with this whole discussion in the public is that the 
impression is created that with this system, that the sinking of refugee boats, or the, 
the rescue at sea could be organised better. And I think also the, the people in Warsaw, 
in the Situation Centre in Warsaw are very concerned that one day, it is said ‘you in 
Warsaw, you are watching idly as those in the Mediterranean are drowning’ (FR9).  
Staff and management portrayed search and rescue operations as not only 
extraordinarily costly but also difficult in practice, given the vast space of the 
Mediterranean, small boats, and often harsh weather conditions. It appeared that they 
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felt the need to justify the organisation’s approach to rescue at sea. Interviewees 
expressed worries that Frontex was bound to fail fulfilling exaggerated expectations, 
and FR1 urged that “we also need to be realistic about it.” While there was an attempt 
to cultivate Frontex’s humanitarian image in its public relations at the time I conducted 
my fieldwork, staff members responded with unease to pressures acting on the agency, 
and referred back to Frontex’s limited mandate and resources possibly to dispel some 
of that pressure in the interviews. 
When speaking about the role of Frontex, staff and management often noted that the 
agency was rendered highly visible in the border regime, and was frequently criticised. 
Several interviewees deplored that Frontex was used as a “scapegoat” or seen as “the 
incarnation of evil”. In particular, critiques of ‘Fortress Europe’ were associated with 
parts of the European Parliament, whereas calls for ‘more Frontex’ were linked to the 
member states and Council. Interviewees did not specifically reference public or 
activist protests, although they occasionally referred to NGOs as being critical. 
Overall, their tendency to focus on the actors with an immediate influence on the 
agency confirms previous studies of administrative agencies. As Christina Boswell 
notes,  
 
the administration’s ultimate source of guidance will be its political leadership. This 
tends to be a far more important source of legitimation for administrative 
organizations than the public. Barring some rare cases where bureaucratic structures 
have become the object of media attention, administrative agencies will not generally 
draw on public reactions to gauge the legitimacy of their actions. […] They are likely 
to respond to these demands only insofar as the political leadership has internalized 
them, and is pressuring the administration to respond (Boswell 2009, 50 & 51).  
The focus of Frontex staff and management on the agency’s immediate stakeholders 
might partially explain its delayed but increasing emphasis on human rights and 
humanitarianism. While harsh criticism of the agency existed from its very beginnings, 
the European Parliament only gained increasing powers and competencies when the 
Lisbon Treaty entered into force at the end of 2009, making it a more influential actor 
in Frontex’s environment (European Parliament 2015a). This might have rendered 
critical voices from within the European Parliament more relevant and visible to 
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Frontex staff, and contributed to decisions to respond to them by altering the agency’s 
public self-representations.  
When Frontex staff and management referred to outside criticism, they were quick to 
point out that it was misguided or inappropriate. They emphasised that Frontex was 
part of a wider field of migration and border governance, and that the agency was only 
implementing policies and decisions taken elsewhere. As one interviewee explained,  
 
the policy is huge, and the borders are like the culprit of it. The borders are like the 
gate. And then you stop or enter, it’s there. But actually the decision is made 
somewhere else. That’s my perception of the big bubble so to say. That’s why you 
say, you say management of border, but I say, management of the border comes as a 
consequence of the management of migration. And that’s a bigger issue. […] And 
then how people are treated and then it’s easier to blame the people that treat you bad 
than to blame the people that you don’t see (FR3).  
Throughout the interviews, Frontex staff members engaged in blame shifting, arguing 
that national and EU policymakers were politically responsible for border controls: “if 
you don’t want Fortress Europe, tell the politicians not to create those, those rules” 
(FR4). In their portrayals, Frontex was intricately bound up with the highly 
controversial policy area of migration governance, which was however controlled by 
member states and EU institutions. This meant that both critique aimed at ‘Fortress 
Europe’ and critical voices regarding the agency’s inability to properly ‘close’ the 
borders were deemed to be misguided if directed at Frontex. As FR2 insisted, “if you 
don’t develop the other structures, you cannot expect border surveillance and control 
to solve anything […]. You cannot expect border control to be the ultimate solution 
for migration.” Similarly, a management member insisted that “[b]order control is the 
last link of the chain, so when beforehand everything has failed then we will not be the 
ones stopping it.”  
As this indicates, some staff and management members also expressed considerable 
frustration regarding the policy processes in Brussels that were affecting them, 
criticising the lack of understanding of policymakers of the processes and requirements 
of Frontex. During an interview I had with FR1, another staff member was present in 
the same room, and towards the end of the interview became involved in the 
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conversation. The exchanges between the two staff members illustrate their frustration, 
and is worth quoting at length: 
 
FR8: Whatever the Commission proposes, it’s always watered down by the Council 
and the Parliament on the way. So then, a compromise that we have to live with. So 
we read the regulation and then we look at each other: “so what does it mean?” 
FR1: Because so many, so many interests have to be satisfied (laughs) in the end. The 
wording is such that... okay... (laughs). 
FR8: As long as criminal law that’s fine, ok, the court will do it. But if you need to 
do something you should better have clear instructions, and the sea guidelines for 
Frontex operations, we read them, they are nice. Nothing new.  
FR1: We just don’t know what it means. 
FR8: But it doesn’t change anything. There are there, okay, so we attach them to the 
operational plan (FR1 laughs). Great. Thank you European Parliament, European 
Council, great.  
[…] 
FR8: We had something that we were calling best practices manual, that was 
developed... […] five years ago. And then with the new regulation we just have to re-
do exactly the same thing, but it’s called differently. And of course, invite people 
again, and it’s like, I would say, it’s like amendments to best practices manual we 
had. But we would have it anyway, and it changes with time and you collect new 
practices and so on. But because it was in the regulation, member states were less 
keen to agree on certain things. Because, it is not binding still for them, but they feel 
this legal pressure somehow. […] So it’s like, some, some actions are 
counterproductive I would say. And there is a big fuss, we hear a lot of voices from 
left to right in the European Parliament, and in the end of the day we get prostheses.  
FR1: Because we’re an operational, you know, we’re an operational agency. We’re 
actually the guys who have to go out there and do it. I mean it’s easy to, you know 
talk about it. But how do you, so what do I do?  
[…] 
FR8: Well I mean, this is like, our, when we talk in the corridors after such meetings, 
we always saying, there is this magic expression that we would like someone in 
Brussels to hear: evidence-based policy-making. It’s that simple. Not that I have a 
feeling that… and then you draft a regulation. Because then you will have nice, legal 
documents that are completely useless.  
While not criticised as explicitly by other staff members, there was an overall emphasis 
on the fact that policies were decided upon elsewhere, while Frontex was (unjustly) 
confronted with the consequences and the criticism of these decisions. In particular the 
European Parliament was portrayed as lacking an understanding of Frontex’s role and 
work, and as posing demands that were not in line with the mandate the agency had 
been given. Presenting itself as the implementing agency of other institutions’ 
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decisions, Frontex’s staff and management thus engaged in double blame-shifting: 
responsibility was diverted both regarding the difficulties of individuals in reaching 
EUrope, and regarding the agency’s inability to work as efficiently as possible due to 
interference from the outside.  
  
Fragmented, inconsistent demands, isomorphism, and hypocrisy 
New institutionalist scholars hold that organisations observe their environments, and 
tend to appropriate structures and belief systems they view as successful within other 
organisations. This process – referred to as isomorphism – means that organisations 
within a given field eventually share a number of commonalities, despite being 
independent of each other (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b, 66). As Christina Boswell 
notes, isomorphism is an important concept in new institutionalism, as it “describes 
the motivation to internalize rhetoric and practices perceived in an organization’s 
environment” (Boswell 2009, 68). DiMaggio and Powell suggest that there are 
coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms of isomorphic change. The first refers 
to pressures in the environment, which might be political or legislative pressures by 
actors the organisation is dependent on, or expectations of funders. In case of 
noncompliance to particular demands, the organisation might be threatened with 
sanctions. Mimetic pressures on the other hand are primarily the result of uncertainty, 
which leads organisations to imitate other actors who appear successful in its 
environment. Lastly, normative pressures relate to widespread ideas of ‘proper’ 
conduct or moral obligations, and a logic of appropriateness (Boxenbaum and Jonsson 
2008).  
Importantly, responding to coercive or normative pressures from the outside does not 
necessarily require a radical readjustment of informal organisational practices and 
structures. External demands might simply not appear useful to the pressured 
organisation, or they might compete with internal organisational culture and beliefs 
(Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008, 80–81). Boswell (2008) suggests that four different 
organisational responses are possible in light of external pressure from the 
environment: full adaptation of the organisation to external pressures; evasion and thus 
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the failure to adapt to the demands at all; reinterpretation of outside demands through 
the lens of previously existing organisational culture or ideologies; or decoupling. The 
latter entails disconnecting different organisational structures from each other and / or 
from an organisation’s activities, enabling organisations to respond to environmental 
concerns while keeping to procedures in line with internal interpretations of technical 
needs, efficiency, and functionality: “decoupling enables organizations to maintain 
standardized, legitimating, formal structures while their activities vary in response to 
practical considerations” (Meyer and Rowan 1991, 58).  
Decoupling also becomes relevant for organisations when they are faced with 
contradictory pressures from their environment. There might be any number of 
rationalities which coexist within an organisation’s environment, in which different 
actors, legal structures, or normative ideas suggest different purposes or procedures to 
be followed (Scott and Meyer 1994a, 117). Both within organisations as well as 
outside of them, individuals and professional groups hold diverse ideas about 
organisational processes and goals. “All these demands not only differ from one 
another, they may well be difficult or impossible to combine: they are contradictory or 
inconsistent” (Brunsson 1989, 8). Decoupling formal and informal structures, different 
units within the same organisation, or language and action, can allow an organisation 
to reconcile contradictory demands. New institutionalist studies have shown that rather 
than this being an exception, most organisations tend to be only loosely coupled 
(Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1994, 15–16). Brunsson suggests that organisations will 
often establish two different sets of processes and structures in response to external 
pressures, especially where norms within the environment are in tension with their 
internal logics: 
 
[o]ne is the formal organization which obeys the institutional norms and which can 
easily be adapted to new fashions or laws, literally by a few strokes of the pen on an 
organization chart. A quite different organizational structure can be used in ‘reality’, 
i.e. in order to coordinate action. This second type is generally referred to as the 
‘informal organization’. Similarly two sets of organizational processes arise: one 
generates action; the other does not, but is kept for purposes of demonstration or 
display to the outside world. The second processes can be defined as rituals (Brunsson 
1989, 7). 
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Brunsson refers to the decoupling of formal and informal structure, and talk and action, 
as organisational hypocrisy. He describes this phenomenon as “a fundamental type of 
behaviour in the political organization: to talk in a way that satisfies one demand, to 
decide in a way that satisfies another, and to supply products in a way that satisfies a 
third” (Brunsson 1989, 27).  
Importantly, such hypocrisy is often the “natural result of interactions between 
representatives of the diverse interests and ideas reflected by the organization”, rather 
than a conscious plan or decision (Brunsson 1989, 29–30). Inconsistencies within 
organisations tend to reflect wider inconsistencies in their environment: they are not 
(necessarily) the product of intentional deception by individual actors or groups, but 
rather – like organisational decision-making more widely – the outcome of the 
interactions of a variety of actors with different interests, interpretations, and goals. In 
Frontex’s case, its various stakeholders pose different and contradictory demands on 
the agency. Maintaining inconsistencies within the organisation is one way of 
negotiating these various pressures: “[m]any organizations cannot or do not want to 
avoid inconsistent norms; instead they become expert at generating support, resources 
and legitimacy from environments exhibiting just such inconsistency” (Brunsson 
1989, 9). 
In conclusion, institutionalist analyses conceptualise incoherence and contradictions 
not necessarily as organisational failure, but as a potentially “reasonable strategy for 
coping with conflict” (Boswell 2008, 510; see also Meyer and Rowan 1991). Where 
changes in language and descriptions are not translated into structures or activities, 
new institutionalists emphasise that even ceremonial or ritualistic changes can lead to 
modifications in self-understandings and power relations within organisations over 
time (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b, 67; Meyer and Rowan 1991, 50–51). 
 
Frontex as a fragmented and loosely coupled organisation 
Examining Frontex through the perspective of new institutionalism offers valuable 
insights, which further complement the two perspectives presented in chapter 4. 
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Frontex faces a variety of diverse pressures from its different stakeholders, including 
the management board as well as the Parliament: inevitably, some of these pressures 
will be in tension or outright contradiction with one another. While embracing a 
security-focused discourse quickly gained Frontex “a considerable amount of 
confidence and goodwill among national authorities” in its early years (Hobbing 2010, 
71), for instance, it simultaneously led to criticsm by the European Parliament for its 
disregard of fundamental rights. In interviews, staff members pointed to the difficulty 
of being faced with such diverse and partly incompatible demands from their 
environment. FR1 elaborated:  
 
I mean if you read some of the articles you’ll see that there is that sort of, Frontex was 
there and you know, there is not enough Frontex. There is too much Frontex. Frontex 
is ineffective. Frontex is too small. Frontex should be shut down. You know, there 
are voices in every direction (FR1).  
FR4 explained that Frontex staff were working in a sensitive area, which meant that 
“you cannot be satisfying the wishes of everyone. Everyone has different perspectives 
on problems and you must be aware that there is criticism and you have to take it into 
account” (FR4). As an EU agency, Frontex has since its foundation been confronted 
with conflicting and at times incompatible demands from different external actors 
controlling parts of the agency (the Commission; the member states and the Council; 
the European Parliament). Given that the agency is dependent on these diverse EU 
institutions for its existence and budget, negotiating these demands in its own work 
has been of great importance to its legitimacy and survival.  
As the previous chapter has shown, Frontex’s public language has transformed rather 
strongly over the last few years, increasingly invoking an image of the organisation as 
a fundamental rights promoter and a saviour of people in distress at sea. In the last 5 
years in particular, Frontex staff have responded to outside pressures and demands by 
changing the agency’s self-representation. When I asked a management member about 
the statement on the agency website that Frontex was Europe’s biggest search and 
rescue operation, their explanation revealed that there had been a conscious attempt by 
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some in the agency to respond to outside criticism through Frontex’s public self-
representation:  
 
[t]hat’s a reaction to accusations by members of the European Parliament regarding 
Frontex. And myself and [then Frontex Executive Director] Laitinen, we had a, we 
then said now it’s enough of us being portrayed as those who are letting people drown 
in the Mediterranean. We will write down the numbers. Those are only the people 
who have been rescued in the framework of Frontex-coordinated operations. Whom 
the Greek coastguard fished out of the sea apart from that, or the Italians, I don’t 
actually know. But through Frontex operations alone, coordinated by Frontex, by 
now, I think by now almost 40,000 people have been fished out of the sea. Who 
otherwise simply would have drowned, okay? And then we said, well, these border 
control operations do not only have the goal of organising border protection, but on 
this occasion so many are saved. So that one should ask oneself the question, there 
was this talk about abolishing Frontex and all these stories. And then of course there 
are also these kinds of numbers (FR9).  
Rather than outlining any particular change in structures or actions, the interviewee 
explained how pressures and criticism by the European Parliament spurred Frontex 
staff and management to portray the agency’s work differently, making changes to its 
website and emphasising the amount of people Frontex operations were saved as a ‘by-
product’ of border protection operations.  
When examining the European Parliament’s interactions with Frontex over time, it is 
clear that the Parliament has exerted sustained normative and coercive pressure on the 
agency in relation to human rights and search and rescue operations, after having been 
marginalised in the founding process of the agency (see chapter 4). In 2009, the 
Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee warned that 
Frontex operations risked creating “a zone of indistinction and arbitrariness, contrary 
to the EU values,” as regards the applicability of human rights (LIBE Committee 2009, 
p.18; Williams 2010, p.149). In 2010, the Parliament issued a resolution in response 
to allegations of human rights abuses against individuals returned to Libya by Frontex 
operations, calling on “member states that deport migrants to Libya, in cooperation 
with Frontex […] to stop doing so immediately […]” where the principle of non-
refoulement might be violated (European Parliament 2010). The Parliament also 
repeatedly invited Frontex’s executive director for presentations and questioning over 
the years (Baldaccini 2010; LIBE Committee 2014; Martin 2013; statewatch 2012b).  
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In 2011, the European Parliament and the Council expanded Frontex’s mandate. As 
noted in chapter 4, in particular the European Parliament insisted on strengthening the 
role of fundamental rights in Frontex’s founding regulation (European Parliament 
2011; statewatch 2012a). With the amendments, Frontex had to create the Consultative 
Forum as well as to establish the position of the Fundamental Rights Officer. 
Following the amendments, the European Ombudsman conducted an own-initiative 
inquiry into the agency’s implementation of its fundamental rights obligations 
(European Ombudsman 2012, 2013; Neumann 2013). The procedure prompted 
lengthy replies from Frontex, which made its Fundamental Rights Strategy and Action 
Plan public (Frontex 2012c), and invited NGOs to comment on these plans and 
explanations, with many taking a critical approach (Amnesty International 2012; 
Caritas 2012; Human Rights Watch 2012b; Jesuit Refugee Service 2012; Meijers 
Committee 2012; Red Cross / EU Office 2012; statewatch and migreurop 2012). 
Frontex has thus faced sustained normative and coercive pressures to improve its 
safeguards for fundamental rights not only by the European Parliament, but also by 
the European Ombudsman and NGOs, legal scholars, and activists. 
Given the growing importance of the European Parliament in particular, it is likely that 
those working for the agency felt a need to respond to these external pressures. By the 
time I conducted my interviews, all staff and management members I spoke with 
invoked fundamental rights consistently and without prompting, and Frontex’s public 
documents and reports had greatly increased their mentioning of fundamental rights. 
Indeed, references to fundamental rights seemed to have become routine-like, like a 
well-rehearsed and necessary part of every explanation of Frontex’s activities. 
Illustrating this most clearly, one staff member said:  
 
of course I don’t want to be boring and talk about fundamental rights, you know, how 
it’s always in our operational plans, there are codes of conducts, there are trainings 
about it... just to make sure that, you know, when Frontex has an operation, it’s carried 
out up to the highest standards. We get criticised anyway, but we can do what we can 
do, you know (FR1).  
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Another interviewee however noted in passing that Frontex’s increase in rights-related 
language did not always lead to structural changes:  
 
in relation to fundamental rights, a lot apparently, in the old regulation there was not 
much reference to this, but they started preparing already before the amendment of 
the regulation. So it has evolved very much. And the [fundamental rights] strategy 
was made before the regulation was amended. Like 6, 9 months before or something 
like that. Several months. So they were really aware that, that critics were there. So 
to say. And so [Frontex is] now trying to see whether, structurally, they need 
structures I mean inside in order to do everything that’s needed (FR3).  
While Frontex might thus have adopted its fundamental rights strategy in response to 
outside pressures in April 2011, this did not immediately lead to structural changes 
within the organisation. When conducting my first interviews 2.5 years after the 
strategy was passed, I was told that internal structures to ensure the mainstreaming of 
fundamental rights throughout the agency were still lacking. It thus seems that 
references to human rights are at least partially ritualistic portrayals of the agency’s 
acceptance of these principles to its environment, which are not necessarily linked to 
meaningful structural changes. Indeed, the most visible structural changes pertaining 
to fundamental rights within Frontex are the creation of the Consultative Forum on 
Fundamental Rights and the position of the Fundamental Rights Officer. Both, 
however, were not initiated by the agency itself, but imposed on it by the European 
Parliament and the Council. In fact, there was fierce resistance from member states in 
the management board and Council working groups regarding the Fundamental Rights 
Officer and the Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, a member of Frontex’s 
management told me. Staff members added that resistance regarding these proposals 
prevailed also among Frontex staff at the time. While Frontex’s management board 
passed the agency’s Fundamental Rights Strategy before the legislative changes and 
references to fundamental rights had become more frequent in Frontex’s PR at the 
time, the change in organisational language did not lead to an openness to structural 
adjustments. Ultimately, both the FRO and the Forum were imposed on the agency 
from the outside.  
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Overall, disparities regarding the self-representations of Frontex and its work by staff 
and management, guest officers, and public documents indicate that Frontex is a 
loosely coupled organisation, in which a number of conflicting rationalities coexist. 
First, its operations are largely decoupled from its core organisation. Not only do guest 
officers feel distanced from Frontex, agency staff also noted that at the time of the 
initial interviews (December 2013), only around 30% of their officers in operations 
had undergone Frontex training. Guest officers are thus likely to be primarily 
influenced by their national border guard culture and training (as well as their personal 
predispositions), and fail to be familiarised with – let alone internalise – Frontex’s 
organisational culture and identity. The loose coupling between the organisational 
culture and identity promoted in Frontex’s headquarters on the one hand and that of 
guest officers on the other hand allows for the coexistence of diverse interpretations of 
border guarding among those who implement Frontex joint operations at the EU’s 
external borders. By not imposing a coherent or unitary understanding among those 
working for Frontex at the external borders, potential conflicts with member states 
over ways of thinking and doing border controls are avoided. Instead, space for 
diversity, contradiction, and incoherence among guest and seconded officers’ 
understandings seems to exist.  
Second, different units within Frontex’s headquarters are only loosely coupled to each 
other. FR3 noted that some staff members were trained and aware of fundamental 
rights, while there was a large effort needed to train other staff and guest officers in 
order to increase their awareness and understanding. The NGO member of the 
Consultative Forum I interviewed similarly emphasised that there were discrepancies 
between different parts of the organisation regarding their openness to the Consultative 
Forum when I asked about its working relationship with Frontex: 
 
with the Fundamental Rights Officer, excellent. […] Other parts of the headquarters 
also good. Good, pleasant working atmosphere. Sometimes, but well that is then 
conditioned by the respective roles and origins, there are difficulties because some 
colleagues first have to learn what we are talking about. So especially the risk analysis 
unit understands its task and its work as rather technical and has not had a lot to do 
with the topic of human rights and individual fates so far. And needed to understand 
first of all what our problem is. That still remains a bit of work. Other parts of the 
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secretariat still have a little bit a very bureaucratic approach, also a very police-like 
approach, but overall the cooperation with Frontex isn’t bad. […] Cooperation with 
the management board - I would not talk about cooperation. The management board 
clearly did not want us (NGO).  
Different parts of Frontex were thus perceived as demonstrating rather different 
attitudes vis-à-vis the Forum by this interviewee. Especially the management board 
was described as non-cooperative, contrary to other parts of Frontex’s headquarters 
that were viewed as relatively easy to work with.  
Third, the interviews I conducted as well as my observations during the Frontex 
management board meeting showed that also Frontex’s management is far from united, 
and is fragmented within itself as well as only loosely coupled to the agency. Frontex 
staff members articulated frustration regarding for instance human rights abuses by 
particular member states from which they distanced themselves. As noted already, 
during the management board meeting, two member states were asked to provide an 
explanation of recent incidents at their external borders, which had left several people 
attempting to cross their borders dead. In informal and formal conversations, various 
management board Members expressed their frustration either with each other (for 
violating fundamental rights) or with Frontex (for blaming such violations on member 
states). Rather than being a coherent, unitary agency controlled by a uniform 
management board, Frontex is thus a fragmented and partially decoupled organisation. 
The agency’s fragmentation and loose coupling allows for the separation of its self-
representations towards the outside from its organisational procedures and rules on the 
one hand, and its everyday practices on the other hand. This enables Frontex to 
demonstrate that it responds to diverse and contradictory external pressures, while 
maintaining flexibility in its practices and procedures at the same time. 
 
Conclusion 
Challenging conventional depictions of Frontex as a unitary, rational actor, this chapter 
has shown that the agency is instead a fragmented, contradictory and only loosely 
coupled organisation. While relatively homogeneous interviews with staff and senior 
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officials seemed to reflect an organisational identity existing within the agency, they 
also revealed that there are divergences between public rhetoric and internal 
interpretations, among management board members, between different headquarter 
units, and between management board members and agency staff. Drawing on new 
institutionalism, I have argued that this form of decoupling represents a response to 
diverse and partially contradictory external pressures on an agency that is urged to stop 
or at least decrease irregular migration on an ad-hoc basis, to search and rescue 
individuals at sea, to respect fundamental rights, and to predict, prepare for, and 
manage risks at the external borders. As legitimacy among Frontex’s immediate 
stakeholders is of existential importance to the agency, there is a clear need for it to 
respond to these external demands to maintain support from its environment.  
A loosely coupled state allows for the coexistence of these different rationalities within 
different aspects of the agency’s work. While Frontex staff and management have 
sought to enhance its legitimacy by changing its public rhetoric, this did not lead to 
the adaptation of internal structures before changes were imposed from the outside. A 
loose connection between Frontex’s organisational identity on the one hand and the 
guest officers implementing its operations on the other hand avoids potential conflicts 
with member states over rationalities and beliefs border guards in the EU should 
adhere to. As I have shown throughout the chapter, Frontex’s staff and management 
expressed profound concerns regarding the way the agency was perceived from the 
outside, and the amount of criticism it attracts. Rather than conceptualising Frontex as 
a unitary, rational, and power-maximising actor as is commonly the case in critical 
security studies, I argue that these concerns to respond to contradictory demands posed 
from the outside are reflected in Frontex’s decoupled state, the discrepancies between 
different units, language and structures, and between those implementing Frontex 
operations on the ground and those planning them in the headquarters.  
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Chapter 6: The Effects of Frontex’s Re-Positioning 
Thus far, this thesis has focused primarily on two issues. First, it explored the factors 
that made it possible for humanitarianism and human rights to be incorporated by the 
security actor Frontex. By examining the history of the discursive formations and their 
characteristics today, I argued that they shared a number of similarities with each other. 
This reflection sheds light not only on Frontex’s appropriation of these discursive 
formations in its public documents and within the narratives drawn on by those 
working for the agency, it also provides important insights regarding the strengthening 
of humanitarianism and human rights in the EUropean border regime more widely. 
While humanitarianism and human rights have been among the main discursive tools 
of those seeking to oppose violent border practices, they ultimately proved combinable 
with a concern to ‘manage’ migration and to ‘secure’ EUrope from potential threats. 
Humanitarian and human rights concerns could be reconciled with long-standing 
practices by security actors such as Frontex, including patrolling activity and 
surveillance (which has been declared to save lives), and the return of ‘unwanted’ 
arrivals to countries of origin and transit (while respecting fundamental rights 
safeguards), among others.  
While the history and discursive similarities between humanitarianism, human rights, 
and security were explored in chapter 2, chapters 4 and 5 offered three different ways 
of knowing Frontex, and of conceptualising the apparent shift towards 
humanitarianism and human rights within the agency. Examinations of Frontex 
through the policy documents leading up to its foundation on the one hand, and its 
publications since it was established on the other hand were complemented with a third 
perspective, which drew on interview data and participant observation. Each of these 
ways of knowing Frontex provided different – and always necessarily partial – insights 
relating to the agency and its environment. Taken together, they offered an image of 
Frontex as a fragmented organisation negotiating divergent demands in a highly 
contested environment, in part by combining seemingly diverse discursive formations 
in its public self-representations. In this process, common narratives that already 
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enmeshed humanitarianism, human rights, and security were drawn on, while new 
connections between the discursive formations were made at the same time. Widely 
known narratives of ‘unscrupulous smugglers’ or ‘asylum fraudsters’ were thus 
combined with relatively new emphases on for instance the positive effects of 
Frontex’s joint operations on member states’ fundamental rights situations, or 
regularly released figures regarding the numbers of people saved by vessels 
participating in sea operations.  
What remains to be done in the remainder of this thesis – before moving to its 
conclusion – is a consideration of the effects the entanglement of humanitarianism, 
human rights, and security has had in contemporary EUropean border governance. The 
previous chapters have sought to explain what enabled their partial blurring, and how 
their increasing intertwinement within Frontex’s self-representations can be 
understood from different perspectives. This chapter, on the other hand, will reflect on 
some of the effects of Frontex’s shift towards humanitarianism and human rights, and 
of the strengthening of humanitarianism and human rights alongside a continued 
conceptualisation of migration as a risk and a threat in EUropean border governance 
more widely. As outlined in chapter 1, this thesis rejects a conceptualisation of borders 
as static and given, and instead sees them as processes that are constantly being 
reproduced by a variety of actors. This is in line with an understanding of discursive 
formations as performative (Butler 1993).  
The growing intertwinement of humanitarianism, human rights, and security 
formations in Frontex’s public documents, and in the self-representations of some of 
those working for and with the agency thus produces particular effects. More widely, 
as the discursive formations mobilised by the various actors enacting EUropean 
external borders shift or blur, this affects how bordering is performed. This chapter 
will outline some of these effects, both in relation to Frontex in particular, and as 
regards the EUropean border regime more widely.23 In doing so, I draw on data 
                                                 
23 Importantly, I am not suggesting here that Frontex staff and management intended to present the 
agency in a particular way with these effects in mind – that would not only overly simplify complex 
organisational processes that cannot easily be reduced to the intentions of individual staff members, but 
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collected through interviews, informal conversations, and observations, as well as 
public statements and documents released by Frontex.  
First, I discuss the effects of the blurring of humanitarianism, human rights, and 
exceptionalist security in crisis narratives prevailing in contemporary EUropean 
border governance, focusing on the invocation of humanitarian or border control 
‘crises’ and its relationship to less spectacular modes of governance. In doing so, I 
argue that crisis narratives have strengthened Frontex, as the agency has become 
positioned as the solution to humanitarian, human rights, and security ‘crises’ alike. 
Second, I show that the appropriation of humanitarianism and human rights in 
Frontex’s public documents has created the conditions of possibility for the emergence 
of new coalitions in the border regime not only in relation to crisis narratives, but also 
as regards risk management approaches. Here, I argue that a common focus on 
categorising, identifying, and managing populations has allowed security, 
humanitarian, and human rights actors to cooperate with each other in governing 
populations in EUropean borderlands. As these newly emerging coalitions tend to stop 
short of questioning the fundamental assumptions underlying contemporary border 
governance, they further reinforce the ‘othering’ of people on the move and feed into 
a dominant risk management approach.  
Third, I re-examine the narrative of Frontex’s role as a promoter of fundamental rights 
that staff and management members presented to me. In doing so, I argue that this 
narrative positions Frontex as a ‘civilising force’ that spreads EUropean values and 
standards of border guarding across EUropean territory, particularly to ‘problematic’ 
EUropean member states in the South (and) East. Finally, I reflect on the potential 
effects of common efforts by diverse actors to ensure EUropean border guards’ 
conformity with human rights and humanitarian principles. On this last point, my 
argument might appear more normative than elsewhere: rather than analysing 
                                                 
would also encounter the methodological difficulties related to ascribing motivations that I outlined in 
chapter 4. Instead, after exploring how and why the blurring of humanitarianism, human rights, and 
security formations has become possible in the previous chapters, I will now proceed to explore how 
the intertwinement of the formations has been productive. 
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developments that already took place, I reflect on some of the potential consequences 
of the growing emphasis on humanitarianism and human rights in EUropean border 
governance, drawing on the insights gained during my fieldwork. 
 
Governing borders through crisis narratives 
The strengthening of the discursive formation of humanitarianism in the EUropean 
border regime in recent years went hand in hand with the declaration of various 
‘crises’. Crisis narratives have become pervasive: references to a humanitarian crisis, 
a crisis of border control, a crisis of the asylum system, a Schengen crisis, a protection 
crisis, a refugee crisis, a migrant crisis, a crisis of Europe, and of course a financial 
crisis and a demographic crisis have become frequent and, to an extent, normalised. In 
EUropean border governance, crisis narratives have increasingly been bound up with 
notions of humanitarianism and human rights, focusing on tragic deaths, large-scale 
suffering, or the lack of basic provisions for those newly arrived, including medical 
care, food, water, or shelter. Human Rights Watch (2012a) for instance spoke out 
forcefully against a “hidden emergency” in the Mediterranean, calling for urgent action 
to put an end to deaths at sea. The UNHCR warned of a “colossal humanitarian 
catastrophe” threatening to materialise at EUrope’s southern borders (Sherwood et al. 
2014). And the events of 2015 seemed to confirm this warning, as media, 
policymakers, NGOs and international organisations alike invoked an unprecedented 
refugee or migrant ‘crisis’ in EUropean borderlands, drawing on the discursive 
formations of humanitarian, human rights, and security alike.  
In this section, I will explore what the invocation of crisis does in contemporary 
EUropean border governance, examining how the term ‘crisis’ enables some questions 
while foreclosing others (Roitman 2014, 10). Rather than conceptualising crisis as the 
occurrence of specific events, I analyse it as a discursive narrative which produces 
particular meanings. As Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins note, this narrative is 
“conducive to the adoption of emergency or exceptional measures. […] The 
pervasiveness of crisis labelling, however, should not lead to the conclusion that EU 
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migration and border control policies operate solely through the logics of emergency 
and exception” (Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins 2014, 116). Following Huysmans’ 
(2006a, 82) discussion on the coexistence of technocratic politics and political 
spectacle as interrelated but distinct processes in the governance of migration, 
Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins suggest that crisis narratives are most prevalent 
among professionals of politics, who draw on them as a routine part of political 
spectacle. Security professionals, including those working for Frontex, are instead 
informed more strongly by bureaucratic routines.  
Indeed, Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins argue that Frontex adheres to a risk 
management discourse, which is “regularly at odds” with more spectacular crisis 
politics (Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins 2014, 121). The analyses conducted in this 
thesis, however, suggest that this is only partially the case. Chapters 4 and 5 showed 
that references to risk, planning, and preparedness were frequent in Frontex’s 
publications and interviews. Nevertheless, they also showed that crises and 
emergencies were invoked. While risk management is a large part of what the agency 
does and how it is defined by those working for it, interviewees and public documents 
also constructed particular events as ‘crises’. Rather than understanding Frontex’s 
approach as being in conflict with the declaration of crises, I suggest that the agency 
relies on both risk management and crisis narratives. Indeed, the apparent tensions 
between both approaches within Frontex’s self-representations are productive, and 
have been beneficial for the agency. As outlined in chapter 5, Frontex is positioned in 
a contested environment with multiple stakeholders, and seeks to respond to at times 
contradictory external pressures to secure its legitimacy. Incorporating both an 
emphasis on routine risk analysis as well as declaring a readiness to respond to ‘crises’ 
opens up the possibility of satisfying diverse stakeholders. It allows the agency to 
maintain legitimacy with professionals of politics in its environment (including 
member states’ governments), and to secure support from more technocratic actors 
like the European Commission.  
Moreover, a focus on risk management is not necessarily at odds with crisis narratives. 
Jef Huysmans’ conceptualisation of diffuse and exceptionalist securitising as two 
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techniques of enacting insecurity is helpful here (see chapter 2). While they have 
different modes of operation, a focus on risk management can become embedded in 
an exceptionalist framing. In this case, “the routines are deployed in and come to 
symbolise a fight against violent enemies that pose an existential threat to the polity” 
(Huysmans 2014, 61). In addition, it is important to note that both modes of enacting 
insecurity can and do feed into each other in practice. This was emphasised by some 
of the interviewees, who explained that urgent interventions produced information that 
was fed back into Frontex’s ‘risk analyses,’ which then enhanced the ‘operational 
response’ to perceived risks and threats, including ‘urgent’ interventions. Rather than 
understanding Frontex purely as a risk management agency, the organisation can thus 
be seen as enacting both diffuse and exceptionalist securitising. Each of these modes 
of operation produces particular effects. While this section reflects on the 
performativity of crises narratives, the effects of risk management are discussed in the 
following section.  
Roitman proposes conceptualising crisis narratives through the metaphor of a “blind 
spot”: invoking a crisis is based on assumptions about how certain processes or 
categories should work, without accounting for the ways in which such categories are 
produced in the first place (Roitman 2014, 13). Using the term ‘crisis’ moreover 
implies an urgency to respond (Calhoun 2010). In declaring a humanitarian or security 
crisis in EUrope, the focus is on the number of deaths at sea, or the number of 
unauthorised border crossings. The wider context of particular events, including visa 
policies and global wealth and power disparities, tends to be obscured. A common 
focus on the ‘urgent’ need to address particular ‘problems’ allows diverse actors – 
including state and security actors, NGOs, international organisations, activists and 
volunteers – to cooperate in their responses to proclaimed ‘crises’, without having to 
agree on a common interpretation of the wider social, economic, and political 
conditions producing these ‘problems’ in the first place. 
Following Butler and Foucault, Roitman argues that “crisis is productive; it is the 
means to transgress and is necessary for change or transformation” (Roitman 2014, 
35). She mobilises Reinhart Koselleck’s (2006) genealogy of the concept ‘crisis’, 
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highlighting that it initially implied decision and judgment. As the New Keywords 
Collective (2016) emphasises, this “draw[s] our attention to the new spaces of 
intervention and government that discourses about the (multiple) European ‘crises’ 
have opened up” (New Keywords Collective 2016, 11). Indeed, crises narratives 
produce particular, ‘response-able’ actors (van Reekum 2016). When EUropean 
governments, agencies, volunteers, and NGOs cooperate to react to ‘crises’ declared 
in the Mediterranean, their interventions work to affirm their agency and humanity. 
These interventions simultaneously project the Mediterranean Sea as a EUropean 
space of care and control. In addition, they portray problematic events as originating 
outside of EUrope:  
 
imaginings and representations of contemporary illegalized migration suggest not 
only that “Europe” is confronted with a “crisis” that originates “elsewhere,” therefore, 
but also that “Europe” is a kind of “victim” of unfathomable conflicts erupting 
elsewhere, derived from the incapacity or incompetence of (postcolonial) “others” to 
adequately govern themselves (New Keywords Collective 2016, 13). 
Those ‘others’ who are on the move, on the other hand, are presented as passive 
subjects to be governed: to be saved from distress, processed in centres, provided with 
aid, screened for potential risks; to be pitied and/or feared. Meanwhile, the term ‘crisis’ 
no longer invokes just a singular moment of decision and judgment, but has come to 
be understood as a condition, a protracted state of being (Roitman 2014, 16). Indeed, 
“we must recognize that – regarding illegalized migration into and across Europe – the 
very distinction between (and separation of) what is ostensibly “stable” and “in crisis” 
is altogether tenuous, indeed, dubious” (New Keywords Collective 2016, 10).  
In this protracted state of ‘crisis’ in EUropean border governance, Frontex has come 
to profit from constantly reproduced crisis narratives. When examining post-hoc 
budget increases to Frontex, it emerges that the agency’s planned budget was increased 
repeatedly in response to events that were framed as ‘crises’ in the Mediterranean, 
including in 2011, 2014, and 2015. In 2011, the declared ‘crisis’ was connected to a 
perceived loss of control over EUropean borders, as increased numbers of individuals 
left from Tunisia and Libya at the height of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ (Carrera, Den 
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Hertog, and Parkin 2012). In 2014, Frontex’s budget was increased post-hoc to allow 
it to step in for (though not replace) Italy’s military-humanitarian Mare Nostrum 
operation, justified by the need for continued search and rescue activities at sea 
(European Commission 2014c; Frontex 2015). The 2015 budget increase came as the 
almost immediate response to the deaths of more than 800 individuals in a single 
incident in April of that year (European Council 2015).  
Frontex has thus emerged as a ‘go-to’ solution to a variety of ‘crises’ in EUrope. The 
agency’s status as the almost automatic solution proposed by EU and national 
policymakers in response to diverse ‘crises’ in the border regime in recent years relies 
on its broad positioning as a security, humanitarian, and human rights actor. Not only 
does the agency present itself as key to improving and harmonising EUropean border 
controls, surveillance and patrolling, but also, it emphasises its contributions to search 
and rescue at sea, and it portrays itself as actively promoting human rights among 
Schengen member states and national border guards. Through its self-representation 
as rescuer at sea, promoter of fundamental rights, and protector of EUropean borders 
and citizens, Frontex has become positioned as a key solution to migration ‘crises.’ 
Importantly, declarations of crises and emergencies – also when coming from outside 
the agency – have thus strengthened rather than weakened Frontex (see also Campesi 
2014, 130). While agency staff and management in part pursue a risk management 
discourse, they not only mobilise crisis labelling themselves at times, but have also 
profited from other actors’ declarations of ‘crises’ in EUropean border governance.  
In addition to Frontex’s positioning as the almost automatic response to diverse 
‘crises’, the close entanglement and partial blurring of humanitarianism, human rights, 
and security in the EUropean border regime have created the preconditions for swift 
transitions between the three discursive formations as responses to ‘crises’ are sought. 
While crises might be declared in light of deaths at sea or poor reception conditions 
for arrivals, responses to these humanitarian or human rights concerns have drawn on 
security practices that precede the particular crises in question, including a 
strengthening of patrolling activities, surveillance, or cooperation with countries of 
origin and transit. The EUropean response to the October 3rd 2013 shipwreck off the 
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coast of Lampedusa – in which more than 360 individuals lost their lives – illustrates 
this. EUropean policymakers were vocal in framing the incident as a humanitarian 
tragedy, and quickly called for the further reinforcement of Frontex. Commissioner 
Cecilia Malmström advocated a large-scale search and rescue operation led by Frontex 
in the Mediterranean Sea, ranging from Cyprus to Gibraltar (Malmström 2013c). 
In addition, the Commission-led “Task Force Mediterranean” (in which Frontex 
participated) was created and asked to present proposals to prevent similar tragedies 
in the future. The Taskforce’s recommendations document is an example of how the 
unequivocal declaration of a humanitarian emergency turned to previously existing 
security practices in a search for ‘urgent’ responses. Its recommendations were framed 
as seeking to “fight irregular migration”, as well as “combating the smugglers’ and 
traffickers’ networks” (European Commission 2013, 7). Proposed measures included 
the closer cooperation with transit countries in North Africa, further surveillance, and 
a reinforcement of Frontex. Improved surveillance was said to contribute to “the 
protection and saving of lives of migrants in the Mediterranean” (European 
Commission 2013, 3 & 16). The Taskforce thus proposed the increased control and 
restriction of migratory movements in the Mediterranean, largely by advocating the 
intensification and continuation of prior policy mechanisms and activities.  
As Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins note, crisis responses often “[call] on pre-existing 
modes of governance and routines of control while at the same time introducing new 
approaches and responses made possible by the disruptive quality of crisis” 
(Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins 2016, 318). While the Taskforce document shows 
the reliance on previously existing measures, the Italian response to October 3rd 2013 
illustrates how crisis narratives can also create openings for new approaches. Its 
humanitarian-military operation Mare Nostrum involved Italian military forces in 
search and rescue activities and the patrol of the Mediterranean, greatly expanding 
Italy’s zone of influence in the Mediterranean and directly merging military and 
humanitarian objectives. Both in creating openings for new measures, and in resorting 
to practices already well established in EUropean border governance, however, crisis 
narratives explicitly drawing on the discursive formations of humanitarian and human 
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rights did not lead to a shift away from security rationales, and resulted largely in a 
continuation of security-based policies and practices in the Mediterranean. Whether 
invoked by those working for Frontex, or by professionals of politics, crisis narratives 
have furthermore strengthened the position of Frontex in the EUropean border regime 
by positioning it as the ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to diverse ‘crises’ at EUropean 
external borders.  
 
Risk management and the emergence of new coalitions  
As noted, crisis narratives facilitate the working together of diverse actors, including 
NGOs and activists, international organisations, police and border forces, and Frontex. 
Importantly, this holds not only for crisis narratives, but also for risk management. As 
argued in chapter 2, the shared fundamentals of the discursive formations of 
humanitarianism, human rights, and security have enabled Frontex (and other state and 
security actors) to appropriate humanitarianism and human rights alongside a 
continued focus on responding to ‘crises’ and managing ‘risks’. Moreover, they 
produce the conditions in which diverse actors’ cooperation can thrive: despite 
different mandates and concerns, humanitarian, human rights, and security actors share 
common understandings. In particular, they all have a focus on categorisation, which 
is seen as the basis for responding to new arrivals according to the risk they pose, the 
needs they have, or the rights they hold. This common emphasis has allowed for an 
intensified cooperation of actors across these fields. Not only are crisis narratives and 
managerial approaches thus closely related, but both are enmeshed with humanitarian 
and human rights formations in contemporary EUropean border governance.  
The interconnections between risk management, humanitarianism, and human rights 
became visible for instance during the European Day for Border Guards 2013. 
Panellists from Frontex, the Italian government, Médecins Sans Frontières, and the 
European External Action Service discussed the need to “manage” migration 
effectively and to identify those with protection needs from amid “mixed flows.” 
While the discursive formations of human rights and humanitarianism were drawn on 
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by an NGO representative and in the statements of other panellists, they contributed to 
a managerial discourse in which humanitarian, human rights, and risk management 
concerns converged. The focus on dividing individuals into ‘victims in need’ and 
‘others’ thereby further strengthened a dominant risk management narrative. While 
humanitarian and human rights actors might argue for exceptions to a risk-based 
understanding for particular categories of people (according to their presumed need or 
legal entitlement), in doing so they “confirm the security norm against which these 
outliers are to be measured. Claiming that exceptions need to be made, they 
(unwillingly) contribute to targeted risk management that depends on these very 
categorizations” (van Munster 2009, 143).  
Furthermore, an emphasis on identification and categorisation reinforces the ‘othering’ 
of those on the move: by presenting them as victims to be assisted, and / or threats to 
be carefully screened, they are juxtaposed to the figure of the EUropean citizen, and 
produced as racialized and faceless, variably helpless, abused, or potentially 
threatening ‘other’ (see chapter 2). While the overall focus is on the management and 
classification of individuals, the subject positions produced in this way are 
nevertheless inherently unstable, and can swiftly transform from one into the other 
(Agier 2011a; New Keywords Collective 2016; Pallister-Wilkins 2015). Again, there 
thus exist moments of close connection and even transition between the formations of 
humanitarianism, human rights, and security, as discussed already in relation to ‘crisis 
responses’ in the previous section. The cooperation of Frontex with diverse other 
actors was not only apparent during the European Day for Border Guards, however. In 
fact, Frontex’s Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights is a further insightful 
example here. The Forum consists of nine NGOs,24 two EU agencies,25 and six 
                                                 
24 As of December 2015, these are: Advice on Individual Rights in Europe Centre, Amnesty 
International’s European Institutions Office; Caritas Europa; Churches’ Commission for Migrants in 
Europe; European Council for Refugees and Exiles; International Commission of Jurists; Jesuit Refugee 
Service; Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants; Red Cross EU Office. 
From 2012-2015, the International Catholic Migration Commission was part of the CF, whereas Advice 
on Individual Rights in Europe Centre was not.  
25 European Asylum Support Office; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 
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international organisations26 that regularly advise Frontex on matters pertaining to 
human rights. Its members work without remuneration by the agency and provide 
advice on all aspects of Frontex’s work, ranging from offering feedback on written 
codes of conduct to observing trainings to visiting operations. Initially, there was 
strong opposition within the agency to the proposal of a Consultative Forum:  
 
[t]o be completely open, initially the member states fought massively against that, 
both in Brussels […] and in the management board, against the Consultative Forum. 
[…] Then it was pushed through somehow and once you have it, you have to see that 
you make the best of it (FR9).  
While many explained that they had been sceptical at first, all staff members I spoke 
with – between one and one and a half years after the Consultative Forum’s 
establishment – viewed the Forum positively, and found cooperation with it to be 
constructive. As the interviewee cited above went on to outline, “many member states 
have lost the fear that we would get an additional watchdog, which would maybe also 
organise shaming and blaming. That – thank god – doesn’t happen, so that we can say 
that the Consultative Forum, the way we configured it, works well at this moment.” 
Far from being perceived as a threat to Frontex’s work, the Consultative Forum is thus 
seen as a constructive force, assisting Frontex in improving its work. Indeed, FR6 
stated, “we couldn’t count on a better advice body, I would say.” 
In the Forum, fundamental questions such as the very existence of Frontex or border 
controls more generally do not form part of the discussions; the focus is instead on 
improving existing procedures, particularly those pertaining to refugee protection. 
Tellingly, a key term in Frontex’s organisational discourse is “best practices”: these 
are represented as enabling efficient and effective border control, while simultaneously 
adhering to human rights standards and humanitarian principles. The common goal of 
emerging coalitions in which Frontex, NGOs, and international organisations 
cooperate with one another is the advancement of such “best practices”, which entail 
                                                 
26 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; Council of Europe; International Organisation for 
Migration; Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe. 
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the ‘humanisation’ of border controls rather than their fundamental questioning. As 
the NGO Forum member I spoke with explained, 
 
we don’t talk about the question of Frontex’s existence, that we take for given, but 
we also make clear that our work, or the fact that we are part of the Consultative 
Forum, that that is not connected to a fundamental agreement with everything that 
Frontex or the member states do […].  
While different viewpoints exist within the Consultative Forum, the willingness to 
keep working together seems to be strong: when Frontex expressed discontent with 
the Forum’s first annual report in February 2014, it was reworked before being 
released publicly. While I was not informed what the source of the disagreement was, 
the report was made publicly available only several months later, in July 2014, likely 
indicating prolonged negotiations (Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental 
Rights 2013).27 As the Forum provides support to draw up or adapt codes of conduct, 
or to mainstream human rights throughout Frontex’s activities, the common pursuit of 
Frontex and the Forum is the optimisation of border governance.  
Also beyond the Forum and the European Day for Border Guards, I was told by 
Frontex staff that the agency was “opening up” to NGOs, by for instance reaching out 
to organisations with specific expertise when developing new guidance for border 
guards. Speaking about a new handbook on “vulnerable children” in airports, a staff 
member explained how Frontex had invited NGOs to discuss a draft document. They 
asserted that there was 
                                                 
27 Interestingly, the Forum’s second annual report – published after the end of data collection for this 
thesis – included a foreword by Frontex’s management board and executive director in which they 
deplored three “misunderstandings” contained in the report, which had not been re-drafted and clarified 
despite an explicit request by Frontex’s leadership. The statement ends with these lines: “The 
management board and executive director of Frontex welcome any critical views on the activities 
performed by the Agency and are ready to constructively discuss such views with the Consultative 
Forum. However, such views should not be communicated within an official report, possibly leading to 
confusion for the general public about Frontex responsibilities” (Frontex Consultative Forum on 
Fundamental Rights 2015, 5). Contrary to the first year, it thus appears that the Forum resisted pressures 
by Frontex leadership to change its report, and Frontex’s director and management decided to publicly 
disclose tensions between the Forum and the agency to distance themselves from some of the 
recommendations made.  
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an open approach from Frontex, also to receive critics, and also to find a common 
ground for cooperation. And at the end of the workshop of course we ended up with 
a document which was endorsed by everybody, so by the member states, Frontex 
itself, and the NGOs and international organisations (FR6). 
While the agency’s first steps of “opening up” to NGOs and international organisations 
might have been legally mandated, it goes beyond these legal requirements by now, 
and succeeds in creating agreements with diverse organisations regarding its work. At 
the same time, Frontex maintains close links with national border guards and the 
security industry, and is thus positioned as a contact point between these diverse social 
worlds. As such, Frontex is at the heart of newly emerging coalitions of human rights, 
humanitarian, and security actors, who work together in their pursuit to optimise and 
‘humanise’ EUropean border controls.  
When seeking to explain these emerging coalitions, conventional accounts might point 
to instrumental and strategic reasons, including the involved actors’ interests (such as 
obtaining legitimacy for Frontex, or having a more direct influence on border practices 
for NGOs and international organisations). Other explanations might note intricate 
connections between nongovernmental and governmental spheres in terms of 
personnel, which facilitates the increasing proximity of NGOs, international 
organisations, and security organisations: some of Frontex’s staff members have 
backgrounds in NGOs or humanitarian and human rights law.28 While these 
perspectives might provide plausible accounts of Frontex’s cooperation with NGOs 
and international organisations, the analysis in this thesis suggests that there are also 
other forces at work. The “constructive cooperation” with NGOs, international 
organisations, and EU agencies that Frontex staff members repeatedly pointed to is 
rendered possible because the discursive formations these actors are bound up with are 
closely interconnected. Not only do humanitarianism, human rights, and security 
govern populations in space and work as techniques of government, but in doing so, 
all three formations centrally rely on the identification and categorisation of new 
                                                 
28 The permeability of the boundaries between governmental and nongovernmental spheres in relation 
to humanitarianism has been commented on by Didier Fassin (2007a). 
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arrivals. Their common focus and shared understandings enable the emergence of 
coalitions of actors who variously see their main mandate as the minimisation of risks, 
the provision of aid to those most in need, or the monitoring of adherence to human 
rights and refugee law. As this thesis showed, Frontex has been able to forge 
connections with such diverse actors in part due to its self-representation as a crisis 
response mechanism, a risk manager, a saviour at sea, and a promoter of fundamental 
rights.  
In sum, Frontex’s increasing reliance on the discursive formations of humanitarianism 
and human rights specifically, and their strengthening in EUropean border governance 
more generally, have produced the conditions in which new coalitions of actors could 
emerge. Frontex’s presence at the centre of the exhibition at the European Day for 
Border Guards 2013 described in the introduction, in between the stalls of security 
industry representatives, those of national border guards, and those of NGOs and 
international organisations, is indicative of its position as a connection point between 
these different communities, situated within an interdiscourse that connects and 
partially blurs the discursive formations of humanitarianism, human rights, and 
security. As the agency has increasingly been positioned as a humanitarian and human 
rights actor, this has opened up new possibilities for partnerships and cooperation.  
As noted, this is reflective of developments in the wider border regime, beyond the 
specific case of Frontex. Ruben Andersson discovered in his fieldwork in Spain that 
NGOs, border police, and journalists cooperated closely in search and rescue 
operations and the management of those newly arrived (Andersson 2014, 143). And 
Claudia Aradau (2008) found that security, humanitarian, and human rights actors 
worked together in the governance of victims of trafficking. New coalitions of actors 
have thus been emerging in the border regime more widely, as NGOs, international 
organisations, and security actors jointly work towards the improvement of border 
controls. Importantly, however, these coalitions tend to perpetuate an emphasis on 
‘managing’ migration or responding to ‘urgent crises’, stopping short of challenging 
fundamental understandings of EUropean external borders as being in need of control 
– and indeed controllable, as separating an ‘us’ to be protected from a ‘them’ that is 
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partially or potentially threatening (see also Aradau 2008, 89). As such, their 
cooperation allows for the continued association of migration with the notions of risk 
and crisis, regardless of the increase in humanitarian and human rights actors and 
appeals in recent years.  
 
The construction of Frontex as a ‘civilising force’ 
Beyond positioning Frontex as the ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to various ‘crises’ in 
border governance, and a connection point between diverse actors in a wider 
‘migration management’ approach, the emphasis on human rights and rescue at sea 
within the agency also has effects on its position in the EUropean border regime, and 
its relations with member states. By framing its work as saving lives at sea and rescuing 
vulnerable people from exploitation, Frontex “simultaneously casts itself as a moral 
actor and protector of human life, securing itself against criticism and strengthening 
its position as an actor in European border policing” (Pallister-Wilkins 2015, 65). It is 
important to note here that the human rights discourse used by interviewees was 
closely linked with a discourse of ‘EUropeanness.’ Interviewees from among Frontex 
staff, its management, and its guest officers claimed that particularly Greece and 
Bulgaria, and sometimes former communist states more generally, were lacking a 
tradition and a history of human rights. Scandinavia (particularly Finland) and 
Germany on the other hand were praised for their rule of law and respect for 
fundamental rights.29 FR1 stated for instance:  
 
and you know, it’s cultural. I mean there is, without criticising anybody, but there is 
a difference in... Probably the Finns started training their border guards in the issues 
relating, you know, fundamental rights in border control, human rights, respect of 
human rights in border control, probably earlier than Bulgarians (FR1).  
                                                 
29
 Similar findings were also made by Aas and Gundhus when interviewing Norwegian officers who 
worked with Frontex: “Our interviewees frequently invoked differences between East and West, North 
and South of Europe, and described themselves in terms of their national policing culture which they 
saw as distinct from, and superior to, other nations” (Aas and Gundhus 2015, 7). 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
The Effects of Frontex’s Re-Positioning   201 
Often, it was implied that peripheral states had some catching up to do, and that 
Frontex was helping them ‘develop’ in this regard. Several interviewees emphasised 
that the human rights situation in Greece had improved thanks to Frontex, which had 
put pressure on the country (see also Aas and Gundhus 2015). While some member 
states were portrayed as not understanding the importance of respecting human rights, 
Frontex operations were presented as a way to expose problematic practices.  
Framing mostly eastern EUropean states as ‘backwards’ in terms of human rights feeds 
into a wider discourse that questions the ‘EUropeanness’ of these member states, i.e. 
their belonging to the more ‘civilised’, ‘developed’ European Union. As Douzinas 
notes, “the Balkans are approached as peripheral parts of the civilised world, placed in 
Europe by accident of geography rather than achievement of history or culture” 
(Douzinas 2007, 74). In this wider discourse, Frontex is constructed as a ‘truly 
EUropean’ actor, a ‘civilising force’ that brings best practices and standards of human 
rights also to ‘problematic’ states in the South (and) East. Moreover, it also presents 
the agency as improving and harmonising standards of border guarding across EUrope:  
 
well I’d say that the operation strategies, the trainings that Frontex does, the question 
of human rights, how do I implement human rights in operational plans, all the things 
that the training unit does, has certainly contributed to a higher level in Europe 
generally, also a higher average level in border protection and a more uniform praxis 
of controls than we had before (FR9).  
By creating the new identity of the ‘civilising force’ for the agency, this narrative 
strengthens Frontex’s position in the border regime once again. In addition, it also 
allows Frontex officials to shift blame away from the agency. Interviewees asserted 
that human rights were not violated during the agency’s own operations, and focused 
on the promotion of best practices and the setting of standards: “wherever Frontex is 
it should be the highest standard, I think that’s pretty much understood by everybody, 
in terms of fundamental rights especially” (FR3).  
Those I spoke with made an effort to differentiate between Frontex operations and 
member state practices, rejecting responsibility for human rights violations during the 
latter. Several interviewees acknowledged that abuses might be committed by 
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particular member states outside of Frontex operations, but emphasised that Frontex’s 
work was human rights conform. They pointed to Frontex’s limited ability to control 
member state behaviour, and often said that it was better to have a Frontex presence in 
‘problematic’ states (particularly Greece) than to leave national forces up to their own 
devices. As one of them stated when asked about human rights, “I can say that the 
Frontex operations […] are properly done. Then, the member state issue is a bit more 
tricky” (FR3). Rather than denying the criticism brought against border guards in 
EUrope more widely, including reports on beatings, inhumane detention conditions, 
and illegal push-backs (Amnesty International 2014a, 2014b; Hristova et al. 2014; 
Human Rights Watch 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2011, 2012a), Frontex staff and 
management distanced the agency from such reports by pointing to the responsibility 
of member states.  
Unsurprisingly, this has led to discontent among some of those affected by criticism, 
who approached me during a break at the management board meeting. They sought to 
express their frustration about the fact that Frontex staff had distanced the agency from 
allegations of fundamental rights abuses by emphasising that no Frontex officers or 
assets were involved, which country representatives perceived as finger pointing and 
lack of solidarity. This episode illustrates the fragmented character of Frontex 
discussed in chapter 5. It also makes clear that Frontex’s interests and self-
representations do not always match those of the member states. Shifting blame for 
rights infringements to member states legitimises the agency’s activities and produces 
the new, positive identity of the ‘civilising force’ for it. In addition, it positions the 
agency as the ‘solution’ to human rights violations at EUrope’s borders, rather than as 
a part of the problem. A greater presence of Frontex, when following this framing, 
should decrease abuse and make EUropean borders more ‘humane’. Every new report 
about violence and push-backs by national border guards would thus have the potential 
to further strengthen the agency, which could point to its training activities, academies, 
and its efforts to establish a ‘common culture’ of border guarding, centrally including 
respect for fundamental rights. Documentation of the abuse and violence travellers 
face when attempting to enter EUrope without authorisation could then lead to calls 
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for more Frontex, rather than a fundamental rethinking of existing practices and 
policies.  
 
‘Sanitising’ the border regime, externalising violence? 
So far, the thesis has primarily focused on the similarities across humanitarian, human 
rights, and security formations. Nevertheless, there exist also tensions and conflicts 
between them, which are productive in and of themselves. In this section, I examine 
some of these tensions, and problematize the effects they might produce. As noted in 
the introduction to this chapter, the following discussion might appear more normative 
than other parts of this PhD: rather than analysing shifts that have already occurred, I 
reflect on the potential effects of particular invocations of humanitarianism, human 
rights, and security in EUropean border governance. Viewing migration as primarily 
a question of security – as is commonly the case – tends to lead to demands to keep 
migration low or ‘under control’. The ability to do exactly that, however, is limited if 
human rights and humanitarian principles are strictly adhered to. As Frontex staff told 
me, if following human rights and refugee law, the agency cannot stop most 
unauthorised travellers on their way to EUrope, but merely identify them. Legally, 
individuals can only be denied entry to EU territory at an external border crossing once 
it has been ascertained that they are not at risk of refoulement, which might necessitate 
individual processing. 
As such, strictly adhering to human rights and refugee law curtails Frontex’s (and other 
security actors’) ability to prevent people from entering EUrope, despite this being 
precisely what is expected of the agency by some of its stakeholders. Similarly, an 
insistence on humanitarian principles in border practices could hypothetically make it 
‘easier’ for people to arrive in EUrope, simply because sincere and determined search 
and rescue measures could reduce the extent to which the Mediterranean Sea acts as a 
space of biopolitical abandonment. While this is still far from a reality, the demands 
posed vis-à-vis EUropean border guards from a human rights or humanitarian 
perspective are thus to an extent in tension with demands to keep arrivals low, which 
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emanate from a security perspective. The debates that took place around Mare 
Nostrum illustrate this.  
Saving thousands of individuals from distress at sea, the humanitarian-military 
operation also coincided with heightened numbers of arrivals in Italy in 2014 (Frontex 
2014j). Accordingly, Italy’s right-wing parties described it as a ‘pull factor’ that 
encouraged more people to attempt the crossing (ANSA 2014b). The attempt to save 
those in distress at sea clashed with a widespread desire to keep Europe’s doors closed 
to unauthorised travellers, and led to fierce opposition to Mare Nostrum. Behind the 
scenes, some Frontex management board members and guest officers expressed 
similar views, which were also reflected in a leaked concept paper by Frontex (2014g). 
Italy therefore faced substantial pressures to end the purportedly humanitarian 
operation. It did not succeed in obtaining EUropean support for the continuation of the 
mission, nor was the operation replaced by EUropean means, as was requested 
repeatedly. Instead, Frontex’s joint operation Triton was launched. Interim executive 
director Arias Fernandez acknowledged, “[w]hile Mare Nostrum is clearly a search 
and rescue operation, Triton will be with the main focus on border control” (Arias 
Fernandez in the LIBE Committee 2014).  
Despite humanitarian appeals to continue search and rescue activities, Mare Nostrum 
was replaced by an unambiguously security-focused operation, which merely 
expanded Frontex’s previous work in the region. Italy’s partially humanitarian 
operation was seen as leading to an increase in boat arrivals, which was deemed 
unacceptable, exposing one of the tensions between humanitarian appeals and security 
concerns. As humanitarianism and human rights grow stronger while migration 
continues to be seen as a security issue, the desire to keep arrivals low or ‘in control’ 
remains strong, while pressures to decrease violence and deaths in EUropean 
borderlands grow. A greater focus on respecting fundamental rights and humanitarian 
principles on EUropean territory – without a simultaneous challenge to the 
assumptions underpinning ongoing security concerns – could therefore lead to the 
strengthening of divergent demands that seem difficult to reconcile. In Pallister-
Wilkins words, “[t]his tension between risk and rescue, this paradox of protection 
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where the subject [people on the move] must be saved while the object [EUropean 
territory] is kept safe, therefore, exists in the wider European milieu in which the 
border guards and Frontex operatives carry out their work” (Pallister-Wilkins 2015, 
60). 
When asking my interviewees about the future of border guarding in EUrope, however, 
a potential solution to this tension seemed to emerge. Asked about future 
developments, interviewees often pointed to the importance of improving relationships 
with third countries and of further externalising border controls. In doing so, they 
explained that the focus was on ‘preventing’ irregular migration through agreements 
with third states, so that “the countries of origins’ authorities, let’s say, or actors, make 
sure that the people migrating choose regular paths” (FR6). Importantly, I do not 
suggest here that externalisation is the conscious response of those working for Frontex 
to the tensions that exist between humanitarianism, human rights, and security. In fact, 
there is a wider and longer-standing drive towards externalisation among EU 
policymakers and institutions, which was referenced also in the interviews: 
 
I think now the trend is to externalise more and more border control. I mean, to put it 
more and more far away from the physical border. This is the trend now and it’s, it 
has a very strong political content behind. I mean it’s not this agency or the border 
guards that are going to develop such system. It has a very strong political component 
that you can put the control of your borders more and more far away of the physical 
borders (FR2). 
Nevertheless, it is worth remarking that externalising border controls could potentially 
reconcile the divergent demands of humanitarianism, human rights, and security. This 
is the case in particular where humanitarian and human rights appeals are focused on 
EUropean borderlands and border guards. Outsourcing the violence, exclusion, and 
discrimination inherent in the current border regime to third states could coexist with 
a simultaneous push to ‘sanitise’ EUropean borderlands from violence and deaths. 
Externalising border controls could hypothetically allow for respecting humanitarian 
principles and human rights on EUropean soil, while cooperation agreements could 
ensure the increasing ‘prevention’ of attempts to cross the Mediterranean Sea, keeping 
arrivals in EUrope low. Similarly, Pallister-Wilkins argues that externalisation can be 
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understood as “an attempt to reconcile the tensions between a humanitarian border 
policing where the individual is the subject and the need to defend territory where the 
territory is the object” (Pallister-Wilkins 2015, 65). 
Rather than describing causality or intentionality, my remarks here are intended to 
offer some reflections on the potentialities of contemporary articulations of 
humanitarianism, human rights, and security in the EUropean border regime. Almost 
10 years ago, Sandra Lavenex (2006, 2007) described the inclusion of EUropean 
immigration control in foreign policy as a continuation of attempts by immigration 
ministers to increase their autonomy vis-à-vis normative, institutional, and political 
constraints. She built on previous work showing how increasing constraints on 
immigration policymaking posed by national constitutions, humanitarian discourses, 
courts, and ministries led to immigration ministers seeking to EUropeanise these 
matters (Guiraudon 2000; Lavenex 2001). As constraints grew stronger on a EUropean 
level, this created an interest in externalising these policies, incorporating them in 
relations with third states. Already then, the constraints on policymaking that were 
sought to be avoided included human rights obligations. It is not difficult to imagine 
that a strengthening of the discursive formations of humanitarianism and human rights 
in the EUropean border regime might provide new impetus to already existing 
externalisation processes.  
In addition to potentially resolving tensions between the demands associated with 
security, humanitarianism, and human rights on EUropean territory, externalising 
border controls projects EUropean power outwards, and extends EUropean influence 
to a ‘buffer zone’ around member states. The process of externalisation re-enacts 
previously existing power inequalities and dependencies between EUrope and its 
southern neighbours, “reproduc[ing] recent colonial relations of dependency” (Balibar 
2009, 203). A member of the management board revealed that some within the agency 
are aware of the cost this might inflict on would-be-travellers:  
 
FR9: We can of course send liaison officers to third states, who attempt to prevent 
migration from there. Although as said before, we only prevent the running away 
then. We don’t work on the causes. […] 
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Interviewer: If you say it like that, it seems pretty apparent that […] the costs for 
hindering migration effectively will be extremely high, if the causes of migration are 
not addressed at the same time. Both financial costs and human costs… 
FR9: That will be the case; that will be the case. 
Externalising controls is thus not envisioned to reduce violence in the border regime, 
but to move it beyond EUropean external borders. As past cooperation agreements 
have shown, violence might intensify in third countries, while being removed from the 
EUropean public’s view at the same time. Cooperation agreements with countries in 
North Africa, particularly Libya, have been described as the creation of “‘off-shore’ 
black holes where European norms, standards and regulations simply do not apply” 
(Bialasiewicz 2012, 861; see also Buckel and Wissel 2010, 40). This exposes a 
fundamental limitation of many efforts to improve EUropean border controls: appeals 
to respect human rights and to save lives at sea are primarily directed at EUropean 
governments and policymakers. Human rights especially are territorial despite their 
almost universal appeal, relying on authorities within a particular jurisdiction to 
respect and enforce them. When border controls and the accompanying violence and 
exclusion are outsourced to third countries, EUropean states cease to be responsible 
for rights infringements in legal terms. While externalisation stands in tension with a 
comprehensive conception of travellers as rights holders, including the right to leave 
any country and the right to seek asylum (UDHR, Art. 13(2) and Art. 14(1)), it shifts 
the responsibility for rights infringements to third states.  
When conceptualising discursive formations as performative, it is important to 
recognise that they might have effects that exceed the intentions of those mobilising 
them. In this section, I argued that humanitarian and human rights appeals that remain 
focused on EUropean actors, and stop short of challenging the assumption that 
migration is a security issue and arrivals therefore need to be limited and controlled, 
risk merely ‘sanitising’ EUropean borderlands. In doing so, they are not only unlikely 
to be able to counter already-existing processes towards externalisation, but might 
even provide new impetus for them.  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explored some of the effects of the increase in humanitarian and 
human rights references in Frontex’s self-portrayals, and in EUropean border 
governance more widely. In doing so, I argued that these two developments have 
strengthened Frontex’s position in the EUropean border regime in a variety of ways. 
Initially, I argued that the coexistence of ‘crisis’ and ‘risk management’ approaches 
within Frontex is productive, allowing the agency to respond to divergent external 
demands, and feeding into each other in its practices. Furthermore, I showed that the 
crisis narratives that prevail in contemporary border governance enmesh humanitarian, 
human rights, and security concerns, and thereby contribute to the further 
entanglement of the three discursive formations. In relation to Frontex more 
specifically, I argued that the intertwinement of humanitarianism, human rights, and 
security in its self-representations has positioned the agency as the almost automatic 
‘solution’ to diverse ‘crises’ in EUropean border governance, strengthening it in terms 
of resources as well as legitimacy.  
Moreover, this chapter argued that the discursive similarities between 
humanitarianism, human rights, and security have created the conditions of possibility 
for the emergence of new coalitions of actors in EUropean border governance. As 
humanitarianism and human rights have grown stronger over the last years, state and 
security actors have appropriated them. This enabled divergent actors to identify 
common goals, and to work towards achieving them together both in responding to 
‘crises’, and in ‘managing’ new arrivals. The Consultative Forum on Fundamental 
Rights is an example of a new coalition that focuses on making existing procedures 
human rights conform, legitimising them in the process. Within these coalitions, 
fundamental assumptions such as the need to control borders are not questioned, as the 
common focus is on urgent responses, or improving the management and 
categorisation of new arrivals. Importantly, this risks reifying not only highly 
problematic categories of ‘economic migrants’ vs. ‘refugees’, but also the ‘othering’ 
of those to be managed more generally, as they are constructed and governed as 
‘passive victims’ and ‘risky subjects’ at the same time.  
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In a third section, I examined the connection between the human rights narrative 
invoked by Frontex officials and a wider discourse on ‘EUropeanness’, which 
questions the belonging of Southern (and) Eastern member states to the EUropean 
community. In this narrative, Frontex is constructed as a ‘civilising force’ that spreads 
‘best practices’ from EUrope’s North West to ‘less developed’ countries. As such, I 
argued that Frontex’s appropriation of fundamental rights has strengthened the agency 
also by allowing it to be positioned as a ‘truly EUropean’ actor. In this role, Frontex 
supports ‘less advanced’ member states by teaching them human rights, and by 
(indirectly) monitoring their practices through its operations. Lastly, I cautioned that 
the entanglement of humanitarianism, human rights, and security in EUropean border 
governance more widely might provide new impetus for an externalisation of border 
controls. Where human rights and humanitarian appeals focus on ‘sanitising’ 
EUropean borderlands without challenging the fundamental assumptions persisting as 
part of a wider discursive formation of security, this could contribute to the outsourcing 
of the violence that a highly exclusionary border regime aiming to keep arrival 
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Conclusion 
This thesis explored the relationship of the discursive formations of humanitarianism, 
human rights, and security in the self-representations of the EUropean border agency 
Frontex. In doing so, it sought to make a number of contributions. Not only did it 
present novel empirical data on the negotiation of humanitarianism, human rights, and 
security within Frontex’s documents, and by those working for and with the agency, it 
also made theoretical and methodological contributions to the fields of critical security 
studies, critical migration and border studies, and organisational sociology, by 
bringing these three fields into conversation with one another. In this final chapter, I 
will revisit the research questions that guided this project from the beginning. By 
summarising some of the main findings and arguments made in the previous chapters 
and relating them back to the research questions, I will also reflect on the contributions 
offered to existing scholarship and debates.  
 
Reflections on humanitarianism, human rights, and security  
As outlined in the introduction, at the beginning of this doctoral project stood my 
curiosity vis-à-vis the use of humanitarian and human rights language in Frontex’s 
public statements and documents, alongside a continued focus on migration as a 
security issue. As such, I set out to explore the question: how do humanitarianism, 
human rights, and security relate to each other, and to governing EUropean borders? 
By reflecting on humanitarianism, human rights, and security individually, and on their 
interrelationships in EUropean border governance more generally, I proposed 
conceptualising them as three distinct but closely connected discursive formations, 
which have become increasingly entangled in a wider interdiscourse of migration 
control. This understanding highlights both the different historical context and 
contemporary implications of each of the discursive formations, and simultaneously 
shows their close connections in governing populations.  
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While humanitarianism and human rights are often seen as oppositional to security, 
this thesis has drawn on and contributed to literatures identifying their similarities and 
connections in governing populations. In particular, I have highlighted that in their 
articulations in contemporary border governance, each of the formations ‘others’ 
people on the move, works through biopolitical and disciplinary techniques of 
government, and reinforces the power of (especially Western) states. In the discursive 
formation of security, individuals are designated as ‘threats’ to or ‘risks’ for diverse 
referent objects (including the economy, public health, public safety, morality, culture, 
identity, and so on). Humanitarianism and human rights produce the position of the 
‘victim’, which is looked down upon, and is in a hierarchical relationship with a 
‘saviour’. The figures of the ‘victim’ and the ‘threat’ are racialized as non-white, and 
have become central to how ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’ are imagined in contemporary 
EUrope. Groups or individuals can occupy these subject positions simultaneously, or 
transition from one to the other: each of the subject positions is unstable, and a ‘victim’ 
can quickly transform into a ‘threat’ (and vice versa) if not conforming to particular 
behaviours, arriving via a particularly deadly route, or if arriving at the same time as 
many others.  
The three discursive formations discussed in this thesis furthermore govern through 
biopolitical and disciplinary techniques of government. All categorise people into 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ border crossers: trusted travellers vs. unauthorised entrants; refugees 
entitled to rights vs. deportable others; those deserving of aid vs. those who are 
considered to be undeserving. Populations are governed in space, with particular 
contexts and locations becoming central for accessing rights or aid for ‘victims’, or 
alternatively to the confinement of ‘threats’. At times, these places become one and 
the same, as detention centres in the UK and other countries illustrate: asylum seekers 
who enter the procedure to have their right to remain in e.g. the UK assessed can be 
detained during the process, and are placed in the same facilities as those who are 
deemed ‘undesirable’ and are sought to be deported. Lastly, the three formations 
reinforce and legitimise the power of, primarily, Western states vis-à-vis their own 
populations, and vis-à-vis other states in the international order. Rather than 
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fundamentally challenging the exclusions created by sovereign states – which rely on 
a division between those ruled, those ruling, and those excluded – humanitarianism 
appeals for pity and mercy on behalf of (some of) those excluded, and administers aid 
to them. The discursive formation of human rights is intricately bound up with 
statehood, as states are deemed to be the actors best capable of protecting human rights. 
The formation of security commonly includes the sovereign state as a key referent 
object to be protected from outside threats, and relies on state power to address such 
threats. In addition, humanitarianism, human rights, and security have all been drawn 
on to justify and legitimate powerful states’ interventions in other states, which are 
declared a danger to international security, and / or to their own populations. Despite 
their differences, the discursive formations of humanitarianism, human rights, and 
security thus share a number of important commonalities with one another, which have 
created the conditions of possibility for their entanglement in contemporary EUropean 
border governance.  
These conceptual reflections constitute the basis of this thesis, and build on as well as 
speak to debates on the relationship between war, violence, humanitarianism, and 
human rights. They synthesize a diverse body of scholarship and relate it to the context 
of EUropean border governance, showing how debates around humanitarianism, 
human rights, militarism, violence, and security relate to contemporary processes in 
the EUropean border regime. In doing so, they contribute to the fields of critical 
migration and border studies and critical security studies, offering a way of thinking 
about ongoing processes in EUropean border governance without ascribing one 
overarching or necessarily dominant rationality. By conceptualising humanitarianism, 
human rights, and security as distinct discursive formations that are closely bound up 
with one another in a wider interdiscourse of migration control, the practices of border 
governance can be reflected on in their complexities. Rather than resorting to 
narratives on ‘rhetoric vs. reality’ or merely understanding humanity-centred concerns 
as ineffectual by-products of an overarching governmentality of risk, this 
conceptualisation opens up space for critical reflections on the intricate connections of 
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and frequent transitions between the three discursive formations in contemporary 
border governance, without overly simplifying it.  
 
Three perspectives on Frontex: research with access limitations  
Building on these conceptual reflections, I argued that the close connections between 
the three discursive formations have enabled state and security actors to incorporate 
humanitarianism and human rights in their self-representations and in public debates, 
without this threatening their identities or basic assumptions. Looking at the example 
of Frontex, I set out to address the second research question: how does Frontex 
negotiate humanitarianism, human rights, and security in its self-representation, and 
how has this changed over time? Rather than providing a single, comprehensive 
account of Frontex and its gradual appropriation of humanitarian and human rights 
language in response to this, the thesis offered three ways of knowing the agency. In 
part, the reason for doing this was pragmatic: given that my research access was 
limited, I decided to pursue various ways of collecting data and trying to understand 
Frontex’s shift towards humanitarianism and human rights language. By looking at the 
agency’s founding history, analysing its publications, and conducting interviews and 
participant observation, I sought to address the limitations that access difficulties might 
pose to the research, in particular given my position as an outsider. Each of the three 
perspectives presented in this thesis offers a different way of knowing Frontex, and of 
conceptualising its recent changes. Each of them is necessarily partial, and provides 
just one part of what is a much larger picture. Relying on different research methods, 
sources, and sites, each perspective also calls for an explicit reflection on what it has 
to offer, and where its limitations lie.  
When understanding Frontex through scholarly work and policy documents relating to 
the agency’s foundation, it emerges primarily as a compromise between various actors’ 
interests. This founding history provides valuable insights in relation to how Frontex 
is being governed today, with member states and Commission representatives playing 
a key role in controlling the agency, but also the European Parliament holding 
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considerable power over it. It also provides a way of making sense of the different 
rationalities that were inscribed in the agency from its very beginning: a 
conceptualisation of security as entailing urgent responses to ‘crises’ which coexisted 
and at times competed with an understanding of security as risk management (i.e. as 
entailing analysis, pre-planning, and preparation). When following this perspective, 
moreover, Frontex’s appropriation of humanitarianism and human rights might be 
interpreted as a reflection of or response to the strengthening of the European 
Parliament in EUropean policymaking as the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. 
Examining Frontex through its founding history thus highlights the agency’s contested 
nature, the multiplicity of interests it was intended to serve, as well as the range of 
actors it remains accountable to. It however fails to engage with the organisational 
dynamics and complexities of Frontex itself, including how the agency actively 
manoeuvres its position as one actor in a contested border regime.  
Analysing Frontex’s public documents provides insights into how humanitarianism, 
human rights and security have been enmeshed in the self-representations of the 
agency, highlighting how they have become articulated in narratives produced about 
Frontex, migration, and border controls. I have shown how Frontex progressively 
incorporated humanitarianism and human rights in addition to a continued emphasis 
on migration as a risk and a threat in its annual reports and press releases since 2008. 
While the first three years of Frontex’s existence saw the absence of references to 
human rights, and only selective references to saving lives, humanitarianism and 
human rights have gradually been mainstreamed throughout Frontex’s annual reports 
and press releases since 2011. In addition, the agency’s publications have increasingly 
relied on the widely known discursive narratives of the ‘unscrupulous smuggler’ and 
‘fraudulent asylum seeker’, in which humanitarianism, human rights, and security 
concerns converge. In sum, understanding Frontex through an analysis of its press 
releases and reports illustrates how the agency has gradually been constructed as a 
promoter of rights, protector of vulnerable people, manager of risks, and defender of 
EUrope in times of crisis. It produces knowledge on how Frontex has been positioned 
publicly and how its documents have negotiated the different discursive formations 
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through time, but stops short of engaging with those working for and with the 
organisation themselves. In doing so, this way of understanding Frontex relies entirely 
on an outside perspective, and has the tendency to portray the agency as a unitary actor.  
Moving from public documents to interviews, informal conversations, and 
observations, a new institutionalist analysis offers a partial view from the inside, if 
necessarily incomplete due to my position as an outsider and the limited research 
access I could secure. Despite these limitations, the collected data captures an 
important part of Frontex’s organisational dynamics, highlighting contradictions and 
incoherencies between its staff, guest officers, and management. It shows that Frontex 
is not a coherent, rational organisation, and that discrepancies between understandings 
of border guarding exist between those involved in different aspects of the agency’s 
work, including regarding the relevance of humanitarianism and human rights in 
EUropean border guarding. At the same time, this perspective does not provide for an 
analysis of the discursive relationships between the formations that Frontex staff and 
management draw on, and is limited in the understandings it can offer of the agency’s 
wider environment.  
Taken together, the three perspectives offer multifaceted insights into Frontex’s 
negotiation of humanitarianism, human rights, and security, and show how 
engagement with the three discursive formations in agency publications changed over 
time. They depict Frontex as an actor embedded in a complex network of EU 
institutions and member states, which the agency is accountable to and partially 
controlled by. At the same time, they show that rather than being entirely determined 
by this position, Frontex’s staff and management actively negotiate external demands 
in various ways. Incorporating humanitarian and human rights language in public 
documents and statements, while insisting on the centrality of Frontex’s security 
mandate at the same time, has been one way of responding to external pressures.  
By combining different methods, sources, and sites, the thesis has provided novel 
empirical information about Frontex and the self-representations of those working for 
the agency, contributing to critical border and migration studies and critical security 
studies. While Frontex is a widely known and much-discussed actor in these fields, 
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there has been only limited direct engagement with agency staff and management thus 
far. Combining ‘nonlocal’ ethnography with organisational analysis in producing these 
insights, the thesis moreover offers a way of transposing Feldman’s (2012) 
observations and methodological reflections regarding EUropean policymaking 
networks to researching individual (security) organisations that provide only limited 
research access. In doing so, it demonstrates the usefulness of an open-ended, 
experimentalist and diversified research design. Importantly, the approach taken also 
shows that (partial) organisational analyses can provide valuable insights even where 
full access to an organisation cannot be secured. As limited access is the norm within 
the security field, it is important to note that organisational research and analysis – 
especially when combined with other approaches – can provide meaningful insights 
also in this research area.  
 
Bringing organisational dynamics into critical security studies 
When analysing the data collected through interviews, informal conversations, and 
observations, the thesis exposed divergences in interpretations and self-representations 
between Frontex’s headquarters, guest officers working in its operations, and different 
members of its management board. These insights challenge conceptualisations of 
Frontex as a unitary and rational actor, and suggest that the agency might be more 
appropriately understood as a loosely coupled organisation within a contradictory and 
ambiguous environment. Drawing on organisational sociology, I argued that 
incoherencies within the agency can constitute a reasonable way of dealing with 
contradictory demands from the outside, or of reconciling external demands with 
internal interpretations of efficiency and professionalism: they do not necessarily 
entail intentional deception or even organisational failure by the agency. Instead of 
examining how and why Frontex as a whole has appropriated humanitarianism and 
human rights, this analysis thus suggests that different parts of the agency have 
engaged with the three discursive formations to varying extents. By presenting a range 
of self-representations and views by guest officers, staff, and management that elude 
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any singular rationality of government, the thesis problematized the attribution of an 
overarching goal or rationality to Frontex. While it suggested that humanitarian and 
human rights language was partially incorporated in agency publications in response 
to outside pressures, the thesis simultaneously challenged a purely instrumentalist 
understanding of these developments.  
In doing so, the thesis contributed to the study of security organisations, in particular 
when following a so-called ‘Paris School’ approach. In existing accounts, diverse 
security professionals are understood to share particular knowledges within a 
relatively closed and often secretive community of insiders. They occupy positions of 
authority due to their status as ‘experts’, and can make claims about threats and risks 
without having to provide evidence for them. Inter-organisational competition is 
understood as a key driver of developments in the wider security field. In this field, 
various security actors compete over threat and risk definitions as well as resources, 
each seeking to maximise its own power and authority in the process. Changes and 
developments are field effects of diverse actors’ interests and actions, rather than the 
results of a premeditated plan (Bigo 2002a, 2006). As the thesis has shown, this 
conceptualisation can be meaningfully complemented with analyses of intra-
organisational dynamics.  
First, this thesis and the organisational work it draws on have shown that an 
understanding of security actors as merely power-maximising is overly simplistic. 
While security organisations might be relatively inaccessible to outsiders as suggested 
by ‘Paris School’ accounts, organisational sociology suggests that they will likely seek 
to respond to demands from their environment if they perceive their legitimacy or 
resources to be threatened. Frontex staff and management often expressed concerns 
regarding the agency’s perception from the outside, and viewed the organisation as 
dependent on a variety of stakeholders (including the European Parliament, the 
European Commission, and the member states) for legitimacy and resources. In fact, 
some of the interviewees were worried about the agency’s quick expansion in terms of 
its tasks and mandate, and were expressing a wish for a period of consolidation rather 
than further growth. This illustrates that within Frontex, concerns do not only focus on 
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maximising power or competences, but are more diversified. Indeed, organisational 
sociology suggests that organisations are primarily preoccupied with securing 
legitimacy from their environment, which includes attempts to reconcile conflicting 
expectations and pressures emanating from it. As the thesis has shown, this is arguably 
a more appropriate way of conceptualising organisational motivations than a simple 
focus on power maximisation. While an organisation (or some of its staff and 
management) might develop an understanding of itself as involved in a competitive 
struggle for power against other security actors, this is not necessarily the case and 
cannot be taken as a given.  
Second, the thesis has argued that those working for and with Frontex engage with 
humanitarianism and human rights to very different extents. Thereby, it has challenged 
suggestions that (all) security professionals are unmoved by or indifferent to 
‘alternative discourses’ such as humanitarianism and human rights, and has provided 
a more nuanced account of Frontex’s positioning towards these discursive formations, 
and towards its environment more generally. By challenging prevailing 
conceptualisations of security agencies as coherent, rational actors, the thesis thus 
contributed to ‘Paris School’ approaches in a second way. It showed that taking 
organisational dynamics seriously reveals a more diverse, fragmented and potentially 
contradictory picture of security organisations’ motivations, behaviours, and 
understandings. More specifically, the thesis has shown that responses to external 
pressures do not always need to affect the entire organisation, or change existing 
structures. Decoupling different parts of the organisation from one another, or 
decoupling outward rhetoric from internal structures and procedures can be a 
reasonable way to respond to external pressures, especially if these are contradictory 
or in tension with interpretations established inside the organisation. While such 
fragmentation is more apparent within other EU institutions, such as the European 
Parliament or the Council, the thesis showed that also relatively small agencies such 
as Frontex cannot be assumed to be unitary or coherent. The concept of decoupling 
thus helps to conceptualise change and continuity in relation to security actors. It 
enables the analyst to understand contradictory practices, or divergences between 
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public statements and practices, without having to resort to notions that imply a 
centrally determined intentionality, such as ‘deception’. By bringing critical security 
studies, critical migration and border studies, and organisational sociology into 
conversation with one another, the thesis argued that organisational dynamics can add 
a layer of analysis to prevailing accounts of dynamics within the EUropean border 
regime, complementing them meaningfully.  
  
Implications for activism, politics, and critical scholarship 
The final question that this thesis set out to address was: what are the effects of 
Frontex’s changes in self-representation on the agency and its position in the border 
regime? I reflected on this question in chapter 6, drawing on Judith Butler’s 
understanding of discursive performativity. In doing so, I examined Frontex’s 
continued reliance on crisis as well as risk management narratives, which – as noted 
above – were inscribed in the agency already from its foundation. I showed that both 
crisis narratives and risk management have become enmeshed with the discursive 
formations of humanitarianism and human rights, which produces particular effects. 
Arguing that invocations of crises and a focus on risk management are not necessarily 
at odds with one another, but can inform and even feed into each other, I suggested 
that Frontex’s position in the EUropean border regime has been (re-)asserted and 
strengthened through both narratives.  
By presenting itself as saviour of people in distress at sea, promoter of fundamental 
rights, and defender of EUrope in times of unexpected threats, Frontex has become 
positioned as the solution to diverse ‘crises’. It has seen budget increases in relation to 
events framed as humanitarian as well as border control ‘crises’, and has become the 
almost automatic solution to diverse ‘problems’ emerging in the EUropean border 
regime. Simultaneously, it has contributed to the blurring of and transitioning between 
different discursive formations: Frontex (among other actors) has responded to 
‘humanitarian crises’ with ‘security measures,’ i.e. practices aiming to restrict 
unauthorised mobility and criminalising those facilitating it.  
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Humanitarianism, human rights, and security do not only converge in crisis narratives, 
however, but also in narratives on routine migration (and risk) management. They 
share a common focus on the identification and classification of individuals according 
to needs, rights, and risks posed. This focus as well as Frontex’s self-representation as 
a humanitarian, human rights, and security actor have allowed for the emergence of 
new coalitions in the EUropean border regime. Indeed, Frontex’s decoupling of 
various aspects of its work has enabled the agency to cooperate closely with a wide 
variety of actors, ranging from the arms and security industry to national border guards 
to EUropean bureaucrats, politicians, and NGOs and international organisations.  
When I began working on this thesis, I had a two-fold aim: on the one hand, I set out 
to explore Frontex’s shift to humanitarianism and human rights from an academic 
perspective, hoping to contribute new empirical and theoretical insights to the fields 
of critical border and migration studies and critical security studies. On the other hand, 
I wanted to reflect on the entanglement of humanitarianism, human rights, and security 
from the point of view of somebody who seeks to challenge exclusionary, violent, and 
often deadly bordering practices. Deeply disturbed by contemporary EUropean 
bordering policies and practices, I wanted to think through the intricate relationships 
between humanitarianism, human rights, and security, examine Frontex’s 
appropriation of the former two, and expose some of the effects of this appropriation 
in the EUropean border regime more widely.  
In doing so, the question of what these reflections and findings mean for activism, for 
politics, and for critical scholarship emerges centrally. I argued that Frontex has 
become positioned as a ‘civilising force’ in EUrope, shifting responsibility for human 
rights abuses to ‘problematic’ member states in the South (and) East and affirming its 
identity as promoting and monitoring the adherence to ‘EUropean’ values across the 
territory. In addition, I made some tentative observations regarding potential future 
developments. In particular, I suggested that calling for adherence to humanitarian 
principles and human rights standards by EUropean border guards could end up 
providing increased momentum for already-existing processes of externalisation, if 
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such calls do not challenge the fundamental assumption that arrival numbers need to 
remain low, and remain focused on EUrope.  
What this means, then, is that relying on humanitarianism and human rights 
uncritically as a way to challenge and oppose current bordering practices could be 
counterproductive in some instances. The intertwinement of the three discursive 
formations has created new openings for practices that rely on a conceptualisation of 
migration as a risk or a threat: I have shown that scandalising deaths in the 
Mediterranean by invoking a humanitarian crisis could lead to more restrictive 
practices as a form of ‘crisis response,’ likely leading to more deaths, and that 
emphases on identifying people in need or protecting refugee rights might further a 
managerial approach that ‘others’ newcomers and affirms an understanding of 
migration as a phenomenon to be dealt with through risk management. In addition, I 
have argued that scandalising rights violations in particular member states might lead 
to calls for ‘more Frontex’ in order to enable the agency to monitor and improve the 
situation in ‘problematic’ countries.  
While all of these potentialities remain no more than this, possibilities rather than 
necessities, they show that even in mobilising humanitarianism and human rights 
specifically for the purpose of critiquing the status quo, it is possible to feed into and 
further strengthen the two modes of enacting insecurity discussed in this thesis. Given 
the intertwinement of humanitarianism, human rights, and security in contemporary 
EUropean border governance, can humanitarianism and / or human rights remain 
useful vehicles to challenge restrictive practices? As media outlets, journalists, and 
academics keep producing images of death and despair from EUropean borderlands, 
the need for change is more than clear. Reports of thousands of individuals dying en 
route to EUrope within the first half of this year alone are prompting renewed calls for 
change grounded in humanitarianism and human rights.  
What this thesis aimed to show is that such calls often fail to fundamentally challenge 
existing frameworks, and might inadvertently serve to legitimise and reinforce 
restrictive practices. While action in light of ongoing deaths and dismal conditions in 
camps across and beyond EUrope is needed, improvements in search and rescue 
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practices or living conditions alone will fail to provide the solution for problems that 
are intricately connected to political inequalities, neo-colonial dependencies and 
structures, and enduring racism. Indeed, calling for urgent action to save lives or 
protect rights should not deflect our attention from asking questions on a more 
fundamental level, and for demanding radical change. Rather than focusing on 
‘sanitising’ EUropean borderlands from violence, abuse, and death, it remains 
important to question what the conception of humanity underlying current and 
proposed practices is: to whom, when, and where does it (not) apply?  
Opening up space for reflection on and challenges to the meaning and significance of 
‘the human’, and insisting on bringing politics back into calls for change is necessary 
to break the continuum of human rights, humanitarianism, and security. Similarly, a 
critical rethinking of the relationship between humanity, sovereignty, borders, and 
violence is needed. Rather than giving up on the ambivalent discursive formations of 
humanitarianism and human rights, it is important to critically and creatively re-engage 
with them. If taken seriously, such a re-engagement cannot end with calls for the 
proper implementation of rights or for the alleviation of some forms of human 
suffering. Instead, it “must address the question of how to remake and improve 
Europe’s relationships with its unwanted settler-migrants, refugees, denizens and 
illegals: all those racial and civilizational inferiors judged infrahuman, whose lives are 
accorded a diminished value even when they fall inside the elastic bounds of the law” 
(Gilroy 2014, 147). Remaking this relationship requires a move beyond appeals 
seeking to re-humanise current practices and policies, or attempting to encourage a 
more consistent implementation of existing laws.  
It also means moving beyond political mobilisation on behalf of voiceless victims, and 
working through and with the power differentials inherent in the struggle against 
exclusion, racism, and discrimination. Once again, the developments of the last 18 
months have shown that it is by no means the European Commission, Frontex, or 
EUropean political leaders more widely who one-sidedly determine developments in 
the realm of migration and mobility. People on the move themselves have defied the 
laws and practices seeking to exclude them, claimed the right to access EUrope, and 
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often succeeded in travelling to their destination countries in spite of manifold physical 
and legal barriers seeking to block them from doing so. They have exposed deep 
divisions between EUropean policymakers, who scrambled for responses to this 
seemingly ungovernable mobility. In doing so, they have demonstrated that moments 
of “autonomy of migration” persist in the face of stringent controls and securitisation 
(see Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008; 
Scheel 2013). 
It is crucial that this agency and defiance is recognised also by those seeking to support 
border crossers, whether through academic writings or practical solidarity actions. One 
(refugee) activist said this February at a conference in Hamburg: “I don’t want 
somebody to support my fight. I want left-wing activists to fight their fights, and I fight 
my fight, and when we meet on an equal footing, we fight together” (cited in 
Schipkowski 2016). Rather than perpetuating patronising appeals on behalf of 
suffering others, political opposition to current border policies and practices needs to 
take politics, power, and positionality seriously, challenging structures of exclusion, 
marginalisation, and hierarchisation within the border regime and beyond EUropean 
territory as well as in social movements. When doing so, it can open up space for 
reflection and (self-)critique, and might allow for identifying moments in which the 
dominant humanity-security continuum proliferating in contemporary EUropean 
border governance can be disrupted or subverted. 
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Epilogue 
With the fast-paced events taking place in 2015 and 2016, the end of data collection 
for this thesis on 31/12/2014 seems rather distant as I am writing this epilogue in July 
2016. There have been record numbers of arrivals in EUrope last year, with 850,000 
people having entered Greece by boat, in addition to 150,000 arriving in Italy by boat 
(UNHCR 2016). The responses were diverse and often chaotic, both in the countries 
of first arrival and in those further along the routes of individuals seeking safety and 
stability. We have seen, once again, staggering numbers of deaths in the 
Mediterranean, with more than 3,770 deaths last year, and already 3,034 deaths by July 
25, 2016 (IOM 2016). While there has been an unprecedented mobilisation of 
volunteers, activists, and NGOs to assist new arrivals in various EUropean countries, 
there have also been increased numbers of violent attacks on them.  
The political response across EUrope has often appeared uncoordinated and ad-hoc, 
with policymakers scrambling to respond to new developments as they arose. Fences 
have sprung up across EUrope, and security concerns have emerged centre-stage in 
some of the debates around a EUropean response to the “crisis”. With the closure of 
the Macedonian border and the emphasis on deportation and detention within the EU-
Turkey deal, the situation looks bleak for those trapped in Turkey, Greece, Syria, and 
other countries without much hope for rebuilding their lives. In light of this rapidly 
changing context, do the analysis and arguments this thesis has presented based on 
data between 2005 and 2014 still matter? It is impossible, within this Epilogue, to 
adequately comment on all of the events that have taken place since January 2015. 
Focusing on a selection of them, in particular the specific debates around Frontex, 
however, illustrates that my arguments remain relevant beyond the specific temporal 
limit of the analysis undertaken.  
After the death of more than 800 individuals in a single incident on 18 April 2015 – a 
month that saw over 1240 lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea – EUropean leaders 
reiterated their commitment to reduce deaths at sea (European Council 2015; European 
Parliament 2015b). A Special European Council Meeting was convened on April 23, 
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which as its first measure decided to triple Frontex’s budget for joint operations Triton 
and Poseidon. This decision can be partially understood as a response to Frontex’s 
positioning as a humanitarian actor: as argued in the thesis, this self-representation has 
allowed the agency to become a ‘go-to’ solution for deaths at sea. In May 2015, the 
European Commission launched “A European Agenda on Migration” in response to 
what it described as shortfalls of collective European migration policies. It proposed a 
range of measures, including immediate actions and more long-term proposals. The 
actions to be undertaken without delay included, among others, closer cooperation 
between Frontex and Europol in order to address smuggling and the establishment of 
“Hotspots”, in which EASO, Frontex, Eurojust, and Europol work together to facilitate 
the swift processing of new arrivals in “frontline Member States”, including their 
mandatory fingerprinting “in full respect of fundamental rights” (European 
Commission 2015b, 6; 13).  
The Commission’s proposal to enhance cooperation on smuggling between Europol 
and Frontex relies on and further strengthens the narrative of the ‘unscrupulous 
smuggler’, suggesting that a fight against the facilitators of dangerous crossings will 
alleviate the suffering of those seeking to reach EUrope as well as decreasing arrival 
numbers, and bringing together humanitarian and security rationales: “[a]ction to fight 
criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers is first and foremost a way to prevent 
the exploitation of migrants by criminal networks. It would also act as a disincentive 
to irregular migration” (European Commission 2015b, 8). Also in the newly 
established Hotspots, the governmental rationalities that are at work within 
humanitarianism, human rights, and security converge. New arrivals are filtered 
according to their presumed humanitarian needs, their status as rights holders, and the 
potential threat they might be posing, and are designated as removable if they fall 
outside of specific categories. Four EU agencies cooperate in the determination of 
individuals’ identities and categorisation, before then processing them according to the 
attributed status. The close cooperation of four agencies with different remits (crime; 
asylum; border control) in the Hotspots can be seen as another example of the 
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coalitions of diverse actors emerging to jointly respond to humanitarian, human rights, 
and security concerns at EUropean borders, as discussed in chapter 6.  
At the same time, the agencies also “help [“frontline Member States”] to fulfil their 
obligations under EU law and swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming 
migrants” (European Commission 2015c). This “help” is not necessarily only to be 
understood in benevolent terms, but is connected to beliefs that Italy and Greece do 
not live up to EUropean standards and expectations regarding the registration of new 
arrivals, first and foremost by not fingerprinting them systematically enough.30 In 
February 2016, the Commission published “Progress Reports” on the implementation 
of policy measures within the “European Agenda on Migration” in Italy and Greece, 
reflecting in this very term the presumed need for these two countries to progress to a 
more advanced, EUropean standard of border guarding (European Commission 
2016b). Among other issues, the reports described a dramatic increase in fingerprinting 
rates for both countries (European Commission 2016c, 2016d). Together with other 
agencies, Frontex has thus been called on as one of the actors spreading and 
simultaneously monitoring the adherence to standards and procedures in Italy and 
Greece, which feeds into its positioning as a ‘civilising force’ not only in relation to 
human rights adherence, but also regarding ‘best practices’ more widely.  
In December 2015, the Commission moreover proposed to establish a common 
European Border and Coast Guard, and repealing Frontex’s founding regulation. Some 
key changes to this expansion of Frontex would include its ability to act without the 
consent of member states where they are unable or unwilling to control external 
borders effectively, thereby further reinforcing the agency’s role as a ‘civilising force’ 
spreading EUropean standards to ‘problematic’ member states. In addition, it is 
suggested that the revamped agency would have an explicit mandate to work in third 
                                                 
30
 Whether or not individuals are fingerprinted matters profoundly due to the Dublin Regulation that 
sets out that the EU country an individual first set foot in is responsible for processing their asylum 
application (European Parliament and Council 2013). Without being fingerprinted, individuals have 
greater possibilities to travel on to Northern / Western EU countries to apply for asylum there, without 
facing the same threat of being deported back to the country where they entered the EU.  
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countries, which would reinforce externalisation processes and likely allow the 
European Border and Coast Guard to play a more active role in advancing them. It 
would also be obliged to institute a complaints mechanism allowing individuals whose 
rights have been violated in joint operations to complain to the Fundamental Rights 
Officer, strengthening the agency’s oversight function vis-à-vis member states’ border 
guards. Further envisaged changes include greater powers in relation to return 
operations; integrating the cooperation of coastguards and border guards; and a 
mandate on internal security with a specific focus on preventing terrorism (European 
Commission 2015a, 2015d). In addition,  
 
[t]he objectives of a joint operation or rapid border intervention may be achieved as 
part of a multipurpose operation which may involve the rescue of persons in distress 
at sea or other coast guard functions, the fight against migrant smuggling or 
trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking control operations, and migration 
management including identification, registration, debriefing and return (European 
Commission 2015a, Article 14(5)). 
 
As such, humanitarianism, human rights, and security objectives could be merged in 
multi-purpose operations conducted by the agency, explicitly designed to jointly 
address these diverse concerns. This would be a move away from operations that thus 
far have been exclusively mandated with border security, and have conducted search 
and rescue activities where called upon by member states rather than planning and 
deploying joint operations with rescue as an objective. It would, if agreed upon and 
implemented, take the entanglement of all three discursive formations in EUropean 
border practices to another level, further intensifying existing developments and 
strengthening the agency’s contribution to the continued blurring of humanitarianism, 
human rights, and security in border practices. 
In the eighteen months since data collection for this thesis ended, the blurring of 
humanitarianism, human rights, and security has, if anything, become more intense, 
and Frontex’s role has been strengthened both in response to deaths at sea, and to 
increased arrival numbers. Far from only consolidating its humanitarian and human 
rights character, the last months have once again seen a growing emphasis on security 
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concerns, which the agency is similarly positioned as a solution to. This is reflected 
also in the recent Commission proposal, which foresees the European Border and 
Coast Guard acquiring additional competences in the fight against terrorism within 
EUrope. In order to allow the agency to implement both new and old tasks, the 
Commission proposes to increase its budget from the €143 million originally allocated 
to Frontex in 2015 (before the tripling of its resources for joint operations Poseidon 
and Triton) to €238 million in 2016 and €281 million in 2017, reaching €322 million 
by 2020, and suggests increasing the agency’s staff members from 402 in early 2016 
to 1,000 by 2020 (European Commission 2015e). As deaths at sea and arrival numbers 
in EUrope have reached new record levels, ‘more Frontex’ has been envisioned as the 
solution to security, humanitarianism, and human rights concerns. Importantly, recent 
developments have also shown clearly that humanitarianism and human rights coexist 
alongside a continued security focus, which has grown stronger again in recent months. 
In the new proposal, Frontex – potentially soon the European Border and Coast Guard 
– would become even better positioned to respond to human rights violations by border 
guards as much as deaths at sea and increased arrival numbers, potentially further 






  230 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  231 
Bibliography 
Aas, Katja Franko, and Helene O I Gundhus. 2015. “Policing Humanitarian 
Borderlands: Frontex, Human Rights and the Precariousness of Life.” British 
Journal of Criminology 55 (1): 1–18. 
Ackerly, Brooke A., Maria Stern, and Jacqui True. 2006. “Feminist Methodologies for 
International Relations.” In Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, 
edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True, 1–15. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Agamben, Giorgio. 1995. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Agier, Michel. 2010. “Humanity as an Identity and Its Political Effects (A Note on 
Camps and Humanitarian Government).” Humanity: An International Journal of 
Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 1 (1): 29–45. 
———. 2011a. Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian 
Government. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
———. 2011b. “The Undesirables of the World and How Universality Changed 
Camp.” OpenDemocracy. http://www.opendemocracy.net/michel-
agier/undesirables-of-world-and-how-universality-changed-camp [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
Agnew, John. 1994. “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of 
International Relations Theory.” Review of International Political Economy 1 (1): 
53–80. 
———. 2010. “Still Trapped in Territory?” Geopolitics 15 (4): 779–784. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  232 
Amnesty International. 2005. “Immigration Cooperation with Libya: The Human 
Rights Perspective. Amnesty International Briefing ahead of the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council, 14 April 2005.” Brussels. 
www.amnesty.eu/static/documents/2005/JHA_Libya_april12.pdf [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2007. “Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Briefing to the UN Human Rights 
Committee, MDE 19/008/2007.” 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde19/008/2007/en/ [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2012. “AI Response to Ombudsman Frontex Consultation.” 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/12024/htm
l.bookmark [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014a. “Lives Adrift: Refugees and Migrants in Peril in the Central 
Mediterranean.” London. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR05/006/2014/en/ [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014b. “The Human Cost of Fortress Europe: Human Rights Violations 
Against Migrants and Refugee at Europe’s Borders.” London. 
Amoore, Louise. 2006. “Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on 
Terror.” Political Geography 25 (3): 336–351. 
———. 2009. “Lines of Sight: On the Visualization of Unknown Futures.” Citizenship 
Studies 13 (1): 17–30. 
———. 2014. “Security and the Incalculable.” Security Dialogue 45 (5): 423–439. 
Amoore, Louise, and Marieke de Goede. 2008a. “Transactions after 9/11: The Banal 
Face of the Preemptive Strike.” Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 33 (2): 173–185. 
———. , ed. 2008b. Risk and the War on Terror. London and New York: Routledge. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  233 
Andersson, Ruben. 2014. Illegality, Inc. Oakland, California: University of California 
Press. 
Angermuller, Johannes. 2014. Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis: Subjectivity in 
Enunciative Pragmatics. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Anghie, Antony. 2006. “The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and 
Postcolonial Realities.” Third World Quarterly 27 (5): 739–753. 
ANSA. 2014a. “Alfano: ‘Barche Dei Trafficanti Saranno Distrutte.’” 
http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2014/08/27/immigrati-alfano-incontra-
commissario-ue-malmstroem_6c76fa23-16b1-475a-90fe-6b3224035a8a.html 
[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014b. “Immigrazione: Salvini, Sospendere Subito Mare Nostrum.” 
http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2014/04/21/immigrazione-salvini-
sospendere-subito-mare-nostrum_1274f155-b486-47e4-85a7-
9e3ed4425c02.html [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Apostolova-Englehart, Raia. 2012. “Humanitarian Duty and Security Goals 
Intertwined : The Case of Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programs 
in Bulgaria,” MA dissertation, Central European University. 
Aradau, Claudia. 2004a. “Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and 
Emancipation.” Journal of International Relations and Development 7: 388–413. 
———. 2004b. “The Perverse Politics of Four-Letter Words: Risk and Pity in the 
Securitisation of Human Trafficking.” Millennium - Journal of International 
Studies 33 (2): 251–277. 
———. 2008. Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
———. 2010. “Security That Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of 
Protection.” Security Dialogue 41 (5): 491–514. 
———. 2014. “The Promise of Security: Resilience, Surprise and Epistemic Politics.” 
Resilience 2 (2): 73–87. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  234 
Aradau, Claudia, Martin Coward, Eva Herschinger, Owen D. Thomas, and Nadine 
Voelkner. 2015. “Discourse/Materiality.” In Critical Security Methods: New 
Frameworks of Analysis, edited by Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew W. 
Neal, and Nadine Voelkner, 57–84. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. 
Aradau, Claudia, and Jef Huysmans. 2013. “Critical Methods in International 
Relations: The Politics of Techniques, Devices and Acts.” European Journal of 
International Relations 20 (3): 596–619. 
Aradau, Claudia, Jef Huysmans, Andrew W. Neal, and Nadine Voelkner, ed. 2015a. 
Critical Security Methods: New Frameworks of Analysis. Abingdon and New 
York: Routledge. 
———. 2015b. “Introducing Critical Security Methods.” In Critical Security 
Methods: New Frameworks of Analysis, edited by Claudia Aradau, Jef 
Huysmans, Andrew W. Neal, and Nadine Voelkner, 1–22. Abingdon and New 
York: Routledge. 
Aradau, Claudia, Luis Lobo-Guerrero, and R. Van Munster. 2008. “Security, 
Technologies of Risk, and the Political: Guest Editors’ Introduction.” Security 
Dialogue 39 (2-3): 147–154. 
Aradau, Claudia, and Rens van Munster. 2007. “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: 
Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future.” European Journal of 
International Relations 13 (1): 89–115. 
———. 2008. “Taming the Future: The Dispositif of Risk in the War on Terror.” In 
Risk and the War on Terror, edited by Louise Amoore and Marieke de Goede, 
23–40. London and New York: Routledge. 
———. 2012a. “The Time/Space of Preparedness: Anticipating the ‘Next Terrorist 
Attack.’” Space and Culture 15 (2): 98–109. 
———. 2012b. “The Securitization of Catastrophic Events: Trauma, Enactment, and 
Preparedness Exercises.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 37 (3): 227–239. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  235 
Arendt, Hannah. 1967. “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of 
Man.” In The Origins of Totalitarianism, 267–302. London: World Publishing 
Company. 
Asad, Talad. 2000. “What Do Human Rights Do? An Anthropological Enquiry.” 
Theory & Event, 4(4). 
https://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/theory_and_e
vent/v004/4.4asad.html [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Baldaccini, Anneliese. 2010. “Extraterritorial Border Controls in the EU: The Role of 
Frontex in Operations at Sea.” In Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal 
Challenges, edited by Bernard Ryan and Valsamis Mitsilegas, 229–257. Leiden, 
The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Balibar, Étienne. 2002. Politics and the Other Scene. London: Verso. 
———. 2009. “Europe as Borderland.” Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 27 (2): 190–215. 
———. 2013. “On the Politics of Human Rights.” Constellations 20 (1): 18–26. 
Balzacq, Thierry. 2011. “A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and 
Variants.” In Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and 
Dissolve, edited by Thierry Balzacq, 1–30. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Balzacq, Thierry, Tugba Basaran, Didier Bigo, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet, and 
Christian Olsson. 2010. “Security Practices.” In International Studies 
Encyclopedia Online, edited by Robert A. Denemark. Blackwell Publishing. 
Barnett, Michael N. 2011. Empire of Humanity. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Barroso, José Manuel Durão. 2013a. “Press Release - Statement by President Barroso 
Following His Visit to Lampedusa. European Commission - SPEECH/13/792.” 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-792_en.htm [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  236 
———. 2013b. “Press Release - Speech - Statement by President Barroso Following 
the European Council Meeting.” http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-
13-858_en.htm [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Barry, Brian. 1982. “Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective.” Nomos 24: 219–
252. 
Basaran, Tugba. 2015. “The Saved and the Drowned: Governing Indifference in the 
Name of Security.” Security Dialogue 46 (3): 205–220. 
Baszanger, Isabelle, and Nicolas Dodier. 2004. “Ethnography: Relating the Part to the 
Whole.” In Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice, edited by David 
Silverman, 2nd ed., 9–34. London: Sage Publications. 
Becker, Howard S. 1967. “Whose Side Are We On?” Social Problems 14 (3): 239–
247. 
Berg, Eiki, and Piret Ehin. 2006. “What Kind of Border Regime Is in the Making?: 
Towards a Differentiated and Uneven Border Strategy.” Cooperation and 
Conflict 41 (1): 53–71. 
Bialasiewicz, Luiza. 2011. “Borders, above All?” Political Geography 30 (6): 299–
300. 
———. 2012. “Off-Shoring and Out-Sourcing the Borders of EUrope: Libya and EU 
Border Work in the Mediterranean.” Geopolitics 17 (4): 843–866. 
Bigo, Didier. 2001. “Migration and Security.” In Controlling a New Migration World, 
edited by Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke, 121–149. London: 
Routledge. 
———. 2002a. “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality 
of Unease.” Alternatives 27: 63–92. 
———. 2002b. “Border Regimes, Police Cooperation and Security in an Enlarged 
European Union.” In Europe Unbound. Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries 
of the European Union, edited by J. Zielonka, 213–239. London: Routledge. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  237 
———. 2006. “Internal and External Aspects of Security.” European Security 15 (4): 
385–404. 
———. 2007. “Detention of Foreigners, States of Exception, and the Social Practices 
of Control of the Banopticton.” In Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies and 
Politics at Territory’s Edge, edited by P. K. Rajaram and C. Grundy-Warr, 57–
101. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
———. 2008. “Security: A Field Left Fallow.” In Foucault on Politics, Security, and 
War, edited by Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal, 93–114. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
———. 2011. “Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, 
Practices of Power.” International Political Sociology 5 (3): 225–258. 
———. 2013. “Borders, Mobility and Security.” In A Political Sociology of 
Transnational Europe: ECPR Studies in European Political Sciences, edited by 
Niilo Kauppi, 111–126. Colchester: ECPR Press. 
———. 2014. “The (In)securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border 
Control: Military/Navy - Border Guards/police - Database Analysts.” Security 
Dialogue 45 (3): 209–225. 
Bigo, Didier, Julien Jeandesboz, Francesco Ragazzi, and Philippe Bonditti. 2011. 
“Border and Security: The Different Logics of Surveillance in Europe.” In The 
Others in Europe: Legal and Social Categorization in Context, edited by Saskia 
Bonjour, Andrea Rea, and Dirk Jacobs, 1 – 30. Brussels: ULB Press. 
Bommes, Michael, and Dietrich Thränhardt. 2012. “National Paradigms of Migration 
Research.” In Immigration and Social Systems: Collected Essays of Michael 
Bommes, edited by Christina Boswell and Gianni D’Amato, 201–231. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Booth, Ken. 1991. “Security and Emancipation.” Review of International Studies 17 
(4): 313–326. 
———. 2007. Theory of World Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  238 
Boswell, Christina. 2007. “Migration Control in Europe After 9/11: Explaining the 
Absence of Securitization.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 45 (3): 
589–610. 
———. 2008. “Evasion, Reinterpretation and Decoupling: European Commission 
Responses to the ‘External Dimension’ of Immigration and Asylum.” West 
European Politics 31 (3): 491–512. 
———. 2009. The Political Uses of Expert Knowledge: Immigration Policy and 
Social Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bourbeau, Philippe. 2014. “Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation 
Process.” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 43 (1): 187–206. 
Boxenbaum, Eva, and Stefan Jonsson. 2008. “Isomorphism, Diffusion and 
Decoupling.” In The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, edited 
by Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Roy Suddaby, and Kerstin Sahlin, 78–
99. London: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Braithwaite, Phoebe. 2016. “From ‘migrant’ to ‘refugee’, Our Vocabulary Has Run 
Dry.” openDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-
it/phoebe-braithwaite/from-migrant-to-refugee-vocabulary-has-run-dry [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Brassett, James, and Nick Vaughan-Williams. 2012. “Crisis Is Governance: Sub-
Prime, the Traumatic Event, and Bare Life.” Global Society 26 (1): 19–42. 
———. 2015. “Security and the Performative Politics of Resilience: Critical 
Infrastructure Protection and Humanitarian Emergency Preparedness.” Security 
Dialogue 46 (1): 32–50. 
Bröckling, Ulrich, Susanne Krasmann, and Thomas Lemke. 2011. “An Introduction.” 
In Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges, edited by Ulrich 
Bröckling, Susanne Krasmann, and Thomas Lemke, 1–33. New York; Oxford: 
Routledge. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  239 
Brown, Wendy. 2004. “‘The Most We Can Hope For...’: Human Rights and the 
Politics of Fatalism.” South Atlantic Quarterly 103 (2/3): 451–463. 
Browning, Christopher S., and Matt McDonald. 2011. “The Future of Critical Security 
Studies: Ethics and the Politics of Security.” European Journal of International 
Relations 19 (2): 235–255. 
Brunsson, Nils. 1989. The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions and Actions in 
Organizations. New York: John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 
Buckel, Sonja, and Jens Wissel. 2010. “State Project Europe: The Transformation of 
the European Border Regime and the Production of Bare Life.” International 
Political Sociology 4: 33–49. 
Bueger, Christian, and Manuel Mireanu. 2015. “Proximity.” In Critical Security 
Methods: New Frameworks of Analysis, edited by Claudia Aradau, Jef 
Huysmans, Andrew W. Neal, and Nadine Voelkner, 118–141. Abingdon and 
New York: Routledge. 
Butler, Judith. 1993. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” New 
York and London: Routledge. 
Buzan, Barry, and Ole Wæver. 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structure of 
International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
c.a.s.e. Collective. 2006. “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked 
Manifesto.” Security Dialogue 37 (4): 443–487. 
Caldwell, Anne. 2004. “Bio-Sovereignty and the Emergence of Humanity.” Theory & 
Event 7 (2). 
Calhoun, Craig J. 2010. “The Idea of Emergency: Humanitarian Action and Global 
(Dis)Order.” In Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and 
Humanitarian Interventions, edited by Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi, 29–
58. New York: Zone Books. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  240 
Campesi, Giuseppe. 2014. “Frontex, the Euro-Mediterranean Border and the 
Paradoxes of Humanitarian Rhetoric.” South East European Journal of Political 
Science 2 (3): 126–134. 
Caritas. 2012. “Caritas Europa’s Comments on the Inquiry on Frontex.” 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/11950/htm
l.bookmark [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Carrera, Sergio. 2007. “The EU Border Management Strategy: FRONTEX and the 
Challenges of Irregular Immigration in the Canary Islands.” CEPS Working 
Document. Brussels: CEPS. http://www.ceps.eu/book/eu-border-management-
strategy-frontex-and-challenges-irregular-immigration-canary-islands [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Carrera, Sergio, Leonhard Den Hertog, and Joanna Parkin. 2012. “EU Migration 
Policy in the Wake of the Arab Spring What Prospects for EU-Southern 
Mediterranean Relations ?” Technical Report. 
https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eu-migration-policy-wake-arab-spring-what-
prospects-eu-southern-mediterranean-relations [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Casas-Cortes, Maribel, Sebastian Cobarrubias, Nicholas P. De Genova, Glenda 
Garelli, Giorgio Grappi, Charles Heller, Sabine Hess, et al. 2015. “New 
Keywords: Migration and Borders.” Cultural Studies 29 (1): 55–87. 
Cholewinksi, Ryszard. 2004. “European Union Policy on Irregular Migration: Human 
Rights Lost?” In Irregular Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical, European 
and International Perspectives, edited by Barbara Bogusz, Ryszard Cholewinksi, 
Adam Cygan, and Erika Szyszczak, 159–192. Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers. 
Ciutǎ, Felix. 2009. “Security and the Problem of Context: A Hermeneutical Critique 
of Securitisation Theory.” Review of International Studies 35 (2): 301. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  241 
Cohn, Carol. 2006. “Motives and Methods: Using Multi-Sited Ethnography to Study 
US National Security Discourses.” In Feminist Methodologies for International 
Relations, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True, 91–107. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cornell, Drucilla. 2014. “Fanon Today.” In The Meaning of Rights: The Philosophy 
and Social Theory of Human Rights, edited by Costas Douzinas and Conor 
Gearty, 121–136. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Corry, Olaf. 2012. “Securitisation and ‘Riskification’: Second-Order Security and the 
Politics of Climate Change.” Millenium - Journal of International Studies 40 (2): 
235–258. 
Cote-Boucher, K., F. Infantino, and Mark B. Salter. 2014. “Border Security as 
Practice: An Agenda for Research.” Security Dialogue 45 (3): 195–208. 
Cuttitta, Paolo. 2010. “Das Europäische Grenzregime: Dynamiken Und 
Wechselwirkungen.” In Grenzregime: Diskurse, Praktiken, Institutionen in 
Europa, edited by Sabine Hess and Bernd Kasparek, 2nd ed., 23–40. Hamburg 
and Berlin: Assoziation A. 
———. 2013. “Kriminalität, Krisenkonstruktion Und Das Narrativ Der 
Migrationskontrolle an Der EU-Grenze. Lampedusa Zwischen Härte Und 
Menschlichkeit.” In Kriminalität Und (Straf-)Recht Im Zeichen Politischer Und 
Wirtschaftlicher Krisen, edited by Susanne Krasmann. Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblodt. 
———. 2014. “‘Borderizing’ the Island: Setting and Narratives of the Lampedusa 
‘Border Play.’” ACME 13 (2): 196–219. 
De Genova, Nicholas P. 2002. “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Everyday 
Life.” Annual Review of Anthropology 31 (1): 419–447. 
———. 2010. “Alien Powers: Deportable Labour and the Spectacle of Security.” In 
The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity, edited by Vicki 
Squire, 91–115. New York: Routledge. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  242 
———. 2013a. “‘We Are of the Connections’: Migration, Methodological 
Nationalism, and ‘militant Research.’” Postcolonial Studies 16 (3): 250–258. 
———. 2013b. “Spectacles of Migrant ‘Illegality’: The Scene of Exclusion, the 
Obscene of Inclusion.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36 (7): 1180–1198. 
de Goede, Marieke, and Samuel Randalls. 2009. “Precaution, Preemption: Arts and 
Technologies of the Actionable Future.” Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space 27 (5): 859–878. 
de Goede, Marieke, S. Simon, and M. Hoijtink. 2014. “Performing Preemption.” 
Security Dialogue 45 (5): 411–422. 
Dery, David. 1986. “Knowledge and Organizations.” Policy Studies Review 6 (1): 14–
25. 
DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1991a. “Introduction.” In The New 
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, edited by Paul J. DiMaggio and 
Walter W. Powell, 1–40. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 1991b. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective 
Rationality in Organizational Fields.” In The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis, edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, 63–
82. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Dines, Nick, Nicola Montagna, and Vincenzo Ruggiero. 2015. “Thinking Lampedusa: 
Border Construction, the Spectacle of Bare Life and the Productivity of 
Migrants.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 38 (3): 430–445. 
Donnelly, Jack. 2007. “The Relative Universality of Human Rights.” Human Rights 
Quarterly 29 (2): 281–306. 
Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 2007. “States of Exception on the Mexico?U.S. Border: 
Security, ‘Decisions,’ and Civilian Border Patrols.” International Political 
Sociology 1 (2): 113–137. 
———. 2010. “Autoethnography – Making Human Connections.” Review of 
International Studies 36 (4): 1047–1050. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  243 
Douzinas, Costas. 2007. Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of 
Cosmopolitanism. Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish. 
Douzinas, Costas, and Conor Gearty. 2014. “Introduction.” In The Meaning of Rights: 
The Philosophy and Social Theory of Human Rights, edited by Costas Douzinas 
and Conor Gearty, 1–11. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Duffield, Mark. 2010. “The Liberal Way of Development and the Development--
Security Impasse: Exploring the Global Life-Chance Divide.” Security Dialogue 
41 (1): 53–76. 
Düvell, Franck, Anna Triandafyllidou, and Bastian Vollmer. 2009. “Ethical Issues in 
Irregular Migration Research in Europe.” Population, Space and Place 16: 227–
239. 
Edkins, Jenny. 2000. “Sovereign Power, Zones of Indistinction, and the Camp.” 
Global, Local, Political 25: 3–25. 
———. 2003. “Humanitarianism, Humanity, Human.” Journal of Human Rights 2 
(2): 253–258. 
Ekelund, Helena. 2014. “The Establishment of FRONTEX: A New Institutionalist 
Approach.” Journal of European Integration 36 (2): 99–116. 
Elden, Stuart. 2010. “Thinking Territory Historically.” Geopolitics 15 (4): 757–761. 
European Commission. 2002. “Towards Integrated Management of the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union, COM(2002) 233 Final.” 
Brussels. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0233:FIN:EN:PDF 
[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2003. “Proposal for a Council Regulation Establishing a European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Co-Operation at the External Borders - 
COM(2003) 687 final/2.” Brussels. 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2003/EN/1-2003-687-EN-F2-
1.Pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  244 
———. 2011a. “The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, COM(2011) 743 
Final.” Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/news/intro/docs/1_EN_ACT_part1_v9.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 
2016]. 
———. 2011b. “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Establishing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), 
COM(2011) 873 Final.” Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/pdf/eurosur_final.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011c. “Statement by Commissioner Malmström Announcing the Launch of 
the Frontex Operation ‘Hermes’ in Italy as of 20 February 2011.” Press Release. 
Brussels. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-98_en.htm [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011d. “The European Commission’s Response to the Migratory Flows from 
North Africa.” Press Release. Brussels. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-11-226_en.htm [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2013. “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council on the Work of the Task Force Mediterranean, COM(213) 869 Final.” 
Brussels. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/1041481 [Last accessed August 
7, 2016]. 
———. 2014a. “Implementation of the Communication on the Work of the Task Force 
Mediterranean, SWD(2014) 173 Final, Part 2/2.” Brussels. 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/legal-
migration/general/docs/sdw_implementation_of_the_communication_on_the_w
ork_of_the_task_force_mediterranean_part_2_en.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 
2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  245 
———. 2014b. “Visit of Angelino Alfano, Italian Minister for the Interior and 
President in Office of the Council of the EU, to Cecilia Malmström: Joint Press 
Conference.” Brussels. 
http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player.cfm?sitelang=en&ref=I092070 [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014c. “Frontex Joint Operation ‘Triton’ – Concerted Efforts to Manage 
Migration in the Central Mediterranean.” Press Release. Brussels. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-566_en.htm [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2015a. “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 




[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2015b. “A European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 Final.” Brussels. 
http://ec.europa.eu/lietuva/documents/power_pointai/communication_on_the_e
uropean_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2015c. “The Hotspot Approach to Managing Exceptional Migratory Flows.” 
Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-
agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_hotspots_en.pdf [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2015d. “A European Border and Coast Guard.” Brussels. 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-
borders/fact-sheets/docs/a_european_border_and_coast_guard_en.pdf [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2015e. “European Agenda on Migration: Securing Europe’s External 
Borders.” Brussels. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-
6332_en.htm [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  246 
———. 2016a. “Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control.” Brussels. 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control/index_en.htm [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2016b. “Implementing the European Agenda on Migration: Commission 
Reports on Progress in Greece, Italy and the Western Balkans.” Press Release. 
Brussels. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-269_en.htm [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 




_en.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 




_en.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
European Council. 2001. “Presidency Conclusions of the Laeken European Council 
Meeting, SN300/1/01 REV 1.” Brussels. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/pdf-1993-
2003/european-council-meeting-in-laeken--presidency-conclusions-14-15-
december-2001/ [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2002. “Plan for the Management of the External Borders of the Member States 
of the European Union - 10019/02.” http://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/funding/2004_2007/docs/plan_management_external_borders.pdf [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  247 
———. 2003. “Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki European Council 19/20 June 
2003 - 11638/03.” 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/76279.p
df [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2004. “Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 Establishing a European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
of the Member States of the European Union.” http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004R2007&from=EN [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2015. “Special Meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015 - Statement.” 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/04/23-special-
euco-statement/ [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
European Ombudsman. 2012. “European Ombudsman Invites Observations from 
Interested Parties Concerning His Own-Initiative Inquiry into the Implementation 
by Frontex of Its Fundamental Rights Obligations.” 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/11757/htm
l.bookmark [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2013. “Decision of the European Ombudsman Closing Own-Initiative Inquiry 
OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ Concerning the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union (Frontex).” 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/decision.faces/en/52477/html.book
mark [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
European Parliament. 2004. “Report on the Proposal for a Council Regulation 
Establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-
Operation at the External Borders (COM(2003) 687 – C5‑0613/2003 – 
2003/0273(CNS)).” http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A5-2004-0093+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN#top [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  248 
———. 2010. “European Parliament Resolution of 17 June 2010 on Executions in 
Libya - P7_TA(2010)0246.” 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-
2010-0246&language=EN [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011. “Frontex Border Guard Teams and Fundamental Rights.” 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/de/news-
room/content/20110622IPR22352/html/Frontex-border-guard-teams-and-
fundamental-rights [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2015a. “EP after the Lisbon Treaty: Bigger Role in Shaping Europe.” 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00008/The-
Lisbon-Treaty [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2015b. “Resolution on the Latest Tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU 
Migration and Asylum Policies, 2015/2660(RSP).” 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&referen
ce=2015/2660(RSP) [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
European Parliament and Council. 2007. “Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 Establishing a 
Mechanism for the Creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and Amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as Regards That Mechanism and 
Regulati.” http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Legal_basis/rabit_regulation-863-
2007.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011. “Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
COuncil of 25 October 2011 Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 
Establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member.” http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32011R1168 [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  249 
———. 2013. “Regulation (EU) 604/2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms 
for Determining the Member State Responsibile for Examining an Application 
for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-
Country National or a Stateless Person.” http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:180:0031:0059:EN:P
DF [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
European Union. 2000. “EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.” 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Fairclough, Norman. 1992. Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge, UK and 
Malden, USA: Polity Press. 
Fassin, Didier. 2007a. “Humanitarianism: A Nongovernmental Government.” In 
Nongovernmental Politics, edited by Michel Feher, 149–159. New York: Zone 
Books. 
———. 2007b. “Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life.” Public Culture 19 (3): 499–
520. 
———. 2010a. “Moral Commitments and Ethical Dilemmas of Humanitarianism.” In 
In the Name of Humanity: The Government of Threat and Care, edited by Ilana 
Feldman and Miriam Ticktin, 238–255. Durham and London: Duke University 
Press. 
———. 2010b. “Heart of Humaneness.” In Contemporary States of Emergency: The 
Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions, edited by Didier Fassin and 
Mariella Pandolfi, 269–293. New York: Zone Books. 
———. 2011. “Policing Borders, Producing Boundaries: The Governmentality of 
Immigration in Dark Times.” Annual Review of Anthropology 40 (1): 213–226. 
———. 2012. Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  250 
Fassin, Didier, and Mariella Pandolfi, ed. 2010. Contemporary States of Emergency. 
New York: Zone Books. 
Feldman, Gregory. 2012. The Migration Apparatus: Security, Labor, and 
Policymaking in the European Union. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Fierke, Karin M. 2015. Critical Approaches to International Security. 2nd ed. 
Cambridge, UK and Malden, USA: Polity Press. 
Fischer, Frank, and John Forester. 1993. “Editors’ Introduction.” In The 
Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, edited by Frank Fischer 
and John Forester, 1–19. London: UCL Press. 
Floyd, Rita. 2007. “Towards a Consequentialist Evaluation of Security: Bringing 
Together the Copenhagen and the Welsh Schools of Security Studies.” Review of 
International Studies 33 (2): 327–350. 
———. 2008. “Human Security and the Copenhagen School’s Securitization 
Approach: Conceptualizing Human Security as a Securitizing Move.” Human 
Security Journal 5: 38–49. 
———. 2011. “Can Securitization Theory Be Used in Normative Analysis? Towards 
a Just Securitization Theory.” Security Dialogue 42 (4-5): 427–439. 
Flyvbjerg, B. 2006. “Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research.” 
Qualitative Inquiry 12 (2): 219–245. 
Foucault, Michel. 1972. The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on 
Language. New York: Pantheon Books. 
———. 1982. “The Subject and Power.” Critical Inquiry 8 (4): 777–795. 
———. 1991. “Governmentality.” In The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, 
87–104. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 1997. Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth: The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-
1984. Edited by Paul Rabinow. New York: The New Press. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  251 
———. 2003. “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-
76. Edited by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana. New York: Picador. 
———. 2009. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 
1977--1978. Edited by Arnold I. Davidson. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
FRA. 2010. “Frontex Signs Cooperation Arrangement with the Fundamental Rights 
Agency.” http://fra.europa.eu/en/press-release/2010/fra-frontex-signs-
cooperation-arrangement-fundamental-rights-agency [Last accessed August 7, 
2016]. 
Freeman, Richard. 2006. “The Work the Document Does: Research, Policy, and 
Equity in Health.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 31 (1): 51–70. 
Freeman, Richard, and Jo Maybin. 2011. “Documents, Practices and Policy.” Evidence 
and Policy 7 (2): 155–170. 
Frontex. 2006a. “HERA II Operation to Be Prolonged.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/hera-ii-operation-to-be-prolonged-iWMEF9 [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2006b. “General Report 2005.” Warsaw. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_
report/2005/general_report_2005_en1.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2006c. “Longest FRONTEX Coordinated Operation – HERA, the Canary 
Islands.” News. http://frontex.europa.eu/news/longest-frontex-coordinated-
operation-hera-the-canary-islands-WpQlsc [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2007a. “Europe and You in 2006 – A Snapshot of EU Achievements.” 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/europe-and-you-in-2006-a-snapshot-of-eu-
achievements-NMzH30 [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2007b. “European Patrols Network.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/european-patrols-network--Weca9H [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  252 
———. 2007c. “European Patrols Network and Centralised Record of Available 
Technical Equipment to Be Presented at Tomorrow’s JHA Council.” 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/european-patrols-network-and-centralised-record-
of-available-technical-equipment-to-be-presented-at-tomorrow-s-jha-council-
O1bOgX [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2007d. “General Report 2006.” Warsaw. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_
report/2006/annual_report_20061.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2007e. “Rapid Border Intervention Teams First Time in Action.” 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/rapid-border-intervention-teams-first-time-in-
action-btjSw0 [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2007f. “Frontex New Premises Just Opened.” 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-new-premises-just-opened-WgUAyv 
[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2007g. “Frontex - Facts and Myths.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-facts-and-myths-BYxkX5 [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2007h. “A Sequel of Operation Hera Just Starting.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/a-sequel-of-operation-hera-just-starting-uy631h 
[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2007i. “Hera III Operation.” News. http://frontex.europa.eu/news/hera-iii-
operation-It9SH3 [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2007j. “Frontex-Led EU Illegal Immigration Technical Mission to Libya, 28 
May - 5 June 2007.” http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/oct/eu-libya-frontex-
report.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  253 
———. 2008a. “General Report 2007.” Warsaw. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_
report/2007/frontex_general_report_2007_final.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 
2016]. 
———. 2008b. “Frontex - UNHCR: Reinforced Cooperation.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-unhcr-reinforced-cooperation-a0Yf4h 
[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2009. “General Report 2008.” Warsaw. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_
report/2008/frontex_general_report_2008.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2010a. “Frontex Estimates Illegal Border Crossings on the Greek Turkish 
Border Have Diminished by 44% by the End of November.” 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-estimates-illegal-border-crossings-on-the-
greek-turkish-border-have-diminished-by-44-by-the-end-of-november-zM59Oo 
[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2010b. “General Report 2009.” Warsaw. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_
report/2009/gen_rep_2009_en.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2010c. “Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis (Public Version).” 
frontex.europa.eu/assets/Attachments_News/wb_ara_.pdf [Last accessed August 
7, 2016]. 
———. 2010d. “Extract from the Annual Risk Analysis 2010.” 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_
Analysis_2010.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2010e. “FRAN Quarterly Issue 2, April - June 2010.” Warsaw. 
frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q2_2010.pdf [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  254 
———. 2010f. “FRAN Quarterly Update Issue 1, January-March, 2010.” 
frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q1_2010.pdf [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2010g. “Papoutsis, Besson, Malmström and Laitinen Visit RABIT 
Operational Area.” News. http://frontex.europa.eu/news/papoutsis-besson-
malmstrom-and-laitinen-visit-rabit-operational-area-jkKZi9 [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2010h. “Frontex Operational Office Opens in Piraeus.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-operational-office-opens-in-piraeus-
hk4q3Z [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011a. “Frontex R&D UAV Workshop and Demo 2011 - Call for Expressions 
of Interest.” http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-r-d-uav-workshop-and-demo-
2011-call-for-expressions-of-interest-EDouHq [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011b. “General Report 2010.” Warsaw. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_
report/2010/frontex_general_report_2010.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011c. “FRAN Quarterly Issue 3, July-September 2010.” 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q3_2010.pdf 
[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011d. “Annual Risk Analysis 2011.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/annual-risk-analysis-2011-uGgHEQ [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011e. “Press Statement on Sudden Increased Migratory Situation in 
Lampedusa.” News. http://frontex.europa.eu/news/press-statement-on-sudden-
increased-migratory-situation-in-lampedusa-YkbG1a [Last accessed August 7, 
2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  255 
———. 2011f. “Request for Help over Migratory Pressure in Lampedusa.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/request-for-help-over-migratory-pressure-in-
lampedusa-0H2ukS [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011g. “Hermes 2011 Starts Tomorrow in Lampedusa.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/hermes-2011-starts-tomorrow-in-lampedusa-
X4XZcr [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011h. “Hermes 2011 Running.” Warsaw: Frontex. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/hermes-2011-running-T7bJgL [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011i. “Frontex Guest Officers Sent to Work in Italy.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-guest-officers-sent-to-work-in-italy-
URXwE0 [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011j. “Hermes Operation Extended.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/hermes-operation-extended-OWmwti [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011k. “Update to Joint Operation Hermes 2011.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/update-to-joint-operation-hermes-2011-7DIILz 
[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011l. “Update to Joint Operation Poseidon 2011.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/update-to-joint-operation-poseidon-2011-jzZfWV 
[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011m. “Programme of Work 2011.” Warsaw. 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/W
ork_programme/2011/fx_pow_2011.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011n. “Management Board Endorses Frontex Fundamental Rights Strategy.” 
News. http://frontex.europa.eu/news/management-board-endorses-frontex-
fundamental-rights-strategy-KxtacI [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  256 
———. 2011o. “RABIT Operation - Situational Update.” 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/rabit-operation-situational-update-pwIcR8 [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2011p. “Poseidon 2011: Migrants Smugglers Open Fire on Border Guards.” 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/poseidon-2011-migrants-smugglers-open-fire-on-
border-guards-ZpmqYU [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2012a. “Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights Elects Chairpersons at 
Inaugural Meeting.” News. http://frontex.europa.eu/news/consultative-forum-on-
fundamental-rights-elects-chairpersons-at-inaugural-meeting-LEmmP6 [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2012b. “General Report 2011.” Warsaw. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_
report/2011/General_Report_2011.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2012c. “Frontex’s Response to Ombusman Own-Initiative Inquiry.” 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/showResource?resourceId=1342511806022_
OI-5-2012-BEH-MHZ-S2012-158110_p3-
61.pdf&type=pdf&download=true&lang=en [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2012d. “Frontex Responds to the European Ombudsman.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-responds-to-the-european-ombudsman-
8oCMDO [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2012e. “JO Hermes – Situational Update.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/jo-hermes-situational-update-SKGo7W [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2012f. “Greek-Turkish Land Border JO Poseidon Land: Situational Update, 
January 2012.” http://frontex.europa.eu/news/greek-turkish-land-border-jo-
poseidon-land-situational-update-january-2012-tXUqGg [Last accessed August 
7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  257 
———. 2013a. “Sea.” http://www.frontex.europa.eu/operations/types-of-
operations/sea [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2013b. “Annual Risk Analysis 2013.” Warsaw. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analy
sis_2013.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2013c. “European Sectoral Qualifications Framework for Border Guarding.” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mSyZwGnhLiw [Last accessed August 7, 
2016]. 
———. 2013d. “Beyond Borders.” Poland: Youtube. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=3&v=6ylKQ1L65ZM [Last accessed August 
7, 2016]. 
———. 2013e. “General Report 2012.” Warsaw. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_
report/2012/EN_General_Report_2012.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2013f. “Update on Central Mediterranean Route.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/update-on-central-mediterranean-route-5wQPyW 
[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2013g. “EUROSUR Panel Discussion at ED4BG 2013.” Poland. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ns9gHa3l5zg&list=PL_d1T8plJFX7ImBzsj
AnjTk5v9P1Z4gTs&index=2 [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014a. “Irregular Arrivals Were at Record High in the Third Quarter of 2013.” 
News. http://frontex.europa.eu/news/irregular-arrivals-were-at-record-high-in-
the-third-quarter-of-2013-qZCQJR [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014b. “General Report 2013.” Warsaw. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_
report/2013/General_Report_EN.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  258 
———. 2014c. “Frontex Risk Analysis Report for Q1 2014 Published.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-risk-analysis-report-for-q1-2014-
published-LyEPZo [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014d. “Frontex Launches Call for Participation of the EU Member States in 
Joint Operation Triton.” News. http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-launches-
call-for-participation-of-the-eu-member-states-in-joint-operation-triton-b9nupQ 
[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014e. “More Technical Support Needed for Operation Triton.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/more-technical-support-needed-for-operation-
triton-IKo5CG [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014f. “Frontex Launches Joint Operation Triton.” News. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-launches-joint-operation-triton-JSYpL7 
[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014g. “Concept of Reinforced Joint Operation Tackling the Migratory Flows 
towards Italy : JO EPN-Triton to Better Control Irregular Migration and 
Contribute to SAR in the Mediterranean Sea.” Warsaw. 
https://www.proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/JOU_Concept_on_EPN-
TRITON__2_.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014h. “Frontex Publishes Eastern European Borders Annual Risk Analysis 
2014.” News. http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-publishes-eastern-european-
borders-annual-risk-analysis-2014-8pfjcb [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014i. “Frontex Publishes Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2014.” 
News. http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-publishes-western-balkans-annual-
risk-analysis-2014-fnd3Eh [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014j. “People Smugglers: The Latter Day Slave Merchants.” Feature Story. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/feature-stories/people-smugglers-the-latter-day-slave-
merchants-UArKn1 [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  259 
———. 2015. “General Report 2014.” Warsaw. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/Governance_documents/Annual_
report/2014/General_Report_2014.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights. 2013. “Annual Report.” Warsaw. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Partners/Consultative_Forum_files/Frontex_Con
sultative_Forum_annual_report_2013.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2015. “Second Annual Report.” Warsaw. 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Partners/Consultative_Forum_files/Frontex_Con
sultative_Forum_annual_report_2014.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Garelli, Glenda, and Martina Tazzioli. 2013a. “Challenging the Discipline of 
Migration: Militant Research in Migration Studies, an Introduction.” 
Postcolonial Studies 16 (3): 245–249. 
———. 2013b. “Migration Discipline Hijacked: Distances and Interruptions of a 
Research Militancy.” Postcolonial Studies 16 (3): 299–308. 
———. 2013c. “Double Opening, Split Temporality, and New Spatialities: An 
Interview with Sandro Mezzadra on ‘militant Research.’” Postcolonial Studies 
16 (3): 309–319. 
Gearty, Conor. 2014. “Human Rights: The Necessary Quest for Foundations.” In The 
Meaning of Rights: The Philosophy and Social Theory of Human Rights, edited 
by Costas Douzinas and Conor Gearty, 16–38. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gilroy, Paul. 2014. “Race and the Value of the Human.” In The Meaning of Rights: 
The Philosophy and Social Theory of Human Rights, edited by Costas Douzinas 
and Conor Gearty, 137–158. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Gioia, Dennis A., and Henry P. Sims. 1986. “Introduction: Social Cognition in 
Organizations.” In The Thinking Organization, edited by Henry P. Sims, Dennis 
A. Gioia, and Associates, 1–19. San Francisco and London: Jossey-Bass. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  260 
Gouldner, Alvin W. 1973. “The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare 
State.” In For Sociology: Renewal and Critique in Sociology Today, 27–68. 
London: Allen Lane. 
Grappi, Giorgio. 2013. “Three Problems without a Solution: The Militant Research 
Conundrum and the Social Condition of Migration.” Postcolonial Studies 16 (3): 
320–327. 
Greenwood, Royston, Christine Oliver, Kerstin Sahlin, and Roy Suddaby. 2008. 
“Introduction.” In The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, 
edited by Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Kerstin Sahlin, and Roy 
Suddaby, 1–46. London: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Guild, Elspeth, and Didier Bigo. 2010. “The Transformation of European Border 
Controls.” In Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges, edited by 
Bernard Ryan and Valsamis Mitsilegas, 257–278. Leiden, The Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Guillaume, Xavier. 2013. “Criticality.” In Research Methods in Critical Security 
Studies: An Introduction, edited by Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu, 29–32. New 
York: Routledge. 
Guiraudon, Virginie. 2000. “European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical 
Policy-Making as Venue Shopping.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 
38 (2): 251–271. 
———. 2003. “The Constitution of a European Immigration Policy Domain: A 
Political Sociology Approach.” Journal of European Public Policy 10 (2): 263–
282. 
Guiraudon, Virginie, and Gallya Lahav. 2000. “A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty 
Debate: The Case of Migration Control.” Comparative Political Studies 33 (2): 
163–195. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  261 
Hajer, Maarten A. 1993. “Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalization of Practice: 
The Case of Acid Rain in Great Britain.” In The Argumentative Turn in Policy 
Analysis and Planning, edited by Frank Fischer and John Forester, 43–76. 
London: UCL Press. 
Hans, Barbara. 2009. “Urteil Im Cap-Anamur-Prozess: Freispruch Für Den 
Einzelkämpfer.” SPIEGEL Online. 
http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/gesellschaft/urteil-im-cap-anamur-prozess-
freispruch-fuer-den-einzelkaempfer-a-653762.html [Last accessed August 7, 
2016]. 
Hansen, Lene. 2000. “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence 
of Gender in the Copenhagen School.” Millennium - Journal of International 
Studies 29 (2): 285–306. 
———. 2006. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. London 
and New York: Routledge. 
Hansen, Peo, and Stefan Jonsson. 2011. “Demographic Colonialism: EU–African 
Migration Management and the Legacy of Eurafrica.” Globalizations 8 (3): 261–
276. 
———. 2012. “Imperial Origins of European Integration and the Case of Eurafrica: A 
Reply to Gary Marks’'Europe and Its Empires'.” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 50 (6): 1028–1041. 
———. 2014. Eurafrica. London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
Hess, Sabine. 2012. “De-Naturalising Transit Migration. Theory and Methods of An 
Ethnographic Regime Analysis.” Population, Space and Place 18: 428–440. 
Hess, Sabine, and Vassilis Tsianos. 2007. “Europeanizing Transnationalism! 
Provincializing Europe!” In Turbulente Ränder. Neue Perspektiven Auf 
Migration an Den Grenzen Europas, edited by Transit Migration 
Forschungsgruppe, 23–38. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  262 
Hobbing, Peter. 2010. “The Management of the EU’s External Borders: From the 
Customs Union to Frontex and E-Borders.” In The Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice Ten Years On: Successes and Future Challenges under the Stockholm 
Programme, edited by Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera, and Alejandro 
Eggenschwiler, 63–72. Brussels: CEPS. 
Horii, S. 2012. “It Is about More than Just Training: The Effect of Frontex Border 
Guard Training.” Refugee Survey Quarterly 31 (4): 158–177. 
Horsti, Karina. 2012. “Humanitarian Discourse Legitimating Migration Control: 
FRONTEX Public Communication.” In Migrations: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives, edited by Michi Messer, Renee Schroeder, and Ruth Wodak, 297–
308. Vienna: Springer Vienna. 
Hristova, Tsvetelina, Raia Apostolova, Neda Deneva, and Mathias Fiedler. 2014. 
“Trapped in Europe’s Quagmire: The Situation of Asylum Seekers and Refugees 
in Bulgaria.” http://bulgaria.bordermonitoring.eu/files/2014/07/Hristova-et.al-
Trapped-in-Europes-Quagmire.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Human Rights Watch. 2005. “World Report 2005.” New York. 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k5/wr2005.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2008. “Stuck in a Revolving Door: Iraqis and Other Asylum Seekers and 
Migrants at the Greece / Turkey Entrance to the European Union.” 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/greeceturkey1108web_0.pdf [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2009a. “Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s Forced Return of Boat 
Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Libya's Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum 
Seeker.” New York. www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/italy0909web_0.pdf 
[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2009b. “Greece: Escalating Risks for Migrants, Unaccompanied Children.” 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/10/12/greece-escalating-risks-migrants-
unaccompanied-children [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  263 
———. 2011. “The EU’s Dirty Hands: Frontex Involvement in Ill-Treatment of 
Migrant Detainees in Greece.” Brussels. 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/09/21/eu-s-dirty-hands-0 [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2012a. “Hidden Emergency.” http://www.hrw.org/node/109445 [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2012b. “European Ombudsman’s Own-Initiative Inquiry into the 
Implementation by Frontex of Its Fundamental Rights Obligations.” 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/11949/htm
l.bookmark [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Huysmans, Jef. 1998a. “Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick 
Signifier.” European Journal of International Relations 4 (2): 226–255. 
———. 1998b. “Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a 
Security Studies Agenda in Europe.” European Journal of International 
Relations 4 (4): 479–505. 
———. 2000. “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration.” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 38 (5): 751–777. 
———. 2004. “Minding Exceptions: The Politics of Insecurity and Liberal 
Democracy.” Contemporary Political Theory 3 (3): 321–341. 
———. 2006a. The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration & Asylum in the EU. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
———. 2006b. “International Politics of Exception: Competing Visions of 
International Political Order between Law and Politics.” Alternatives: Global, 
Local, Political 31 (2): 135–165. 
———. 2008. “The Jargon of Exception - On Schmitt, Agamben and the Absence of 
Political Society.” International Political Sociology 2 (2): 165–183. 
———. 2011. “What’s in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security 
Nothings.” Security Dialogue 42 (4-5): 371–383. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  264 
———. 2014. Security Unbound: Enacting Democratic Limits. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Huysmans, Jef, and Alessandra Buonfino. 2008. “Politics of Exception and Unease: 
Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism in Parliamentary Debates in the UK.” 
Political Studies 56 (4): 766–788. 
Huysmans, Jef, and Vicki Squire. 2009. “Migration and Security.” In Handbook of 
Security Studies, edited by Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer. London: 
Routledge. 
ICRC. 2015. “Red Cross Red Crescent Mediterranean Platform on Migration Calls to 
Stop Labelling People on the Move as ‘illegal’ | International Committee of the 
Red Cross.” ICRC. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/red-cross-red-crescent-
mediterranean-platform-migration-calls-stop-labelling-people-move [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Ioannides, Isabelle, and Matteo Tondini. 2010. “Ethical Security in Europe? Empirical 
Findings on Value Shifts and Dilemmas Across European Internal-External 
Security Policies.” INEX Research Project. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1812907 [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
IOM. 2016. “Missing Migrants Project - Latest Global Figures.” 
http://missingmigrants.iom.int/ [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Jacoby, Tami. 2006. “From the Trenches: Dilemmas of Feminist IR Fieldwork.” In 
Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, edited by Brooke A. 
Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True, 153–173. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Jeandesboz, Julien. 2011. “Beyond the Tartar Steppe: EUROSUR and the Ethics of 
European Border Control Practices.” In A Threat Against Europe? Security, 
Migration and Integration, 111–132. Brussels: VUBPress. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  265 
Jeandesboz, Julien, and Polly Pallister-Wilkins. 2014. “Crisis, Enforcement and 
Control at the EU Borders.” In Crisis and Migration: Critical Perspectives, edited 
by Anna Lindley, 115–135. London and New York: Routledge. 
———. 2016. “Crisis, Routine, Consolidation: The Politics of the Mediterranean 
Migration Crisis.” Mediterranean Politics 21 (2): 316–320. 
Jesuit Refugee Service. 2012. “Your Own-Initiative Inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ 
Concerning Implementation by Frontex of Its Fundamental Rights Obligations.” 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/11948/htm
l.bookmark [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Johnson, Corey, Reece Jones, Anssi Paasi, Louise Amoore, Alison Mountz, Mark B. 
Salter, and Chris Rumford. 2011. “Interventions on Rethinking ‘the Border’ in 
Border Studies.” Political Geography 30 (2): 61–69. 
Jorry, Hélène. 2007. “Construction of a European Institutional Model for Managing 
Operational Cooperation at the EU’s External Borders: Is the FRONTEX Agency 
a Decisive Step Forward?” Research Paper. CEPS. 
http://aei.pitt.edu/7406/2/7406.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Kasparek, Bernd. 2010. “Laboratorium, Think Tank, Doing Border: Die 
Grenzschutzagentur Frontex.” In Grenzregime: Diskurse, Praktiken, 
Institutionen in Europa, edited by Sabine Hess and Bernd Kasparek, 2nd ed., 
111–126. Assoziation A. 
Kasparek, Bernd, and Marc Speer. 2013. “At the Nexus of Academia and Activism: 
Bordermonitoring.eu.” Postcolonial Studies 16 (3): 259–268. 
Keller, Ska, Ulrike Lunacek, Barbara Lochbihler, and Hélène Flautre. 2011. “Frontex 
Agency: Which Guarantees for Human Rights?” Brussels: Greens/EFA in 
European Parliament. http://barbara-
lochbihler.de/cms/upload/PDF_2011/GL_Frontex_E_1.pdf [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  266 
Kennedy, David. 2002. “The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the 
Problem?” Harvard Human Rights Journal 15: 101–125. 
Klepp, Silja. 2010a. “A Contested Asylum System: The European Union between 
Refugee Protection and Border Control in the Mediterranean Sea.” European 
Journal of Migration and Law 12 (1): 1–21. 
———. 2010b. “On the High Seas, Things Are a Little Bit Delicate...” In 
Grenzregime: Diskurse, Praktiken, Institutionen in Europa, edited by Sabine 
Hess and Bernd Kasparek, 2nd ed., 201–218. Hamburg and Berlin: Assoziation 
A. 
Koselleck, Reinhart, and Michaela W. Richter. 2006. “Crisis.” Journal of the History 
of Ideas 67 (2): 357–400. 
Kostakopoulou, Dora. 2009. “The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and the 
Political Morality of Migration and Integration.” In A Right to Inclusion and 
Exclusion? Normative Fault Lines of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, edited by Hans Lindahl, 65–92. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
Krause, Keith, and Michael C. Williams. 1996. “Broadening the Agenda of Security 
Studies: Politics and Methods.” Mershon International Studies Review 40 (2): 
229–254. 
La Reppublica. 2014a. “Immigrazione, Alfano: ‘L’Europa Ci Aiuti, O Stop a Mare 
Nostrum.’” La Reppublica, June 14 
http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/06/14/news/alfano_mare_nostrum_blocc
are_sbarchi-88963387/ [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014b. “Non Si Fermano Gli Sbarchi. In Poche Ore Centinaia Di Migranti. 
Alfano: ‘A Ottobre Stop Mare Nostrum, via a Forza Ue.’” La Reppublica, August 
15 http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/08/15/news/sbarchi_di_immigrati-
93825851/ [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  267 
———. 2014c. “Emergenza Migranti, l’Ue Gela l'Italia Su Frontex: ‘Non Ha I Mezzi 
per Subentrare a Mare Nostrum.’” La Reppublica, August 19 
http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/08/19/news/emergenza_migranti_fronte
x_gela_l_italia_non_abbiamo_mezzi-94075220/ [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014d. “Migranti, a Novembre Parte Frontex Plus. Alfano: ‘Ora Si Può 
Superare Mare Nostrum.’” La Reppublica, August 27 
http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2014/08/27/news/alfano_fontex_plus_pronto_
a_partire_e_sostituir_mare_nostrum-94535416/ [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
La Stampa. 2014. “Alfano: ‘Mare Nostrum Diventerà Frontex Plus Barche Dei 
Trafficanti Saranno Distrutte.’” La Stampa, August 27 
http://www.lastampa.it/2014/08/27/italia/politica/immigrazione-alfano-incontra-
malmstroem-mare-nostrum-diventer-frontex-plus-
73VBUdTXx8Jfr0aQ5wgSLI/pagina.html [Last accessed September 14, 2014]. 
Lavenex, Sandra. 2001. The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies: Between Human 
Rights and Internal Security. Aldershot, England: Ashgate. 
———. 2005. “The Politics of Exclusion and Inclusion in ‘Wider Europe.’” In Soft or 
Hard Borders? Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe, edited by Joan 
DeBardeleben. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
———. 2006. “Shifting up and out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration 
Control.” West European Politics 29 (2): 329–350. 
———. 2007. “Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration 
Control.” In Immigration Policy in Europe: The Politics of Control, edited by 
Virginie Guiraudon and Gallya Lahav, 129–150. London: Routledge. 
Law, John. 2004. After Method: Mess in Social Science Research. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Law, John, and John Urry. 2004. “Enacting the Social.” Economy and Society 33 (3): 
390–410. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  268 
Léonard, Sarah. 2009. “The Creation of FRONTEX and the Politics of 
Institutionalisation in the EU External Borders Policy.” Journal of Contemporary 
European Research 5 (3): 371–388. 
———. 2010. “EU Border Security and Migration into the European Union: 
FRONTEX and Securitisation through Practices.” European Security 19 (2): 
231–254. 
LIBE Committee. 2009. “External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice.” 
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2009/410688/IPOL-
LIBE_ET(2009)410688_EN.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2014. “12.0 (LIBE/8/01027) Frontex Activities in the Mediterranean.” 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/video?event=20140904-
0930-COMMITTEE-LIBE [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Lundborg, Tom, and Nick Vaughan-Williams. 2015. “New Materialisms, Discourse 
Analysis, and International Relations: A Radical Intertextual Approach.” Review 
of International Studies 41 (1): 3–25. 
Makaremi, Chowra. 2009. “Governing Borders in France: From Extraterritorial to 
Humanitarian Confinement.” Canadian Journal of Law and Society 24 (3): 411–
432. 
Malmström, Cecilia. 2013a. “Cecilia Malmström on Twitter: ‘Appalled by Lampedusa 
Tragedy. Thoughts Are with Victims and Families. We Must Redouble Efforts to 
Fight Smugglers Exploiting Human Despair.’” Twitter.com. 
https://twitter.com/MalmstromEU/status/385701926433992704 [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2013b. “Press Release - Tragic Accident Outside Lampedusa: Statement by 
European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström. European 
Commission - MEMO/13/849.” http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-
849_en.htm [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  269 
———. 2013c. “Press Release - Commissioner Malmström’s Intervention on 
Lampedusa during the Home Affairs Council Press Conference. European 
Commission - MEMO/13/864.” http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-
864_en.htm [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Malone, Barry. 2015. “Why Al Jazeera Will Not Say Mediterranean ‘Migrants.’” Al 
Jazeera, August 20 http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/editors-blog/2015/08/al-
jazeera-mediterranean-migrants-150820082226309.html [Last accessed August 
7, 2016]. 
Marcus, George E. 1995. “Ethnography In/of the World System: The Emergence of 
Multi-Sited Ethnography.” Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1): 95–117. 
Marsh, David. 2015. “We Deride Them as ‘migrants’. Why Not Call Them People?” 
Guardian, August 28 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/28/migrants-people-
refugees-humanity [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Martin, Marie. 2013. “‘Trust in Frontex’: The 2013 Work Programme.” 
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-212-frontex-work-programmes.pdf [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Mbembe, Achille. 2003. “Necropolitics.” Public Culture 15 (1): 11–40. 
McConnell, Fiona. 2010. “The Fallacy and the Promise of the Territorial Trap: 
Sovereign Articulations of Geopolitical Anomalies.” Geopolitics 15 (4): 762–
768. 
McDonald, Matt. 2008. “Securitization and the Construction of Security.” European 
Journal of International Relations 14 (4): 563–587. 
Meier, Albrecht. 2014. “Frontex: Wir können ‘Mare Nostrum’ nicht Übernehmen.” 
Der Tagesspiegel, August 19 http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/fluechtlinge-im-
mittelmeer-frontex-wir-koennen-mare-nostrum-nicht-
uebernehmen/10353154.html [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  270 
Meijers Committee. 2012. “Public Consultation on Frontex and Fundamental Rights.” 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/11996/htm
l.bookmark [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Merry, Sally Engle. 2006. Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating 
International Law Into Local Justice. Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Meyer, John W. 1994. “Rationalized Environments.” In Institutional Environments 
and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism, edited by W. 
Richard Scott and John W. Meyer, 28–54. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, Inc. 
Meyer, John W., John Boli, and George M Thomas. 1994. “Ontology and 
Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account.” In Institutional Environments 
and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism, edited by W. 
Richard Scott and John W. Meyer, 9–27. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
Inc. 
Meyer, John W., and Brian Rowan. 1991. “Institutional Organizations: Formal 
Structure as Myth and Ceremony.” In The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis, edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, 41–62. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Mezzadra, Sandro, and Brett Neilson. 2013. Border as Method, Or, the Multiplication 
of Labour. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press. 
Mies, Maria. 1992. “Towards a Methodology for Feminist Research.” In Social 
Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice, Hammersley, 64–82. London: Sage. 
Mignolo, Walter D. 2000. “The Many Faces of Cosmo-Polis: Border Thinking and 
Critical Cosmopolitanism.” Public Culture 12 (3): 721–748. 
Mignolo, Walter D., and Madina V. Tlostanova. 2006. “Theorizing from the Borders: 
Shifting to Geo- and Body-Politics of Knowledge.” European Journal of Social 
Theory 9 (2): 205–221. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  271 
Miller, Gale, and Kathryn J. Fox. 2004. “Building Bridges: The Possibility for 
Analytic Dialogue Between Ethnography, Conversation Analysis and Foucault.” 
In Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice, edited by David 
Silverman, 2nd ed., 35–55. London: Sage Publications. 
Monar, Jörg. 2005. “The European Union’s ‘Integrated Management’ of External 
Borders.” In Soft or Hard Borders? Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe, 
edited by Joan DeBardeleben, 145–163. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Morehouse, Christal, and Michael Blomfield. 2011. “Irregular Migration in Europe.” 
Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. 
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/TCMirregularmigration.pdf [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
Moyn, Samuel. 2007. “On the Genealogy of Morals.” The Nation. 
http://www.thenation.com/article/genealogy-morals [Last accessed August 7, 
2016]. 
———. 2010. The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
and London, England: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Murphy, Alexander B. 2010. “Identity and Territory.” Geopolitics 15 (4): 769–772. 
Mutua, Makau. 2001. “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human 
Rights.” Harvard International Law Journal 42 (1): 201–245. 
———. 2007. “Standard Setting in Human Rights: Critique and Prognosis.” Human 
Rights Quarterly 29 (3): 547–630. 
Mutua, Makau wa. 1995. “Conflicting Conceptions of Human Rights: Rethinking the 
Post-Colonial State.” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of 
International Law) 89: 487–490. 
Neal, Andrew W. 2009. “Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of 
FRONTEX.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 47 (2): 333–356. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  272 
———. 2012. “Normalization and Legislative Exceptionalism: Counterterrorist 
Lawmaking and the Changing Times of Security Emergencies.” International 
Political Sociology 6 (3): 260–276. 
Neumann, Simon. 2013. “Ein Neues Mind-Set Der Europäischen Grenzschutzagentur? 
Zur Internalisierung Menschenrechtlicher Vorgaben Durch Frontex.” MRM - 
MenschenRechtsMagazin 1: 19–32. 
New Keywords Collective. 2016. “Europe / Crisis: New Keywords Of ‘the Crisis’ in 
and of ‘Europe.’” Zone Books near Futures. 
http://nearfuturesonline.org/europecrisis-new-keywords-of-crisis-in-and-of-
europe/ [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Newman, David. 2010. “Territory, Compartments and Borders: Avoiding the Trap of 
the Territorial Trap.” Geopolitics 15 (4): 773–778. 
Newman, Edward. 2010. “Critical Human Security Studies.” Review of International 
Studies 36: 77–94. 
Nunes, J. 2012. “Reclaiming the Political: Emancipation and Critique in Security 
Studies.” Security Dialogue 43 (4): 345–361. 
Olsen, Johan P. 1976. “The Process of Interpreting Organizational History.” In 
Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, edited by James G. March and Johan P. 
Olsen, 338–350. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget. 
Paasi, Anssi. 1998. “Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in the World of 
Flows.” Geopolitics 3 (1): 69–88. 
Pallister-Wilkins, Polly. 2015. “The Humanitarian Politics of European Border 
Policing: Frontex and Border Police in Evros.” International Political Sociology 
9 (1): 53–69. 
Papadopoulos, Dimitris, Niamh Stephenson, and Vassilis Tsianos. 2008. Escape 
Routes: Control and Subversion in the Twenty-First Century. London and Ann 
Arbor: Pluto Press. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  273 
Papastavridis, Efthymios. 2010. “‘Fortress Europe’ and FRONTEX: Within or 
Without International Law?” Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (1): 75–
111. 
Parker, Noel, and Nick Vaughan-Williams et al. 2009. “Lines in the Sand? Towards 
an Agenda for Critical Border Studies.” Geopolitics 14 (3): 582–587. 
Parker, Noel, and Nick Vaughan-Williams. 2012. “Critical Border Studies: 
Broadening and Deepening the ‘Lines in the Sand’ Agenda.” Geopolitics 17 (4): 
727–733. 
Pêcheux, Michel. 1982. Language, Semantics and Ideology. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press. 
Peers, Steve. 2011. “The Frontex Regulation – Consolidated Text after 2011 
Amendments.” statewatch. http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-140-frontex-
reg-text.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Pellerin, Helene. 2005. “Migration and Border Control in the EU: Economic and 
Security Factors.” In Soft or Hard Borders? Managing the Divide in an Enlarged 
Europe, edited by Joan DeBardeleben, 105–122. Ashgate: Aldershot. 
Petersen, K. L. 2012. “Risk Analysis - A Field within Security Studies?” European 
Journal of International Relations 18 (4): 693–717. 
Pezzani, Lorenzo, and Charles Heller. 2013. “A Disobedient Gaze: Strategic 
Interventions in the Knowledge(s) of Maritime Borders.” Postcolonial Studies 16 
(3): 289–298. 
Pollack, Johannes, and Peter Slominski. 2009. “Experimentalist but Not Accountable 
Governance? The Role of Frontex in Managing the EU’s External Borders.” West 
European Politics 32 (5): 904–924. 
Pritchard, Stephen. 2015. “The Readers’ Editor On… the Semantics of Migration.” 
Guardian, August 16 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/16/readers-editor-on-use-
of-term-migrant [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  274 
Pugh, M. 2004. “Drowning Not Waving: Boat People and Humanitarianism at Sea.” 
Journal of Refugee Studies 17 (1): 50–69. 
Rancière, Jacques. 2004. “Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?” The South 
Atlantic Quarterly 103 (2/3): 297–310. 
Ratfisch, Philipp, and Stephan Scheel. 2010. “Migrationskontrolle Durch 
Flüchtlingsschutz? Die Rolle Des UNHCR Im Kontext Der Externalisierung Des 
EU-Migrationsregimes.” In Grenzregime: Diskurse, Praktiken, Institutionen in 
Europa, edited by Sabine Hess and Bernd Kasparek, 2nd ed., 89–110. Hamburg 
and Berlin: Assoziation A. 
Red Cross / EU Office. 2012. “Comments of the National Red Cross Societies of the 
Member States of the European Union and of the International Federation of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in the Enquiry Concerning Frontex.” 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/12058/htm
l.bookmark [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Reid-Henry, Simon. 2010. “The Territorial Trap Fifteen Years On.” Geopolitics 15 
(4): 752–756. 
Rijpma, Jorrit J. 2010. “Frontex: Successful Blame Shifting of the Member States.” 
Análisis Del Real Instituto Elcano (ARI). 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GL
OBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari69-2010 [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
Robson, Colin. 2002. Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and 
Practitioner-Researchers. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
Roe, P. 2012. “Is Securitization a ‘Negative’ Concept? Revisiting the Normative 
Debate over Normal versus Extraordinary Politics.” Security Dialogue 43 (3): 
249–266. 
Roitman, Janet. 2014. Anti-Crisis. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  275 
Rumford, Chris. 2006. “Theorizing Borders.” European Journal of Social Theory 9 
(2): 155–169. 
———. 2012. “Towards a Multiperspectival Study of Borders.” Geopolitics 17 (4): 
887–902. 
Salter, Mark B. 2008. “When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Borders, Sovereignty, 
and Citizenship.” Citizenship Studies 12 (4): 365–380. 
———. 2012. “Theory of the / : The Suture and Critical Border Studies.” Geopolitics 
17 (4): 734–755. 
———. 2013a. “Expertise in the Aviation Security Field.” In Research Methods in 
Critical Security Studies: An Introduction, edited by Mark B. Salter and Can E. 
Mutlu, 105–108. New York: Routledge. 
———. 2013b. “Introduction.” In Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An 
Introduction, edited by Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu, 1–14. New York: 
Routledge. 
———. 2013c. “Research Design: Introduction.” In Research Methods in Critical 
Security Studies: An Introduction, edited by Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu, 
15–23. New York: Routledge. 
Salter, Mark B., and Can E. Mutlu, ed. 2013. Research Methods in Critical Security 
Studies: An Introduction. New York: Routledge. 
Samers, Michael. 2004. “An Emerging Geopolitics of ‘Illegal’ Immigration in the 
European Union.” European Journal of Migration and Law 6 (1): 27–45. 
Scheel, Stephan. 2013. “Studying Embodied Encounters: Autonomy of Migration 
beyond Its Romanticization.” Postcolonial Studies 16 (3): 279–288. 
Schengen Agreement. 1985. “Agreement between the Governments of the States of 
the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of German and the French 
Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders.” 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(01) 
[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  276 
Schipkowski, Katharina. 2016. “Eklat Bei Flüchtlingskonferenz Hamburg: Frauen 
Ergreifen Das Wort.” Taz, February 27 http://www.taz.de/!5282015/ [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Sciortino, Giuseppe. 2004. “Between Phantoms and Necessary Evils. Some Critical 
Points in the Study of Irregular Migrations to Western Europe.” IMIS-Beiträge. 
Vol. 24. http://www.imis.uni-osnabrueck.de/pdffiles/imis24.pdf [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
Scott, W. Richard. 2014. Institutions and Organisations: Ideas, Interests, and 
Identities. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Scott, W. Richard, and John W. Meyer. 1994a. “Institutional Environments and 
Organizational Complexity.” In Institutional Environments and Organizations: 
Structural Complexity and Individualism, edited by W. Richard Scott and John 
W. Meyer, 113–119. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
———. 1994b. “Developments in Institutional Theory.” In Institutional Environments 
and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism, edited by W 
Richard Scott and John W Meyer, 1–8. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 
Ltd. 
Servent, Ariadna. 2012. “Playing the Co-Decision Game? Changes and Institutional 
Adaptation at the LIBE Committee.” Journal of European Integration 34 (1): 55–
73. 
Shani, Giorgio. 2007. “Protecting Human Security in a Post-9/11 World.” In 
Protecting Human Security in a Post-9/11 World: Critical and Global Insights, 
edited by Giorgio Shani, M. Sato, and M. K. Pasha, 1–14. London: Palgrave. 
Sherwood, Harriet, Helena Smith, Lizzy Davies, and Harriet Grant. 2014. “Europe 
Faces ‘Colossal Humanitarian Catastrophe’ of Refugees Dying at Sea.” The 
Guardian, June 2 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/02/europe-
refugee-crisis-un-africa-processing-centres [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  277 
Sossi, Federica. 2013. “Migrations and Militant Research? Some Brief 
Considerations.” Postcolonial Studies 16 (3): 269–278. 
Squire, Vicki. 2009. The Exclusionary Politics of Asylum. Migration, Minorities, and 
Citizenship. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
———. 2010. “The Contested Politics of Mobility: Politicizing Mobility, Mobilizing 
Politics.” In The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity, 
edited by Vicki Squire, 1–25. New York: Routledge. 
———. 2015. “Reshaping Critical Geopolitics? The Materialist Challenge.” Review 
of International Studies 41 (1): 139–159. 
statewatch. 2012a. “A Drop of Fundamental Rights in an Ocean of Unaccountability: 
Frontex in the Process of Implementing Article 26(a).” 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/may/02-eu-frontex-article26a.html [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2012b. “Criticism Mounts of Frontex’s Operations at Sea.” 
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/200-frontex-search-rescue.pdf [Last 
accessed August 7, 2016]. 
statewatch, and migreurop. 2012. “Statewatch and Migreurop’s Joint Submission to 
the Ombudsman of the European Union.” 
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-193-eu-ombs-inquiry-frontex-
evidence.pdf [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Stranieriinitalia.it. 2013. “Napolitano: ‘Pattugliare Le Coste Da Dove Partono I 
Migranti.’” Stranieriinitalia.it. http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/attualita-
napolitano_pattugliare_le_coste_da_cui_partono_i_migranti_17807.html?utm_
medium=twitter&utm_source=twitterfeed [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Stritzel, Holger. 2007. “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and 
Beyond.” European Journal of International Relations 13 (3): 357–383. 
———. 2011a. “Security, the Translation.” Security Dialogue 42 (4-5): 343–355. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  278 
———. 2011b. “Security as Translation: Threats, Discourse, and the Politics of 
Localisation.” Review of International Studies 37 (5): 2491–2517. 
———. 2012. “Securitization, Power, Intertextuality: Discourse Theory and the 
Translations of Organized Crime.” Security Dialogue 43 (6): 549–567. 
Taylor, Adam. 2015. “Is It Time to Ditch the Word ‘Migrant’?” Washington Post, 
August 24 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/24/is-it-time-
to-ditch-the-word-migrant/ [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Tazzioli, Martina. 2013. “Countermapping Migration Governmentality: Arab 
Uprisings and Practices of Migration across the Mediterranean.” Goldsmiths, 
University of London. 
Tickner, J. Ann. 2006. “Feminism Meets International Relations: Some 
Methodological Issues.” In Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, 
edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True, 19–41. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ticktin, Miriam. 2006. “Where Ethics and Politics Meet: The Violence of 
Humanitarianism in France.” American Ethnologist 33 (1): 33–49. 
———. 2011. Casualties of Care. Immigration and the Politics of Humanitarianism 
in France. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. 
Times of Malta. 2011. “Italy Fears ‘biblical’ Immigrant Exodus.” Times of Malta, 
February 24 http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110224/world/italy-
fears-biblical-immigrant-exodus-february-24-2011.351723 [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
Tsianos, Vassilis, and Sabine Hess. 2010. “Ethnographische Grenzregimeanalyse.” In 
Grenzregime: Diskurse, Praktiken, Institutionen in Europa, edited by Sabine 
Hess and Bernd Kasparek, 2nd ed., 243–264. Berlin and Hamburg: Assoziation 
A. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  279 
Tsianos, Vassilis, Sabine Hess, and Serhat Karakayali. 2009. “Transnational 
Migration: Theory and Method of an Ethnographic Analysis of Border Regimes.” 
Brighton. www.sussex.ac.uk/migration/documents/mwp55.pdf [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
Tsianos, Vassilis, and S. Karakayali. 2010. “Transnational Migration and the 
Emergence of the European Border Regime: An Ethnographic Analysis.” 
European Journal of Social Theory 13 (3): 373–387. 
UNHCR. 2008. “UNHCR Agreement with FRONTEX.” 
http://www.unhcr.org/4857939e2.html [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2013. “Lampedusa Boat Tragedy – Update.” 
http://www.unhcr.org/524e8d2d9.html [Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
———. 2016. “Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response - Mediterranean - Regional 
Overview.” http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php [Last accessed 
August 7, 2016]. 
van Houtum, Henk. 2010. “Human Blacklisting: The Global Apartheid of the EU’s 
External Border Regime.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 28 
(6): 957–976. 
van Houtum, Henk, and Ton van Naerssen. 2002. “Bordering, Ordering and Othering.” 
Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie 93 (2): 125–136. 
van Munster, Rens. 2009. Securitizing Immigration: The Politics of Risk in the EU. 
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
van Reekum, Rogier. 2016. “The Mediterranean: Migration Corridor, Border 
Spectacle, Ethical Landscape.” Mediterranean Politics 21 (2): 336–341. 
Vaughan-Williams, Nick. 2008a. “Borderwork beyond Inside/Outside? Frontex, the 
Citizen–Detective and the War on Terror.” Space and Polity 12 (1): 63–79. 
———. 2008b. “Borders, Territory, Law.” International Political Sociology 2 (4): 
322–338. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  280 
———. 2009a. Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power. Edinburgh. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
———. 2009b. “The Generalised Bio-Political Border? Re-Conceptualising the 
Limits of Sovereign Power.” Review of International Studies 35 (4): 729. 
———. 2010. “The UK Border Security Continuum: Virtual Biopolitics and the 
Simulation of the Sovereign Ban.” Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 28 (6): 1071–1083. 
———. 2015a. “‘We Are Not Animals!’ Humanitarian Border Security and 
Zoopolitical Spaces in EUrope.” Political Geography 45: 1–10. 
———. 2015b. Europe’s Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond. Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Voelkner, Nadine. 2013. “Tracing Human Security Assemblages.” In Research 
Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction, edited by Mark B. Salter 
and Can E. Mutlu, 203–206. New York: Routledge. 
Vuori, Juha A. 2008. “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the 
Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders.” 
European Journal of International Relations 14 (1): 65–99. 
———. 2010. “A Timely Prophet? The Doomsday Clock as a Visualization of 
Securitization Moves with a Global Referent Object.” Security Dialogue 41 (3): 
255–277. 
Wall, Illan Rua. 2014. “On a Radical Politics for Human Rights.” In The Meaning of 
Rights: The Philosophy and Social Theory of Human Rights, edited by Costas 
Douzinas and Conor Gearty, 106–120. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Walters, William. 2002. “Mapping Schengenland: Denaturalizing the Border.” 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 20 (5): 561–580. 
———. 2006. “Border/Control.” European Journal of Social Theory 9 (2): 187–203. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  281 
———. 2008. “Putting the Migration–Security Complex in Its Place.” In Risk and the 
War on Terror, edited by Louise Amoore and Marieke de Goede, 158–177. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
———. 2010. “Rezoning the Global: Technological Zones, Technological Work and 
the (Un-)Making of Biometric Borders.” In The Contested Politics of Mobility: 
Borderzones and Irregularity, edited by Vicki Squire, 51–73. New York: 
Routledge. 
———. 2011. “Foucault and Frontiers : Notes on the Birth of the Humanitarian 
Border.” In Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges, edited by 
Ulrich Bröckling, Susanne Krasmann, and Thomas Lemke, 138–164. New York: 
Routledge. 
———. 2015. “Reflections on Migration and Mobility.” Movements. Journal Für 
Kritische Migrations- Und Grenzregimeforschung. http://movements-
journal.org/issues/01.grenzregime/04.walters--migration.governmentality.html 
[Last accessed August 7, 2016]. 
Walton, John. 1992. “Making the Theoretical Case.” In What Is a Case? Exploring the 
Foundations of Social Inquiry, edited by Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker, 
121–137. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Weick, Karl E., and Michel G. Bougon. 1986. “Organizations as Cognitive Maps: 
Charting Ways to Success and Failure.” In The Thinking Organization, edited by 
Henry P. Sims and Dennis A. Gioia, 102–135. San Francisco and London: Jossey-
Bass. 
Weizman, Eyal. 2011. The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from 
Arendt to Gaza. London and New York: Verso. 
Williams, Andrew T. 2010. The Ethos of Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Humanitarianism, Human Rights, and Security in EUropean Border Governance 
 
Bibliography  282 
Williams, Michael C. 2011. “The Continuing Evolution of Securitization Theory.” In 
Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, edited by 
Thierry Balzacq, 212–222. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2002. “Methodological Nationalism and 
beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences.” Global 
Networks 2 (4): 301–334. 
Wolff, Sarah, and Adriaan Schout. 2013. “Frontex as Agency: More of the Same?” 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 14 (3): 305–324. 
Wonders, Nancy. 2006. “Global Flows, Semi-Permeable Borders and New Channels 
of Inequality.” In Borders, Mobility and Technology of Control, edited by Sharon 
Pickering and Leanne Weber, 63–86. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer. 
Wyn Jones, Richard. 1995. “‘Message in a Bottle’? Theory and Praxis in Critical 
Security Studies.” Contemporary Security Policy 16 (3): 299–319. 
———. 1999. Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
Yin, Robert K. 2003. Case Study Research Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
Zaiotti, Ruben. 2009. “The ENP and Security: Creating New Dividing Lines in 
Europe?” In The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: 
Governance, Neighbours, Security, edited by Thierry Balzacq, 187–204. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Zetter, Roger. 2007. “More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in 
an Era of Globalization.” Journal of Refugee Studies 20 (2): 172–192. 
 
